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Abstract of Thesis: 
Tlm: MOBILITY OF THE: ARAB ARMIES IN THE EARLY COHQUESTS 
By D. R. Hill. B. So. A.M.I.C.E. 
Submitted for the Degree· of Master of Letters ot the University 
of Durham. 
This work deals wi.th the Arab conqtlests: from 622 A.D. to 656 A.D. 1 
" wi~ ~i~ ~ference to Mobility. and! is based mainly on .!\rabic· . 
· .. sources s~ch as ~ab¢~ · BaJ.idhuri,. WaqidiJ! Ibn ljistiim, Ya/qu"Qi and . 
'"·Abd al-~kamo It is div~clecl into six ·Chap:t;ers. 
. . 
. . . . 
Chapter I is intrOductor;Y ana: outlines cond.i tions in Arabia and in 
the Persian ~ Byzantine Empires on: the eve at the conq~sts, 
. chapter. n:· is· ·a· brief' regional: ~ograp~ of the regions conquered 
in the first invasipns. · : . · : · ·: · . · · · 
. . 
' . . 
. . .Chap~r III is a. discussion ·on ~e camel: its 'main clmracteristics;. 
the li;Lstc:>rical, and geographi~ spread pf camel-culture.. · 
, Chapter .. :IV ~s a s~ry of the histoey of the ~~J.;y o~nquests. 
Chapter V .is. a s~ey of Ara.~ military a.ff'a.irs and covers JDa.l\V 
·aspects ot t~s subject inc~ucling.~ ~nditions Of service; weapons; 
' numeri~ strengths;: troop formati<ms;; command; tactics;: statio warfare; 
deception; the Arab woman in battle·; provisioning;. care of w~d; 
treatment of the slain and of pri~oners;. booty;. the origin1 planning and 
direction of the conquests; aain;ni stration of the conquered lands; pensions; 
Muslim morale. · 
Chapter VI .deals With Mobility and is divided into two sections. 
Section I·is-devoted to a. discussion o~ the use of the camel and the 
hors~ in the da.i1y life of the Arabs·., Section II considers ·the use made 
by the Arabs. of mobility as an instrument of war in the early conquests. 
A short Conclusion summarises the advantages and disadvantases · 
possessed by the Arabs when they began their wars; of conquest. Superior 
mobility is assessed a.s; one of the important assets. 
THE MOBTI.ITY OF 'l1HE ARAB· .ARMIES m 'JlliE EARLY CONQUESTS 
By D. R. Iilil]. B~ Sc:. A.M.I.C.E. 
Subllllitted for the Degree of' MASTER OF LE'I"''ERS 
of. the. UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written CQDsent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
:1.965 
PREFACE 
The work that follow;s: is: an a.ttemp:t to assess; 'the contribution made 
by mobility to the succe,soS of the Arab armies: in their ea.r.I.y conquests ... 
from: 622: to 656 A.D.. Particular a. ttention is. paid to the role of. the. 
camel in transp:orting· troop:s over long: tista.nees: in arid c·ondlitions, 
s·ometimes. a.t. high SJlleeds of· march. Obvious·ly no evaluation could be 
made W:i thout c·on~idering the effec.t. of other significant: factors and,. 
in a.ddit:i,on to the sec·tions: on Mobility and the: Camel, chapters have 
therefore: been included on: Condi t:i.ons: in the Near Ea.s.t. on the. e:ve of" 
the Conquests•; Geography; a. brie£ his;torical survey of· the Conquests; 
Military Affairs. !:~regard: the chapter on Military Affairs a.s err equal 
importance a.ndi relevance as: the cha.p,ter on Mobil!.i ty andi indleed the 
separation of the two subjects. is largelyi artificial a.nd is due: only to 
the ne·eessi ty for ordlerly presentation. Little research on Arab Mili ta.ry 
Affairs has• been published in the English language and among· the works 
I have: consulted on this subject:-! must.-~:ingl.e out the thesis of' Leo · 
Beckmann as· haVJing given me the mos;t assis;tance: and guidance. Not. 
only was the information of great intrins:ic value but the ide-ntification 
of. sources saved many hours of re:s:earch. 
On the subject of. Mobility,.. having no first-handl experience of 
camel-mounted troop:s:,. I wrote to Lieutenan~nera.l Sir Jiohn Bagot 
Glubb K.C.B'. to ask him if I migJ:lt draw; on his: knowledge•. He readi].y 
agreed! to my reque:st, and: answ.ered every P.Oint in the que.s:tionnaire: 
whieh I sent to him with great thoroughn~ss ,. a courtesy for which I 
am extremely grateflll. (Reference:s. to this. correspondence appear in 
the: footnote·s: as 'Glubb - by letter'). 
I would! als·o like to expres.s my· gratitude to the members. of the 
s'taff.' of the School .·of. Oriental Studies:, es]_le·eia.ll!.y Professor T.W. 
Thacker,. Mr R.L. Hilll., and! Mr. I.J·.c. Foster a.nd his Library staff' 
f.or the eneouragement: and as:sista.nce which they have always offered 
so reaclily. 
Finally I acknowled!g~ a.n ·es~ecial indebtness to IlliY' supervisor, 
Mr. F.R.c. B'a.gley, not only for the invaluable guidance a.nd critieism· 
whieh has; given to me,. but a.ls:o for the sincere interes:t which he: has 
taken in the progre:s;s; of my studies. 
NOTE ON TH8 SOTJRCES 
I have restrie·ted!. my researche.s to those: Arabic. sources which embo~ 
the earlie.st traditions.,. mainly thos.e of the Med:ine:se authorities 
Ibn Is:l}iq andi Waqidi, where· such tr.adi tions are. sufficient.. Thus for 
t-he first. ten Hijrah year·s the: material in Ibn ~isham:, Waqidi (Kremer), 
Waqidi (Wellhausen) ~ a.nd!. ~aba.ri is·. largely adequate. For later years. 
Balidhuri,. covering· as he does all the ma.in theatre.s of operations,. 
w.a:s the bes.t general guide:,. but it w.as neces·sa.ry to have frequent 
recourse to ~abar.i, since· he. usually gives accounts of' e.vents at. greater 
length and in more detail. ~abari quotes. the'Iriqi authority, Sayf 
b.'"Uinar, very freC!}!Uently,. a s.ource who mus•t: be used with circumspection. 
Yacq\ibi's accounts are much briefer than those of.· ';'abari or Balidhuri, 
but are: of value in many case:s. as sunorting evidence. ',fabari deals 
rather briefly with the wes:tern s·P.here. and I have therefore used the 
'FutUh al-8hB.m' of' Lees for events in Syria, taking into due account 
the semi-fietional nature of this work. I have also used'Abdi al-~ 
for events in Egyp.t to supplement the meagre. accounts; in ';'aba.ri and 
Baladhuri. The Qur,an has been used to a limited!. extent for subject 
matter .which is·. clirectly connected with military affairs. Finally 1 
I have consul ted the poems of a.l-Khansa; the poe.tes.s of the Banu 
Sulaym~ in order to obtain a. contemporary view1 on w.a.rfa.re and! 1the Badw 
concep:tion of chivalry. 
The chronic-les of· John of Nikiou, Sebe-os and. Michael the Syrian, 
and the Strategikon of Maurice· w.ere consulted for further factual. data 
and as a counterbalance· to the Arabie• s.ources•. 
Use: of the Sources 
It is: c·learly beyond! the s.cope of this w.ork to use source material to 
cover the whole field of the conques:ts in every aspect. Cha.p.ter I. has: 
thus been derived! mainly from. w.orks·. in European languages·. on early 
Arabia, Sasanid: Persia, and Byzantium. Chapters; II. and III. do not. 
require the use of s:ource material. Chap.ter IV., a brief summary of the 
oonque.s·.ts,. presents. s:ome difficulty. It· is derived., in the main,. from 
the works of. such Orientalists as Caetani, Becker,. BUtler, Gibb, Musi1, 
Watt and Wellhausen, whose critical examinations; of the traditions have. 
clone: much to clarify obs:euri ties and! determine the true: course of events 
from con£.licting versions. Even so it has: been neces·sa.ry s:ometimes: to 
select the vers•ion mos:t acceptable to myself from the evidence. available, 
on the not infr~quent oce·a.s:ions. when the Orientalists themse1ves differ 
in the·ir interpre:tations:. I ha.v:e not, there£ ore:, used the European 
works• in is·olation, but in conjunction with the Arabie· sources. In 
many cases references. w:ouldi be mis·leadling,. because the version. given 
in any one tradition but rare1y matches., in all de:ta.ils..,. the version 
arrived at by a detailed examination of the available material. I 
have= therefore limited footnotes to referencea which indicate· the 
sources for the more important events:. For Chapters; V. and VI. the 
Arabic sources have: been used throughout and as far as pos:sible: 
conclusions have been ck'awn from examination- of the tradd. tions:, although 
weight has been given to the opinions: of eminent Orientalists;. This 
latter is, however, less true of Chap~er VI., mobili~ having received 
little attention from Orientalis.ts, and here conclusions and 
interpretations: of facts are. based mainly on the sources:. 
Sources Consulted 
(a) Arabic· 
:1!... ~abari: Annales quos scripsi t etc .• ; ed. M. de Goeje, Leyden,. 
1879-1901., first series·.. (Tab 1 .• ) 
2:. B'a.lidhuri: Liber expugna;tionis regionum; ed. M. de: Goeje:,. Leyden, 
:1.866. (B'a.l) . . 
5;. Idem: the oTiginS) of the Islamic State; trans. Philip K. Hi tti, 
New York, 19:1!..6. (Not cited) 
4. Waqidi: Waqidi 1 s. his;tory of ~ammad' s; campaigns;;: ed. Alfred v:on 
Kremer,. Calcutta, :lL855/6. (Waq) 
5. Idem: Mul].ammadl in Medina.; ed. and trans. Ji. Wellhausen, 
Berlin, :ll.882·. (WVV). 
6. 1Waqid!i 1 : Fu~ esh-Sh&m•;: ed. W.N. Lees, Calcutta, :1.854. (Fut Lees) 
7. Ibn ip.sh&m: The life of Mul}ammad according to l.fui)a.mmad ibn Isl:}.~, 
ed. F. Wustenfeld, G<ltti!Dgen,. :1!..858/60. (m) . 
8. Idem: 'IDle life of Muha.mmad:, a trans,la.tion of Ist}.iq 1 s Sira.t Rasul 
Allah;: ea. and! trans:. A. GUillaume, London,. 1.955. (IH Guillaume) 
9. Ya' qubi;: Hd.storiae;: ed. M. 'I'h. Houtsma, Leyden, Vol II, :1885 .• 
(Ya' q II) 
1.0~ rAbdl.·a.l-~tam: FutUJ:l. Mi~;: ed. Cha.s .• c. Tor:E!ey,. New Haven~. :1.922, 
in Yale= Oriental ~eries,. Researches:., Vol. ~II. (Fut Mi~J 
11.. The Holy QurJ an: Royal Qur, in;. Cairo, A.H~ :li.5S>7; S'Ura.hs. 
numbered ~n traditional Arabicprder~ 
:1!.2. Al-Rhans'a : Poetry;; ed. Karam a.l-Bu~.tani, B·e.yrut,. :1L951.. (Al-Iqla.n.~) 
(b) Coptic: 
15 •• Jiea.n Eveque de Nikiou;: Chronique; ed. anclll trans:. M.H. Zotenberg, 
Pa,ris, :lL885.(.T. Nik) 
( c:) Armenian 
1.4. Sebeos;: Hie;toire d 1Heraclius.;; trans. F. Ma.c:ler, Paris·., 1.904·. (Sebeos) 
(ci~j) Byzantine· 
::ll.5. L1Armee. byzantine a la fin du VIe: s.iecle d'apres. le Strategieon 
de Maurice:;: trams .• F. Aus:s·are.sses:., Paris, :1!..909. (Stra.t) 
(e:) Syria.c 
:1L6. Michel le Syrien: Chroniq:ue; ed. a.nd. trans .• Ji.B·. Chabot, Vol II, 
Paris;,, 190:1.. (Mich Syr II) 
Works· Consulted 
t.7. Beckmann, L. Die Mus,limischen Heere der Eroberungszeit, Hamburg, 
ll955. (Typewritten thesis) (Beckmann) · · 
:1!..8. Becker, C.H. The expansion of the Saracens;. in Cambridge: Medieval 
His.tory, Vol II, pages 529-5:90, Cambridge=, :1.91.2:. (Becker) 
19. Brehier, L. Les:. Ins;titutions de l 1Empire Byz~tin, 2nd Section, 
Paris:, 1949. ( Brehier) 
*20. Butler, A.J. The Ara.b conque:s:t of Egypt and the last thirty 
years of the Roman dominion, Oxford,. 1.902. (Butler) 
"' ,.... 
*21. De: Goeje,M.J. : Memoire: sur la eopquete de la Syrie,Leyden,1901. 
(in Memoires d'his.toire et de geographie ar.abes,Vol.2.) (de Goeje) 
·· *'22. Caeta.ni,L. : .Anna.li del IsJ.am, Mi~11905-:l!.926. ( Ca) 
25. Idem. Chronographia. Isla.mica,, Pa.ris·,~a. (Ca Chron) 
( Nr..B. R~erences; to Caetani,the great majority of whieh are to the Anna.li, 
are by Hijrah year f'ollow:ed by paragraph number) 
24. Article 'Badw·' in the Encyclopaedia of Islam,nev Edlition,pp 872-892:, 
Leyden,:li958. (Contributors: c.s.coon;:H. von Wis;SJnaml!. and F. KussmauJL;: 
W. Montgomery Watt)" ( B·adw,Coon etc:.) 
' 25. L 'Antica Societa B'eduina - a collection compiled by F .Gabrieli,Rome:, 
1959. (Contributors; W.Dosta.l;G.Dossin;:M.Hof'ner;:J.Henniger;F.Ga:brieli) 
( ASB,Dostal etc.) 
26. Montgomery Watt.,F. : ~amma.i at. Mecca,Oxf'ord,.1955. ( Watt,Mecca) 
27. Idem. Mul].ammad at Medina,Oxford,.1956. (Watt:, Medina:) 
*28. :EJ&midullah,M!.. : Les champs du bataille. au temps du Prophete:, 
in Revue des Etudes Islamique-s,,:li.959 ,pp; :lL-13. ( Ham) 
*29. Le Strrmge,G. : The lands: of the Eastern Caliphate,2nd edition,. 
Cambridge,1950. ( Le Strange) • 
50. Fisher, W .B.. i The· Middle E&s>t -a Physic·a.l, Social a.ndi Regional 
Geography,L ondon,1950. (Fisher) 
*51.. Mu.sil,A. ~' .Midclle Euphrates,Ne.w York,1.927. (Mus ME) 
*"52:. Idem. Northern Negd;,New York,1.928. (Mus NN) 
*~i. Idem. Arabia Deserta,New York,:ll92.7. (Mus AD) 
54. Idem. Manners and! customs of' the Rwala Bed!ouins,New: York,:li928.(Mus' Rw.al.a) 
55. Noll:deke, T.'. Geschichte der Perse:r und Arab.er zur Zeit der Sa.saniden,. 
Leyden,1879. (Nol Ges) 
56. Thesiger,W:. : .Arabia.rll Sands;,Lomdon,1959. ('IDles) . 
57. Gibb, ·H.A.R. : ~e. ~-b conques·.ts; in Central. Asd.a,.Londonji .. :?lli925. (Not eited) 
58. Wellhausen,J. : Re:s·.te: Arabisehen Heidentums·.,2nd edi tion,.Berlin,.1897. 
( Well .. Res:te) . 
59. Idem·. : Skiz;zen und. Vora.rbeiten,.VoJL. VI,BerliD.~:li.899. (Well.VI) 
40. Glubb,.Sir John Bagot. : Wa.r in the De:s:ert:,Londo:n,:ll960. (Glubb WID) 
*410 Oppenhe±D,.M.~.von. : Die Beduinen. Vol I. Leipz.ig,1959; 
Vol II,Leip.zig,:1L945;: Vol ~II,.Wiesbaden,:ll952:. (Opp) 
42. Doughty.,C.M. : Travels in· .Arabd.a Deserta,London,.:li.936. (Doughty) 
45,. Lammens.H. : Le Berceau de 1 'Isl.a.m,.Rome ,.:li.9:li..4. (LaDI! Berc) 
44. Idem. : La Mecque· a la veille de l 1Hegi.re,.Beyrut.,:ll.924. (Lam• Mec) 
45. Smith.,W.R. :·Kinship: and marriage in. early .Arabia,.London,:l!.907. (Smd:th) 
46. Diehl,C. : Hi.stoire de l'EID!pire Byzantin,Paris,192.4.(Not cited!) 
47.Duss·au&,R .. : Les .Arabes en Syrie avant. 1 1Islam,Paris;,1907.(Dussaud) 
· 48. Byzantium. A collection edited by N.H. Baynes and H. St.L.B .• Mos.s., 
Oxtord.196::1L. (Not cite~) 
49. Dennett,D •. : Converrlon and the Poll-tax in early Islam,Cambri(lg~(Mas·.s) 
1.950. (Denne.tt) 
50e Skosyrev~. : Soviet. TUrkmenistan,Moscow,1956. (Sko~ev) 
5:1L. Ritter,C. : Vergl.eichende Era:kundle von Arabi.en,Vol.II,Berlin,:li847. 
( esp:.pp: 609-759: Die gepgraphische Verbrei tung des Ka.mels in 
der Al ten Welt) (Ritter) 
52. Fries:, Ni. Der Heerwesen der Araber zur Zeit der Omaijjaden na.ch 
')laba.ri, 'l"ubingen,. :ll92l... (Fries) 
55. Schwarzlos:e, F.W. Die Waffen der aJ.ten Araber aus. ihren Dichtern 
dargestellt; Leipzig, 1886. (Schwarz) 
54. O'Leary, E. Arabia before Muljammad; London, 1927. (O'L) 
55. Beckingham, C.l!,. B'* Faris·; article in the Encyclopaedia 
of Is·lam, 2nd Edii tion,, Leyden,. 1.959. (B~r Faris.) 
56. Walz, R. Zum Problem de:s; Zei tpunktes, der Domestikation der 
a.ltweltlichen Cameliden;. in ZDMG,. ~Oi, ~951, 29-5~; (Walz I) 
~04, 1954, 45-87. (Walz II) 
57. Idem. Be·i trage zur al tes,ten Geschichte der al tw.el tlichen 
Ca.meliden etc.;: in Ac:tes: au 4a Congr~s: interna.t. des Sciences 
Anthropologiqrue.s et Ethnologiques, Vienna., 1952!, (publ. 1.956) 
Val III. (Wa:lz. III} 
58. Wiesner, Ji ... -Fahren und Reiten in Alteuropa und im Alten Orient; 
Der Alte, Orient, Vol 58, II, 1959. (11V'iesner I) 
59. Idem. Problema: der fruhzeitlichen Domes.tikation i~ Lichte neuer 
Forschung;;; in Actes du 4.e Congres internat. des Sciences Anthr. 
· e-t Ethn., Vienna, 1.952, (publ. :lL955), Vol II. (Wies,ner II). 
60. Albright, W.F. Zur Za.hmung des; Kamels;; ZAW, 62, :lL949/50, 5i1.5. 
(Not cited) 
61. Monteil, V. Ess.ai sur le Cha.meau; Ifan, Mauretania, 1.952. (Monteil!..) 
62~. Fielcl, H. Camel Brands. and Graffiti; In supplement to JAOS, 
number ~, 1.952. (Not cited) 
N.B .• Following each w:ork, in parentheses,. is: given the abbreviation 
us:ed for tha. t w.ork in references:. 
Note on the preparation of the map 
Works marked.w.ith an asteriSk in the above list hav.e provided inform-
-ation for the. :@.reparatiolil!. of the map, by ident=i:fication of p]ace-names:. 
Many other pil..ace:-name,s· have been derived from modern ma.ps; where' the 
location o·f a place on the map1 tallies·. W·i.th the. location given in the 
s:ource:s:, it is. a;a;sumed that its position has; remained unchanged since 
the 7th century. For exa.mpil..e,,. there' are s.till w:a tering places called! 
Thaclibiyah, Zarud and Sharaf on the: route from Najcl to lower'Iraq, 
and these pJiaces are named in the s.ources as: halts: on the march of' 
Sac dl1 s: army from·. MedinBJ to Qididya.h; there is· still a village called 
Mu>tah near Kerak. 
Maps us:ed: ins·lude:. 
1.. War Office and Air Minis·try Survey, scale: 1.: :1!..,000 ,000 :-
Be,iriit;. Cairo; Damas:cus:;; Al-Jiauf; B·aghdad;: Ba.l?l'a.h; Meclina.;. 
Mecsa; Riyadh. . 
2. Tra.ns:jordan: Pa.les.tine Survey 1.94:1!.., s.cale.:l!..: 500,000 •. (in Arabic) 
5. As·. indicated above:, maps inc:luded in the. works·. of Caetani,. Butler, 
Musd.l, etc. F9r the:,eas:tern· part of the region I have relied almos:t 
exclusively on the maps: s"On:tained in Le Stli'ange' s; 'Lands: o:f· the 
Eastern Caliphate•. 
CHAPTER· 
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1.81. 
a. 
Condi tio:ns in Arabia and iDa the. Persian a.nd Byzantine Empd.re:s. on tile 
eve: of the Muslim conquests. 
:IL. Arabia. 
One of the: most important factors in the economi.c and p.oli tical life: 
of the Middle E"as:t,. from a.nccd.ent. times: to the present day, has been the 
pa:s;sage ·of merChandise from the East. to the Medii terranean. In Rome and 
later,in the. Byzantine. Empire,there was a eonstan-t demarul for luxury 
goods: froDI! India,Arabia and Abyssinia. :li.) These ineluded spices,silks, 
precious: stones and perf'ume:s. 2) There were severaL routes by which 
theae goods. could be taken to their destinations: from the Indus valli.e.y 
via the passes. of the Ef:i.ndll Kush and Turkestan anc1 thence to . the Caspian 
and! Persi.a; 5) by sea to off-loading points on the Euphrates, thence 
by river-boat to the great bend of the Eupbrate:a(near· modern Maska.nah), 
the nearest point on the. river to the Mediterranean, whence the goods 
were carried overland; 4)from the lower Euphrates: by caJ;avan via Petra 
and later via Palmyra; 5) by sea direct from: India. via. the Red Sea to 
Egypt; 6)by sea ta: South Arabia and thence _via Mecca to Syria and 
Egypt. 7) A combination of circums·tances had.,at the beginning o:t· the: 
7th century A.D.,.maie the lasiklamed route by far the· most importaat. 
channel for this commerce. 
lL) O'L 65ff;.Lam. Me.c 7ff;l.2;:Watt; Mecca 5•. a) Lam. Mec 26. S) O·'L 65. 
4) Lam· Mec U:f.'. 5) Lam! Mec lL2:;0'L 8::lif:tt. 6) O'L 79. 7)Watt Mecca S;O'L 180f• 
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Carriage: of merchandise. by the northern routes:, always liable to Pers-ian 
interference: as a means: of applying economic: s-anctions a.ga.inst 
Byzantium, 1.) w:a.s completely closed in the first decades of the 7th 
century by the long a.ndl bitter war between the two Empires. 2) In South 
) Arabia. the Kingdom of Ip.myar,····success:or tb·:the_ ancient states of Sa.ba 
and!. Minaea, and once prosperous: throug..l-J. control of the caravan routes. 
to the north, hadi long been in decline. '!'his:· decline may haye begun 
with the dis:covery of the principle of the monsoons in the 1.st century 
A.D. a.nd the consequent development, by the Romans and later the, 
Byzantines, of effective: sea tr~ic to the East via. the Red Sea.. 5·) 
In the .first centuries of our era, therefore, there was great economic. 
distress in SE Arabia and ma.ny settled clans: became. nomadic: a.nd moved 
to distant parts. of Arabia. 4) In the 6th century the Ya.ma.n became· an 
arena for the economic: rivalry of Persia. and Byzantium, with the 
Abyssinians; a.s: the agents, of the latter. 'l'he Kingdom of Ip.mya.r wa.s 
finally overthrown by an Abyssinian army an<ll! the Yaman be:ca.me subject 
to Ethiopia about 525 A.D. About 570 A.D. the Abys;s.inians. were in turn 
conquered by the Persians and!. the Ya.man be~a.me a satellite: of Persia, 
andL remained s:o until the· a.cffivent of Islam. 5) During the 6th century 
Red Sea traffic had!. pas·sedi into Abyssinian control and had declined 
in importance·,. 6) At. the same time the Meccans:, who had previously 
been only middlemen and retailers, gradually gained centro~ over most: 
of the trad!e: from SE Arabia to the North. 7) 
:li.) O'L. :l.:li.Bi ff;: Watt Mecca 5. 2:) Lam. Mec 20 f. 5) O'L 79; Badw; 
(Wissmann) 884. 4) Badw,· (Wissmann) 885; ASB (.HOfner) 68. 
5) Watt Mecca :12: f.;; 0 'L 207.. 6) 0 'L ll.82:. 7) Wa.tt Mecc-a 5; 0 'L :1.80 f. 
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T.hus the Meccans gaine~ full control of the Arabian trade routes at a 
time when all other qhannels w.ere: blocked by w.arfare or decay, and the 
early part of the 7th century w.aa a period of· great ·prosperity :r·or 
Mecca. lL) The C'i t:y grew in importance· as a commercial and financial 
centre vci. th facilities. for banking and credit transactions ~ all the 
institutions normally as so ciatedi vrl th a soci.ety organised on. a ~pi tal-
-is.tic: basis. 2) Economic· and political eontrol in Mecca was in the 
hands of the tribe of QuraySh, div.ided at this time i:J;Lto ten clans of 
va.ryi.ng affluence and iJ!Iportanee; thes·e clans,. r.a.th~r than the: whole 
tribe.,. w.ere the viable· units from the point of view of group sol.id:ari ty .5.) 
Nevertheles:s· pus:ines·.s intere:s.ts may have begun to ~t across lines of 
· group loyalty a.ndl, in the pursuit of w.ealth,. ane::ient obligations such 
as: the pr.otee·.tion of the weak andi the c·are: of orphans and the destitute, 
tende.c1!! to be forgotten·. At the same time the w.e:aker clans: and the le:ss 
influential members: of the importan~ clans w.ere excluded from the more 
profitable· enterpris:es.,. a.nd were naturally resentful. From! these two 
clas·se:s.,. the p.oor and the would-be-rich,. came the majority of the early 
adherents of Islam. 'Fhe social malaise of Mecca arose from the grafting· 
of an aequisi tive: mercantile system in which individualism tended to 
r.e.pilace: group) solid.a.r.i ty onto a s.ocie:tty w.hic:h still. retained the olal 
nomadic attitudes: and. s:ocial insti tut;ions, .which in the new· environment 
became irre!li:evant andl lost their moral f'orce. In the des·ert a leader 
w.as. entitled to the fourth part of booty taken on a raid: and this 
e·nabledi him: to perform his: trad:i tional duty of looking; after the poorer 
members. of the tribe, but a merchant who had a.ma:s.sed wealth by his: own 
shrel!'dness w.ould feel no such obligation. 4.) 
1) Watt; Mecca 3·;, 0 1L ::ILBO ff'.. 2) Lam. Mec. U6-:t7:l;. O'L 182. S·) La.IDJ Me c 50 ff. 4) Watt: Me:c:ca 1.6 ff'. 
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Nor would the pressure of public opinion be brought to bear against him; 
in the desert the poets had fulfilled a function somewhat similar to that 
of the modern pres;s - his praises were sought,his satire. was feared .. But· 
the most likely patrons of poe·ts in Mecca were the rich merchants: and a 
poet would be unlikely to criticise his source of remuneration. With the. 
breakdown of morality was: connected a decay in the religious life of the 
Mecca.ns. There were numerous: cults in Arabia: connected: with various: shrines, 
of w-hich the shrine at Mecca was among the most important, :lL) but by the· 
time of Muhammad these eults had ceased to have much relevance. The: 
. 
Arabs; may· be· said to ha:~e li'lled chiefly by tribal humanism,..the manifest-
-ation of the: qualities' of manliness and fortitude embodied in the tribe. 
'mle possession of such qualities: in an indirldual i-s because. he is a 
member of a tribe which is characterised by them:. The: honour of the 
tribe· is what makes life meaningful and in this conception the poe.t; 
p~ayed a key role;. his function was. to glorit,y the name of his own tribe 
by 'boasting' and tarnish that of others: by 'satire'. In the Mecca of 
Muhammadl,however, honour ha.d ceased to exercise men's minds:, since· they 
found meaning in the acquisition of wealth and power,this being the 
. . 
objective not only of the very rich but also of the community as a 
J-
whole. Thus the Qur an recalls men to the practice of some of the 
virtues of nomadic. life: it inveighs against men made arrogant by 
wealth,condemns the oppression of the weak,encourages. the rich to be 
generous to the poor. More serious matters such a:s murder,theft and 
ad'u.JL tery were still a.dequa tely dealt with by trad!i. tionaJ. methods. , 
especially the curb on murder by the blood-feud. 2) 
:li.) Well Reste :l-94;10:lk-:lL40. 2) Watt Mecca: 16-29;:Well Reste 186;221.. 
;.•· 
Such then was the milieu of' Muhammad's early ministry, a centre by no 
. 
means isolated from the outside world but in touch with the great 
civilisations of' Greece and Persia by means of' a highly developea trading 
system .. Especially was this the case with the Byzantine Empire in whose 
terri tori ty lay Syria, the main terminus. of' the Meccan caravans, although 
commerce with the Byzantines was interrupted by the Persian occupation 
' of Syria,614-627 A.D. The city of Bu~ra. was: the market allotted by the 
Byzantines: for the receipt of' merchandise from Arabia and the arrival 
of' the caravan and the storing of' the goods was carefully superintendeclll 
by ~zantine agent&. and Customs officers. 1) Through such contacts the 
Meccans. doubtleas hadl adequate intelligence of' f'oreigri af'f'airs anclll 
internal conditions in the two states. The bankers and financiers: of 
Quraysh hd. also,by their management of a commercial centre which was 
the means of' their livelihood and by their dealings' with the much moile: 
numerous nomads surrounding the town.develo-ped a political sense which 
w:as to be invaluable after the conquests. 2) The political acumen of' 
( (-
men such as Umar and Mu awiyah was no accident ... The possession of such 
sagacity was absolutely vit~l to the survival of' Mecca since no 
agriculture can be practised there and trade was: essential to its, 
prosperity .. 5) 
Very different was: the situation in Yathrib,except insofar as 
it arose from a somewhat similar cause: the unsuitability of' nomad§!.c. 
. ' 
customs and thought patterns for life in a settled,ma.inly agricultural, 
community. 
1) Lam Mec 54;;46;0 'L 187;;0pp' I 280. 2) Watt Mec·ca 5;Lam· Mee. 59. 
5) Watt Mecca 2. 
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Rather than a compact city Medlina consis:ted! of a number of farms, ha.milets 
an~ str.ongholds spreaoa over a fertile tract of country which was in 
turn surrounded by barren. hills., rocks: and lava. flow:s. 'IDle dominant 
section of the community was: t:P,e B:. Qaylah, who w.ere sub-divided into 
tw:o tribal. groups., the Aw.s. ancl the Khazraj, thes:e in turn being fra.g-
-mented into a. number of clans;~ The B. Qaylah, perhaps of s • .Arabian 
extraction, gained political control about the middle of the 6th 
century A.D. but two groups of Jiew:s. oceupying fertile: tracts. of land 
remained strong enough to·r.etain a large degree: of independe?ce. These 
were· the B-~ Qura.yzah and! the B.. al-Naclir, while in Muhammad 1 S> time 
. . . 
there: w.a~. a third, less influentia.J., Jewd.sh group;, the B. Qaynliqa~ 
'IDlere: were· fre~uent feuds: be:tw.een th~ Aw,s. and the Khazraj which had 
erupted into a pitched battle, also inViOlving the: J"ew.s, a few1 years 
before the Hijrah. What: was: happening was: that:, in a community depen_d-
-e:nt on agriculture:, a pe:tty warfare was engendered by the pressure of· 
an increas;ing population on lim ted food supp.tl..ies. The· principle, of· 
force, of taking and. keeping whatever· one can by ~ed. might., allied 
to the system o:r· the blood-feud!, works sa.tisf'ac·toril.y in the vast 
spaces: of the open desert, but it is• intolerable iri. a s:ettled community. 
s·ecuri ty of life and tenure is: not guaranteed and long-term improve-
-ments in a.gricul ture a.r.e: dis.couraged:. What is required in such a 
cas:e is: a single supreme: authority to act as·. arbite~ between the 
various: contending groups>,. and this. is: a eoneeption quite alien to 
nomadic thought-. Thus. there. \vas• much to attract: the Medinese in the 
idea of a community based! upon a religious: ideal, whos.e leader would 
be without bias: tow.a.rd!s: any one section of the soeiety. 
(This page derived from: Watt Mecca 1.4:lL-:lL49;; La.m. Berc 2:65) 
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Apart from· this. s:ound material reason there: w:a.s als.o a. religious factor 
in the malaise of Ya.t~b: in the nomadic outlook the meaning of life 
is found in the honour and prowe.ss of the clan,. but such a concept is 
only relevant for small, closely-knit: units and does not apply to a. la.rge 
group: like the An~ir·, which ha.d 1i ttl.e contact w:i th outs,iders. Nor was 
there: mueh glory to be found in the kind of petty murdering tha. t. went 
on at. Yathrib a.n<l. the peopJ.e mus.t have been hea.rti]y sick: oft the 
continual,. senseless killing:. Such briefly were the reasons. that 
impellea the men of the An~ar· to accept ~d in their md.dst. :1.) 
The 'l'ribes· .• 
Other important settlements in Arabia at the time of ~a.mma.d. included: 
Jewish se,ttlements. at Khaybar,. 2:) Fadak,. 3} and in the Wadi-]..-Qura; 4) 
the northern oases. of Taym~) .. 5) al-~jr,. 6} Dedlin,. 7) Tabiik,. 8) and 
Diimat-al-Jandal;: 9} the oases of eas:tern Najd. with al-Yamiinah as: the 
, ) 
most important;; :li..O) the Yaman,. e·special]y· Sana andl the thriving 
' , 
Chris.tian eommuni ty of Najran; ll) the town. of ~& if·. :1.2;) Of more· 
importance to Mecca and to nascent Is.J.am., however,. were: the nomadic 
tribes·.,. many of whom had sections who were: settled in the oas:es. 
1} Watt Mecca 1.4:11..-1.49. 2) B'al 25i ff;. Lam Mee 84; 195·; 265·;. Watt;. Mecca 
2;lL7 ff;, O'L 1.75i. S) Bal 29 ff; Watt. Medina 21.8,; La.Dll Mec 85; O'L :1.'73. 
4) B'al 55i ff;. Watt Med!ina 218;, Lam• Berc :154 f;; O'L 1.75i. 
5) Bal 53i ff;, Watt Mediina 21.8; Lam: Mec. 85.; 0'1 1.75;. 6) O'L :l!.BO t·. 
7) O'L 105> r. a;) m 894 ff; ww 5:90 ff; La.IIIl Me~ 258; 259. 
9) Bal 6:1L f;. Tab :lL. 2:065 f; m: 905; WW 405 f; Watt Metina 562-364.· 
:lLO) Bal. 88 f;. Tab 1.. :1.94:1L ff;, Watt. Medina :15:5-:l!M. 
U) Watt: Medina ::h28 f; O·'L 1.05 f;; (s~>) Bal 64; La.Dll Berc 255• f;. 
Watt. Medina :1!27 f;; 0 'L :1L45 f.· (Najran). 
12:)· Bal 55; m: 869-876;, 'WW 568-575; Watt Medina li.O:l.-1.05. 
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No detailed discussion of the tribal systelll! at the time of Milha.mma.di 
- . 
is: possible here.;- ' (~or which s:ee:_ especially: Opp. I, 49-50; 279-2·80; 
' 
II, 6;. 1.71.!"':1!.75!;. 51.4-316;; III, 5-9;; i79-180;; Watt Medina. 78-1.50). 
It is·. important,. however,. to understandi the compilie::ld..ty of the si-tuation 
of· the internal and external tribal relationship:S:j both the Meccans. and 
Mul}amma.d needed tribal a.llie:s· and in order. to wd.n and retain their 
al]egiance had to have an· accurate apprec-iation o:r· the eurrent. situation. 
'IDle tribal s:tructure- is pre-s:ented in the traditions a.s based on kinship 
in the ma.le: line, althoug;h. a person not in the d!irect. line (n9t a. ~~ 
or a ~amim) could. obta.in s:ome of the privileges of kinship,. e:specia.l]3r 
protee:tion,. in other ways. :1.) He might do this as: an a.iJLy (hali.f), as a 
' . 
protected ne:ighbour (jar),. or as a. client: (mawla). The partie:s to an 
alliance: were formally equal,. but if one person lived as a. ~ii.f in a 
tribe. his position would tend to become subordinate. .Tiwar i..m:plied 
s·ome· i.nferiori ty,. while the status. of mawla W:a.s: acquired by a. slave on 
his; emanci.pation: s:lave:s w.ere attached to the tribes, either Arabs 
who had:. been taken in raids a.s chiiaren,. or Abyssinians.. A man could 
be expelled from· his: tribe :f'or he.rmfu]. condue·t and might then wander 
alone a& a. su'llik: or attach him·self to another tribe as a. jar. 2) The 
tra.dd. tional view. of ])&trilinear de:sctimt dices: not, howeve·r, correspond 
w:ith all.. the~ fac·.ts., a.s f'or ins:tance: the many traces; of matriliny which 
occur in Mu~?-ammadl'·s, time. 5.) It has: been a.r~ed (e.g·. by Smith) 4-) tha.t 
·, -
the:se traces: ana! relics of older, looser forms: oft marriage repre:sent. 
a. phase: in a. transition from: a. matrilinear. to a. patrilinear system. 
1.) Badw. (Wat:t.) 890;: ASB' (Henniger) 79. 2.) Bad'w (Wat:t.) 890; Smith 40 ff. 
5:) Bad'w (wa. tt:) 890~· 4:) Smith 1.-5:9; 156-:1.90 .• 
160! 
Hennigar suggests ,.on the other hand,no such regular evolution but a 
development from a societ,y in which several forms o~ nomadie social 
•· 
cultures existed simultaneously. 1.) Neverthele&.s,the: genealogies., 
however marred with inventions and fabrications,ao on the whole describe 
real relationships,and for units of up to five hundred persons they 
repre~~entr-real. organisms. a) Before Islam· the leaaler was. called the: 
sayy±d not the sha.ykh and was chosen from the leading f.'amilies: for his; 
personal qualities: the choice was; not direct~ based on descent and 
a minor could not be selected nor could one lacking in judgement or 
courage.Survi'VSJ.. in the: desert was; too hazardous to be left to a man. 
of dubious personality. 5) The sayyii was thus a 'primus inter pares' 
and led the ma:jlis,whose: adhesion he could only gain by persua&ioll(, 
never by force. Other leading men were.the military commander (ra,is. 
_, ) 
or ga id) and the judge or· arbitrator (ha.kam: , both also wd. thout coercive• 
. 
powers. 4) Weight was; given to the words. of those who were: reputed to 
have: supernatural powers (k&hin) 5)anG11 to the poets (shi'ir),w~ose 
eulogies. and invectives. had an effect upon the listeners akin to ma.gi·co6) 
The tribal. structure was· constantliy in a state: of flux: some tribes 
would prosper,become too numerous to function effectively as a unit and 
would split up into two or more sub-tribes,.7) On the other hand a. tribe 
which did not pr«»Sper and dwindled in numbers had th~ choice between 
becoming deP.~p.d:ent on a stronger tribe.,allY";ng itself with another weak 
tribe or disappearing. 8) 
ll..) ASB. Henniger 69-95. 2) Ibidl.8:JL. 5) LB.IIIl Ber_c:;·. 2051. ;3·27f. 
4} .AS.B: Henniger 85; Lam B'erc· 205ff·. 5) Well Beiste. :150ff'. 6.) La.m Berc 229. 
7}8) Ba.b Watt 891. 
•. .-, 
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In some cases Where a strong leader arose in an important tribe: he 
might. induce other tribes to join: in a confederation out of fear or 
self-interest,but such an as·cendaney was always resented and the 
confederation usually dissolved on the death of the leader. Thus there 
was~ a bewildering proliferation of tribes,.sub-tribes ,clana,al.liances 
andi confederations. to say nothing of rivalries:,disputes. over leaier-
ship:· etc. inside single units. lL)'Fhe Meccans. a.ncill later Mul}ammad took 
care to be informed "bout tribal politics of this s:ort and w.ere. able 
to manage the nomads by a skilful combination of tiplom.acy • 1 divide 
and rule 1 ,largesse:,force and matrimonial alliances. It should not be 
forgotten,of course:, that· while the Meccans. needed the friendship' of-
the nomads to ens.ure a .safe passage for their caravans, and as allies 
in war,financrlal. benefits accrued to the Beduins as ·a result of their 
co-operation in these fields. The advantage ~s not all one.-sided.2.) 
In the early years after the Hijrah ~ had to rely fQr his 
• • • # 
mili ta.ry strength on the Elmi.grants·. a.D:d the An~ar ,.although ill the years 
between the batt~e of Badr and the failure of the ·~c~ si~:ge of· 
Medina.he received adherents to Islam; fro~ individuals: of the smaller, 
weakf;lr· tribes_in the vicinity. of Medina and Mecca. He also entered 
into alliances,,at first with tribes to the west an~ south-west. of' 
Medina who wel'e within the Medinan .sphere of :i,ntluence: a.ndl la:ter,as 
the power and reputation of Islam·grew,with other .tribes. ~e: paid 
particular attention to the tribes to the north,along the roaa to 
Syria. 
1.) ASB~ He~ger 80~;;Watt Medina. 78f • 2) Watt Medina lL42-ll50;Lam Mee 1.85ft. 
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At first such alliances were, pacts of friendship, and non-agression, 
but when Mul}ammadl grew; stronger he was able to insist on :f'1.1rther 
terms such as recognition of himself as: the 'messenger of God!' and 
the payment of tribute.. 'fhe terms varieal from tribe to t:rr.i:t>e ,.and! to the 
end of his life he was probably willing to make alliances with s.trong 
I 
tribes,.especia.lly thoae in a position to invade Iraq,.without 
insisting on acceptance of Islam. After the fall of Mecca an~ the battle· 
of Hunayn the trickle of deputations from tribes: or sections of tribes 
. 
wishing to enter into alliance with tile new community became a flood, 
and by the end of M11hammad' s life mos.t of Arabia had some form ot 
. . -.. 
connection wi.th Isl.8J!l,ranging from ~ integration to a loose: 
alliance wr.i th the weaker section of a tribe. :li.) 
:li.) Watt Medina 142-150. 
1.9. 
2:. The: Arab buffer: states. in. the North. 
(i) Gha.s sin. 
The· tribe of Gluissin oceupti.ed the region of the ~wran and by the 
6th century A.D. had become, the most important Ara~ gr.~p' in the 
borcll!erlands of Byzantium;. They were used by Byzantium as a buffer state 
to prevent incursions from Arabia ani als:o as. a coun;ter to the: sd.Dii.lar 
Arab state of· ~ah in the Persian sphere: of· influence. In 529A.D. 
their chief ,.Hiri th IV ,.was honoured by Justinian w.i. th the title~ of 
phylareh and the rank of patricius,.and at about the aame time other· 
minor phyla.rchs. in Syria disappeared and control. of the Syrian Arabs 
was in the hands of the chief of the Ghas·sin. Thereafter for nearly 
a century,w.i.th intervals when the tribe. w.as .out of favo"ur,.they were 
the watchdogs. of ByzantiUJil on the southern limes and took part in the 
frequent wars between Byzantium and Persia,a.lthough their activity; 
often took the foi'I!ll of raids: against their fellow Arabs of ryi"rah. l.) 
:For these: services they -v_rere paid a subsidy by the Emperor. 2:) At. the 
height of their pow;er they controlled the oorder steppes Wihi.c~~y 
patrolled with dromedary troops,.and their cavalry was renowned;they 
ruled the. oaSiis·. of Diimat a.l-J&ndaJ. and mounted raids as; far south as 
Kha.yba.r. 4) Nev:erthele·ss by the 6th century they w.ere semi-nomadic; 5:) 
probab~· they never departed from such well know.n,.well watered routes 
as; ~wran-'f'ablik-Kh.aybar or Wati Sir~-~ah. The prestige of 
the Ghas·.s"anid a.ris.tocracy among the desert Arabs &Ui. in: Me:caa and· 
Medina,baeked! as- it was by the might of Byzantium,.was oonsd.derab]e· 
and survived their decline for a time. 6) 
:IL) 0 1 ~ li.S4f ;Lam Mec 243ft' ;Opf I 280 ;Dus.sa.ud! 9 ;5Mf' • 2) Lam. M~c· 26lh 
5) IbJ.d. 2:62:. 4) Ibiclll.264. 5) Opp'I 280. 6) LaiD!Mec 264.-;0'L :1l65f'• 
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Ass.ociated with Ghassi.n at the time: of their greatest powers; were the 
- ( 
northern tribes' of Lakhm,Judha.m,Kalb,,.and the ·many clans. of Qua:i ah• 
and they may also have· been paid subsidies by :Byzantium. :1.) All these 
Ara.bsc were Christiana of the Monophysite· persuasd.on,and after about 
' . 540 A.D~- there was a Bishop; at Bu~ra aha.rged solely; with their 
supervision. 2) At the time of the Persian. invasion of Syria (6:11S/61.4) 
the Ghassinids; ha.dl eea.sei to exist as. an effec·tive fighting force and 
the payments of tribute were not renewed,because of straitened 
financial eircumstanoes,.atter the victory of Heraclius in 628. 5-() 
Nev;erthelesa the Ghassinids andl their allies fought againf!l't the 
Musl.ims at Mii' tah and in the later· battle's in Syria the q:has.sinids 
fought on the side of the Greeks;4) at the Yarmiik the Lakhm and Judhim 
were: allied to the Mn;Slijms al.thougb they deserted. during the: hos;tilities.5) 
It is reasonable to suppose that,.hadl the Ghas:sanids: and their al.lie-s 
been at the height of their powers and in fulll concord: with Byzantium 
at the time of the first Musli.m. incursions ,a.nci had they retained! & 
fully nomadic culture,the task of the Muslims would ·have been 
incomparably- more diffiou]t. 
:JL) Bal. :1135 ;Ca 1.2 ,.505ff • 2!) 0 'L ll38ff • 5) Ca 12, 505ft·; a •-L :l.65f. 
4) B'al :1!35;Tab :n... :Ji6:W:f;2.08ll.fWaq 401f. 5) Tab l... 2548. 
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( ii) The Lakbmids of :tfiran. 
( .-Towards the end of Arsacid times. lower Iraq w:as oceupied by Arabs, 
the dominant el~nt among theml being the tribe ot' L~: de·spi.si.ng 
' fa.rmi,_ng they e::mc,ted tribute f'rom the Semd. tic peasants and! spent 
their time in hunting~sport and 'VHI.rfa.re:. The Sasinids ma.de unsuccess-
-fulL attempts; to. expel them· but in ab·out 24:0 A.D~ the· settlement was 
t t-
recognis.edl. by Shapilr I,and their leader,Amr b .• Acli~w:a.s :formally 
invested as king; with Hirah as. his capita:L. Persia. wa.s. a feudal!. s;tate, 
andl. Hirab was·, one· of many autonomous provinces: w,i thin the: Sis·anie:1i 
Empd.re;;the Persians alwQS inve.s;tedi a member of the. tribe of Lak:biD! 
of the: fami];y to which the firs.t ld.ng· had belonged.:l!..) The role of 
the Lakhmids· was thus. c-losely analogous. to that of the Gha.s:sinicfls,. 
and they enjoyed. a similar prestige ~ong the town dwellers and 
nomae:1is. of Arabia. They also hae:1i commercial dealings with the interior 
ana! sent delegates to all the g,:"eat Arab fairs 2) ,.and took care' to 
safeguard their freedom of movement by cultivating· the friendahip 
of the Beduin chiefs: of Najd and ev;er1, the. brigands ( su~ lUk pl... sa. raJ.ik), 
. . . 
not e:schewing: the judicious distribution of bnbes. 5) For despite 
the fame of the black q&mels of ~rah~4) the La.khm:i.dls were no more 
able to travel in the desert without;·the co-operation of the Badv 
than other travellers and armies both before and after their time. 
As Lammens says; (Mec·que _250): •ns savaient _que le desert se fera.it 
toujours le complice des. Bedouins contre toute action militaire 
de grand! style'. 
1.) 0 1L :ll54f:f;~ Mec 244ft'; 2:)0'L 155:t. 3;) Lam Mec 250t. 
4} Lam Mec 252£.·. 
22. 
Some centuries· before Isl~ &11 the peasant population around ~ir.ah 
were· Nestorian Christians,in~lutin:g some .of the Arabs"although the 
Lakhmd.d dynasty remainedi paga.n until co:m;parativeU.y late:.l,:~i) The 
greatest prosperit,y of· ~a.h was in the 6th centur,y,refleeting the 
peak period of sasinia power: the summit w:as rea.chedl in 552 for 
when Justinian sued for peace wd.th Persd.a,he: was obligedi to pay 
tribute not only to the Sasanid king·_.Khusraw .AnUshi.rwi.n, but alsc 
to the ruler of l;firah,.Mundhir m. Neverthele.ss warfare betwe.en 
:f!irab and the Arabs: of the Syrian frontier continued,.perhap·s with 
the taci 't. approval of the Pers•ia.ns:..2) The end of the r.akhtmj d atYn&sty 
came in 605: relations between the . Sasini dis: and. J?3" ra.h became strained 
l 
and the Lakhmid ruler,.Nu man V,.took refuge in the desert: but: returned 
later &nd. was· put to death. A Persd.an puppet ruler from the tribe of 
I -
'Ea;yy was: then installed but on his death in 6:lL4.- :Khusraw Palrvig made 
~jrah an ordinary province under a· Persi.an satrap,. 3') Thus:,as in the 
We:s,t,.an effecti~ check against Arab infiltration and invasion was 
removed and the way was open for the arrival of the Muslim armies. 
3. A note on the theory of progre:s;sive: de.s:s.ication in Ar.a.bia. _ 
The hypothesis that the climate~ _of· Arabia has become steadily drier 
from the: Ice: Age to the pres.ent da.y, w:i. th eros:ion and los:s; of top~s:oil 
increas·ing, causing an e:v;er greater pressure. on existing. food supplies, 
has. been put forward to a.c·count for the successive w:a.v;e:s: of' Semitic 
inva.si.on and! inf'il tra tion into the more· fertile: countries. of· the. 
north. (Ca :1!.2:,. :105 f'f'.) 'IDle Muslilll! eonques.ts a.re: s•een by Ca.etani as 
the las.t of this serie•S· of· incursions. The base:s; for this: theory, 
w:.hieh is• not nowi' generally accepted,. a.re as follows: 
(a): Many traces: of' irrigation exi.s:t:• buried d:am:s; e~pty channels; 
airy wells• or cis.terns. 'lllies:e are often in places where. there :is. 
.:. -' no obv.ious; w:a.ter supply and this: seems: to indicate that. surface 
water· has become scarcer. 
(b) Arehe.ologieal eViidence for the ex:i.s.te·nce of' s·e.ttlem.ents. in regions 
now:· barren. 
(e) Biological atte:sta.tions such as the appearance of lions and 
croeodd.les: on Egyptian and Me·s:opotamian relief's: and traces in 
Libya. of' a typ.e of' snail.. which requires• 20 ine:hes of' ra.inf'a.ll 
annually in order to survive:. 
Prineipa.l opponents of' this theory have, been: Musil (NN 504 ff'); 
Lammens. (Me·c·que 2'54,. 509, '4:ll..O; B'ercea.u ll.8 f ,. 1.5:8 f'f);; Fisher· (Middle · 
Ea.s;t. 52~ f'f) • The arguments aga.ins>t it. may be SllillJlla.rised as follows: 
. . (a) 'The lion was a desert-a.da.pted breed! which has been hunted out of.' 
existence and dd.d not die out; from. c;limate eha.nge:s.; erocodile:s 
w.ouldl be· known in the.a.ncient w.orld from Upper Egypt; the snail 
w:a.s• probably a. late: Ic.e: Ag~ denizen whic:;-:P, died out; in Neolithic. 
times.. 
(b) There: is: little apparent change in environmentaJL condi. tions in· 
the Middl.e Eas.t;agricultura.l. techniques: depicted! in ancient art and 
literature. still aurviv.e;weather conditions describeGl,in Herodotus 
for exampJ..e, bear· close· resemblance to modern condi. tions;;many relic·s: 
of Ancient Egypt would not have survived iD a damper climate. 
{c) There are no references in Greek,Latin gr Syriac sources., nor in 
the Arab tratitions,of starvation oz::··dsssication. On the contrary,the= 
p·eriod which is: being considered.,600 B.c.-soo, A.D.,was; mainly a 
prosperous one. 
(d) Existence of ancient caravan routes - why should Damascus a.nd 
Aleppo: have :f'u:Q:e.tioned for millenia as poillts. of departure: for 
caravans it they did not lie on the: borders of the desert'? Me.dd.na.., 
' Pe.tra,Jierash,Bu~a,Da.mas:eus.,Pa.~a,Al.eppa a.nd Dura Europus: lose 
their rad.s.on at'etre: it the desert. boundary is moved further inland. 
{e) T.he ruin of irrigation work& and hence the settlements based 
thereon was dUe to w.ar·,invas:ion,.misrul.e:,negle:ct and silting.·. The fall 
of the water-table may be dUe to· the lowering of river beds by erosion 
and/or la·ss of sub-surface. water by de-fore:s.tation . 
(:fl') ':!]he: Arabs· cod~ not have been so effectiv,e in wa.r it thew had been 
in a s:tate of semi-stanation. 
{g) Another factor ,not mentio~ed: by these authors;,is: the: existence 
of the camel in Ara.bia.,an anjmal. which c-annot live in a damp eJ.imate·. 
{see Ch.S) 
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Conclusion. 
Conditions were w.etter in late Tertiary and early Quaternary periods 
and d'Uring: Neolithic times a period of d!.esiceation ac:companied the 
final. retreat; of the ice-ca.p,..but by the opening of· his;toric times 
this: inerease in aricli ty had enae.d. The environmental. changes over 
the: last 5/s.ooo years. are dlle. to: 
(a) Lowering: of the beals of stre&JII!s; atu.e to. normaJ.i.""erosion; this also 
loweredl the wa1iie:a.-tablle &nc:l left many. irription iii.takes above the 
new w.ater l.e.vel. 
(b) Soil erosion due to w.as.teful agrl.cul tural. metholills and de:structio:ra; 
of wgetation. 
(c) Mi.srulle ,:war a.Bd invasion. 
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4'• :Byzanti.ne- a.nC! Persian affairs in the _century before the: Hi.j:rah 
'!'hi's brief' S.UlDJI1S;I'Y' is deri ve_d from Works; Nos. : l!B 1 :1.9 1 20-,.22:1 5'5, 
46.,48 ~ :: ';' . 
The. wars; of Jus.tinian (527-565) which regained some parts of the Roman 
Empire in the \Yes.t ,and his lavish expend:i ture om public builtings and 
fortifications,,.while ;rrad.s:ilng the pres;tige of the Empire in some areas,. 
had! serious after-effects. In regio:m:s: other than the West a policy o:r· 
pas:sive defence,su:P.P.lemented by carti'ul. tipl.omaey and a ne'brork o_f 
alliances hac8i bare]y held! the frontiers: but had been expensive in 
subsities and diamaging to prestige. Under his succes·.sora Justin II 
(565-582::) and. Maurice (582~02) war was :renewed. with Persia and the 
main Byzantine ob .. jectives. were a1ita:ineQi by 5-91.111'1th tlile ces•sion byr 
Persia of her portion of Armenia and the fortresse:s on the approaches 
to: Asd.a Minor. ID. It~1how:ev.ezo, the Lombard!s: had invaded the country 
in 568 and by· 580 ·they-were in'. possessi.on of more- than half the 
peninsu.l.a. In the B&llams,after ten years of w:ariare Maurice suC"Ceedecl 
in checking: the ad'Vi&Ilce of. the Avars and by 602 Imp.eri.al. troops w:ere 
again astri.ie the Danube. These succes:ses me swept away by the rev~ 
-elution o~ 602 when the troops,a.ngry at having to\:~:r on the 
Danube,.rebelled and proclad.lneal Pb:ocas.a brutal eenturion,_as Einperor. 
Maurice and his f&mily 11111!1re muralered and a reign of terror ensued. 
Internal clisorder ani anarchy and bankrupt finances threatened the 
-very existence of the state,while in the Eas.t Persian raiding forces 
c-aptured the outlying: pro~ces of Byzantium anQl. rav:ag~ even her 
Anatolian possessions•. 
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The almos:t hopeles:s s·i tuation was saved by Heraclius, s.on of.' the 
governor of Carthage:, who in 6:1!..0 sailed for Constantinople;,. overthrew. 
Phocas., and addressed hims.elf to the task of:" repairing the rava~:s. 
of the years of misrule. 'l1he demoralized armies w.ere re-organised,. 
finances w.ere repaired by s.trict ec·onomy and! the ei ty :faet:ions were 
.sternly repre:s·.sed. 'i'he Pers·ians, howe:v:er, could!. not yet be met in open 
·combat: and in w.ave of conques:t the Sasani.d. :r·orces rolled over the 
Middle East. In: 6ll Antioch fell..,. in 6l.5: Damascus, and .1er.us.alem: was 
sacked! in 6:lL4 and! its Patriarch toge:ther with the relie. of the True 
Cross w.ere carriedl off to Persia;. in 6:1.9 Egyp:t. w:as invaded and rapidly 
su'bjuga ted. Herac·lius• based his: counter-attack on the Caueasus, boldly 
leaving_ Constantinople: .to her fate:. He bega.n his: operations: in 622, 
recruiting the local tribe·s and!. des.eendd.ng at interVtals to raid 
northern Persia. In 62.6, before his; final preparations were. compJ!.ete, 
Constantinople was:. attacked in his abs·ence·.by an alliance o:f.· Ava.rs, 
PersiansJJ Slavs. and Bulgars:,. but: they were: defeated! by the: resolution 
and unity of the. city and the prowe·ss of the Byzantine fleet:. In the: 
follo'V'Iii.ng year. Her.ac:lius adivanceclli into the hea.r.t of Persian terri tory 
and w:on a great victory nea.r.· Mosul. Although he w.as unable. to reach 
Ctes•iphon,. the murder of the Sasi.nid king, Khus.raw: Parv'iz, in 628 
a.nd the disturbed state of.· the Persian realm, forced the Persians to 
sue for peace. Egypt:,. Syria. and As:ia Minor w:e:r:e res·.tored to Byza.ntiU!IIl, 
the: T.rrue Cross was returned to Jierusa.l.em, and in 629 HeracJ.ius entered 
that eit,y in a blaze: of glory. 
Internal weaknesses,.howev.er,.in Egypt and Syria undermined the security-
of' the restored Byzantine power. The: Greeks: we:re an alien ruling clas-s 
with little sympathy,; for their foreign aubje.cts. In Egypt the civil 
and military serv!ices were· filled by the ruling elas:s to the _general 
exc-l.usion of' the Copts:: • the~ whol.e machinery of' go'Vi8rillllen.t in Egypt 
was· diree.ted to the s.ole purpose of' Wringing prof'i t out of' the ruled! 
for the benefit of' the rulers.' (Butler p.42) 
Nor were' matters aided by the actions of' Heracl.iua after his return 
to S~a. In order to prosecute the war with Persia he had taken a 
large: loan from the Ort..'I-J.odox Church and he immediately set about; 
collecting the sum d:u.e by taxi n·g the Syrians before: they had had time 
to· reoov:er from the miseries·- ·of' the Persian occupation. ReJ.igion also 
played a part in embittering relations between the Byzantines; and the 
native populations. The great majority of' the latter, in both- Syria 
and Egypt,.were Monophysites,.also- known_as Jacobites:,.bitter.ly divided 
from Orthodox doctrine by their di.v:er~nt belief's about the: nature 
of' Christ. Compromises,.such as that devised and encouraged by 
Herac1ius and known as Monothelitism,.were eq.ual].y.- _odious to thEml!. 
'ihe natural. result of· this.at a time when religious. tolerance w;as: rare.-. 
w.as an almost continuous persecution of' the nativ:e:Christians; · 
by the Orthodox Church. This. persecution went on throughout the· 6th 
century anal earlly 7th· century,.warying in intensi~,.but. reaching its 
wlmin.a;tion in Egyp.t in the years immedia teJ.y before the Musli.lll! 
invasion,where it was; organised with great diligence by Cyrus-,. the 
Orthodox Patriarch of' Alexandria. 
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Nor were the Jews exemp1; from the effects of' intolerance: in 650 
Heracl.ius made the fatal blunder of permd.tting a massacre of the Jews 
in Jerusalem~ and the survivors. later weJ.comed the Arabs as~ the 
- .. 
instruments of their vengeance. Opinions differ as to the amount o"£ 
co-operation giv;en by the Syrians and Egyptians to the. Muslim inva.del!'S, 
but there• can be no· Oloubt that useful assd.stanoe was• given on many 
oooasd..ons~,,ev;en- if sec.tions of the population were soon disillusioned 
by the outward. manifestations of yet another. religious- fanaticism. 
The social order in Persia was no less inseeure•. The Sisinid 
kingdom was feudal, with the power of the king re-sting on the consent; 
of the landed nobility and the Mazdaea.n pries,thood. These= two Estates·-~ 
acting in concert,were strong enough to: depose a king·~b?t mutual.. 
jealousies and feuds prev;ented them from excercising their powers in 
oligarchie rule a.nd they were always obliged! to enthrone a ·new king:. 
A strong,able king could wield! power b,y tip]omaey a.nd by a policy of 
'divide and rul.e' ,.but even the best. of them were :f.orcedl to a.c:cord. 
privileges to the nobility anal the clergy ,including exemption :f.rom 
ta.xes,.so that it was the poor and not the rich who bore the brunt _of' 
the expenses for the frequent foreign wars. Another way of placating 
( -the elergy wa.s. by persecuting the Nestorian Christians:. of Ira.q,a.nd 
dUring -the centuries of Sis&niclfl rule• frightful pers~_cutions of these: 
Christians took place at interv;als. Ano_ther weaknes:s of the feudal 
structure was that the governors of lar~ province.s; exercised .their 
powers almost as ~dependent rulers.,this being es.-pecially true of the 
remoter prov.inees·~ This tendency can be observed~ in the Arab ac·counta 
ot the conquests·., where such governors are described as negotiating 
with the inv;aders as if endowed! with the status of independent. kings:. 
Af'ter the ex:haus;ting struggle with ByzantiUlll: the last year~ of the 
SisB.ni.ds were full of anarchy and sordid cruelty. Followi.i.ng. the murder 
of Khusraw. Parri.z in 628,.disputes over succe.ssion led to micidal. 
civil w.ars,palace revolutions and assassinations. Intern&a order 
dissolved!. in chaos while adventurers and pretenders occupied and · 
vacated! the throne in quick succession. On the eve of the Mll&lim 
c'Onquests a; SUC'cessor w.as found in Yazd!agerd III who.,noiiili.Dal~ at: 
least ,.was legitimate. By then :i!:t. was too late to repair in time the 
ravages of md.srule and anarchy. No'tt sll.Ijllrising];w· the: Chriatians at 
r Iraq were read& to prof':fi'er assi&tance: to the invaders who came to· 
oust their persecutors. 
51. ·. 
CHAP.L'ER II 
GEOGRAPHY. 
~s see.tion is; a brief description of the physica.l geograJ)hy of the 
area as it woultt. affect the activities of a miltar,y force on active 
operations: i.e. ground conditions;llSitural obsta.cles;water supplies; 
c-limate. The chapter is baa:.ed almost entirely on Fisher,Le: Strange, 
and personal experience and references will not'··be given except in 
the few cases where other authorities Q&ve: been consulted. Place~ 
-names have not been accurately transliterate&. but are given in the 
:f'orDll most usua:l.Jly accepted in English;modern phce-na.mes. are. used 
throughout ,.excep;t; where ,.for greater clarity,. the· .old name is given 
alongsaae·the new. 
A map has been prepa.l!'ed wb.idl is intended to pre~ent, in conven-
- ient form, the phce-names; ass.ociatecBJ. with the eariy Arab conquests 
in the form _in w~ch they appear in the souree:s. The maps and! 
authorities used in compiling th:is information are given in the lis;t. 
of ·works consu1ted;obvious~ it has not been possib]e to include the 
name of every town,village and fortress mentioned in the source.s. but. 
it is hoped that the information w.ill cover all the important battle:s, 
raids,si.eges and! j~. The: map is purely toponomicaJL andi wd.tb the 
exception of seas,lla.kes and i.mjpom-tant waterways·.,.no attempt has. been 
made: to include physical. features. 
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The regions conquered or partiall!y conquered in the Arab expans·-ion 
( ... 
up to· the death of Uthman comprise: 
li::; Arabia1incluting the northern steppes. 
2:. The coast lands of the Levant. 
· 3 .• Egypt andl Cyrenaica. 
4. South-eas·tern Asia Minor and Armenia. 
5. The lands of the Sasanid Empire: in terms of modern frontiers this 
includes. !ri'n,B·aluc:bistin,parts of north and west .Ughanistan.,. and 
the ancient province of Khurasin which was much larger than its modern 
namesake and embraced parts of northern .A£ghanista.h and extended; into 
modern Ui~S.S.R. as: far as the river Oxus. Also within the Empire were 
( - - ( - -lower Iraq,Me:sopotami.~ ~d Khuzistan actually part of Iran but having 
c -physicaJi. sim.ila.ri ty to Iraq). AlLthou~ Mesn.potamia,,especial]y the 
the nor~-east,was debatable land between Persia and Byzantium,it has 
beeD inc::l.ud.ed in this section for convenience. 
:li.. Arabia 
Almos;t all. of west and central Arabia lies at a height of; at least 
2/3,~000; feet but the plateau is til ted! ao that the we.stern edg~ stands 
much higher than the eastern. East of a straight line from Abu Keniil 
(' 
to the Kuria. Muria is:lands the surface (Um'i"n excepted) is e-.rerywhere 
below; :1!.,000 feet. ::ta.se of magma in the we:s·.t has further heightened the 
lewl by produc·i:ng extensive· basalti·c plateaus with frequent vol.canic 
cones exceeting 8/10,000 f'eet. Further inland, basal tic. irruptiona are 
less frequent and are al.mos,t absent ~ the east. The whole s·urra.ce 
of' Arabia is deepily dissected by fluvial ae:tion:the be·s't develope~ 
wadis; are thoae trending towards the Euphrates and the Persian Gulf. 
Arabd.a can be tividea!. into se.veral :fairly; tistinctive: regions: 
(i) The we.stern highlands:. 
(ii) The s:outhei'l!ll coas.tl.ands-~ 
( ·••)(Ui-l.l.l. . man. 
(iv) The eas.tern ooastla.nds. 
(v) The interior deserts. 
( i) 'The western highland&.. 
55. 
r 
From the head of the gulf. of. Aqaba to latitude 20 N is. the Hejaz, 
divided into tw:o• sub-regions:: the Matiin north of latitude: 24- N and 
the: 'l'.ihima from lati tume 24 N to 2.0 N ... ~, Matian is a highland region 
with peaks reaching 9 ~000 feet ,and the highlands drop abrup'tly to a 
narro.w coastal p:llain. On the w.e:s;t, of the range there are cleep]..y incised 
wadis. which carry.· torren~s ner,- few years for a few: d:aya. ·on this: 
side the effects; at rainfall are soon tissipate.d. and .the el:lmate. is. 
ex.ce·sdvely humid.; there is thus no habitation and no important. routes. 
On t9e eas·t the water can be: stored! iri the shallOV'ler, broader valleys, 
and in upl.and basins where alluviWII! ocCUFs1rain:f'al.l collects and is 
shield!ed from: the sun and hence wel]i,..irrigation is possible. Th1m 
there is· a line of oases on the eastern slope:s:-Mudawwarah,'rabUk, 
c 
al.-Ala,Medina. mere garden cultivation is practised and trade: route·s 
have developed with the far Borth and south. 
South of latitude 24 N the range: decreases. considerably and in 
many :pU.aces is only about. 5 1000 feet in height;the coastal phin is 
wider and routes inland are easier. This: region contains the oas.is o:f 
Mecca. Apart from: these oases the whole_ of the Hejaz is barren,w.ith 
only a few· stunte.d bushe:s;~and not even pastoralism is possd.blle. 
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( -South of latitude 20 N lies As"ir,a region of extensive uplands• mos.tly 
o¥er 5.ooo feet with peaks UF to nearly 10,000 feet. There is a 
madera te rainfall and for s·evera.l months of the year the wadis; are 
fi.lled by fast flowing streams which do not reach the sea. except a.ftel!" 
exceptio~ heav,y floods. T.he steep valleys of the upper streams 
earry a dense jungle of bushe:s;~ thorns and moderately sized plants•; 
away from the valley bottoms this; c~.s· to gras·.sland with sd.zeab]e 
trees•. 'IDle higher slope:s. have been cleared and! terraced for cultivation·~ 
!he eoastlandi is arid. and barren. 
A siinilaJ!." pattern but on a larger s:cale occurs:. in the: Yaman. Much 
of the Yama:ni: highlands lie: at 7/1.0.000 feet 'With one peak of about: 
:1i.4~.000 feet. There is the s·ame pattern of streams; Wlhich fail to reach 
the coast and the coastal pladn is barren with few. inhabitants;access 
from the coas.t to the plateau is ver,y: diffieul.t .• On the plateau the 
winter temperatures a.re low.; with frost. a.ndi snow;,while in summer the 
heat is. l!la.de leu oppreasive by the. elevation. There is. an annual 
rai:rl.fall of· 2.0/4.0 ine:he:s. in summer w.i th other :falls in March. 
Extensive areas of the plateau are: cultivated. 
(ii): The southern coas·tland!s;. 
There is a gradual drop in elnation from es·.t to east: in the wes;t a . 
narrow; coas:tal pllain 5 to :lLO mile:s wide gi"H:s way to a tableland 4/7 ~000 
feet high,heanly dissected with w.adiis which are often completely 
barren. North is the trough of the Wa.dli HaQ:ramawt and north again is; 
a level plain stretching into inner Arabia. Rain:f'all is less: than in 
the Ya.man with perhaps 25/SO inches. in the coa.s.tal plateau east of 
the Yaman,with the ra~ ·season in the summer. 
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Over the rest of s. Arabia rainfall is below 7 inches. annually• the 
rainy season is in the late winter and the summers. are· dry;towards; 
( -
Uman rain may only fall once in ev-ery five or ten yeara. Temperatures 
• 
are high and most of southern Arabia is barren,wi.i...th agriculture 
confined to a few; s:catterd districts.. 
( 
( • • •) T'l:..=-111 ·. uwa.u. 
( 
Umin is isolate<ili from the rest of.· Arabia b~ the Empty Quarter: the 
interior is a high tablelana: at a level of about 4p000 feet with the 
Jabal aJ.-Akh.d:ar· ~ising to 9/:li.O .ooo feet. The ]ll.ateau is tissected by 
numerous deep. wadis. Rad..nfaJ.l is. about lLO inches a year and many 
springs·. occur~:but on the s:outh-west sd.de o:verloold.llllg: the desert-. water 
is scarcer and occurs in the form of a line of springs. along the· 
' foothills. _The coas.tline: of the Ra s Mu:s.a.ndam peninsula is of the :fjord 
type with inlets that are excellent as·. harbours; but the climate: is 
hot and humid and there is• no access to the interior,.~· 
(iv) 'Phe eastern coastlands. 
This region is everywhere. below a level of 6QOr ··feet:. Annual rai.ntall 
is less: than 4 inchee;,but a curious f·ea.ture of' the region is the 
occurrence of artesd.an springs• which are though~ to be fed fli'Om as 
far away; as the wes.tern highlands. Where such springs occur .as; in 
, 
JSal:lrayn islanclli and the oases of al!""~si.cultivation is· possible. 
FrO!!l about latitude 26 N as far as:. Kuwayt,.however,.the landl is· almos·.t. 
entirely bare: and uninhabited. Apart from one. or two small. ports,even 
ship:s; of shallow dl;'aught cannot approach within miles of the shore 
because of the shallownes•s,conil reefs,and shifting sand banks. Inland 
are extensive lagoons and salt marshes. Kuwa.yt has, a: good deep-water 
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harbour but land communications; with Basrah a.re= difficult: because of 
the marshy nature of the ground. 
( v) The interior des:erts. 
North of a line from(Aqa.ba to al-Ja.w:f' and thence to Kuwa.yt lies the 
s.teppe: country - the Badiet a.l-Sh'im. South between al-Jaw.f and Haill. 
is· the Nefiid,. a. region of. loose s-and! ani. bare: rock,. which is oonnec·ted 
-A th (al 171..-::',. b ,, u.o e great southern desert,. the Rub -:~-u.LA.I-1,. y; 1the Dahna desert. 
Somewhat less barren is: the: Na.jd, a. triangle lying between Medina.,. 
Mecca a.nd. Riyadh. 
To the north the Batiet a.l-Sham stre.tche.s: a.a far as the banks of· 
the Euphrates;: its altitude ·increases slowly from 2:,000 fee:t at the: 
la.ti tude of a.l-Jaw:f to 3-,000 feet at 1the la.ti tude: of. Da.ma.scus and then 
declines slowly again north of Palmyra.. It is. a vast pi.ain intersected 
by shallow wadis. trend!ing north-east. Thes:e wa.dlis of.te·n retain water 
and the lines. of wells. s:o r·ormed have led to the e:s.ta.blishment o'f 
routeways. from' eas.t to west. One· of the most important. of the routes 
is: the one from Karbala to Hail,. and another leais from a.l-Jawf' to the 
WicH Sirl}an a.nd! thence to the :ey&wran. The. northern steppes have a 
rainfall of fJ;"Om 2 to 6 inches annually and carry gras;s into the late 
s,pring;. a variety of bushes: provide camel fodder. Summer temperatures 
a.re high but there is an appreciable drop. at night. In winter the days 
can be uncomfortably cold and the writer has recorded a night temper-
-ature on '11'.4 pumping station of 2.0 F. below· freezing point. 
This, region has; provided the essentials for pastoral culture in its 
fulles;t development,. andL even today many hundreds. of camels: a.re: 
pastured in spring in the steppes of the Palmyrene. 
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Because· of the: relative ease of ~ovement the regi.on has been us:ed in 
the past for the: passage of commerce and as a route for military 
expeditions. There, are: few oases· in the area,of which Pa.lmyra and 
Qaryatayn are two examples:. 
The great Nafud desert is a region of rocky outcropa with 
ridges. worn· down by water and wind. action into grotesquely shaped 
pinnacles: and crags. B'etWecm the ridges: lowland basins mostly covered 
in loose s-and occur,.and in s.ome of these,.where an impemaeabJle: s:tm-
-s.tratw:m retains water;cmltiva.tion can be carried! on. The: largest. oases 
are in the west,w:here the Wa.tei,"' ~·oot:' the Hejaz finds: ita way eas,twardis·, 
into artesian· basins;the. presence of such oases with populations·. up• 
to 15,.000 is in marked eontraat to the &diet al-8him. RaiJ.:l:fal.l is 
very rare, and the el.imate. is one of extremes;. In summer a diurnal. 
range of 40 degrees; F. is; common,w:ith maxima of 115/120 F.;:rros;t is 
common: in winter;'ri.olent. winds spring up and 4?-e ciliown with equalL 
rapj.dit,t. 
c: - -
'Phe Empty Quarter (al.-Rub al-Khali) or· the Sands; (al-RaDla]) 
is the: Ya.st s·anclcy' des:ert. of southern Arabia,.covering 400_,000 square 
miles: 11and it is. almost a total bar:rrier to normal travel. There are 
wells. Oil! the fringes· of ·the Sand:s but the interior is almost comple.tezy 
waterless. L) HUge sand dunes; are. a formidable obstacle. even to Badw 
who; are adapted to this des:ert a.nd whose camels• are bred for travel 
in: these conditions. 2) Small tribes do,howev.er,.make use: of the. Sands 
tor grazing 5) a.nd for refuge. 4-) 
L) ~es. 105f. 2:) ibid. :lL29f'~ 3;) ibicl.1:1L21'. 4) ibid.277,. 
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The Najd is a diverse region of upl~s,small plateaus:,sea.rps.,broad 
valleys and dry river beds. Granite massifs up to 4/5 1000 feet: occur 
and another feature is a series of scarps running north to south,the 
highest being Jabal Tuwad.q,:l..,OOO; feet above the p].ateau. Upwelling of 
ma:gma has occurred iii! places; forming; desolate lava fields like the, 
Leja of ~wrin. Rainfall is low in the lowlands bu.t more abundant in 
the uplands and a certain amount of preeipitation finds, i t.s way into 
the lowlands: or else is retained by occasional.. impermeable layers in 
·the uplands. Hence some oasis cultivation is ~riei on in the lowlands 
and a lesser amount in the highlands. Only about one twenrtietb,.however, 
is, cultivatable: and the rest of the region is given over to nomadism 
or hunting. Ne"VJertheless th~. Najd is· an island of· relativeJ.y fertile 
country in an expanse of waterless desert and barren mountain rid!ges. 
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2. The eoastlands of the Levant. 
The region will be described from north to s:outh •. 
The .Tabal. ~~:ariyah or Alawd. mountains a.re: of an average heigP.t o:fi'' 
about 4,000 feet with the valley of the: Ghab to the east,. a. rift 50 
miles long by :1!.0 miles wide, in which flow;s the Orontes• before turning 
we·s;t to the sea· betw.een the Ansariyah andl Amanus; ranges. Its• floor 
lie·s, 3·,000 feet below the summits\ ·of the An~riyah and until recently 
it was covered!. in w.inter by flood w.aters and in summer by malarial 
swamp:s. Only on the wes;tern s:lopes; of the Anlji·a.Fiyah :is. eultivation 
possible and! much o:f the s:outh a.nd ea.st is barren and thinlyr populated. 
East of the Gh'i.b the land rise:s; 1m :form an irregular pJ!a.teau,; it. is 
very open ani!! fertile and easily e.ul tivated! but bee·aus.e of i t·s. elevation 
s,treams. are dteeply indented. anat irrigation. is Q:U'ficul:t:. 
'l'he ~b~~: (Ipm.f!:) gap• separates. the An~:a.riyah range: from the Lebanon, 
a s•ingle round:e.d up:f'bldl of rema.r.ka.bly; uniform, height., about 1.0,000 
feet at the highest part. There: are: many springs at: the. 5/5,000 le~el 
but deep ravines: in the lower zone make a.cce·ss clliifficult: and in the 
pa.s·,t: the Lebanon. has; provddeat sanc·tua.ry t:o refugees, who g~ined a 
living by a.grieulture in the fertile upper zone:. T'o the east is the 
fertile: plain of the B~a' and then the. Anti-Lebanon where w.a.ter is 
mueh se·arcer.· than in the Lebanon,. andl hence: settlement. is. sparse. 
The defile of the B·aradla forms a gap; between the Anti-Lebanon and 
Mt. Hermon which at: 9,200 feet: is· 2:,000 feet higher than the highest. 
peak in the Anti-LebanoR. 
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A series of lesser ranges. in Syria begin north of· Damas:cus,. trending 
south-we.s;t·. to north-eas.t,.andi. die out on the· Euphrates. The lower sli.opes 
carry grass only for a few weeks· in· the year and .. nom.acM.sm is. the· 
predominantway of lif~. 
South of Damascus, the topography is; dominated! by lava f.lOW:s. 
South-we s.t S;,ria and!. northern Jordan is- an irregular pl.a. teau at. lL,.OOOi 
to 2:,000! feet~~ In the west towards the Jordan "''alley the fands:cape is 
o~ a.nd rolling with level stretohe·s and open val]eys with occasional. 
basaltic ridges or la¥& cones:this. regi.on.J:Iaw.ri.n,.can with a good. water 
suppl!y be: very productive. Further east. the plateau becomes higher 
and more· rugge41,.with vast numbers of boulders·. becoming; an increasing: 
obs.tacl.e to cultivation. i'he highest part is the Jabal Druze,. an 
irregular dome of basalt capped by volcanic cones. North-west and 
north-eas;t af the Jiabal Druz:e lie two barren and dieaolate areas of 
lava,.al-Leja and a],...Sa;fa,wri th al~Leja the more forbidding of :the: two. 
Lebanon pa.s·ses. without break into the plateau of Galilee 
whicll is at an average height of :lL,.000/2,.000 feet. with s.ome peaks 
at 5,000J feet. It is a. region of smooth,.round.edi. hills and grass--
-co'lfered uplands.;the whole. ma.s;sif' ends in the p\l.ain of Es:dra.el!.on to 
the west and south-west which varie·s in width :fi'rom 20 miles at the 
sea to a mere: 1/2 miles inlandi..,!)pening: out again to 5/10 miles, towards 
the: Jordari. It has a very rich s·oil but until recently was· malarial.. 
South of Esdraelon is Samaria,low.er than Galilee but deeply 
dissected with many valleys,,_ma:ny of them mere gorges. Cultivation is 
possible in the wider valleys,.otherwise the area is given over to 
pastoralism. 
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-Samaria merges, with the plateau. of Judaea which eo~nces about Nablus; 
it lies; at a level of :lL.;$00/3;1 0001 feet but it is• much~ leas eroded than 
Samaria due to lower rainfall. The landscape is dust,y and repellent: 
wide expanses of bare rack,scattered bau.ll.ers amd scree,and occasional. 
smaU. v.alleys which are often dry. Vegetation is often littl.e more 
than scrub: and thorns. Cul.tivation is liimi.ted to patohe:s of all.uvium 
in the deeper valil.eys where water is availiable and· there are onJly five 
settlements of ~portance: Jerusalem,.Be,thlehem,Ramall&h,.Hebron and 
Beersheba. 
Another fault divides the main plateau from the Negeb,,ar.r irregullar 
upl.an.Q! region :li.~000/2,.000 teet in its. mean height. but with oe:casionali 
ranges· :lL,OOO feet highe~ than the plateau. 
The Sephalah is an intermetia te. zone between the uplands of' Jud.aea 
a.ndl. Samaria. and the coastal pla.in,and. a riclge 700/:lL,OOO feet above: 
sea level dirldes it from the piain. More r'ainf'all and erosion with 
consequent .alluv-ium in the valleys makes. it sui table for cultivation 
. 
and hence the population is denser. The eoastal plain itself is narrow 
in the north where in some places the hills start almost at the sea 
but it widens in the ·south whe·!'e the plain is :li.0/15· miles. wide. The: 
plain of Sharon ia very fertile but the southern coas:t towards. Gaza 
is. le·s:s so because of blm,n dune sand. Beyond Gaza the: true desert 
begins. 
The Jordan trough is flanked along aJ..mo·st its entire length 
by the highlands: ot· .T:uda:ea and Samaria and the steep,fa.ulted edges. 
of the Arabian piatea.u. There is: thus. a precipitous des•eent to the. 
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floor which lies 1~300 feet below sea le~ at the Dead Sea. A number 
of small streams have carved deep1 notches in the plateau edges. and 
some are used by roads,but otherwise direct communication across 
the. rift is impo·ss·ibl.e. 
·The: rainfall in the Le:wmt is on the whole adequate: there 
is rain all the year round in north Syria but no summer rain in 
Lebanon or Palestine while beyond Gaza true desert. conditions prevail. 
Annual rainfall 'VIaries from 50 inches in Lebanon to :1L.4 inches, at Gaza. 
On the coas·t winters. are mild,:f'rost is. almos't unknown and snow is 
rare;the Shlouq wind can raise the temperature considierab~ in winter. 
The summers are moderately hot but the high humiiit,y is unpleasant 
and! the nights are oppressive. In the mountain zone the winters are 
eoldi ana snow.· is abundant;in summer temperature.s are also lower with 
a marked! clllrop at night·. The inhabi ta.nts of Beirut., whenever possible, 
( 
desert the· city in the summer for mountain re:s:orts s.uch as. Aley and 
~diin which can be reached by ee.r in about h&lf an hour. The Ceaia.rs·, 
of Lebanon bas; become~~in· recent; years,.a popular winter re.sort :for 
The: Nile VJalley and its Borders. 
Comprising: 
(i) Sinai. 
( ii) The Ea:s tern Highla.ndis: .• 
(iii) 'The We:s·tern' Des.erts~. 
(iv} ~e Nile Valley. 
(v) Cyrenaica. 
(i} Sinai 
The Sinai peninsula is an irre~ plateau til teal upw.ards towards 
the s·outh;.the sow~ern half is· at an altitude of 2,000/2:,500 fee,t 
with peaks rising over 3:,ooOl :feet. higher.. Along the: Guli:f of· Suez. the 
pJ!.a.in is 5/8 m:i.les 'll'idie but along the· Gulf of Aqaba the plateau :falls 
abruptly to the sea. The coastal plain at. the: Medd.terra.nea.n is broad 
' -and extends. througll. al_:Arish to the lowlands of w.es:t Palestine; it 
has·, alway~ been a corridor :f'or movement between the Levant and the 
Nile: valley .. The entire region is dissected! by irry; river valleys; 
the rad.nf.a.l] ia 6 inarhe:s annually in the north and 2/5 inches; in the 
s·outh. There is much loose s:and and s:e.ttlement is diifficul t be:cause: 
sand. tends to build UJill against fixed ob.jec:t".s. In the north there are 
some aett1ements where cultiv-ation is poasible in hollows where water 
is retained by ba:rement roc-k. Otherwise nomatism is• the principal.. 
way of life. 
(ii) 'Fhe. Eastern Highlands (between the Red s·ea and: the Nile). 
This: is a larger area than Sinai but lower in a1titud.e·- 1.,000{2:,500-' 
fee,t with the highes~t peak at 7,480 f'eet .• It is heav-ily dis,se.cted 
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with deep wadis running into the Red Sea. anEll the Ni]e:;watm- is very 
scarce and cultivation is almost impos:s·ible:. 
(iii)' ~e: Western Deserts;. 
About half the area is below; 6QQ ... f'eet in altitude and few parts exceed 
:li.,.000l feet ;;a line of continuous·. scarps: runs along the Cyrenaican 
bordier. 'l'here are m~ deep, ba.si.ns; with artesian watel!" o:t· which the 
Qattara depression is. the larg~st .• while others. include DakhJl.a, Siwa, 
and the Fayyiim1 (Egypt) and J"arabub·.Jalo,.and Kufra (Cyrenaica). The 
Qatta:rra depression is. not cultivated because: of malarial· c::ontitions·, 
but many of' the other basins. support considerable. populations. Outside 
the basins the des:ert consists; of' bare outcrops:, s.to~ was·,tes; and loose 
(iY) The Nile: Valley. 
From A~ northwards. the river flows in a well developed 
notch valley w::i. th cliff boundaries, the valley being about 6i mile:s; 
wide: w:ith the ri'Vier occupying about half a mile.~ At Cairo the delta 
region· begins with two main branches: the eastern or Rosetta branch 
and the western or Damie:tta branch 'Which is about :lL4 miles long~. 
About half of the delta is covered by lakes and Si'i18JD,ps.. The river 
controls: introduced in this century have materially affec1recill the 
regime of the Nile at Cairo. Cae:tani .in his Chronographi.a: Islam:ica. • 
gives the maximum and minimum levels of the: river for each year· from 
the Arab conquests. onwa.rd!s.,€J!UOting Mahisin. Figures for max:i.mwm ~ 
_, 
rise -nrry from 5 to :115 dlhira although for most years the figure is. 
- c - (" from :li.O to 13 d:hira. 'fhe dhira Y.arie:s. from 50 to70 eentimetre:s. Taking 
the mean at 60 centime:t;re:s;, the minimum rise: would! be 3. metre:s.,maxi mum 
9 metres;,.while in most years the rise. would be from a: to 8 metres. 
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The' c~imai;e in the Nile Valley is remarkably unifoli"'Il due to the absence: 
of relief although in summer the temperatures at the coast are 
noticeably less than at Cairo. O.ver the whole region,in summer, there 
is a marked drop in temperature at nights. 'li'he: winters: are mild ,and 
frost is unknown' in the Nile Valley but occasional coli spells occur 
llith slight snow showers as; far soujh. as Aawan;the hot Khamsd.n winds 
blowing from inland are more hal!'mt.ul. to crops; than eold!. Annual. ·rain-
-fall is 8 inches• or less;.the coast gets from, 4 to 8 incb.e;s but south 
of Cairo the annual amount is 2 inches or less,. Evien this is a decept-
-iv-e figure be:cause a fairly heavy onset may only oe:cur once in two 
or three years· .• 
. , ( w) Cyrenaica. 
(a) The North. 
The: edges of the uplands are broken into several s.teps of which the 
lowest is the coastal plain,.a narrow:,often dis:ce:ontinuous s.trip. 
Sometimes only a fe'Wl hund:red yards; wide,it reaches. its·, greate,st width 
o~· 12: miles. at Benghazi. Because o~· the broken nature of. the coun~, 
routes,.espeei.ally in the east and south-east,.mus:t gp inland:~ The. 
seeond step, app.ea.rs; as a series of r:i.d.ge:s: in the east and as a more 
open terrace in the south-west (plain of al-Barq:ah). In the eas;t·. is 
a tangled oountry of deep• wadis and isolated hills•;mos•t of the wadis: 
are too bare for human habitation. !he. third step is a moderately 
high pllateau,open and rolling in the wes.t and narrower in the eas•t, 
where it rises• to just over 2·,000 feet above: sea level and foli"'Ils• in. 
the extreme· east the small dissected rldige of al-Hamrin:,.the highes•t. 
part of Cyrenaica. The entire plateau is. known,.by reason of its· 
vegetation,as the Jabal al~dar (see below). 
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(b) The South. 
South of the Jabal a.l-Akhc!ar the surface slopes ciliown tcnm.rds the main 
Saharan plateau. Immediately below the cres;t the land is heavily tti.s:s-
-ected! with deep; w:adis but farther south the relief· is gentler,w±th 
shallow alluvium-filled basi.ns seJParated by low ridiges: and an occasional. 
higher hill. This• region gives way to the true eastern Sahara. until 
the. sand! s:ea of Calans:cio is; reached, covering· se'Jieral hundred miles 
Wii th soft mobile s-and!. In the southern region. oc-casional lowland bas:ina 
with artesian water oecrur and in these limited settlement is possiblLe. 
(c)- Vegetation anal Climate,. 
The v.ege.tation in the coastaL. pJLain of' CyirEma:ica is mostl!y.' g~igue -
a thi.ck CQ:R:II.'ing a£ smrub and thorn with the occasional. evergreen oak •. 
On, the second step there is extensive woodJiarul which is widespread· 
over northern Cyrenaica and this is: most important:, since it provides 
graz.ing even in a poor· summer and s·eems. to resist damage even by gpa.ts. 
The: woodland cease:s. below the cres,t of the J"aba.l. aJ.-Akhcffiar and gives; 
way to garrigu~ and grass-cover~ patches which in turn give way to 
s:te.ppe vegetation and ev:entuall.;w desert. 
The high relief and the surrounding sea gi'V1es,in parts,an annual rain-
-fall of li.5· to 20 inches but the amount timinishes rapi~ in the: east. 
and s:outh ..... A aerious disadvantage: is the capriciousne:ss of the rainfall 
in thait once. eViery 4 or 5 years there is a. bad season a.ndl cultivation 
is therefore. hazarious. Hence there is; a strong bia~~; towards pas:tor.alism. 
With allowance made for slight differences· of heavie:r~ainfall on the 
plateau a.nd a somewhat reduced summer tempera.ture,the climate. is typical. 
of. the Middle Ea.s.t and much re·sembles: that of Egypt and south Pales tine. 
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4·. Asia Minor. 
In this section it is propo.aea; to· deal only \\d. th those parts of 
Asia Minor whieh were the scene of hostilitie.s: in the early conque·s:ta. 
These: w:ere.: 
(i)- The: East Mediterranean Coastlands. 
(iil Eas.tern 'l'ur.key ( N. Jazirah and Armenia). 
(i). The East Mediterranean Coastlands. 
~he. division be.tween Syria and Turkey (Bilam al-Riim) is a serie:s of 
narrow. but high mountain ranges. Running f~om weat to east these are: 
(a): The. main Taurus• running· north-east. from Silifke;from the coast the 
range is cut by river action into four massif's.the highe:s.t: of' which 
reache:s. 12:,.000 feet. The riv:er gorges: offer practicable routes. through 
the barrl.er,the: mos:t famous being the Cicilian Gates through the valley 
of· the· Yezilouk. 
(b) The: anti-Taurus,.lower than the Taurus,and running parallel. to it 
to the eas:t .• It consists. of five· main ranges:,.four of which d!ie away 
40~.miles north-eaat of Aa!a.na giving rise to the Seyhan pllaino 'fhe:. 
fifth range.,the Misis Dagh·.oontin~s: further to the south-wes.t. 
(c) The· Amanus lies: behind Iskanderun,so that the GUlf o:f I&ka.nderun 
:is· bracke:ted by the Am8iilUS· and the Misis Dagh. 
There is. a considerable population in the larger folds of the anti-
Taurus and in the plain of Seyhan,.which has access to the interior 
by mountain pas·se:s. The region is by no means; arid and has: an annual. 
rainfall of 30 inches: in the south-facing ranges of the Taurus sys•tem 
and: from 20 to 3n inches·. on the coast. · There is also s·ome rain in 
summer, which is warm! and hUDI!icill; the winter is milcl,o: 
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(ii) Eastern Turkey. 
There is little physical unity in the region;a series: of mountain 
ranges;,,extensive and continuous·. in the north,fa.ll away on the. s·outh, 
first into-a broken plateau countr,y and then into an undulating plain 
( -
which continues through north Syria and Iraq. There are several large 
rivers auch as; the A.ras;,Euphrates and Tigris and a number or· downthrow; 
basins which include Lake· Van. North-eas.t Turkey f'orms; ancient Armenia,. 
a land in whicli soil cover is thin· or entirel.y absent. The rivers have 
cut immense gorges and often lie several thousand feet below.· the level 
of the plateau. The lava up]ands of Armenia are mostly uninhabited 
because of the barren surface= and the a.l ti tude•• Aroundl Diyarbek:i:r 
and Urfa the topography is much less; ruggeclll but the rivers are deeply 
slotted! and the extent of cultivation is limited;the= way of. life is·, 
most~ pastoral• 
Climatically this is one of the most inhospd. table areas in: 
the world with hot,.dry,.dlls:ty summers and bitterly cold winters:,.while 
both spring and autumn are subje.ct. to hot or oolclli spells· .• The; summers 
are naturally hotter &nd! mo~· aridi in the south,. towards· the Syrian 
steppe·,;mhere: temperatures: may exceed. 1.00 degree:s F. Winter's are cold 
e~n in the south but in the north they are. extremely bitter· and snOW·· lies 
for 120 days in the nort:b-eas.t: whereas at. Diyarbe:kir it o~ lies: from 
7 to :1LO days:. There is a moderate rain£a.llL of between 1.7 and 24 inches 
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5. The Lands; of the Sasinid. Empire:. 
The Sisamdi Empire comprised. the. who].e o£ modern Iri.n to~:the:r with 
parts: of· what are· now Af'ghanistin,We·s't Pa.kist&n,Baluchistin,aouth-west: 
( 
U.s.s.R. and the lOW!la.nds of· Iriq and! MeS:Oipotamia. Not all. the:se regions, 
how.ev.er~wer.e conquerea or even eff'ecti~y raided in the period under 
review·. The area ean be dealt w:i th by covering mo_dern ·nran in its dis~ 
-tinct geographical di'rlsions.,girlng for each dinsd.on the equivalent. 
name:s as: used by the. Arab sources. Kh.uzistin will be omitted from this 
I 
section an~ aescribed in the same: section as Iraq and. Mesopotamia,with 
which regions; it has consd.derable physical a.ffini ty. (The small. corner 
of we·st Af'ghanis.tin entered by the early raiders may be considered as 
sd.m!i.lar to the Eastern U'Pla.nds region o1f" Irin). A second section will 
deal with the area between the Caspian and: the Oxus,then east Khuras·an, 
now the 'l'urkmen S.S .. R.,and a third· With the lowlands:;· 
(i): -irin (exclud.ing Khuzistin). 
Iran is a high plateau ringed. on all sides by higher mountain ran~s 
and hence it has· a physical unity based on separation from ita adjoining 
regions .• To the south and_ west there is a marked! contrast. betwe.en the 
. 
Zagros. range and the plains of Me·sopotamd.a and to the north an equa.l.Jly 
abrupt descent occurs from the Elburs to the plains: of Turke:sti'n and 
the Caspian basin. Elsewhere the mountain ring continues without much 
interruption into the highlands. of eastern Anatolia and! the more broken 
massifs of Baluchistan and Afghanistan. The country may be divided 
by topo9'aphy into tour fairly distinct regions: 1.. The Zagros: toldls; 
2:. 'File Northern Highlands:;~i.The Eastern Uplands.4.The: C~ntral Plateau. 
Q 
1.. The Zagros. 
The Zagros can be sub-divided,from a pnysical viewpoint,into three 
regions: 
111!-a The North-Wes,t ,between the 35th and! 39th. parallels .• 
(Adherb.ayjan,part ott Jib&l.) 
l...b·~ The Centre ,between the 55th and: 27th parallels'• 
(Fars;,part of Jibal.,.pa.rt of Kirm&n) 
-. -. 
lL.c. The South-Eas.t.,.be:tween the s-trait of Hormuz and Baluchistah) 
(Makran,Jabal: )fl]:ts:,pa.rif .. of'.: .. Kirman) 
1.a. The North-Wes-t. 
This region give:a: the appearance of an extensive plateau whi.ch is-
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til tecili. towards the south-east a.ncili is intersected by numerous; deeply 
incised valleys so that reli:ef is extremely varied. s·ome r.iver valleys 
are no more than gprge:s but others; are wider;:for e:xamp]e the Aras w:hich 
forms a COITidor 10: to 4K) miles; wide and the saria:. Rud which has; a 
basin ll5 miles wide around the town of Mianeh .. The area also inClude's 
Lake Urmiyah a.nd its: bas·in,a total area of 20,.000 s:quare miles. Another 
feature is the oc·cuiTence of numerous·. volcanic·. peaks,often on the 
highest part of· the plateau,.produc1.ng imposing cones- reaching :L4,000 
feet above sea level. The upl.andis are: stony, very hot. in summer and 
-v:ery cold in winter,.and off"er little· inducement to settlement,W!hich 
occurs mainly along the wider river beds and around Lake U~ah, 
usually on the higher reaches of its feed streams,before they are 
affected by the lake's. salinity;Tabr:i.z lies on such a stream-,3·5 mile:s 
from the shore of the lake. 
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The central Zagros. is characterised by intense :folding :in densely 
packed ridges. aligned in: ra.nks;in the north the ridges are broader 
and higher,in the south smaller and! finer·. Again the rivers o:ften run 
in steep• gorge·s too narrow f"or even the. smallest alluviWII\ terraces 
to fol!'Dll. In, s:ome parts: where there. are no gaps. through the ridges, 
the rivers :follow a tortuous course ~a one syncline to, another while 
others follow; a sho:rter,precipitous des·cent to the Mesopo.:tamd.an pJi.a.in. 
. . 
Out&tanMng aingle peak& are rarer than in the north-w8s:t; range bu-t 
there is a greater extent of" highland. Parts. are covered m th veget-
-ation,.esp.ecially in the. north,.but much of the region :is of bare, 
startlingly-coloured rock. Some of· the wider valleys. can be cul tiVtated 
by terracing· into· the hills. but. mos-t of the p.opulation is pas:toral. 
Another f'eature of· the· region is the OC'CUITence of' small. lcmland basins 
s·ome: of which,.e.g. Shiraz andi Niriz,.are totally_ enel,os:ed:. and he.nce 
ha"R internal drainage with consequent :formation of salt lakes or 
ma.rshes.;:others·, have: ri"Vter outlets. The,se basd.ns. are intens.]y cul.tivated 
in the non-s·aline s.tretches;. 
:::n..c. The: South-East:. 
'This: region is. much less imposing than the eentral Zagros,.i ts. 
topography is more irregular and broken. A narrow coastaJi. plain is 
s.ucceeded by a zone of pil.ateau country at an average altitude oft 
2,000/5,000 tee.t,crossed by lines of hills: that occasionally reach 
6,.000/7,000 feet. Between these= hills lie numerous river bas•ins·. that 
dis:cha.rge. directly to the sea. 
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Northwards; the plateau terminates in an extensive trough,the J:az Murian 
basin,.which is partly filled with a thick layer of silt and partly 
with wind-blown s·a.nd. There is no drainage from the baain and its 
centre is occupied by a brackish lake. fed by two streams whili.e. other 
streams fail to reach the lake and are buriei beneath the sand dUnes. 
B'e;rond the basin is a single narrow line of highland dd.vidi.Dg: it from 
the central plateau. There is occasional cultivation in the south-eas.t 
region. where. water is ava.ilable,otherwise: the landiscape is desolate. 
2. The Northern Highlands. 
( Jii.lm,.'¥aba.ristan,.Qilmi.s ,.Jur jan,.pa.rt. of· E. Khurasan) 
The Northern Highlands are divided into two· groups;: the· EJ!burz range, 
andl the more extensive .chains to the north-eas·.t,.chief among which are 
the Kopet Dagh and the Al.a Dagh. Be.tween the tw.o maase.s lie·s• a trough 
part of which is occupied! by the Atrek river. 
The Elburz. is a. series of narrow, steep' folds,often reaching 10 1000 
feet in altituie within 50 miles of the Cas.pian. Erosion is very active 
in the northern slopes. where great torrents. run in deep gorges to the 
sea. Further south there· are better developed rivers. such as. the Shih 
Riidi. and the Nur. There is a markedi climatic variation,.with much less 
rainfall on the, southern flanks ,and while the· northern slopes a.re well 
wooded up> to 7,000/8,.000 feet the· vegetation becomes much les;s; luxuriant 
further south,.pas.sing in the extreme south to scrub and bare hillsides. 
The coastal plain varies. in Wiidth from :1.0 to 70 miles: and is covered 
in semi-tropic&l forest,eleared in places for agriculture~ 
c 
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The: Eas:tern range:S ha.v:e: a. north-west to south-east alignment: the, 
Kope,t Da.gll reaches. 1.0,000 feet in plia.ces.. Between the Kope:t Da.gh a.nci 
the Kuh-i-Aleh lie:s: a. well-defined valley in whic:h flow·s. the A:trek 
r.i ve-r ,, north-w.e.st tow.a.rds. the Ca.s.pia.n, a.nd the Kasb£· river towa.ros 
Af'gha.nis·.tan. This: valley is. the main corridlor be:tw.een the Caspian 
and the 'furcoma.n s.teppes around. Merv. The highla.ndls a.re barren but 
the river valleys are very fertile: with the richest. part; in the Ka.shf 
valley around Meshed. 
3.. The Eas·.tern U"pl.a.nd:s. 
( Qulp.s•tan,. part. of Khurasan, part: of Si·jistan ) 
The:se. uplands: extend from Region 2:. to the s:outh-ea.s:tern Zagros a.nd 
a.re irr~ar in trend a.nd topography with many wd.de 1owla.ndi basins. 
In general the region is: barren a.nd unprod~c:tive with much ].oos·e scree:, 
jagged peaks and clrif.ting sa.nci. The clima. te: :ii.s. one of' e:xtreme:s of 
heat a.nd oold, great aridity and. a. persistent violent wind. Some: 
a.gricuJlture: is: pos.s:ible around the few; rivers of which the mos.t import-
-ant. is the lfelma.nd.; its lake.,. however,. floods; a.:fter rains in Afghan-
-istan a.nd its tributary s.treams change cours.e wd. thout. warning a.nd 
floodl adjacent. diis.tricts so that. s·ettled oe:cupa.tion is very difficult .• 
4. 'Fhe Central Plateau. ( The: Great: Desert ) 
The northern part is occupied by a B'ell'ies of closed basins filled with 
salt-encrusted mud;: the sharp• edges of the sa:J. t: ca.n cause serious. 
injury and! the surface can give way under a man 1 s. weight. Elsewhere 
there is a. more· normal stony or sanQy ~esert. In addition to hazards 
underfoot,, movement is; mad!e even more perilous: by frequent fogs in winter. 
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Settlement is. largely eonfined to the slopes. of surrounding ranges; 
and communications. follow: the circumference~ avoiding the de:sert;. 
In the Middle Ages.,. however, there were routes·. across. the Great Desert, 
along w.hieh. covered water-pits w:ere maintained!. at s•taging points for· 
the us:e of' trave:llers. The: eas;t:..w.est routes; passed through one or 
other of the only three !lermanent oases in the desert was,te.. The·se 
widely separateOl. se:ttlemeilts .still exist;: from. north to south they 
are (old name firs.t): Jarmaq-Jandaq; Naband-unehangedl;; Sa.nij-
-Nasratabad. (see Le Strange· 5'•22: f) 
In general the climate of Iran is one of high summer tempera tu.res. 
and. very low; Wii.nter temperatures;. in sUIIIIIier much of· the: interior is 
intolerably hot.andl altitude does: little· to mitigate the intense heat~ 
although there is a rapid fal] in temperature: at night. A feature 
of the climate: is• the frequency of very high W·inds:. The heaviest. 
rainfall is:. in the north-we:st,. and in the: Elburz and north.-we:s.t Zagros, 
while: it is: much less in the Kope.t Dagh a.nd the Ala Dagh and the 
south-eas.t. Zagros;, and. insignificant in the central des·ert. On the 
Caapia.n coas·.t humidity is: always. high, with a. maximum in Wtimt:er, while 
in the Persian Gulf humidity is; highes·.t in summer and: in conjunct;on 
w:i th the intense heat gives·. rise: to very oppressive conditions· .• 
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Q;ther Sasanid provinces. 
'mle:se inelud!e:: 
1.. Eas:tern Khurisin - now the 'furlanen S.S.R. 
c - -2. 'IDle Lowlands; - Iraq,, Me,s.opotamia, Khuzis·tan. 
1... Eas~tern Khurasan. 
(This sec·tion is·, derived from Skos:yrev) 
Four fifths of this. region is; oe·cupiedl by the desert now.• know:n as 
the Kara Kum, an arid a.rea where, before the introduction of modern 
techniques·., w.ells. were infre-quent and shallow' wit~ a low. yie:ld of' 
water. It is typd.eal des:e:rrt see·nery and contains, in a.ddi tion to 
areas of dune s·and! and salt. pans;, extensive trac:ts cov:ered by hardy 
shrubs and small tree:s; such a.s. the tamarisk andi tile acacia. Until. 
recently the traditional w.ay of life in the Kara KWlll was noma.dic 
and the Turlanen tribes lived in a manner s;imilar to that: of the 
Badw in Arabia. 
There are regions in this province• how:e:ver, where: an a.gricul tura.JL 
life· is; pos,sible and cultivation has been carried! on there= s·ince ancient 
time:s. First there: are: the. oases; in the· foothills o:f.· the Kopet Dag:h,. 
in the fe:wr pla.ce.s. where the higher slope.s. are: not so precd.pi tous as 
to cause the torrents to :f.all to the plain w:d. th destructive violence. 
Some agriculture is·. basedi on irr~ga.tion but f·or most cultivation the 
rainfall is suffici~nt. The seconQ region is, the two oases based on 
the rivers; Murg~ab andi 'fedlzhen (Arabie:: Herat: River) which flow into 
the south of the province: :from Afghanis=tan. 
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In the Middle Ages the most flourishing settlement in this region~ 
on the Heri.t. :rriver,,was Sa.rakhs-S'while: the: imp.ortant centre of Ma.rv 
w.as; the: chief'· town of' the: Murglii.b region. Rain here is, very s·canty 
and agriculture is based on irrigation;having be.en tapped by 
irrigation cana:Ls: the two rivers flow: to waste in the. deaert .• 
'Fhe: third region is along ·the banks. of the Oxus: where ,however·, 
cul tiv:-ation is confined to those areas not occupieS!. by jungle: or swamp. 
hen so irrigation is ti:f'ficul t because of· frequent shif'ta in the 
course: of the river,the unpredictability- of the -water leveJ.,and the. 
:fact that the banks of· the river are some feet above: water level., 
necessitating some means of litting aid. To the north lies: the ext-
-ensd:v;e oa:sd.s sys:tem o:f· the Khwa.rizm, in the ~er delta of. the. Oxus, 
where: a considerable irrigation agriculture haa been carried on since 
ancient times. At the time of the Arab, invasion the: principal. city of 
this: region was: Khiva.. 'l'"o the eas;t the i.m:}jlortant: oases; o'f Bokhara and 
Samarqand lie a short dista.nee beyond the Oms: on the Zara.f''&ih&n rive-r. 
With the exception of the Kopet Dagh f·oothills· rainfaJlJL in the 
province is very scanty a.nd in the past lti'e was basea1. either on 
irrigation or was fully nomadic. The climate is severe with hot summers~ 
relieved by a big drop in temperature. at night ,,and winter-s: are very 
cold espec:i.aJ.ly in the north, snow s.torms and hea-vy fros:ts. being coliiDIOli~ 
In the Kope:t Dagh region the climate is les·s severe. espeC'iaJ.ly in 
'"~Falleys: protected from the east winds~where frost is a rarity; in 
summer the altitude there brings: welcome relief 'from the heat. 
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I 2:~ The. Lowlands- Iriq,.Mesopotamia or al-Jazi.rah,and ::Khuzist&n. 
The Mesopo,-tamd.an piain is di ri.aed into tw:o parts: the northern 
half consists• mostly o-£.· pasture lands. covering a s.tony plain; the 
s.outherz:1 half is a rich aJllu.viaJL region. watered artiticial.J.y. Tbe 
Arabs called tJ:le. northern half' al-Jazirah, the island,and the· southern 
. r - r 
half al-Iriq or al-Sawad. The term Iriq, there:f'ol!'esmust not be con:fused 
with the modern state of the same name which is mudl larger in extent:. 
' To the eas:t of the pJ.ain of Iraq is:· the lowlanGll Persian province ot 
Khuzis.t&n. 
(.) 'rr- ... J. .aq. 
Great changes have· ocC'\lJlT'ed in 'Iriq lti.nee. the: time of the: Muslim 
eonque·st,.changes which have. entirely alter~ the physical contitions 
in the: region. nds is dUe: to two: main cause:s: the. alteration :in the 
lower courses of the two r.ivers,.~d the lilecay of the irrigation s.ystem 
whic:h was in exis-tence at the time of the conque·st and is only nOW/ 
being restorei._There is no' certainty as to the reason for the changes 
'in the courses of. the. two riv:ers.,.except insofar as rivers 'Vri.th the· 
regime of the '1':i.gris and Euphrates.f'low.:i.ng Wii th a loWi gratient 
through level plains,.must al~s have a tenden~ to change direction. 
Fisher (Mi~. Eas:t Ch.XV ) attributes. the a.ltera.tions of course· and 
( 
the condi tiona of swamp; anal fiooding: in lower Iraq to the. par·tial 
c!amming of the Tigris·. and Euphrate:s by si.l t de.posd-ted by the KB.r\m 
and Ka.rkeh rivers flowing from the Zagros· .• 
58. 
~s theory seems to be: partially sup]ported by B·ecki.ngb.am; (Bahr Faris) 
who says that the tigris and Euphrates: leave most of their silt in 
the marshes. above Qurna and that the Persian GuJ.t· is affected only 
by sd.l.t from the KS.run. He -challenges·,however,the widely accepted 
theory that silt has: caused the gra.cma.J. recession of the waters. of 
the Persian Guli''1 and. quotes G.M. Lees and N. Falcon ('The Geographicall. 
History o"£' the. Me.sopotamian Plains,.GJ :li.952) who have claimed that the 
area between the Arabian massi:f· and. the p!la.teau of· Iran is one of 
tectonic· subsidence~mitigated but not counteracted by the depasit of 
silt. Bec:kingham: finds no geological evid:ence that the head. of the. 
Gulf has:. been north-we:s.t of its pres.ent position siilce the Pliocene 
age ancl accept·s the possibility that it m~ ev:en have: been fUrther 
to the south-east in historical times. 
Notwithstancting these divergencies,however,it is; certain that. 
( 
in the 7th century lower Iraq was: subject to the same conditions of 
swamp1 and regular inundation that. are characteristic of the region 
today ,.but the topographieal. pattern was; different. In the 7th century 
the 'l?igris, when it came about 1.00 md.le.s• below Baghdad,.turned of."lt from 
its; present course: into the ehannel now known as the Shatt al-Ha.yy 
. . . 
and flowed south for a further :ll.OO miles. before it became lost in 
the· Great Swamp,.having expended most of its waters· in irrigation 
channel.s. The main stream: of the Euphrates. l'l'a.S then the Kll1'ah branch, 
the present course past Hillah being then merely a great irrigation 
eana.l called the Nahr Sura. The Euphrates 'als:o discharg~ into the 
Great Swamp ,.a :few· mile:a below Mah. 
_, 
The Great Swamp•,al-B'a~a. ~,oeeupiedi an area. nearly 200 miles in length 
and 50. mile:s a.cros.s,and stretched from just south of' Kiif'ah near]y to 
B'a.~ah.(Its formation was attributed! by al.-Baladhuri 1.) to neglect 
of the d¥ke.s; by the: Sisinid: authorities from the end of the. 5th. 
century A.D .. onwa.rds.the final irrevocable: inundation occurring in 
629 when both rivers•. we:rre in exceptional ~te:.) The Great: Swamp· was 
( 
not a bar to navigation: the estuary,,the present Sha"t?~ al-Arab,. 
flowed in the same: channel as it doea to~ and from a point.near 
the modern Qurnah a line of lagoons: connected by open channels led to 
the point where the Tigris entered the S8alllp. By this w.aterwa.y cargo-
-boats went without diff'i~l ty from Ba~da.d to Basrah. 
It is._rtieva.nt to comment briefly on the regime of' the two 
' ( 
rivers,whic$ also has: a marked ef'feet on conaitions in Iraq. Both 
ris.e in the Armenian highlands and are fe~ chiefly by. melt from winter 
snowfall;both at first follow a. tortuous path round the:'east-west 
f'olda of' the Zagros; anc!ll later emerge in the plateau up::Lands: ot· Syria 
and KU.rd:istan a.nclll thence take a direct south-easterly course•. The 
Euphrates. receives two important. tributaries in the north Syrian steppe 
but otherwise it ree.eiw:s; much of' its water by sJ.ow percolation 
through porous rock strata. The Tigris,on the other hand~receives 
maey tributaries: from: the Zagros and its: effluent is due more to 
direct run-off from torrents. Hence local rainfall in the Zagros can 
cause• consid:erable changes, and a rise of' B/:li2: feet in 24 hours ia 
not uncommon. Both rivers, ha~e a steep. gradient in the upper reaches,. 
mos.t of the fall being between Asia Minor and Baghda.d,and a. very sJ.ow 
:fall in the lower reache:s. 
:1.) Ball 292f'. 
60. 
The gradient of the Tigris is greater tha.n that of the Euphrate.s-, :.: 
although the' Tigris is the narrower river and has: a greater :flow:·. 
Both rivers: carry much sediment. The:se cond.i ti.ons are naturally 
conducive to flood.ing,especially in the Tigris and also produce~in 
both riv:ers,a tendency to change course. a.nd flow in new channels .• 
B'oth rivers. are at their lowes·t in September and Oetober;;there· is 
a slight rise in the Euphrates: in November but the firs•t ons:e:t of' 
winter rains has a marked ei'fect on the Tigris but ·is; scarceJ..y 
noticeable in the Euphrates. From December. onwards both begin to rise 
rapidly;:max:i.IIlUIIl\ flood of the Tigris is' in April,.ot. the Euphrates: in 
May. It will be appreciated how much the· condltion of the rivers; a.ndi. 
the riparian lands at a given time of yea:r eould affect: the cours.e 
of· a. military operation. 
It is not·.;pos;sible here to des·cribe in detail the eanal s.ystem 
which accounteclll,in· anci.ent a.ndi medieval times.,:for the marvellous 
( c 
f'ertili ty o:f IraqJ. Briefly ,all Iraq north o:ft the swamp and between 
the two ri~rs: was• then traversed by a succession of canals which 
drained: eastwardl into the Tigris;;while east of the Tigris a. canal,. 
200 miles in length,.called the Nahrnan,.irrigated the lands on the 
Persian side. of the Tigria. 
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( ii) AJ!,..J azlra.h. 
This is. a re·gion of undulating pllairi bounded by the two rivers; and 
(' 
on the north by the ranges of Asia Minor;the boundia.ry between Ira.q 
and &1-Jazira.h w.as. generally placed by Arab geographers; at about the 
latitude of Takrlt. Its altitude is: from 500 to· 1,.000 feet. To the 
east of the Tigris lies. As:syria,a land which rises. in s·.tep:s; towa.rdis 
the north-east,each s_tep1 being marked by incre&s·ingly prominent ridges 
aligned north-west to south-east. Numerous: tributaries; of the Tigris 
hav:e broken through the ridges;. This lands·cape. passes into increasingly 
broken country and e:orentually to the main ranges of the Zagros to the 
east and the Anatolian mountains to the· north. 
(iii) Khuzist&n. 
'!'he Persian prov:ince. of Khuzis;tin may be regarded as an eas·tward 
(' -
e-xtension of lowe~r Iraq, with similar· conditions; of climate. It. is. an 
alluvial plain which eventually give·s· way to the: foothills of the 
central Zagros. Its main waterway is the Kirlin river,known in the 
time or· the Arab conques;ts. as the DujayJL,and it receives Ill8.lW tribut-
-aries on its; way from the highland:s. to the Persian Gu]j'·. With a 
·fertile soil ana an efficient irrigation system,based. on these. water-
wa.ys:,.i t was a proaperous region at the time of the conque:s.t, with many 
large towns and a thriving agriculture. 
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Climate 
( - - -The, climate: in Iraq,Jazirah and! Khuzistan is basically one of d.ry, 
·Very hot summers·. and relatively. eold,diamp winters. :.'.North""'We.sterly 
~h_d.milt winds blow in the summer,b:ringi.ng the rmpl.eas:a.ntness of bloW:D 
dus.t,.but there is some relief from heat at night·. Temperatures f'or 
Ba~rah,.B'aghdiad. a.n.i. MosulL are fairly uniform,a.Jl..thou:gh the nights. are 
cooJLer inland. In the south the winters are milder than illl the north 
r 
and the summers are longer. The notorious corulitio:r:I!S: in low:er rraq 
are due mainly" tO evaporation o.ver. lakes and! rivers,causi.ng high local 
humiti ty ,while: a mi].e: or two away there may be a sharp drop. It. is. 
a difficult: ~siollogicaJL climate in which heat stroke ani exha.us.tion 
can easily occur. O-wer most of the. country the average annual. rainf'all1 
is about 5 inches burt towardls. the Zagros it is o-.rer 15 inches. The 
15 inch isohyet; is of great i.mpo;r.tance since: abov.:e. this le:orel. 
agriculture. is: pos.sible wi. thout irrigation; below this: level ll.fe must 
be· either riparian or nomaaie. 
CHAPrER III 
THE CAMEL 
1.. General. 
'IDlere are two types of· camel~ the Arabian one-humped Dromeclary (Camel us 
Dromed!a.riua) ~ana: the: B·actrian or two-humped. typ~ (Camelus: Bactri.anu!s). 
~ese are two dis.tinct species and not. variants. of one speci.es.. 1) 
For the s-ake of clarity the term Dromedlary wil~ be used when referring 
exclusi"'reliy to the one-humpeQI type and the terlDt Bactrian when referring 
exclusively to the two-humped variety. The· 1 camel' will!. only be used 
in a context which embraces. both types:. Cross-breed!i.ng between the 
two species is p.os:sible and this has led! to a: wide. variety of breeds 
in'. regions where the tw.o species; intermingle:• e.g. Iran~India,. 
A:f'ghanistan,.'l'urkes;t~ and Mes:opota.mi.a. 2) There are &ls:o many dif:terent 
breeds of dromedary in Arabia.;1which are reared for s.pecif'ic purposes, 
e.g. for travel in the. sands: of the Empty Quarter or for trav:eJ!.. in 
the mountains o:t· S.E. Arabia. 5.) 'fhe scope: of this work does not permit 
oons-ideration of the re:sults·, of auch cross-breeding and specialisation 
and for present purposes. camels 'Wli.ll be regarded as belonging to one 
of the two main• species:. The impo!ll'tance of the camel toda.y is diminished 
due to the development of motor and air transport.the exploitation 
of oil resources: in the: Middlie East and the poJiic:i.e:s of Midline 
Eas.tern gpv,ernments in settling their nomad!s. When, theref"ore, the 
present tense is used! here it must be unders:tood: as. applying to- a 
period of recent history before this decay in the importance of' the 
camel set in,.in general terms the. 19th century ana the 20th,.up· to 1.925·. 
1.) Wals 5·. 195.. 2:) R:i. tter 659f:f'. 5) Badw (Wissmann) 882.;':Fhe& 249. 
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The eame1 is an animal which flourishes: in the dry, desert or s·.teppe 
regions. of the old! world and its: exis:tence as. a d!ome·sticated. animal 
makes possible a highly spe.cialis:edL nomadic eul ture in those regions. 1.) 
It prov;ide:S" transport both for man and his; goods, its hair is woven irito 
tent-cloths, its' flesh is eaten, its. milk is often the sole sustenance 
of B'adw; familie:s for most of the year. 2:) 'The camels of Central Asia. 
and Iran, howe:v.:er, have. never played the dominant role in men's lives 
as: has the dromed.ary among th~ Arabs. The nomads. of those regions have 
only one or tw.o w:ords·. in the·ir voeabulary for the camel;; 3~)- taming of 
the Bactrian in the ancient world was eonccurrent. with the ·emergence of 
the horse as·. a: ridling animal and hence the Ba.c.tria.fl never bec·a.me 
important: for riding but only as a pa.ek animal. 4) In Arabia.,. on the: 
other hand, and later in N. Africa, the dromedary w.as c·ompl.e:tely 
integrated into the lives. of' the nomads:. There is: an extens~ive tech-
-nical vocabula:J!.'Y in use: by the B'acbv for the manag~ment and use: o:f 
the a;nimal;; many hundreds:- of names are. given to the dromedary, each 
w:-i th an exact connotation. Such names are: descriptive: of. many· 
characteris-tic·s:: sex, age:, colour, reproduction,. behaviour and purpo•s.e: 
(i.e:. riding, load-bearing, water-raising e:tc·.): 5) In addition th·e 
v.ocabula.:r.y has: worc:Es: for all other aspects. of dromedary breeding: 
parts: of the bodly ,, diseas·e:s., erie&., pas.turing,, watering,. harnessing 
ana. sa~dler,y, riding· and! loading. 6) 
:1:) Doughty I, 556. 2:} Ritter 6:li.5 ff; Mus Rwa.la 348,;; The:s. 2.44.; 
Doughty I, 261.;: Lam Bere. 51.. 5) Ritter 741.. 4) Walz 2, 57; 
Wiesner ::lL, :11..00 f;; B'adlv (Wis.smann) 882:. 5) Ritter 74:1 ff;. 
Mus; Rwala 5·29-5?0. 6) As for 5, s.ee als:o Monteil. 
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The: camel tbr.iv;es; in a dry climate and! cannot live. ~n regions where 
there: is: higl:l. atmospheric· humidity. It can tolerate; extremes of heat. 
and cold! but not. a climate w:ith cons•tantly hig):l average: temperatures.1) 
The dromedary is more: tolerant of' such condiitions, es.peciallYi heat, 
since: it is es.tablishedi. in Indd.a, where the Bactrian cannot liv.e. 2) 
The: Q.8mel pa.sture.s on. w:oo~· cile.s:ert pila.nts suCh as acacia, tamarisk,. and 
thorn that. all other animals, even the goat, w:oul!.d refuse. 5.) .SaJl.t 
pil.ants•, of'· which it is espe:ciall!y fond,. seem: t.o be essential to its 
well-being·. 4) In some areas the camel is. given :fi'Odd:er such as flour or 
d!ate:s, 5) but this is not generally the case:. 6) Frequency of wa t.ering: 
varie·s• w::i th the s·eas·on andl. type of grazing: on the: sa.l t plants they can 
only go W·ithout water for 4 or 5 days,; on dry plants: fro~ 6 to 15 days; 
on juicy gra.sse:s; in the spring for 5:0 days or more:. 7) The came] is 
unique: e.mong· ruminants: in having; a special c·ompa.rtment in its stomacll., 
the· tis·sue therein being divided e.ell-W:ise. In this· eavi ty, as if in 
a. <lamp' sponge:,. water can be s.tored for a considerable time·, remaining 
unmixed!, comparativ;ely fresh, and e:x:tra.ctable:~ 8) When Badw are 
tormented by thirst they kill a few.· dromedaries,. cut open the bellies,. 
let. the water settle:, and then drink it. 9) The: camel 1 s ability.· to 
- . . . 
w:iths:ta.nd the. rigours. of the desert is; due not only to their ability 
to s;tore w:a.ter but also to pre:s:erv:e it. They can tolerate an increase 
of U degree:s F. in normal body temperature without mucll. water loss 
through sweating. 
:li.) Walz: 2·, 55;. Ritter 649; J55~.£·t:755. 2) Walz 2, 65. 5;) Ritter 61.4.; 
Badwr (Wis:smann) 882:;_ Doqghty t, 425. 4.) Mus. Rwala 55;7 f·;. Walz 2:, 55; 
Lam Berc: 54 r·. 5} Thes .. 249;; Ritter 651.. 6). Mu:s Rwa.la. 556 ff; 
Ritter 6:JL.4. 7) MUs Rwala 5·5,7 f;. see: als:o Ritter 615;. The:s. 1.:12 f; 
WaJ.z 2:, 56;: Doughty I, 260 f. 8) Ritter 61.5. 9) Mus Rwala. 5"68; 
'lhes; :158. 1.0) B'a.diwr (Coon) 872:. 
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A Bac,trian in a. caravan carries~ 480 to 600 pounds. for a daily march 
of 20-25 miles, :t): while a s·trong dromedary wil~ carry about 600 pounds 
at a mareh speed of tw.o miles. in the hour or a:bout 500 pounds at a 
speed of three miles·, in the hour. 2) The dromedary is smaller, more. 
agile· a.nd swi:f'ter than the Bac.trian 5} and is preferred. a.s a mount 
for couriers. and raiders. 4) '!'he female is fa.v;oured for riding· as. -
it. ca.n go longer without wa:ter or pa.s.ture tha.n the ma.le and does not 
w.ea.ken even in the rutting seas:on:, when the male: beoome:s exha.us:ted. 5') 
'L'he Baetrian is. better adapted for travel :in mountainous. terrain than 
the dromedary and ea.n a:scendl to heights. of 4,000 metres; on the: ea.rav;an 
route:s. 6) On the route:s, aeros;s the Gobi they are worked! only in the 
winter months when the air is at its. driest and are. resctedi for one or-
tw.o weeks at the end!. of the month-long journey before the return tF.ip•. 
For four to five: months·. in the summer they a.re· allowed to graze and!. 
store up, fat in the hump.s as· a reserve of streng:lth. 7) 'l'he d!romedary 
neecis. a:t leas;t three months res:t to recuperate a:rter a long, 
exhaus;ting journey. 8) 
In general the B'a.d'w. treat their mounts kindly: they do not beat 
them but give· their orders w.·ith -:the traclitional wordls: of command, 
riding them w.::i. thout bit or brid!le (even the use: of the nos.e-ring: is. 
not univers·a:l), and guiting them Wi:i. th a gentle ]Jressure of the foot 
or ca:mel-s;t:i.ck. On the march the rider will sing andl recite. to his. 
dromedary tmd the animals appear to appreciate this s.o that: it acts 
as: a palliative. to the hard:ships of the journey. 9) 
:li.) Walz. 2:, 56. 2:) Mus AD 455. 
Walz 2, 57. 4) Ritter 651. 
Ritter 65:9. 7): Walz 2:, 56. 
'L'hes: 44;; Lam Berc· 251. 
5i) Ritter 659 f;; B'adw (W:is:smann) 882;· 
5) Mus. Rwala 549. 6): Walz 2:,. 56; · 
8) Mus Rwa.la. 5:57. 9) Ritter 618 ff ;: 
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As·. opposed to popular· belief' in the West, the· dromed!a.ry is normal]¥ a 
., 
patient:,eas.i.ly controllable beast andl is; treateai. 'With gr.t. consider-
-ation b;w· the B'&Clllw·;real affection between master and mount is. common. 1.) 
2:. The geographical spread of' Caanel.-culture and the historieaJi. 
de"Ve:l.opment o:r· Camel-n.oma.diism. 
The present-day regions. of' camel.-cul ture are as; f'ollOR;: 
( i) The Dromediary • 
.Arabia;,North Mrica as· fa:r south as the· beg:inp:ing of' the tropical wet 
regions. along ~he Nd.ger and Senegal river valleys and the lower Suaah; 
~ - -Iraq and! Mesopotamia;:Syria and Leba:non;Pales·tine: and! J'ordtan;Kurdistan; 
Asia Minor and Armenia;;the dry areas: ot.. the north-west Intian sub-
-continent;A:tg.t:lanis~t&n;:west 'l'Urkes·.tin. 2) 
(ii) The Bactrian. 
South-wes;t Siberia;;Manchuria;Mongolia;Chine:se and Russian Turkes.ti"n; 
.Ughanis,tan;;no~ Irin;:the 'luranian and Kirghiz s.teppes;the: Caspian 
basdn and! thence: we:s.tward as·, f'ar as Asia Minor ;:the Black Sea steppes 
of' Russia. Thus: its habitat is; ma:i.nly in Ea_~!t and . Midllll.e Asia between 
the·. 40th a:.ndi 5()th parallels, of' lati tudre;:only. in the tran~Baikal.ia!l! 
steppe~ are: they reareclli as f'ar.· north as the 56th paralleJ..,andl never 
beyond! the 60th. The: northern limit may be taken as the beginning: of' 
the sub-polar· regions and the Reindeer zones.5) 
As has; already been noted,there are large: areas; where both 
breeds are in use and where: consid:erable cross~breeding has~ taken 
place. North Africa and Arabia with its northwardi extension into 
( -Pales.tine,Syria,Jord:an and Iraq has remained the exclusive pre:serve: 
·:t.) ,Ritter~, ·6:ti:5~f.:;:~e.S 56 ;;69; 255 ;.Doughty II ,.50:1!.. 2} Walz 2:,65 ;Ritter 659'; 
650!;65·1.;655f';'P54;75;S. e.tc. 5,) Walz 2.,54-55. 
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of: the dromedary~ :lL)while the nomads: of the more northerly ~J.teppes 
of· Central and East Asd.a hav-e: a camel-culture bas.ed solely on the 
B'a:ctrlan. 2) 
When a:nd where was. the camel first domes;tica:tea? Much research 
ha& been done on this problem- but. the question cannot yet. be answered 
with certainty. S)For the purpose of this. work it is not essential 
to knOWl the a;nswer Wii th exactitude:, since w:e are more concerned to 
e:s;tablish the situation prevailing at the beginning of the 7th cen1i:u.Jeyr 
A.D •• but even to this end a brief SUIDJDai'Y of the re·sul ts obtadnedl so 
far· is neces:sary. Thi,s can then be extended from ancient times to the: 
era of the Muslim conquests; to arrive at an es.timate of the situation 
pre'Via.iling;.;at that time. 
(i} The Dromedary. 
The first mention of camel. mountedl nomads is the Old Te:s;tament 
. . 
reference to an incursion of Midianites. into Palestine in the first 
half of the 1.1Lth century :a .• c. 4) From· this fact Walz has; de-welopedi 
the ·hypothesis that the earlies:t effectiv;e dtome:s.tieis:ation took place; 
probably in the Najdl, two or three centuries earlier. 5) He also main-
-tains tha.t this dome:s.ticisation took place without being given an 
im!puls:e· by the earlier ta.ming of the Bactrian camel,.aJ.though Wis·.s:ma.mJ! 
points; out that parallel inventions are: rare in history a.nd that it is: 
unlike~y that the B'actrian was not brought south from time:to time 
in the turbulent years. o'lr the 2nd. millenium: B\.C. 6) 
ll.)Ritter 74:llff;;Badw (Wissmann) 887f·;personaJ. observ;ation in TUnisia, 
Libya,.Egypt,.Syria,Labanon,Iraq and Qatar. 2:) Ritter 659. 
5) Walz :11.,.29. 4) Judges: 6-B;;Wal.z 1,.29f'f. 5) Wa.lz 1.,,48-49. 
6) Ba.dw· (Wissmann) 882:. 
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Dostal has put forwarcili. a motification to the theory of Walz. 1.) 
He points· out that there: is atte.station ott dl!'omed:a.ry riding from Tell 
Asma.r in·Mesopotamia in the second!. haJ..f of the third millenilllll! B.C. 
In this repres:entation,.a.s;. in later ones; in south ~a.bia, the riding 
position is on the crupper. The :li'irs•t endence of the humpl position 
for riding is a relief. from Tell Ha.la.f of' the 9th century B .• c. and 
Dos.tal. thinks that it is permis·.sible to place the adloption of this 
pos-ition a feWi centurie·s: earlier. 'i'he rlting position on the hump· is 
a much more: efficient position th.an: that on the cruppel', the animal 
can be ridden more swiftly and this wouldi make poss-ible the keeping, 
of' large herds and hence a fully nomadic culture .. Dostal calls this 
period af'ter· the: adoption of' the· hllm.'pi posi. tion,. tproto-beduin' .In it 
the: North,which hadi. dlopted this- position and hence a beduin way of' 
li:li'e=,-is diff'erentia.te<l from: the South,.which had r.etaine<ll!. the old 
methodl. The new stage of' development would! awaken needs: that are· 
considered the: reasons :f. or expansion into urban and a.gr.i.C\ll tura]. 
areas;: extension of gra.d.ng areas;increased need for ba.rtm-;the first 
pos:sibility f'or:::·entering into urban oulture. e.g. through caravan . 
trade. Evidence of· such increased ip.tercours.e is: shown in the sudden 
appearance of new eJ..ements. in diromeda.ry saddlery ,.such as the saddle-
-eloth,brea.s.t-s;trap• and tail-s·trap1. 'Fhese: were taken OVier from horse 
riders; in the 7th century :e· .• c. - the first authentic contact between 
<llromedary-shep~erds: and horse· riders. 
1.) ASB (Dos.-tal) lLlL..S4. 
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Certain warrior skills were acquired but milita.r.y effectivenes·.s seems 
not to have been grea. t, since the As.syrians were able to ma.ke deep: 
inroads into Arabia.. The situation again changes·.,according to Dostal, 
w:i th the introduction of the saddl~-bow princ·ipille to dromedary sadcUery, 
the Arabs being thus enab]ed to fight effectively from eame1-back for 
the: firs~ time:. FroDI! this. develo;pment. Dostal elates the c·ommencement. of· 
the full-Beduin\ period in north Arabia. Tb:is: is dated! at. about the. end 
of the first. md.ll.enium B .• c. or the: beginning of the Chris:tian era. 
The s·econd part of this hyp.othesia is; weakened~. by the fact. that. the 
<tr·omed&ry is not an animal. which can be: used! by mounted troops; in combat. 
a.nd!,.as w.ill. be seen in Chapter 6,i t was the: custom of the: Arabs to 
d!ismount or change: to horseback before· battle. Any increased. military 
potential of the Arabs may have been due to the introduction of the 
horae. after 500: B··.C.,.or perhap;s as late as the time of Chris:t. 1) 
In any _case· it is indisp:u;table that the dromedary was. :fi'ully 
d!ome·s;ticate.d! in Arabia. at the beginning· of the: firs:t millenium B.C. 
whence it spread gradually to the regions·. which it occupies: at the 
present time. The dromed.a.r,Yr was introduced into Ethiopia. from south 
Arabia. about 500: B·.C. or perhaps: three or f"our centuries. earlier,and 
spread! thence: Viia east Sudan and the. Saharan oa.se:s to North Africa. 
where it was. first es.tablished in the closing years of the first. 
md.lleniUDI! B' .• C. and it was first established in Egypt. in Ptolemaic 
times;. 2:) Its. spread to the north was extensive:to Palestine,.Syria.,. 
As.ia Minor,Me:sopotamia and Jibal(Med!ia) ~mainlyr to those areas where 
it was necessary as. a beas.t of burden on the many caravan routes. S) 
li.) Badw( Coon) 872:. 2) Wal.z ::li.,.52l-4i. 5) Ritter 755. 
71. 
In the first millenium B .• c. Mesopotamia was: already the borderland 
between the dromedary and the Bactrian.· li..) In the period between the 
thira and: sixth centuries A.D. there: was great insecurity in Arabia 
and a decline: in the caravan _trade ,and increasing nlim.bers of sett].ed 
pe~pilies. became nomad!ic. In the north such nomads· as could not s·ell. their 
d:romeia:ries. for_ the declining caravan trad:e w.ere probably attracted 
by· the wars between Rome and Persia to serv.e as dromedar,y troops on 
the side of one of th~ two opponents. 2;) 
The following is a number of attestations for the spread of the 
drome~ to the north and east: 
(a) Relief of D. rider from Tell.. Halaf.· in Mes:opo.tamia.9th century B.C. 
(Wa.lz :lL~44;;B'adWi{WisSIIia.nn) 882.) 
(b) CuneiforDil records: ott D. mounted nomads: fighting Assyrians. in: 880 B.C. 
and 854 B.C. ,. the: latter being: Arabs: from the area. be'&ov:een Syria and! 
r - -IraqJ.including Wadi Sir~ and the Pal.myrene:. (Ba.dw(Wissmann) 882:.) 
( c )Arab D. riders, wr.i. th Xerxe:s in his: invas:i.on of Greece. (Ritter 657f.) 
( clli) Distinction mad!e; between the two breeds by the early Persians. 
(Ritter 659,.quoting the Zend-Avesta.) 
(e) Distinction made between the two breeds; by Aristotle and Diodorus; 
D. usedl by Mede:s agad..ns·t Greeks: in Media in S.:IL4 B.C. (Ritter 659£'.) 
(f) D. used by Alexander in his march from: Pers.epo]is: to· Khuri.sin 
in 550 B.c. (Ritter 640.) 
(g) :Q. pos:ses.sed! 'by Goths when they appeared on the lower Danube 'to 
menace Byz:antium,.in the 4th century A.D. (Ritter 642£.) 
:lL) Walz 2,.71. 2:) B'adw(Wis·.smann) 885. 
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(h) D. brought to China'in small numbers as tribute not later than 
the Han Dynasty (202. B.C. - 221. A.D. )but its existence was: reported 
in China by Chang: K'ien a:f.ter his: expedition to west Turkes.tan in. 
::1125 B.C. (Walz 2:,62: and note 1..) 
(i) First mention of camel in India about 500 B·.C. but it is not known 
whieh species. this was. The D. first became widespread. in north-west. 
Indd.a after the Muslim: conquest-s in the 8th century A.D. 
(Wa:lz 2;,.64-f;:Ritter 655f.) 
Thus by the time of the first M.uslimt expansion, the dromedary had 
been fully domesticated as a herd! and riding animal in Arabia for 
nearly tw.o thousand years. and in those intervening centuries: had spread 
r 
to the desert and steppe: lands of North Afric·a,Egypt,.Syria,Iraq ~cl 
Mesopotamia. It. had also been introduced into Iran andi ~kes·t&n and 
it s·eems likely that ita superiority over the Bactrian as· a rid!ing 
animal must have been appreciated early,.es.pec;ally from contacts·. with 
Arabs mounted on clromedarie:s,.either as. opponents·,allies or traders· .• 
This superiority would have the grea.te·s.t relevance in regions, whe~e· 
· water was scaree ,since it would! then be difficult to maintain horse.s 
in any numbers. and the ar..omedary would be a satisfactory subs.ti tute 
as· a riding animal. In such regions it wouldl be natural for the dromedary 
to displace the B'actrian altogether because the former is aa effective 
as. a pack animal while being the more efficient mount. Such a 
dev;elopment may well have taken place by the 7th century A.D. in 
wry arid M"eas, such as south-east Persia and more especially in the 
Central Desert.,.while in Khurasin amd Sijistan a mdxed culture based 
on horse,dromedary and Bactrian may have developed. 
(ii) The Ba.c:trian camel. (This note is taken from Walz 5:,.196-197 .) 
Since wild Bactrian c·amels still exist in the s·teppes of Central 
Asia and Eas;t Turke·sti!l. it is a: reasonable suppo:si tion that this 
region was·, the centre for the earliest domes·.tication of the two-humped 
camel.. The first attes.tation is from Shih 'fepe in north Irin between 
s·.,.ooo and 2:,.500 B·,.c. and at about the same time;at the latest at the 
end of the third millenium\ B.C.,.it was known in West Turkes·.tan. There 
is attestation at Minus·sinsk.on the southern border of the Central 
Asian steppes.,.at·. ab.out :h.~200~·B.c .. Firs.t evidence for the Bactrian 
ea.mel in Mesopotamia was about 1.,.500) B.C. but it remS.ined a. rarity 
until the 9th century :B.C. In the. firs:t. mi.lleniWIIl l3.C. the use of 
the B'actria.n spread acros·.s the Iranian plateau :in· the wake ot· Iranian 
horse breeders and much later,towa.rds· the end of the firs;t mi.llenium 
B.e.,it was introduced! into China and! north !Delia. It wa.s first. used. 
in the ca.raJVm~. trade be:tw:een China and western Asia in the 4th century 
B.C. but it had! been known aa a domestic ani mal in north Ir'"in :for 
2:,000 years before this time~ 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE COURSE OF THE EARLY CONQUESTS 
A brief historical 5urvey. 
'l'he military activity of the ~fus,lims; began s·oon after Muhammad s·e.ttled 
in Medlina; in the year 625j (A.H. 1.) the practice. of raiding Mec·can 
cara.v.:ans; was adopted, ::1!.) the main purpose. presumably being to obtain 
a livelihoodi tor the Emigrants, although deliberate. provocation of the 
Mecc-ans: may als:o have been intended!. The firs·.t raid!s. were unsucce:ss-
-ful, either becaus:e the guard!s, w.ere too numerous: for the small forces: 
of the raiders: or becaus:e they failed! to make· an interception. !hen, 
early in 624 (Raja.b A.H. 2), a. small party of Emigrants ambushed a 
Meccan caravan at Na.khla.h, 2:) on the road betw.een Mecca and 'fa, if, 
killed one guard!, took tw.o pris;oners:,, and returned w-ith the booty to 
Medina. This. raid was: the firs:t s:erious provocation of Mecca. and!, 
s;ince: it took place in the holy month of Rajab, may also have caus:ed 
some misgivings• in Medina. 
']he first large-scale engageme.nt in Islam w.as the battle. of. Badr 
in March 624 (Ramai!!lan, A.H. 2:}. S) ~ad! had received. word that 
a: large: Meccan carav.an was returning from Syria and colle.cted a force 
of over 500 men to intercept it. Mea.nw.hile., news: of the dlanger had 
reached Mecca and a force of about 950 men set out thence f·or Badr. 
'J?he caravan, led by Abu Sufyan, managed to e·lude the Muslims:,. who 
camped at the wells of Bad;r, where they we~e approached. by the Me.cca.ns. 
Probably neither s·id:e· ha.dl intended from the outset to engage in hos•t-
-ili ties, but a po&i tion was; reached from. which honourable retreat. w.a.s 
impossible. The Muslims blocked up> all the wells except one,. around 
1.) WW 55;. 2) Tab 1.. ::ll272: ff ;. WW 54 ff. 5) Tab 1.. 1281. ff ;:1291_ ff; 
Wa.q 2:1L ff •. 
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which they were stationed ana the: Meccans,in neeQ of water,w.ere forced 
to attack Mulplmma.cl!i on ground of his own choosing .• The result was·. a. 
dec·isiv;e: v;ictory :f·or the: ~'uslims,from 45 to 70 Me.ccans being; kilJledl 
and! a similar number taken pris:oner. 
The: yea.r. after Badr ineludedl the ex.puls-ion,a.fter a s:iege·,of the 
- - ( Jew.i.sh alan of· the Ba.nu Qaynuqa.;s:e:u-eral raids aga.ins;t tribes; to the: 
·eas:t and! south-east: of Melillina:;the ~p.twre of a la.rg!B: Mecc·a.n caravan; 
a. token raid by 200 Mecca.ns under· Abu Sufyin to the outskirt& of· the 
oas·is; of· Medina. 'ml.en in March 62i4(Sha.wwi.l A.H. ~;) came the· main Mecca.n 
riposte:; 'li.) a.n army of about 5,000 men advanced to Me:dina and on arrival 
pastured their animals. in the standing corn in order to provoke the: 
Muslims; to come out and fight. This tactic was successful. ana ~ad 
was; persuaded agains.t hi:s; will to take the: :fiel.<it. During the night,. 
us.ing their superior loc·aJ. know:ledge:,,the Muslims: took up. e. tactically 
s:ound position on the lower slopes. of the hill of Ul].ud,:w.ith the enemy 
e·e.mp: be:tween them: and! the oasis; of Medina. A group; o:t archers. was 
stationed! on a s.pur to g)lard! the .left :flank. The battle started with 
sd.ngJLe eombats f''ollowedL by a general melee: in which the Muslims gained 
the adv:ante:ge and seemed to hav.e. victory in their gra.s~·;:the Meccan 
cavalry could not ma.ke a;ny headway against the Muslim archers. 
Finally ,howev.er, the archers left their pos:t to join in the advance 
and the que.st for plund!er and the way was open for the Meccan ca:v;alry 
under Khiliciii b. a:l-Walld to attack the Muslim flank and rear. Great. 
confusion ensued,particular.ly aa the cry went up; that ~d had 
been killed!. 
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The report was untrue·,.but the Muislim:s. were. dispersed: andl Muhammad, 
• 
wounclled in the faee and ·leg, reached. the slopes o~ the hill. w.i th a 
bo~ of· his ·:r.ollow.er& and some sort of order was. restored!. The Meccans. 
were: :unaob]e· to follow up their succes;s: man;y of t~:iir horses.; were 
w:ounded;an important part of the Medina.n f'orce:& haai remained in the 
town;:and perhaps most important of' all.the Me:cc·an infantry had once 
again been shown to be inferior to· that; of th,e Mus~ims. 'l'he following 
day the•=Muslims; s.et out in pursuit;:f·or the vi.e.tim. of a raid not to 
have done so WQUld have· been contrary to eus.tom and would have been 
regarded ·as; cowardice. The: two ]Jarties: caril]lled a :fi'ewz miles; from Medd.na 
some distance: apart from each other but neither side attempted to give 
battle. After a dlay or tvro the Me:ecans; set out for home .• 
During the tw.o years; 'after Uhud md.litary activity w:a.& confined 
• 
largely to ex:pedi tions: agains.t tribe:s to forestall any hos>tile: moves 
against Medina. Some of these raids. were sucees.;sful,others were: without 
fruit ,.andl. there: were some Mus·lim casual ties. i'o this period aJ.so: belongs 
the expulsion of anot4er· Jewish clan :fi':r:-om the oasis of Medina .,ill 
_t . -
Auguat 625(Rabi 1,A.H.4);this was the B'anu Na!fir who surrendered! to 
the Muslims after a siege las;ting fifteen Elays. 
In April 626{Dhu al-Qa.' aah,.A.H. 4.) a force ot· about :lL,500 ~s,lims 
mi.th :1!.0 horse,.led by ~,went to Badr perhaps·. in order to keep 
c 
a rendenous maa:e at ~ud between U:ma.r and Abu Suty&n. :lL)Abu Sufyan 
appea.Ted at. Badr nth a force of 2;._000 ani!L 50 horse but there was no 
contact between the· two s.ide:s~;presumably both parties wished to avoid 
fighting andi merely to make a show of strength. 
1) ~ab: ~. 1457ff;~v 167ff. 
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In June 62·6(Muharr.am! A.H. 5) Muhammad led a :raid against a hos:tile 
. . ' 
eonoentration or.· tribes; to the ea.S:-t of Medina but the tribesmen took 
to the· higher ground and there was; no engagement. Again,however·,the 
danger of taking up: &rillS', agains·.t the MusJ..ims: was. demons.tra ted. In 
the summer of the same: year M11:q.ammad led an expedition to the oasis·. 
of DUmat al~Jandal near~ 400 miles: to the north,the whole journey 
of 750 miles; taking only 25 days .• This expedition .may also have· been 
mounted: to show the Mus:lim strength before the men of the oasis became 
involved in hos.tile ac.tivities; agains't Mul}a.mmad,but: it is. chiefly 
interesting in demonstrating the early- interest. taken· in the routes. 
to the North •. 
Plroof of ~ad's. growing power is given by his expedition in 
De~emb:er 626(Ra.jab A.H. 5) agains:t a tribe to the north-we:st of Me.oca, 
an area in which Mee-ca had hitherto been supreme:. The· reason :tor· the 
raid! :.was; that the tribe was arming for an attack on· MecHna..aoubtle·ss 
in collaboration with the Meccans:. The group was: taken by surprise, 
and a.fter ·a brief res.istance were all taken prisoner, together with 
a cons·iderable amount of booty. 
The las.t attemp.t by the Meceans• to break Mul].ammad' s: power be:ga.n 
c ' 
on the 3lLst March 62~(8 Dhu al-Qa dah,A.H. 5)a.nd! is known as the 
expedition of the Kha.nciaq or Trench. :1.) The Mee:ca.n force consisted of· 
about 7 ,.500 mensine-luding tribal confedera:tes.,:wi th some: 600 horse. 
To1 eounter his: weak::ne:s·s in cav,alry Muha.mmad · hadi a dii tch constructed 
0 ' 
along the "Wlllnerabl.e flank o£· the tovm.,the -other approaches being 
prote:c·tedL by hills. or by lava fields. 
:1) 'l!ab :lL. :JL463ff ;Waq 562i':f'. 
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The: harve:st had! alreaay been ga.thel!'e:d so the Me,cca.ns were not, able,,, 
as· at. Ul}ud,.to prov.oke the MusJlims into gi'ring· battle in the open 
plain; :so., they remained] behind the tl!'ench for the duration of the siege .• 
It is. strange· to reflect that the Meccans were unable to find an answer 
to the: s.imple defence of a dry d.itch.bu.t ne:ither ca.v;aJ.ry nor toot; was 
able to make· any im;pre:ssion on the Musl.ims:. Dissension in the ranks 
of the Mecean a.lliance,fostered. by Mul}amma.d 1 s.dipiliomacy,split u-p· the 
. . . · ... - .... -· 
.-- confederacy into its' various sections and ine.;l~ent:rweather SJ.·so 
hastened the lii'ting: of the: sieg!':':.By the mididlle of· April the besiegers 
had departe:d!·. 
As: soon as the safety of Medina was,· a.ssured,.Muhammad summoned 
. . 
the· Muslims. to inve.st the s.trongholdis of the: Banu. Quray~ah,.a Jewish 
clan who were aecused! of intriguing with the Meccans: during the siege. 
of:' Medina.1.) After a. s·.iege lasting twenty-five days they surrendered 
un~Qnditionally;al] the men were put to death and the wgmen and 
children s:old as; slaiv:es,. 
In the period from• the s·iege: of Medina and the exe:cution of the: 
Quray~ to the pact. of aJL-EJudla.ybiyah in March 628(Dhu al-Qa c dah.A.H.6.) 
expeditions against potentially hos·til.e: tribes, continued; to be. mounte:d. 
There were also two more: moves. to the North.one. of them an expeaition 
to Syria,the other· once: again to DUmat al-Jandal. The purpose o~ both 
of the·se expeditions was·. probably trade:. In the same· period a Meccan 
caraVl&Il: was• succe·s:sfully intercepted and booty and prisoners were 
taken. 
:lL) Tab 1..:1.485ff,;;WW 2-::lLOff. 
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The expedition o:r· al-l_fuda.ybiyaih was: actuated primarily by religious; 
and p_plitical motiv;es.;it resulted in a treaty according· to which the. 
Meccans were to ev-acuate their ei~ for three mays in the following 
year· to allow the Muslims: to perform the: les;ser pilgrimage. :IL) 
The next military action by Mul:Jammad was against the J'ewish settlement 
of Khaybar ,.2) to the north of· Medina. The JTews had! some warning of 
the danger but the marc:h was. ex.e:cuted with great speed. andl se.crecy 
and they were taken by surpri!Se with insufficient preparations·. to 
wi thstandl a sieglf9:. Khaybar ~onsisted of several ~cups of· strongholds-. 
and these were attacked piec:emeal;af'te:r the firs·.t two hadi ·s-urrendered 
the. remainder a.ls.o yielded,on terms s:imi.]ar to those imposed! in the· 
·later conques.ts. The Jews were. to remain on the· land and continue to 
cultivate it,.gi"ring up' half the produce to the Muslim owners; ( the 
members of the expeti tion,.to whom the land was. apportioned in lots;). 
Treasure,a.rms and armour,and animals were taken a.s: booty and a. fif.th 
part waS' aJ.lottecffi. to· ~· Sevreral siiialler .J:e.wish colonie:s in the 
vicinity also submd. ttedi to ~d at this time on si.md.lar terlii'S. 
Af'tezo· Khaybar· raids against tribes continued but the moFe intere,sting 
feature of this. period is the mounting of further expeditions. towardls 
the North. The large:st of thes.e,,in August/Se:p;tember 629(Jumah 1.,A.H.8), 
_.) 
w:as to MU tah,in the dis.tl!'iet o:f KeTaJt· in Jordan. It was compos.ed oi' 
about 5,.000 men under the eommand of Zayd b. I}a.Fitha.h _and appears to 
haVie: fought an engagement against a sup.erior enemy force. Zayd and 
two other leating Muslims were ldl1ed but very fe\V of the rank and. 
file,and the force was: led sa.:fely back to Metina by Kha.lid b.al-waiia.s,) 
:li.)Tab lL.1528ff';;WIN 241 • 2)B'al 25ff,;Tab lL.1575.ff;WW 264.ff'. 
5)Tab i.1610f'f',;W«509f'f. 
eo. 
'!'he accounts of the events leading up> to the submd.s:sion of Mecca. are 
obscure·,and are beyond! the scope of this work. In January 65.0(Rama~ 
A.H. 8)Muha.mmad set out for Mec·ca at the head of some :10,.000.1 men. A 
. 
high degree, of d~crecy was maintained and the Meccans were kep·t in 
ignorance o£.· his intentions. until the Muslim force was in the neigh-
-bourhood of the city. Abii Sufyan wd.th s.ome leading Meccans came out 
to mee.t ~adi and formalJ!y submi. ttedl to him·. ~ammad proclaimed 
a general a.mne~s,ty from which only· a few leading enemies• were excludedi; 
some of these w.ere later pardoned but several were executed .. There 
w.as v.ery little other bloodshed.1) 
While: ~d was: at Mec·ca assuming his. new responsibilities·. a new 
threat was. taking shape to ·the eas:t. A conf'"ed:eration of tribe:s, known 
as· the Ha.wazin· were assembling an army of'· about 20,000 men,.which 
- _, 
included the tribe of T.ha.qif,the tribe inhabiting the town of ~a if,. 
andl many nomadic clans, who ha.dL allied themselVie:s; with them. in this, 
eon£ederation .. On the 27th January 65"0(6th Sha.wv.v:i.l A;,iH.8) ~amma.d 
set out to mee:t the enemy with about 12,000 men,.and on the evening or· 
the 501fu J"anua.ry he camped near the Hawazin at Huna.yn. The following 
.. .; 
morning the Muslims moved! down into the wadi,but the enem:y,; ca.Wl.ry 
had coneealedl themselve:s in the turns ancll! ~llies. of the w.adi and when 
they is;sued forth to attack some of the MusJ..im Viangua.rd fled. Mul}ammad 
himself.·, together with a. group1 of his Companions ,.s•too<iii firm and: this 
.ev.entua.lly turned the tide. '!'he men were dispers.ed,.tak:en pris:oner, 
or killed and the w.omen and children were: made captive. 2) 
lL) B'al· 55ff ;Tab :1..1.6:li8:ff'. 2) Tab :1.. is55£f; ww 5"54f'f'. 
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A large amount of boot,y was assemblei an~ left at; a place called 
( _, 
Ji rinah while M~&IIIlllS.di went on to besiege: the town o-r !& i£·. De:s;pite 
the fact that the Muslims hadi s.ome siege engines with them= they were 
unable· to make any impre:s;sion on the defence:S; of the town and after· 
c -fifteen days: they re.turned to Ji ranah for the distribu;.tion of the 
I 
booty taken at ~nayn. 1.) 
The las;t,andl :from the numerical v-iewpoint. the greate:st,.o:t all 
~ad 1 s; expedi tiona· took place :fl'rom, Oc·tober to December 630 
(Rajab - Rama9'an· A .. H. 9) and was di:ir~cted to ~ab'Uk,,near the Gul:t o:t 
c . 
Aqaba. Tr.eatie·s were· concludeat w:ith smal].. Jewish and Chris:tiam aettl.e-
-ments; on a.nd near the Gulf and a detachment under Khalidi b. al-Wali.d 
was sent to DUma:t aJ.-.Fandal and a. similar treaty was. made nth its: 
r.uller. 2) 
This. concludies the· summary of the militaT,Y events during the life-
-time of 'M!J-qamnnad.,who cliecil! on the 8th J'\me: 632:{:li.3th Rajab ,A.H.11.). 
Before the Muslims. could embark: on the expeditions whi.ch were to 
dev;elop> into wars of foreign oonque·st they had :f'irs.t to es:tablish a 
:firm. position in the Arabian peninsuJ!a. 
:lL) Bal 55ff';;'fab 1..:lL669:ff • 2:) IHl 895ff;WW 5.9();f'f • 
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'l?ha wars oft the: 'Riddah. 
The death of Muhammad; w:as the signal for the: outbreak ·of disorders in 
Arabia;;this: movement is des·crl.bed by Muslim: historians. as the. 'Riddah' 
or apos-tasy f'rom Is:la.m. In fact,.howe.ver.,at: the time o"£ Muhammad's 
death onl.y part oft the Hejaz was. united to Is:Jlam; whi]e: the trib.es·. of 
. 
- - , 
central. Arabia - Gha~afan,B'ahila.h,Ta.yy,etc. - w:ere in the po·sition. of 
Jloo·s·e poilli tica.ll dependence on ~ammad. They may ha-.e been parti~ 
IsJ.amis.ed. In! the · reat: of .Arabia. - Yama.n,Najran, Ye.miroah,anci the south 
and the: eas.t: - ~d either had no connections at all. or had 
alliances~ with isola. teal tribes or Wii. th md.nori ties inside other tribe so 
In· m.any cases Mus.l.im! agents had been sent to such tribes to propagate 
Is]am1 ana to colle.ct. tribute,.and the time of the -Riddah most. at these 
agents w~e co!D!pell.ed. to flee back: to Medina.. Thus mos·t. oft the Ahl. 
al-Riddah had ne:ver been Muislims and the w:a.rs agad.ns,t. them were wars 
ot· conque:s·.t for politicaJi. doiid:nation and tribute:;they were the :rea.Ji. 
starting point t·or the expansion of' Islam. 
One of Abu :Sekr 1 s first acts on beco!Idng Caliph 1ms. to order the 
aendli.ng: of!' a large exped.i tion to s:outhern Jordan in accordance with 
the pllans: ~d had been making at the time of· his death.l.). This 
was a rash act since it left Me·c:ca and Medii.na denuded of troap·s ,and 
for this reason was opposed by s:om.e of· the other Companions;• Indeed 
the danger be:came acute when,.in the abs.ence of" this. expeditionary 
force:,. the infant s:ta.te was menaced! by hostile: concentrations of :ey:ejiz 
tribes:. The ex:p-edlition,.however,returned in time to re:inforce: Abu Bek:i-
:tL) Tab :li.. :ll848ff. 
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aga:ins•t the loc:aJ!.. insurgents and! their camp· in Dhu. al-Qas.sah was 
taken (Aug...Sep1 652:,J~ II A.H.1l!..)1)Some: o:f the: fugitives. fled to 
· Buz&kbah,.in northern Najd,and joined the Banu-Asad who were ].ed by' 
the agitator ·~yl].ah. Aga.ins.t theJIII Abu Bekr sent Khi.lid b. ~-Walid 
. t 
with 4,000 men(end Sep-Jan 655,Rajab - Dhl:l:. al-Qa dah A.H. :U) .2) 
- . ) 
Before: the battle: Khalid was joineGll by the: tribe: of' Ta.yy; wha1 had 
]lre·riousJ.y been uneerta.in-. 'fhe encounter resulted in compJ..ete victory 
t·or the· Mu,slims.;the eneJDiY' w.as dispersed and the Asad! and the: Banu 
,_ ~ 
.Amd.r submitted! .. From Buzikh.ah Kl:ii.lid moved against the 'famim.,but 
' without s·anction from. Abu Bekr ani agains.t the oppos·i tion of the: 
An~?ar• He: surprised the camp o:f the Tamim in al-But;~ and defeated 
them,taking a number of ]ITisoners some· of whom he ordered to be 
executed. 5·) This; a]l]lears: to have been an act: of· personal ven~·ance• 
and!. he: w.as' ordere.d!. back to Medina to exp·lain his: conduc-t. There he 
c 
w.as ~neratedi by Abu B'ekr a.~ins.t the wishe·s: ot· Umar ani given 
command ot· a new a.r.mu to reduce the l}anifa.h i:n Y.a.rniinah •. The incident. 
- ( 
at al-Bu'i;:&$ is• gi.V:en in the s;ourcre:s·. as> the: reason f'or Umai' 1 s. supposed 
~erso·na1 animosity towards• Kliil.id.4) 
The l.eacler of the. Ha.:ni:fah was the "faJ.s·e prophe.t;" Mu.saylimah 
r . 
and! the battle took ]lll&ee: at A~abah,near Y&mimah in central .Arabia.5) 
It. was one of the most stubborn].y eonte·s·.ted! battles in early Islam: 
a.fter fighting; in the open the ~nlrah retreated to their waJ.].ed 
gardens: where :fierce. hand-to-hand :fighting took place. 
:lL) T&b :lL. :IL874. 2} Tab :lL. :ll886ff. S) Tab. :li..o :1L922ff. 4) Tab :lL. 1.925"£'£'. 
5·) B'al. 88f'f; 'rab :IL. · :li.95"0f'f'. 
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This part. of t..'tJ.e baJttle w.as; known af'terwards· as. ~adiiqa t-.al-Mawt, 
. . 
the 'Garden of Death'.. Musaylimah w.as: ld.lleaJ in the fighting:,. which 
_( 
was; a total vic,tory for the Muslims (May-June 655, Rabi I A.H. :LZ). 
After the battle Khalidl accepted the surrender of the strongholds 
on fairly lenient terms: .• 
Accordiing to s:ome reports Khalid moved frollll Yam8.ma.h to al-B~rayn,, 
' .. 
this being the name at that time: for what is now the: coas.t of' a.l-Al}sa, 
the islandl now.· called: BaJ:lrayn be:ing th~n known as• uw.n. There he is 
c J . 
said to have. joined forces·, vrl.th al-Ala b. al-Ha~ami and ass·.is.ted him 
in the siege of al-Zara.h anal. the oeeupation of the small is:land of 
Dir!n (an is·la.nd which carries; the same name to<iJJa.y and lie:s opposite 
e.l-Qatif). 1.) In the autumn, however, 'Kh.S.lidl was. at al-Nibaj, en route 
( c 
to Iraq:. The reduction ··or. B'~ayn,. Umin, Mahrah,. and the Hagramaw·t 
was. perhaps only s·anc:tioned later. by Medina; it w.as: carried!. out larg~ly 
by tribes: in alliance w.d.th Ivledina as; opposed to troops sent out for 
the purpose. The recluction of thos:e regions• w.as·. not completed until 
severaol year~ after the firs;t armies had left for. Syria and(' Iraq;. the: 
conquests·. were ·rtever thorough and!. many areas in this quarter of· Arabia 
w.ere: virtually independent fifty years later. 
The Yaman seems; to have: had. little to ~ with Mul].ammad or with 
Islam during the Prophet's· lifetime and what are: called in the source.s 
the 11firs.t and second apostasies•" in the Yaman w.ere: in fact incidents 
in the civ;il wars; among the Persian andl .Arab inha.bi ta.nts or.· the region.2) 
lL) Bal 84; 90; 'J!a.b :1L. 1.957 f. 2;). Tab 1.. 1.795 ff; 185:L ff ;· 1985· ff. 
as.-
It w.as: during the: "second aposta~" that the MusJ.ims f'irst--pJ!.ayed an 
important role in the. Yaman. A certa:in Qays·, b. Maksh"U.q: ha.d seized power· 
c-, 
in San a,killing one. of the Pers-ian leac!m's; and com]>elling the .other 
two to seek refuge with an Arab tribe with whom they had blood ties. 
Qays: w:as unable to enlist the aid. of.· the: :f!imYari te: chiefs,. 'the: tribes 
(' 
o:f' Akk: and!. Masmiiq turned agains;t him,and he was·. obliged to f.lee. to 
._, -
the region be:tw.ee.n Sam a and Najran. There he s:ought refuge. 1ll'i th---his 
c c -
oldi eolleague,Amr b. Ma dikarib,but there was nowr ba.d blood: between 
them and he recieveill no ass.is;tance:. Meamdlil.e Aw· Bekr had dis:pa tched 
an arrrry to the Yaman under Muhajir b. Ab.i-Umayyah which included 
_, 
contingents; f'rom Mecca,.Metina and ~a i:f'_,w.i.th tribal alllies. Qays was 
c -
also menaced from the s-outh by the ap:]>roach oft Ikrimah b. Abi-Ja.hlL 
,. 
through Mahrah. Muhijir met vdth little resistance and Qays and Amr 
w.ere ca-ptured ane:1! sent to Mediina in chains where they were later 
parioned. The: Chr.is;tians or.· Najrin seem to have taken little part in 
the civil ~ andl. conelud!ed a pet with Abii B'ekr when the o:ppo:rtuni ty· 
arose~ 
86. 
Syria 
The 'little pilgrimage:' of Abii B'ekr in September 655·. (Rajab A.H. 1.2) 
was: the occasion for the ordlers: being issued for the mobilization of 
forces for the invasion of Syria~ The orders w.ent to the tribes of 
the :eyejaz: and to some tribes; of Najd and Yaman;; they began to arrive: in 
smallish numbers: and a:s s·oon as sufficient w.ere mustered they were giv:en 
a lea:dler and! sent out. '!he firs;t: to leave w:as Yazid b. Ab'I-Sufyan b;w 
the roadl through TabUk, f'ollow.ed! shortly afterwards; by Shur~bi1 b •• 
. ~ r-
f!asanah by the sa:me route,, and later by Amr b. al-A~, who took the 
Red!. Sea road through Aylah. The first to join battle was: Yazi.d, on 
4th February 654 ( 29 Dhu al-Qa. c dah A.H. 12:).. His; cavalry surprised a 
Byzantine force in the Wadi al.!'Arabah,. at Ghamr, and! routed them. 
The fugitives: took refuge at Dathinah, towards Gaza, but were pursued 
a.ndi again s·.catte~edl and! their leader w:as captured and!. put to death. :1.) 
The whole of southern Pales·.tine. was now open to Arab marauding parties 
ana a series of devastating: raidls took place, only walled towns being: 
safe. These raids ranged far: throughout s:outhern PaJ.es·.tine,. into trBJ1!s-
Jordan, and. perhap_s. as; far as the walls. of Caesa.rea. and to the vicini 'bJ 
of .Yerusalem. Alarmed by these: depredations,. Hera.clius assembled an 
army under.· his; brother Theodlorus who,. seeing that the menace was most 
serious. in Pales:tine, advanced to Ajnad!ayn which lay -to the south-east 
of .Jerusalem. In view of this danger some of the Arab forces. retir.edl 
to the fringe:s; of the desert, a.l though significant num-bers remained 
in Palestine. R~in:forcements were: requested from Medina with great 
:l!.) Bal. 107 ff; T'ab :l!.. 2:108 f. ;, 21:1!.2: ff:; 2121. ff • 
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urgency and!, towards: the end of Ma.rch 634 (Mu.~a.rra.m A.H. ·15.) Khalid 
left (Iraq on the orders ~-.of Abu B'ekr to go to the aid of the armies in 
Syria. ~&king the route via DUmat-al-Jandal to the watering-place of 
Quraq:ir in the Wadi Sirl].in, he then turned north and after a forced 
march of five nights d'uration through waterles;s, des·ert he a.rrivedl at: 
the wells· of Siiwa in the s'teppes. eas~t of Damaseus .• (See Ch. VI for a 
full discus.sion of this jolU!ney}. From• Sliwa :Khalidi. ma.de: a surpris·e 
attack on a Ghass:i:nidl camp; at Marj Rihi ~ near D:amaseus on Easter Day· 
2.4th April, 634 (:li.9th Safar A.H. 1.'5). Recognising the danger that the 
. . . 
Arabs w:ere: in, by having scattered their forces. to pursue their ow.n 
selfish interes:ts., he advanced s·outhw.ard.s. to the east of the Jordan 
and finally effected a junction w.ith (.Amr and Yazldi in the Widi al-
c 
..;A,ra;ba.h. '!'hey then advanced agains,t 'l'heodorus at Ajnadla.yn and gave 
battle. 1.) The result was a. complete victory for the Arabs. and the 
whole' of· Pale:s.tine was; now open to p.lu."ldlering raid,s:. Only the la.rge 
tow.ns. held out, although Ga.za may have: been put under tribute:,. and 
Arab armies. reaehed as. far as. the w.alls. of lp.mf?.. 'Jlli.e Greeks-now 
succeeded in concentrating an army which crossed the· .. Jordan and occupied 
Baysan. '!'he Arabs~,. once. more united unde.r the eommancili of KliBJ.id, 
as:s:a.ul ted Baysan and forced the Greeks to withdraw over the Jordan. 
'!'hey were: followed across the river and finally routed at the battle• 
of Fi:t:J. (Jan 65:5, Dhu al-Qacda.h A.H. M.). 2) The Mu.s·lims now; became 
. masters of all Pa.les>tine and tra.ns·-.T:ordan.. 'mle- vie.torious Arab army 
advanced to the region south of Damas:eus. where. _they me.t and dle:f.eated 
:li) B'al :ll.U ff; Tab :1!.. 2125 f; Ya c q II, 1.50 f. ·2:) Bal :lUi.5;. Tab 1... 2155 ff. 
as. 
a Greek army under Baanes. a.t Marj a.l-~uffa.r,and the: G~eks then re:tired 
behind the. w:alls of Damascus. After a brief pa'!lse the Arabs advanced 
to the city andl laid siege to it( March· 655;,M~a.m A.H.:14) ;a force 
sent by Heraalius to relieve the garrison w:a.s dief'eated. at". B·ayt Li~y'a. 
and. the crl.ty w:a.s l~t to its f.·ate. There was. dis:sension be~en the 
tow:n&peoP']e of· Damascus and the· Byzantine md.litary forces, and Baanes: 
lett the city and retired!. towards: the north. 'l'b.e Arabs entered the 
bel..ea.gueredl city w-hich sur.renl!llered! on terms on 4th Sep.tember 655 
(:1i5th Rajab A.H.lL4). :li.).After the cession of· Da.ma.scus; the Arab& moved 
further north a.nd took: pos;ses:s:iion of·~ w.here a formal peace treaty 
w.a:s. also concJ.udred. 2) 
The s·.ieg~ of· Damascus and its: f'alJL :marked the end o:r· the: ra.zz.ia. 
phase of' the warfare and the be:ginning of the war of' conques-t and 
the who'lle country w:a.s now pac·ified w.i th the exception o:f the larger· 
:f.ortres:ses. 'IDle Arab armies. winteredl in Da.ma.scu;s. and J;Tim~;m this. 
period ShuraJ::biJL. b. Ha.~anah subdued the who~e of the pro'Vii.nce of· 
Jiord!an and took pos:se:ssion of Tabiriyyah,Baysan,.Slisiyah,a.ncii! other 
ei ties: of the region. Other gr.oup:S: occupied! al-Ba.thaniyyah and the 
E!&wrB.n w:hile yet other& pe:net:uated to the north as f'a.r a.s: Palmyra-: 
The w:·inter of' 655/656 w:as: spent by Her.a.cJ.ius. in f'ev;er.ishly 
as:s.emb-ling a.n army in Antioch amd Edessa,and at the beginni.Dg; oft 
spring a large. force• mov:ed southwardi whiJ!.e sea.bol!'Ile reinforcements: 
landing a. t the: ports of Palestine: menaced the Arab flank-. Realis-ing: 
the danger,Khalid evacuated ~im.J?·· and Damas·.cus; and in face or· the 
superior f.orce o-t· the Greeks. moved to the south-eas:t of ~e- river 
:lL)Bal. i20f-t';;Tab :JL. 2lL46ff • 2) Bal :1!29f'f. 
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Yarmlik. Here they were: in a fertile, part of' Spia_,.and ware across 
the· roads leading from central Pale.s.tine to the eas.t of the Jordan 
a.nd to the SDuth. They were protected in the rear by the deeply 
incised! ftl.leys of the YarmUk tributaries and re.tre.at to the desert: 
or to Medina was: secured. The· Greeks. pitched caDliiJ at Jilliq( 1rod!ay 
Jiliin) ,.ana a long waiting: period enaued w.d. th activ;i ty confined to 
patrolling and skirmishe,s.,.a.nd this. dela.y a~ted. in f~v;our of' the Arabs. 
'Fhe: Greeks were: beae:.1f'P!V- jealousy; and insuborclination: their commander 
was; Theodorus Tri thurius; with B'aanes. in command of' one: tivis-ion· but 
a section of.· the ~rebelled! ag$inst Heraclius. andi declared Baanes. 
Emperor. There were: als:o desertions among· the Arab aUJdllia.ries• 1.) 
The Arabs.,.on the other hand,re~ivedl a. s.teady stream of reinforcements 
r 
from Medina and! among them was AbU. Ubayclah h. al-J'a.rriq.,.who- was sent 
c 
by Umar to take· o"Rr the supreme: eommand of the ar.mli.es. He appears 
not to= ha.ve let this be kn~vm. until after the battle in: which Kha.lid 
w.a:s the coiiliilallding general in the field. 
When the Arabs, had. been adequa. tely> reinforced. they again took 
the off'ensive:;;they outflanked the Greeks to the east and cut their 
lines of communication w.i. th Damascus ,and by occupying the bridge over 
the Witi al-Ruqqad they a]so cut the· line of re.treat to the wes;t: .• 
Fina.J!Jly they forced the G:re:eks. into the angle: be:tween the Ya.rmlik and 
the: Wadi al.-Ruqqad. 'fhos:e who were not killed there pllunged down the 
s;teep' banks 'of" the ri'Viers but those. Wiho m&na.ged! to escape: were annih-
-ilated on the othe:~r. siaie,.aince the A:z"a.bs by oe.cupying the- bridge 
were: easily able to cross. to the f9.! bank. 2) 
. lL) Ca ll5 ,499ft'. 2:) B'a:l 135·r ;Tab 1.. 2087; Ya' q II ,.:ll.BOf~ see. also 
Mich Syr II, 420 f'. 
This; was. on 20th Augus.t 6:56(:1L2th Ra.jab A.H.:ll.5) ana was. the decisive 
s·.troke in a battle whieh had lasted. for s·everal months;the Greek army 
was totally de:stroyed and Byzantine :power in Syria was at an end. . 
Soon af'tel!."Waol!"d!s Heraclius ,having giv;en up all hope ,.lef't An!tioch and 
returned to Constantino.ple. :ll) 
After the battle the Arabs, ad:va.nced to the north and occupied!. 
( 
Damas:eus.J) this time permanently ,.in Decembe-r 656(Dhu &1-Qa. dab. A.H~15). 
- C' By now Abu Ubaydah had aasumed control and distributed the various 
com.mandis; on a systematic· basis. He himlself· advanced northwards; with 
Khilii and occupied tile towns. ot· Bacalabakk,.¥im~,Ma'arrat a~-Nuc-min, 
Qinnasrin,andi. the. res·.t of the country as :far a.s Aleppo; and Antioch. 
r r-
At the same time Amr b .• al-As conquered Palestine.,and ShuraJ?.bil 
• 
·bt. al-Hasanah subdued Jordan a.ndi the MeEli terra.nean coas,tal towns: of 
• ·;= 
in Arab hands with the exception of· the fortified. cities of Jierus·alem 
and Caesarea.;Jerusalem: finally surrendered in 658(A.R.:ll7) 15') Cae:sarea 
not until 640(A.H.:lL9) .4) Al.though summer raids into Asia Minor we:re 
mountea,sometime:s on· a large s:cale:,.in the years. that :followed, the 
Amanus: range remained the effeeti-ve frontier between the: Arab·s·. and 
Byzantium tbrougho~t the Umayyad: Caliphate. 
1} Tab lL. 2B94. 2) Bal U6~l4.7 ;126 ;;128 ;13:lL-:ll54;159 ;;:lL44-lL45 ;1.46-151.; 
Tab 1.. 2549;2595.;2594. 5) Bal ~9. 4)Ball. :lL40i'f. Mich Syr II, 430 f. 
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AI -Jazirah(Mesopatamia). 
. ~ 
Al-Jazirah was -invaded in 639/640(A.R.:1..8) by Iya~ b. Gh8.lliill w;i th troops 
from Syria andl. was subdued without DIU!ch opposition; the conquest of 
the: eastern part of the region was. completed in 64:1L(A.H.20) blW troop-s 
( -
advanc:i.ng from' Iraq ria Mos.ul. :lL) 
( 
The: f'irst . incursion into lower Iraq was. in the :nate. summer of 63"3 
(A.H.l!2:) .lJIIhi]e in a]~ibaj ,.Kh&lid b.. al..Walli united bd.s forces. with 
' - -' those: of' aJi.-Muthanna b. all..J;i&rithah of" the Ba.kr b. Wa ill.. for the 
, 
purpose: of' raidiing Iriq. "ml.e: comb.ined force: moved up, the: EUphra tes• 
raiding aind exa.e,ting tribute and in· the autu.mn reduced the town of 
a.1-~ah,.although this was not a conquest. in the f·ormaJ.. sense but 
the. classic: type: of nomaci raid agains:t a settled community. No. attempt 
was made: to take st:r.ongpoints by as.sau1t bl:li.t the raililers w:ouli camp• 
in the cultivated! land around the town,.pas.ture their animals' in the 
standing corn,damage or threaten to damage fruit trees etc. !he town 
would thus be' forced into the payment of tribute,.w:hich would take 
the :li'brm of a monetary payment and! provision of f'ooclll,.fod:dier,andi 
other requirments:. fbr life in the de:sert. The attack on the fortress 
( 
of Ayn al-'l!amr,howev,er,w:as. of a diff"erent nature since the citadel 
was taken by f·orce and its· garrison put to the sword. It is; probab].e 
. tha:t it was intended th&t it should!. serve as. a base for other operations 
and seems to ha~ been used f'or this: purpos·e during the remainder 
of· this :Phase:. 
:lL) Bal 1.49ff;:lL72£f'·;1.78;M1ff; Mich Syr II, 426;. 445• f. 
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Al!,-Mu.tbatula and Kh&lid continued their raids to the north,.both a¢nst 
settlements; such as· Anbar a.ndi Anah,.and. against the encampments. of the 
Ba.nu Tia.ghlib ,.ranging· as f'a.r north as the mountains. of aJL-Bishri. Also 
in this period is: the jou~ey of Kh8J..id to DWnat al-Ja.ndal to support 
(" 
Iya~ b. Ghanlm who w.a:s: a:ttempting its reduction. 1.) 
- l After the dep~ture of' Khalid for Syria the B'akr b. Wi il eontinued 
to raid along the Eu.phrates:,.blllt new;s; reached them· that a Persd.&n pun-
-i tiv:e) force was: aasembling agains.t them. This,. toge,ther wd. th the 
des.ire: for crossing the riv;er to the more pros.perous region to the: 
.... 
eas.t,.inducecffi them to· ask Meciina for assistance .• AJL-Muthanna himself 
is reputed to have: gpne· to Medina :for this purpo:ae,arriving when Abu 
Bekr was on his death bed. No aid w.a.s. given until the news· arrived 
of' the victory of' Ajni.dayn;the position in Syria being then more secure 
.( ( (' 
Umar appointed: AbU Ubayd al-ThaqB.f'i,.a relatively obscure Mus·lim, to 
( 
lead a small expedition to Iraq. After rapid pr~parations and a spee~ 
_ r c _ 
march Abu Ubaydl arri"led! in Iraq and uni tedi his party with that of 
.... -
al-Muthanna in the: ·neigJ:tbourhood of' al-J;lirah. ~e point c:hos·en for 
the eroa:sing was near al-?1rah jus·t above the bifurcation of the: 
Euphrates where:,.wi th the co-operation of the loc·al inhabi tants,a 
bridge: ·was repaired! or· erected. This was a simp~e pontoon structure 
or bridge of boats·. he~d tog"'ther by cable:&. The: Masl.im force then 
crossedi to the eas;t bank, apparently without appreciating the grave 
Eia.nger to whieh they were exposing. themselves,and soon after crossi?J,g 
they were. attacked by the: Persians who were. accompanied by elephants. 
:1.) See Bal 24-:ll:f'f·;.'rab 1.. 2.01.6-2075; for the whole: of this; early campaign. 
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C~ught in swampy ground v:ery different from· the open terrain in which 
they were a:e·cus:tomed to mano~vre: freely, the Arabs: could find. no answer· 
to the Persian tactics. I~ attemp.ting to disable the elephants, Abu 
' Ubayd. and: another Muslim leader were kili.l!ed and: probably only further 
enraged the beas:ts. The Muslims took to flight but the weight of the 
f'ugi tiv:es· broke the bridge and many were drowned;V!'hile other·s: died 
attempting to s"Wrillll to s-afety and yet others perished to the Persian 
sw.ords·, or ere tra.mp].ed underfoot by th~ elephant&. OnJ!y the bravery 
and s-kill of al-Muth.a.nn8. averted complete di~s·ter;fighting: a stubborn 
rearguard action he· held the Persians at bay while the bridge was 
• o:. 
repaired! and then when the last of the Muslims· had cros:sed he cut 
the cables of' the bridge. and! t..."l-).us severed. the Persi.ans'line of" 
,. 
pursuit. The whole campaign from: the departure of Abu Ubayd from 
Me.dlina to the battle on 29th November 6M(29th Rama~ A.H.ll..'3) 
oc·eupied only three: months. 1.) 
The year following the Battle of' the Bridge was. relatively quiet:. 
The {'ersians made no attemp,t to f'ollow up their suc.ce:s.s by operating 
on the wes:t bank. of' the. Euphrate:s,.andl the: only activ:e, force on the 
Arab ride was that of al-M1.1t~,.who remained in the vicinity olfi' 
al-Hirah whence he mounted small raids; along the west bank of the 
river. Doubtless he kept Medina informed C?f' the situation and continued 
r 
to ask for aid,but the attention of' Uinar was once again fully engaged 
in Syria. 
In the summer of 655(A.H.~4) a section of the Bajilah tribe from 
< C" 
the Yaman movedi into Iraq under the command of Jarir b. Abd!a.llah,. 
l.) Whole ca.m.paign of.· 'Bridge' in: Bal.. 250f'f';;Tab :t. 21L59f'f'. 
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( 
perhaps; w-ith the sa.nc.tion o~ Umar,per.haps :independently. They arrived! 
when al.-?u'ilthanna had retired to the desert fringes: in the :face of the 
advance of a Pers:ia.n force which ha.d re:-ocwpioo al-P".dra.b:. 'rhere was 
. . . 
cons·iderable :friction between the· tw.o Arab leaders since both were 
at the hea:cffi of their ow.n tribe,smen and neither would acknow·ledge the 
other's authority,.but they seem to have: temporarily compos,edL ·their-
differences; when advancing: to meet the Persians;. The two s:ides me=t 
at Buwayb,to the south of al~irah,and the P~sians were' aefea.tedi.~) 
'They abandoned a.l-~ah but it wa.s not re-occupied by the Arabs;1who 
remained quiescent dU.ring the months• that followed. •.The battle of" 
Buwa.yb wa.s· fought in Qe,tober or Nov;ember 655(A.H.:lL4 - Rama.~) and 
. ( -
there was·. no military activity of any signi:f'ica.nce. in Iraq in the 
year.· that :followed. Any demands that ma.y have been made by Jarir or 
... 
a.1-Mutha.nna were= ignored in Medina while events; in Syria were moving 
to a ciimax:. 
It is. likely that the new·s·. of' the Arab victories in Syria. was 
known to the Pers-ians. a.nd that this knowledige ha.s•tened their pre.p-
-arations for as·sembling a large army to expel the Arabs t.rom the 
<: - ' borders. of Iraq. Al.:.Mutha.nna.,.before his d!ea1ili(late: in .656),m:ust. ha-ve 
ensured! that the news. of the=se preparations reaehe<iil Medina. By the: 
- ( 
autumn of· 656 the battle of' the YarmUk had been won a.nd Uina.r could 
( 
now· turn his. attention to Iraq. Arter s.ome deliberation. he· appointed 
Sa <a: b. Abi..JNa.qqas; to lead! the firs·.t real. inwasion a.ga.ins;t the 
Sas·ini.d power;. 
:lL) Bal 255f:f; Tab :IL. 2jl85ff'. 
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The preparations; began about September 636 (Ra.jab A.H. :lJ2:) and forces 
from the ~·jaz and from the Ya.man and elsewhere began to as:semble at. 
~irar· near MedinBI. Sacd later moved his camp to Sharaf or to Tharlibiyah, 
both in northern Arabia on the road from Medina to C"Iraq. He: spent the· 
whole wd.nter 636/637 (Raja.b to Dhu al-~jjah A~H'. 15} in that. region 
attemp1ting to gather an adequate force but got few· recruits·, from the 
tribe:s of· the north-east, many of whom had a tra{iition of friendly 
relationships: W·i th Persia. The recent memory of the d.:j,.s·as.ter of ~e 
Bridge doubtless: deterred others.. 'l'he total force which sac d was able 
to mus:ter· probably did not ex.ceedl 6,.0001 men; these included warriors 
from central and! w:es.tern Arabia,. some Ya.mani tes especially Bajil.ah, 
andl sma:lJ!. numbers of Asa.di and ']amim. 
With this smal:Jl. force Sa' d. advanced to ciriq in the spring of' 
637 .and camped at Qit:lisi:yah on the desert fringe of the sown lands. 
It was. hi& policy to induce the Persians to attack him in desert oountry 
where= Arab knowledge of such terrain w.ould offse-t the disparity in 
numb·ers (the Persian army was probably about 15,000/20,000 strong). 
The .Persians,. undler their general Rus.tam!, moved s·outh and camped 
opposite. the Arabs. A lull of about four months interv;ened before= 
battle was. joined. and during t~is period the Arabs sent out many 
raiding partie:s: who scoured the outlying villages: and cultivated areas 
for food. and fodder. 'l'he Persians were pow:erless to prevent them=. 
becaus:e: of tp.e superior mobility of the Arabs. Gra.dualJ!.y the Arabs 
became more daring and carriecl!l their raids; nearer the Persian eamp·. 
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It is; possible that an incident in one of these raids precipitated 
the decisiv;e: eonfl~c:t, with a _skirmish growing: into a battle as. more: 
and. more reinforcements reached each side. The battle las.ted f<>r one 
day a.ndi. was probably ne.i ther s:o blood& nor s,o hard fbught as: the Ya.rniiik. 
Nevertheles.s: victory wa:a oomple.te and Persian los:s:es were considerable, 
their general, Rustam, being among the- dead. The· Muslim cavalry, cross-
-ing the Euphrate:s, ·carrl.ed! the pursuit without much opposition through 
the fertile: land! of the Sawad as far as the W.alls of al-Madi'in 
(Ctesd.phon). ::lL) The battle.,oi' Qidd.siyah was fought in JUn.e 657 (J'umaaA 
I A.H. :1!.6}-; after a ·brief resp:i; te the main body of the: Arab &3M11!Y' 
followed! the cavalry to al.-Mad&'in, without meeting any res;ist~ce. 
They arrived. on the wes~t bank opposite the city,. joining up once: more 
w.i. th the cavalry,. ancli were confronted with the unfamiliar problem o:f" 
e:rossing a river without boats' or a brid!ge" all means; o:f" eros;sing: 
having been removea or destroyed by the Persians. ~ntua.lly- they 
were: led! to a fordi by a native and after some hesitation,. spurred. 
their horses·, into the 'li'"igl-is:. and! made: the crossing. 2he city was 
entered w,ithout ~pposition in July 657 (Juma~ IT A.H. 16) •. 'fhe king, 
followed by the court,. Persian dignitaries,. and!. finally by the Persian 
garrison had fled towardS: the Irani~ highland:s•. Great quanti tie.s 
of booty were: captured a:t the fall of the city, which points to a 
precipitate flight by the: king and! his followers:. 2) 
:lL) See Bal 255-262;;, Tab :lL. 221.3-2~67; Ca. 1.6, 5-1.1.7;; for battle of 
Qidis!ya.h and events. leading up to it; see also· Mich Syr II; 421.. 
2:) Bal. 262: ff;. Tab 1. 2141.9 fff Mich Syr II, 425: f·. 
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For more than a yeaF after the f~ll of· the e2~ Sacd remained in 
al-Mada,in with the: bulk of his army~ presumably enjoying the novel~ 
of a life of ease ana luxury. The only event of note in this period 
- ') 
was; the battle of Jialula.. The Pers.ians had assemblei. a foFce in 
. - ,> Jalula, in the foothills of the Zagros, probably as a defensive screen 
f'or the city of ljU.lwan, in which the king had taken refuge. To deal 
with this f·orce: Sac dl s:ent a detachment of his troop:s who defeated 
the Persians, andl the king waf?. obliged to leave· HUlwan and flee ito 
,; 
the ·Iranian plateau. The battle: took plLace in December 55,7 (Dhu. a.l-
-Qa'dah A.H~ :1L6}. 1.) 
Eventually, at the expres:s order ofrUmar, Sac d left al-Madi)in and 
foundeci the fortified! camp: of Kiifa.h in the: vicinity of ~rah. This 
was in the winter 658/659 (end: of' A.H. 1.7). 2:) Ba~a.h,. a similar found-
r. 
-ation,. also on instructions from U:mar" had been made a little. earlier, 
in 657 or 658, shortly after the battle of' Qadisiya.h. 5i) The:se two 
se-ttlements were at firs.t merely enc·ampments but later grew into 
towns.. 'mley w:ere the military bas·e:s from which the conquests of 
Persian a.na central Asia w.ere undertaken. 
1.) Tab 1.~ 2439 ff; Bal 264. 2:) 'i'ab .1.. 2560; Bal 275·. 3) Tab 1.. 2578 ff. 
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Khiizis,tB.n :lL) 
The conquest of Khiiz.is.tin w:a.s: largely the. w:ork of Abu Musa al-Ash ("ari 
w:ith troops from Ba~rah,a.lthough troop·s from· KUt&h co-operated in 
the capture of 'fus.tar, the final episode: in the campaign. The inhab-
-i tants w.ere of Iranian stock and! thus: not tisposedi,a.s; were the 
( 
Semi te:s; of IraliJ!• to yield to the Arabs Wii thout a s.truggle. Their 
defen~: w:as·. ·oonduc·ted w:ith great energy by the m.ar.zuban,.al-H'ilrmuzan, 
and f'o~ years elaps·ed from• the :fi'irst Arab incursion in 658(A.H.:l7) 
to the conclusion of the conquest w:·i th the :f'alJl. of Tustar in 642: 
(A.Bl.2jL). 'l'he. pro'rlnce W:as a fertile land with many f'orti:fi":iedi. towns, 
and; the· Arabs. w.ere: ha.ndic-appedi by shortage: of' sd.e:ge machines and lack 
of experience: in si~ w:ari'e.re:. The conque:st. w.as thus: a slow: progress 
:f.rcim. s.trongpoin·t. to s.trongpoint w:hi.eh were: reduced after s·.ieges of' 
-wa.rying duration,sometime:s terminated by treachery on the: part. of' 
· one of the· inhabitants. The: Arab armies. haJ. ted!,:fi''or. the: time· bei.ng, 
when . they reacb.eciJI the mountain barrier o'£ the Za.gro.s. 
1) B'al. :1176~85 ;.Tab :lL. 2535-2545. 
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The Iranian Uplands: and· the East:. 
'IDle conquest of the heartland of the Sasini.d E!mpd.re wa.s. a process which 
took over a deeade to oomple:te a.nd. was. :followeQI by the: slow conquest of 
the eastern regions,but reports on the period in the sources are. very-
meagre. The signal for the beginning o:f' this w.ar:f.a.re was the battle of 
Nihawa.nd in 642{A.Hi~ ~): 1.) the Per·sians,.probab~ at the· prompting of 
King Y!azdagerd who was then in Fars,,.assEm!lb]edi a large: ariDiY at: Niihiwand 
vrl th f'orce:s: drawn· from al]. pa.rts of· the kingdom. On. learning oft this 
the Musl.ims mobd.l!isM an ex.ped!i tionary force from the warriors of" Mah 
with some a~~tional. troops from Ba~rah,a.nd the overaJ.]. command was 
giVien to Nu(m"in b •• Muqarrin. The battle which enaued. was. a comrpJlete 
( 
Viic:tory for the Musl.i.ms.,a.l though Nu min himself was killed in the 
fighting. The :i.mmediate sequel to the battle: w.as: the lll!OU!l!ting of a 
numb.er of large-scale raids. in dif':f'erent. clirections- and under· various 
leaders,a.l thougp. in most eases: the complete. aubjugation of these reg;iions 
:followed some time. later. Thus JiibilL was. partially conquered in 643 
(A.H.22:)by Kiir~n troc:>J_p:s who had! fought: at Nihiwand under :EjWlihayf"ab. 
b. al-Yamin,. the succes.sor of' Nu cma.n. 2) Ray ,Hamadlian· and Isfahan were 
conquered :r·or the :firs;t time in this. period but: had. to be re,..·subdued. 
' . 
la:ter .5) Even the town of· Nihawancl i tsell' had. to be re-captured in 
4 ) 
645(A.H.~).The s~uthern part ot· Jib&l was conquered bM· troops from 
B'a~ra:h under Abu Musa, who was gpv.ernor of the town from 658 to 650.! 
(A.H.:IL7-29). They took Dinaw.a:r,.Masaba.dh&n ancill Mihraji'nkadhak,and 
rangeaJ a:s far a.s; Qum and Qashan.5) 
:1.) B'al 502"-305;;Ta:b :11.. 2596-2655. 2) B·aJL 505-507. 5) Bal. 507ff; 
Tab L 2655f'f'. 4) Bal 309._ 5) Bal 5\112i-3.:li.5_p S!J7. 
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In 645 (A.H·. 24) Abu Mii'sa wd. th B"af?ran troop:s invaded Fars,. where forces 
from-. B'al}rayn under cUtmnan b. Abi.-].~s w.ere: already opera. ting·. They 
eo-operated in the·ir attemp;ts to subdue Fars but progress·. w.as slow and 
difficult:. Sabiir was taken in 644. (A.H. 25) but rebelled and was 
rec·onquered in 647/26;. I~~akhr w.as. conquered and reconquered three 
times;, in 644/25:, 649/2'1, and! 650V2.8. The year 650 s:aw the. appointment 
r r- • • 
of· Abd!a.llah b. AIIIli.r as governor of.· Ba~r.ah a.nd l.t was in this year that 
he c-omp!l!.eted the conquest of Firs. 1) Following; this- the Muslims under-
-took a number of expeditions into eastern Iran under several virtual]y 
inde.pendent. leaders. Ibn·'Amir himself invacle<iil. Khurasan in 651. (A.H •. S01) 
with the as·tute and dipJ!.oma.tic al-Al}naf' b·. Qays as his lieutenant; 2) 
they took the d:esert route from! Yazdi to ~aba.s Gilak andi thence via 
Qayin to Hera t:. Hera t,. Bad.ghis a.nd Ma.rw al-Rudlh submitted wi tho~ t 
opp.os.i tion. and the first serious check to the advance c·ame in the 
Murgha.b valley,. where al~a.f w.ith 5",000 me·n was opposed by the organ-
-ise.d! force·s of lower 'lUkh'iris:tan and! had to retire on. Ma.rw a.l,...Rlidh. S) 
A s:econdl expedition under al-Aqri r b. ~bis. was more success:fuJL and 
defeated!. a weaker :r·orce in J"uzjan and then advanced eastwards,. tempor-
-a.rily oe·cupying s:everal towp.s. inc-luding· Ba.lkh. Small.. parties made 
plundering raids. in the neig;hbouring: territories:., not. always suc.ce·s:s-
-fully. A general up:ris·ing. in the year 654/655 (A.H. 35/54) caused 
the Mus·lims: to relinquish their hold on Khurasan· for a time although. 
(" 
s:e:v;eral raids: by Ali's governors are recorded. 4} 
1.) Bal 586:-3.9:1.;; covering the conquest of Fars. 2) Ba.Ji.. 405· ff; 
Tab 1.. 2682; ff; 2884 ff. 5.) B"al 407. 4). Tab 1.. 2851. ff;. 2905 ff. 
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Operations; were resumed when peace was res.tored to Islam by the re.cog-
-nition of Mt/i~iyah in 66lL (A.H. 4:1); IbnrAmir was again the· commander 
and the operations followed the same pattern as before. Indeed for the 
whole: period 650-665 (A.H. 29-45) the so-called conquests w.ere: little: 
more: than large-scale plundering; raids. There was no ordiered progress 
or- the Arab arms- until Khurasin w.as broug;ht under the- control. of Ziyad 
b. Abihi, w:ho was nomd.natea governor of B~l!'I'ah in 665 (A.H. 45). 
In the north a similar pattern of events. develop~d; Armenia was 
firs;t effectively invaded in 65~ (A.H. 52:) by a combined force: of Syrians 
under Habib b. Mas;lamah and!. KU:f.ans~ under Salman b. Rablr ah,. who was 
. ' ' 
later ki-lled in the Caucasus·.. Armenia, hOw.ever ,. was never fullly- ab-
-sorbed into the Ara.b empire in the early years andl indeed it was a 
fie:ld of contention between Is·.lam· a.ndi Byzantium in the centuries ~hat. 
followed. 1.) The firs:t expedition to Adherbay jan was: ~dertaken by 
K:iif'a.n troops on the af'terma th of Nihawand under the command! of 
J!udha.yfa.h b. al-Ya.min. 2) This was in 645i (A.H. 2.2) and! it wa.S::-little 
more than a. raidl, for in 647 (A.H. 26i) a ID'Ore· thorough conques·.t wa.s 
carried!. out by ah-WaJ.i.d b. 'Uqbah,. then gov:ernor of Kiif'ah,. who th~n 
departed,. leaving al-Ashrath b. Qays as his; deputy. S) Al-Ashc a.th 
completed the conquest and introduced the policy of. settling Arab 
veterans; in the land! with t:.}].eir falililie:s. 4) 'Even so the- region was 
not fully pacified since in 65:lL (A.H. 50), w.hen Sa.' id b. al~A~ was 
governor of· KUfah, he: sent Jiarlr b ... ~bQ:all~ to Adherbayjan w.here he 
me,t a.ncll! defeated a combined force o~ Armenians: and Adherbayja.nia.ns. 5) 
1.) B'al lL97-205. 2) Ba.l 5·25-527;; Tab :1. 2660 f. 5} .Bal. 5:27-528. 
4)- B'a.l 529. 5) B'a.l 528. 
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'!'he only mention of the lands to the south and s·outh-east of the 
Caspian in the time of the early e:onques·.ts; w.as~ the raid by SaC'idL b. 
al!.As in 65:1i.. (A.H. 50), but he seems to have achieved little except 
the exaction of tribute· from a few towns. ~) At this period one source: 
mentions; the d.a.rlger of the route to Khuri.san through QUi:nis: because: of 
the opposition of the peopile of J!urjin. Ins.tead one had to go from .. 
- ('- ) Fars; acros:s: the Great De·s:ert,. the route: taken by Ibn Amir. 2 · 
1} Bal. 534 f. 2:) Tab l.. 2859. 
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Eg;yp.t. 
( (_ 
The invasion of Egypt was. undertaken by Amr b. al-A~ 1probab~ with the 
sanction of the Caliph,.al though cUmar may have. later repented of hi~ 
.. c 
rashness and attempted to halt the expedition. Amr's force of 3,500 to 
. c -
4,.000 men reached t.."'le borders. of Egypt a:t al-Arish on 12.th December 639 
(:l!Dth Dhu a.l-Ijijja.h,A.H.18) and took the we:stward· inland road to Pelusium 
(Arabic a.l-Farim&:>.) .:lL.)After a siege: of one month t..l:Le· town was taken and,. 
(" 
having no troops to spare as ga.rrison,Amr had the walls razed to make 
it useless as a s.trongh'old if re-occupied,.a.nd resumed his· march,his 
losses hav;ing been more· than made: up· by the Badw who flocked to his 
s.tandard: in ex:pe.c:ta tion of booty.. His·. route was. inland! via the modern 
aJ.-Qa.ntarah to Bilbais ;here· an enemy force was. cut to pieces but the: 
tovm of B'ilbais. was strong enough to resist for· :one·. month. After its, 
fal]. the Arab army ad.vancedl to UIIIIIl! Dunayn north of the great for-tre$8 ··· .:: 
of· Babylon,.at the head of the Delta .. 2)The Byzantines were now· more ,... 
alert and Oyrus~the Monothelite Patriarch of· Egypt.(the 'Muqaw.qas' .~f 
the sources) moved towards Babylon with a large army under the Greek 
general Theodore:. In view.· of the strength of the force:s: arrayed agains;t 
him! together wd. th the formidable task of reducing such fortre.sse:s. as 
( . 
Babylon,Amr now urgently reques;ted reinforcements; from Medlina. While 
w~iting for these: reinforcements,ha.ving: temporarily taken posse.s.sion 
of Umm Dunayn·,..he crossEd the Nile a.nd mounted a. awif't raid agains·,t. the 
Fayiim,where s·ome· cattle: were: taken as. booty. 
lL) Bal. 212.;:Yia q II,ll67f'f;Fut.Misr 56f. 2:) B·al 21!.3£'. 
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The reinf'orcements: - 4,000 men under a:J..-Zubayr. with tw:o similar parties 
( 
following -arrived at Heliopolis{Arabic Ayn a.l-5hams·.) in JUn.e 640 
- ' . ( (J"umad!a. II,A.H.19) and a junction was. ef'.fee:ted! w.ith Amr on his return 
f'rom the FayUin. Heliopolis w.as made the base of o-perations: for the: .Arab 
a.rmie:s.. The MusJ.im army with all its reinforcements• probably· numbered 
about :li.5 ,000 men. The Greek field! force:,not inc·luding the garris.ons, 
w:as; about 2.0,000 strong. In· July 640(Ra.jab,A.Hi.:li.9) the GreekSJ a.dvanceci 
( 
agains:t the Arab positions ;,Am!r had s.tationed on either flank of the 
Greek line of· advance· de·tachm.ents: of· troops,and these· :foree:s: attacked. 
the Greek flanks a:f'ter the battle.;. w.a.s joined. The re:sult w.a.s a compl.ete 
rlctory for the Arabs.1.) 
The: defeat of the Greeks: left the: whole· region at. the mera;y of· the 
inva:ders;.the Fayiim vms. now quickly a.nd ruthle:s.sly subjugated; Mi~, 
Umm Dunayn. ana other towns in the apex of the Delta were· occup2ed; a 
general panic· dirov:e the garris.ons and! many of the inhabi ta.nts; o:f the 
Delta towards Alexandria:. The sie:g~ of Babylon now be:gan in earnes.t. 
(Se.ptember 640,Ramaain,A.H.:IL9}·. For reas·ons. which are not entirely clear 
. . . 
Cyrus seems; to have: been determineil on surrender a.ndl after sQme l'l.egot-
-iation: he was read& to cedle the fortre:ss on payment of· the jizyah. 
He: left for Alexandria to communica.~e his proposals: to the Emperor, 
the status. GJ:UO in Babylon being maintain~ in his absence. He was, 
however ,.ordere.cl to Cons.tantip:op]e: to ac·count :for his actions•,.:repri.ma.nded., 
disgra.ced,.an<l s·ent into exile .• When this bec·a.me know.n in B'abylon 
hostilities were renewed and fighting (!:raggeGii on in; sallies and 
skirmishes: outside the w.alls. 
:li.) J'.Nik 557;,Fut.Mi~r. 59;Tab :lL.2.592:. 
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c 
Amr. himse·lf went at the head of!' a. detachment to eheck a relieving 
force but was sev:ell'ly mauled in dloing s:o;: the relief·,, howev.er, never 
reached! the beleaguered! garrison. The final assau]Lt was moumrtred on 
Good Friday, 6th ApriJL 64:1. ( :ti.8"th Raj ab A. H. 20) : AJ.-zuba.yr with a small. 
part,y succeeded in getting to the top• of the wa.l]. using a. ladder but 
was prevented from fUrther advance· by a cross wa.l~. For the garrison, 
however,. the. inc2dent was sufficient to pree.ipate surrender,was.ted 
as; they were by disease: and disheartened by the recent news of the· 
death of Heracliua. They were: given three day& to leave the: tort. on 
eondli tion that they left behind!. alli. treasure and war· ma teria.ls.. 1.) 
The w.ay was now, open to .llexanaaria and the: army was.: set :i!n motion 
along the: wes;tern or desert bank of' the Nile,although they crossed to 
( - ' capture and sack the town of· Nikiou 1,5.th: May 64:1L1 2:6th .Tumada I AoH. 
20). The advance. was; resumed but the Arabs; were me·t by s;tubborn rear-
-guard: actions; by the Greeks who had been reinforeed by seaborne 
contingents ani by recruits. from• ·the lower Delta. The last. bat.tl.e 
w.as: a hara~fought enga~ent; for the fortre·s.s of :Ka.rjiin which lasted 
for ten days;;: the town anc!li r·ortress were eventualJ!..y taken but. the 
Greeks; retire~ in good order to Alexandria. 
It. was impos:sible for the Arabs. to take• the town by as.sault. as 
it w.as protecte~. to the north by the sea~ to the sou~ by Lake Mareotis 
and! to the west by the Dragon canal. To. the: east and south-eas;t i-t 
was open but the mighty w:a.lls. were guarded by a formidable artillery. 
( 
.A.mr left a a:e.taehment· encamped! before: the city ade.qua. te to deal with 
sortie:s;,, and then went on. to a series: of p~nd!ezo:ing raids: in the: Delta, 
where: he was unable to reduce an::/ of the fortified tow.ns. He then went 
~) Ba.l 213-215. 
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s:outh and completed, with relative ease,. the conques.t: of· Middle Egyp•t. 
Me"8i11Wihile in Constantinople Cyrus; had returned from exile and had 
impre:ssedl upon the~ feeble. sue·ees.sor oi' Heraclius the neees;si ty :for 
surrender in Egypt:. Armed with the Emperor's warrant. he returned to 
Alexandria ac~com]>anied by troop~ reinforcements in case the negottat-
-ions should ]ITOVe unsuc·~s.si'ul. Having been received with enthusiasm 
( . by the. populace he set out in sec:re.t; :for Babylon where: :Amr,. jus.t back 
from· Midffi.e Egypt.,.reeeiv.e.d him cordially. The treaty was concluded 
on 8-th November 64:1L( 28th Dhu al-Qa r dah A.H. 2!'Y) • Its teJl'mS; w.ere these: 
lL. Payment o:f· a fixed. tribute by all who w:ere inC'luded in the. terms: 
of' the treaty. 
2. An armistice i'br eleven months during which the Arab :forces·. were 
to maintain their ]>O$itions but keep apart and undertake no 
... mi::)..itar,y operations: agains;t Alexandria; the Greek forces. to cease 
all hostile: acts. 
:5i. ~e garrison or· Alexandria and alJL troop.s to leave by sea with 
an. their pos:s·es.sions; and treasure. 
4·. No G-reek army to return or to attemp.:t the recover;w of Egyp.t. 
5. Arabs were not to seize ehurche:s or interfere with Cbris:tians .• 
6. Jew;s; to be alloW:edl to remain at. Alexandria. 
7. Hostages to be given by the Greeka as a sd.gn of gpod f.ai th •. 
The :f-irst in:fbrmation of the surrencle:F to :reach Alexandria wa.s when 
an Arab army appeared before -the walls; to claim the first payment of 
tribute. The riots. that broke out at this news. w:ere quelled and Cyrus 
somehow managed to reconcile the Alexandrians: into accepting: submission. 
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Hope: of finaned.al relief, de:sire :for religious~ toleration a.nd a settled 
pea:ee may have. been the most. potent factors; in p.ersuadd.ng them, to 
ae·quiesee. The treaty w.as quickly ratified both by the Emperor and 
( 
by Uinar·. 
In the winter of 64:1i/642{early in A.H. 21L)the md.litary camp of' 
al~Fus:~~ ,jus,t south of the site of Cairo• was f.ounclledl and later· grew; 
into a. large cd.ty. ('l?his· was. a jund on a s-imilar pattern to Klira.h, 
. B'a~rah.,Qinnasrin,etc:. ) 
In the armistice: period the reduc:tion of the coastal towns of the 
Delta was; undertaken but stubborn resistance: was encountered and it: 
took nearly a year to complete the: conquest·. Long bef'ore this the 
eonque:st of Upper Egypt bad been peaceably conel.udedi.. 
On September 17th, 642: (16th Shaw.w.ai,~.H.2~),. the las~ of· the 
Greek forces·, having embarked, c.Amr entered Alexand:ria at. the head of 
his. Arab warriors.. 1.) 
The only other event of· note in the conque:st of Egyp;t proper was 
the recapture: of Alexa.ndtcia by Byzantium. At the end of 645 (about: 
M~a.rr.am: A.H.25) a: flee.t. carrying a large Greek force. under· the: command 
ot Manuali. set out in great. secre.cy from Constantinople; on arrival· at 
Alexandria they surprised! the small Arab garrison who were overpow.ered 
( 
and slain, very te.w- making good their escape:. At. this; time: .Amr· was no 
longer in collllllSnd in Egypt hav.ing been d:epos:edL by cuthnia.n in fa.'Viour 
of ~bdeJ.lah b• .. Sa( <m;: he may even have. been in Meeca. He was re.ealled! 
to Egyp:t at the urgent reques;t of the troops; a.nd set about organising 
his :forces in Babylon. 
1.) See: Bal. 22.0-2211.;: Butler 249-309;; 324-325;. :for the surrender of.· 
Ale:x:a.ndria. and ev-ents.. leadiing up: to it. 
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'Fhe Greeks: had was:ted. valuable time in idlene:s·,s in Alexandria 'and in 
plundering the towns of the lower Delta,; had! they attacked. in (.Amr'·s 
abs:ence: while the Arabs·. w.ere s·till disorganised they might have: 
re.conquered the whole country. Whe-n they finally adv.anced up the= 
Nile 'Amr w:as' rea.d!y for them. The= battle: took piliaee: near Nikiou and 
w.as: desperately contes~tedl, the Greeks fighting w.ith great valour. 
The: Arabs=.w.ere ultimately;· eomp]Letely vicclt"orious. and pursuedi the broken 
remnant~ of the enemy ~ to the walls: of Alexandria. The Greeks 
took refuge: in the cd. ty, elosed the ~te:s and! prepared t"o withstand 
a sj_ege. 'L'his time,,. how.ever J: one: of the. gates: w:as opened by· a traitor 
a.nd! the: Arabs~ rus·hed!. in and carried! the city by assault., looting: and 
{ . 
slaying until s~topped by Aiilr' s: orders. Many of· the Greek garrison 
were: slain in the fighting although some es:capedt by sea; the, women 
and children were taken as. part of the booty. The fall. of the: ci 1ty 
was. in the summer of 646 (about. Shawwa.:t., A.H. 2.5). r.Amr had the walls 
razed to the ground! to prevent it being us:edl as. a fortress in another· 
rebellion of the same kind. 1.) 
Nubia. 
Nubia was never subdued in the: early years. o:f.· Islam. A raiding; force 
c 
sent there by Amr was forced to retreat after suffering casualtie:s 
from the a.c·eura.te marksmanship of' the: Nubian archers.. Later,, in the 
{ 
time of' Uthm&n, a treaty was concluded wi.th the Nubians;: under· its 
terms. the Nubians were: to supply an annual quota of' slaves in return 
for provisions and! a robe of honour. This: was obviously a treaty 
between equal partie:s: a.nd not a. treab- imposed by a victor. 2:) 
:1!..) Ba.l 2·21.. 2) B'al 256 f. 
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North Africa. 
This region can be dealt with very briefly since.,. with the single· 
exception of the PentapoJiis, none: of it eame under permanent Muslim 
rule in the period! here: under review:·. Soon afte•r the· first conquest 
of Alexandria, in the: wrinter· 642/645 (A.H.2:1.), (Amr mounted the. first 
wes;tward expedition from. Egypt. The Pentapolis offered no serious' 
resistanee:,. Ba.rqah immediately -~c·cep.ting the· payment. of tribute, and 
thencefoward the Pentapo]is was permanently incorporated into the 
Islamic· domains:. :ll.) From; Ba.rqah 'Amr moved rapidly an Tripoli which 
w:a:s; taken by as;sault and plundered, a:f'ter a siege lasting sev.;eraJL 
weeks.. 2) From• Tripoli he: advanced! with great SW:if'tness on Sabratha 
(Arabic ~abrah) which he attacked in a surprise raid at: dawn; the 
town was taken by force andl liooted. This w.as the end of the_ swift 
( 
campaign and .Amir returned, Jladen Wii th booty andL captilres., paused at. 
B·arqah to aceep;t. the submission of a B'erber tribe, and. the:n re-entered 
Egwp:t.. · In the next two or three years :raids: from.t Barqah w~e led by 
( - ... ( 
Uqbah b.. Na.f'i,. one. reaching: as :tar as the Fez:zan. 5,) A large raid 
(_ 
w:as undertaken by· Abdalllah b. Sac d when he was governor of' Egy.p-t:, 4) 
starting out about the end of 647 (A.H.26). The Byzantine authority 
was• in cli.s•solution at this time and the Patriarch Gregory of· Carthage 
had rerol ted.. Carthage doe.s: not seem to have supported! him· and he 
based his rule on the Berbers, residing at Sufettila(Sbeitla). 
:lL) Bal. 224f·; Fut. Misr· :1.70t·; J. Nik 578. 2) B'al. 225f. 5i) BaJL 224:. 
4) Bal 226f·. · 
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( 
Abdal]ah raided Tripoli Wlithout being able to take the town itsel:f. 
and detachments of his troops ma.y have got as far as Ghadames:. Gregory 
( 
did not take. the field agains·t the Mus,lims. but w:hen Abdal1iah got as 
far as the· site of'· Qayra.w.an he turned aside to Sbeitla a.ndl ann·ihila1ted 
Gregory' s. a.riDY' ~> Gregory himself' probably :falling in the ba. ttle. 'fhere 
~ 
was\ no oons·olid!a tion~ how.e:u:er, because Abdallah was persuaded to retire 
on the payment of' a large sum. of gold: the who1e expedition took: a 
little o'V/er a yeaar·. 
The remainder· of the eonques:t and pacification of.· ~poJli and 
Tunis (.Arabic. Ifriqiyah) beJ.ongs to the period following Mu; ( awiyah' s 
as;sumption of! power as the :first Ummayya.d C'aliph. Many· ott the. mos.t. 
(' - c: brilliant ·raids w.ett"e carried out by Uqbah b. Nafi, but the: ef!fect: was 
r . 
small be.cause· Uqbah made no attempt to win over the Berbers and the 
Mus:lim authority was only ef:fec·tiVie when a raiding force. was actually 
in the area. The final pacification of' Tripoli and 'l'unis. was not 
( 
achei:v;ed until the days: of· Abdl a.l-Malik, and was carried out under 
the leadership' ot' ~ssan b. a.l-Nu{m&n, who tid adop.t. the policy of' 
winning over the B'erbers. :1.) 
::11.) Beaker 5.66-369. 
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CHAPTER V. 
MILITARY AFFAmS. 
Service am.d mobilization 
In Medina there was no standing levy of troopa similar to the anabish 
(sg .. ~bush) in Mecca: the:se were perhaps. 'mixed multitudes' or the 
remnants. of a number of' smll tribes: who had banded together and were 
available for military s:ervice, with some form of financial incen~ive .• 1.) 
'They formed a contingent of tl?-e Meccan armie:s: in the·ir battles with 
the Muslims a.nd hadi the.ir own leaders. 2:) In Medina, on the other hand,. 
although there was no organised mili ta.ry service, no able-bodd.ed man 
was exe.used by Allah. 5) Leave: of absence eouldi only be given by 
(' 
Muhammad 4) as· when he excus:ea Uthm'in becaus:e of the illness of his 
. 
w:ife Ruqayyah,. the ·Prophet's daugP.ter. 5) Mul].a.mmad himself initiated 
the summoning of the Muslims. and the caJ.i was. aent out by messengers: 6) 
and· the ,...subsequent mus.tering w:as• supervised: by ~d in a.n assembly 
pil.ace ordained by him. 7) 'There is: no mention that subs;titute·s could 
be s·ent in one's; ]ilace: as; was. the cas:e in Mecca. 8) Later,. at the time 
of the expedition to TabUk, a register of tribal rolls was. mentioned 
but this: was purely for the: purpose: of ensuring that. booty was fairly 
dis•tributecl and was. not a. register of those liable for s:ervice. 9) 
1) Watt. Mecca ll;; 154-:ll57. 2,)- m 556; 557 ;: 56:1L; S82.; 61.4; 
'rab 1. 1599;; 1.418;; 14.70;, 1558 f;. lL655; Waq 199. 5.) ni 909. 
4) m: 909 ;: WW 592!. 5) Waq 272. 6 )- m 428; Waq :~i'·2.6;: WW 54;: 59l.. 
7). Waqll4. 8} m 460;: Waq 25;: 26; WW 169. 9) DE 908. 
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Under the first Caliphs the summons; to w.ar went out in writing, us.ual.ly 
to the town dwellers of, for example•,. the. Najd,. the :f!ejaz and the 
"Ia.man. 1.) The· warriors: then c·ame into Medina as; soon as they were able 
to make the journey since. they trav:elled with their women,. children 
and movable: bel.ongings. 2:) The motives that induced men to go to war 
were· 'booty and the love: of Parad!ise'; 5} the assertion that in the 
time: of Abu Bekr there· was a military levy which, for example,. obliged 
-' the province of Me·e·ca: to provid!e 500 men,. and! each dis-trict oft !a if' 
ZO men,. 4) w.as probably an anachronism and applied to a later era. 5) 
There was certainly no conscription in the modern sense up• to the 
time of ~a.d!'s death. 6:) At a later· date the tax officials (umara 
al-s:adaqi.t) bec·a.me: responsibJle: :r.·or mob:ilisaition but no ac-curate date 
ean be given for the commencement of this sys;tem~. 7) Participation 
in the conques.ts w.as not confined to Mllslims or even to Arabs: there 
( 
w.ere Christian Arabs• with al-Mut~ in Iraq,. 8) and non-Arabs 
) . -( ahl al-hamra ) were mentioned! at. Qad.isiyah. 9) Th~r.e were also 
Pell.'·s·ians: fighting with the Arabs,. iO) and in ijulw:an there~ w~s.~ a::-f'6rce 
) 
) _, 
compo:se.d. of· Arabs and non-Arabs comb.ined (md.n al-a.:fna wa min a.l-ha.mra.) 
which,if the tradd.tion is reliable:,. was the. first mi.xecli army in the 
conquests .• n) 
:li..) Tab :11.. 2084 ,.6ff;; 2:1L60 ,1Lf;; 2082:,.2:;; 2085,1.0;; Ba.l 107 ,Uiff·. 
2) Tab :11:. 2·2::ll.8,.5.3·)Bal 255,5.4)Tab :lL. :l!.988,:li.3. 5} Well. VI 65.; 80 •. 
6) B'al 63ff·. 7) Tab• :1.. 2082;:5~·: ·.::· 8) Tab :11.. 2:li..90,.1ff; Hal 25i. 
9) Tab :1!... 226:1L,.4fi'. :110) Tab 1.. 2540,:1L4ff. U.) Tab 1.. 2465:;. 2473. 
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Als:o it is not certain that a leader such as. al-Muthan.n.B. had accepted 
. ~ - r 
Islam at. the time: of his: early raids·. in Iraq, and! Umar permitted tribes 
who had taken part. in the•. 1Riddah 1 to raid on behalf' of Islam;. 1..) 
In any umy the waJlTiors w:ere known as. the ahl a.l.-quw.ah, 2) as 
distinct from the: women, childlren,. weak, age.d and ilil w;ho w.ere called 
c ~, 
oolle:e:tively ci'u ata. 51) 
'l'he provision of' arms:. 
A w.arr.ior had to obtain his personaJ. arms. but. as·.sis•tance was given on 
oecarlons:. Thus at: ~Iunayn some of the weapons. were provided by 
Mul).ammad, 4) and on another occasion weapons were bought: from the 
treasure of' the idlol. Rabbah. 5) Special care. was taken in preparing 
:tor the· expeti tion to TabUk and the provis;ion. of arms. f·or the warriors 
c 
wa.s: called for by Mul}aminad as a volunta.ey offering: Umar, Abu Bekr etc. 
made: contributions and even the women gave jewellry. 6) Of first impor-
-tance was. the provis;ion of good mounts. 7) Every new· victory brougllt 
fresh amounts• of booty 8) but clothing,. arms. anal mounts were al~ays 
in. short s.uppiliy· anal it was fre·qi,i_en tly stipula. ted in the terms: of peace 
treatie:s·. that the Mus·lims be proViidec!l: with a set. quantity of such 
items;. 9) Weapons: were also obtained as pers·onal spoils. on the battle-
-fieldl; :lJ.O) arrows: were: gathered up· and re-used. ll) 
:1!..) Tab :tL. 21l20;. 2:li.65. 2:) Tab :1.. :1-880; 1988;: 2ll2jL. 5) Tab 1. ~. 
4) IH 842:. 5) WW 5.85. 6) WW 591.. 7) WW 592•. 
8) Waq 96f;: :.1L84;; 196f; 574;; 420;;; Bal 453·;: Tab 1.. :1.359;.,1.674. 
9) B·al 18;: 20;: 25.;: 60;: 61.;: 64~ :l!.O) Waq 80;; 95 •. ll) WW. 507. 
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Weapons:;; Clothing; Siege Weapons:;: Equipment;: Tbols. and Tackle. 
Weapons· .• 
In this section use' has. been made: of Sehwarzlose' s w.ork (see lis:t of 
s·ources:) which is: a detailed. survey of the arm~: ·usedi in Arabia~ compiled 
from researches·, into pre-Is·lamic poetry. The scope of the present 
work, however, limits reference to those term~ w.hich are commonly 
used in the Arab sources. 
The basic weapons of the infamtry, the great majority of the, 8.rmy 
in the ea.r1y years·. of the conquests, were.: 
The bow· - gaws. pil.. a.g;w:is. 1.) 
.Arrows. - nabl (coll.); ~ .P~· siha.m~ a.sh.Um., suhlim; nushsliib p] .• 
nas:h.ishib; gidh pJ!... ag:dih,. aqdllh, aqad.JJ:. 2) 
. . 
Nushs·ba.b was; usually us·edl :r.·or the arrows. of enemy troops; the qiah was . 
a blunt arr~used for divination. 
'l'he quiver - kinanah or ja' b&h. 5} 
A quiver w.as; mentioned whic-h eontained 50 arrows. 4) 
Archery was the only long range . weapon in early Islam and seems to 
have been fairly effective, espe:ciaJ.ly against cavalry. 5) Sac d b. 
Abi.-Waqqas; was: a. noted marksman and: at lJl:lud he killed a man who was 
protected by a rock, only his·. head being exposed. 'IDle arrow s·.truc.k 
him in the eye. 6) The bow, like other· weapons of the periodi,. was. 
liable to break in oombat, a,nd at ~udl Mlll]ammadi' s bow· broke near· the 
tip and was of no further use. 7) 
1.) Tab 1. 2556;: B'al 260;. Waq 222:;. 259; WW 53i;: 95;: n6;· 110; Fut Lees 
I, 5;· Schwarz 2.74 ff. 2) ~ab 1. 1.409; 21..78; 2256; Ba.l 1.75i; 221..; 
257; Waq 52:;, 225i;. Sehwa.rz. 516 f. 5;) Waq 222:;: WW 55; 1::1!.6; 
Fut Lees 'r, 5;: Sehw.arz 5:316 f. 4). Vfa.q 240. 5) Waq 223i. 
6). Wai!Jl 259. 7) Waq 2:j;9. 
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That ~adl and his Companions·. used! the bow. indicates• that it was 
not considered beneath the dign:i ty of a leader to do s:o, as: would! 
have been the case. in the later Middle Ages·.. The enemies of the Muslims 
-also used the bow;, the Nubians: be:ing particularly accurate: and deadly. 1) 
At Qadis!ya.h the Pers:ians mocked the Arabs:•· arrows., calling; them 
spindles (d'Uk), but the Arabs claimed that whereas the Persian arrow.s 
mere.ly clung to the outside o-£· the·ir clothing,. their ovm a.rrow.s 
penetratedt armour anal euirasses •• 2) 
'!'he sword! -~ pill.. suiiif. 5:) 
The sw.ordi was. the weapon· used by both cavalry and! infantry for personal 
defence;. sword!s; often became blunt or bent during combat and rendered 
useless. 4) At Yainima.h the ~ah had Indian swords. which they held 
unshe·a thedl in the sun to make them more flexible. 5) Famous. aw.ord:s·. 
were known by name. 6) 
'The shield.- turs:. pl. atra.s., tur\is;; ~jafah pl. ~ajaf;: darqah. 7) 
'l?he haja.f'ah and the <iia.rg:a.h were sihieldis of plain leather Wii thout 
reinforcement. 
Other weapons·. ine1udeal. the spear and the .lance, the latter essen-
~tially a: cavalry weapon; it was ~ometimes. used as; a s.ymbol of· 
office. 8) The helmet and ~our were marks· of prestige and authorit,y 
but the wearing of a;rmour was; eomparatively rare. The· dagger was 
us·ed for pers:onal defence and in close combat. 
:11.) Bal 2517. 2:):. B'al 260. 5.): B'al 258; Tab :lL. 2350•;. 2425;. Waq 62.; 79;. 
98;: 99;, W~V. 97; :tlD9. 4} Ba.l 254;;· Waq 79. 5) Bal 88. 6) Bal :l!.20. 
7) Bal 22::t; Tab lL. li.408; Waq 62:; 86; 2ll.S;: WW :US;: 31..4;; Fut Lees: I,. 3·7;. 
Schwarz 35:1L ffe 8) Tab i. 1660. 
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Stone-throw.ing wa.s·. effectively us:ed, especially in c!tef'ence. Only a. 
single mention has· been found! of' the battle-axe. and. it is: f'e.l t that; 
this may be an anaehronism f'or the early period. 
The lance - rimh pl. rimi.h. 1} ~di's. lance had a. head ~ 
. . 
made of. brass. 2;) There were Inclian lance:&. w:·i th sha.fts; of' bamboo, the 
gianih pl. g,un.I.v, ganawit:, qana.yat. 5) Lances also broke during combat.4) 
The spear -(ana.zah,, ha.rbah. 5) Mi1~ammad us:e.di his spear (harbah) as a 
throwing weap:on. 6) 
The helmet - mighfar pl .• magh'i.fir-, a. JLea.ther helm~t like. a cap, 
bayc!tah, a metal helme·t. 7.) 
. 
Ai-m.our - dir c 8) 
Stones: - 9) 
Battle-axe. - ~abrazayn. pili .• -at. :1!..0) 
Dre:s.a 
'.mlere: is little inf'ormation in the s:ource:s about dre.s·s and a standard 
unif''orDl! w.as unknown. n) Stockings; were not w.orn ·but an under-g~m.e.nt. 
and an over-garment (al-tha.w.b'ini.') were obligatory to all. Muslims. ~) 
Supply of clothing w:as stipulated. in the terms·. of' peace· treaties. 13,) 
:1..) Bal 99;; 264!; Tab ~. 2262!,; 2.425·;; ww 58;; 95:;: Fut Lees II, 1.70. 
~:) Waq 2;1!,4. 5,) Tab 1.. 25:1i.3•,; Wa.q 250 j; Fut Lee:s I,. 5.4.. 4) Ta.b 1.. 
Waq 229. 5) Waq 80;. WvV 1S4 note: 2;; m 565•. 6) Waq 247; see~ 
Sehwarz 21.0-245 for the lance and spear. _ 
7) Tab :lL. 1.406; Wa.q 224;, 24:l!.5· 247;; 2.48; m 574;; ww 1.15·;: 1.25;: Fut I, 5;: Schwarz 549-551.. 8 Tab :l!.. 1389; 2.4~8; B'al 64;; Me;: 
Waq 55;, 6:1;; 202:;; 2:t7;. m 679;, Fut Lees: I, .5'.. 9) Tab :lL. 2197; 
W"iV 1.05;; :IL92.;, 274.. 1.0) 'fab 1. 2462. 11} Fries W7 f'; 29. 
12:): VIW 264·, note_ Si;; 559. 15•) Ba.l 215~ Fut Misr· 60. 
2425·; 
Lees 
ll7. 
Siege Weapons. 
There was no production of heavy weapons in Arabia but captured machines 
l 
were used in the siege of ~a if, without mueh. effect. 1.) 
Thes·e. machines included:-
The! manjazrlq: pl. maj&nig'" majaniq - a mangonel or catapu]t. 2!) 
t' - -The a.rradah - similar to but smaller than the: manja.niq. 5·) 
The dabbabah - a protective s:cr.een for adv.ane·ing up to the w.alJl.s 
under mis:sile. fire. 4) 
The: ~br pl. ~ub'Ur - s:imd.lar to the dabbabah• 5) 
Ladders and! horse-ropes, (wahg pili. awhiq) were used in an attempt to 
s·cale: the walls· of Damaseus:. 6) 
In the early conquests atte111pts. to take· beleaguereal fortre:sses: b;w storm' 
w.ere nearly always: unsuc·ce·s.sful 7) and only in Ummayyad times was a 
re~a.r &rtillery insti tutedi. 8) 
Equipment, Tools:,. and Tackle. 
There is no mention in the source.s of baggage trains. be·ing used in 
the early conque·s.ts, the first mention being in Ummayyad times.. 9) 
Troo:f!!S operating far away from~ the.ir. home territory must,. however,. 
have earriedl a good! deal of' bagga.ge with them,. .especially if they had 
t' -been suc·ces:s.fuJL in obtaining· booty; in Iraq KhiJ.id b·. al-walid used 
:1..) Bal 55; WW 370. 2) Ba.J!. 200;; 589;; Tab :1... lL669;; 2427. 
5·) Tab :1.. 2427;: B'al 221.. 4.) Tab 1.. lL669;: 2.427. 5) Tab 1.. 1.669. 
6) Tab :lL. 2152:. 7) BaJ. 140f;; 580;; 589; Tab :L.. 2596f; 2555i;; 2556. 
8) Fries 45; 55f';, see Schw,arz.51!.9-322 for siege machines. 
9) Frie:s: 46. 
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boats to tranaport. his; infantry, baggage and booty and! this suggests 
tha:t; the ~uanti ty of' equipment. may have been considerable. 1.) Baggage 
ia sometimes referred to~ although not with the meaning of' an organised 
pack-train. 2) 
Tents were made from hides (khaym&h pilL. khiyam), from cloth woven 
from a.nimal. hair (fustat. pl. f'asatit) ~ a.nd from: tree bra.nche.s., 
(branches. - qi~b). 5') Temporary shelters: which coul.d be dismantled 
and re~rectedl were: c·ons.tructed from· ree<ls. 4) 
Ac·cord!ing: to al-B'aladhi:iri compJ!.ete= sewing kits. were: carried by 
every ma.n who went raiding with Kathir b. Shilla.b when he: was. governor 
of' Ray and! Da.s:taba; 5) in the: earl;yr days, however,. a man w.ou]d pref·er 
to exoha.nge a torn shirt with a fresh one from= the boo·ty rather than 
mend! the old. one. 6) 
In early Islam: martial music·. was suppl.ied by the: women, who used 
drums; and tambourines (<iuf.f' pill.. dUf'iif') to s.pur on the warriors in 
battle:. 7) 
1.) Tab :lL. 2058. 2) Tab lL .• 261.9;; 2829; Fut. Lees I,. 89. 
5) Bal 54:11..;: WW 47;; 49;; 55!;; m 459f ;;. 4) Bal 546f. 5) Bal 5!18. 
6) Tab :1!..e 2695. 7) Waq 207;; WVV. 44.;; :li.05; :li..09f. 
119. 
Consideration of the numerical s;treng:ths. of' the Bli'llli.es. 
Special.., often ma:gical, attributes. are given by Oriental.s to numbers, 
the numbers 7 a.ndi n,. for example, having, gpod ana bad influence 
res:pee·.tiv:eJ.y. The number 4 (a.nd. its; multiple-s) is lueky: the best 
expeditions; are of' 400 men,. the be:st armi.e:s. of 4.,000, the s-a:f.es.t. tribe: 
or people number-s, :1!.2:,000~ The· n.umber· 4 anclll its: multiples,. therefore., 
often appears. in the tradd. tiona:. 1} 
There follows. an analysis. or· the numbers involved il:l•. the principal 
battles, as: rec·orded! in various; sources. 
The early battles: (M - men,. Hl - horses;, C - camels) 
Battle 
Badr 
mju.d: (s) 
The Di t·ch ( 6.} 
Muslims: 
s;:li..5 M 10 c (2) 
700 M (4). 
( 'JO d:eadl. by name) 
5000 M 
( 6 dead by name) ( 7) 
:li.O,.ooo M 
:1!.2:,.000 M 
Me:eca:ns 
950 M 700 C ~00· H 
5000 M SOOO C 200 H . 
(22: dleadi by name) (5) 
1.0,.000 M 
(5 dead by name) (7) 
Mecca. (8} 
f.!una:yn (9) 
~ablik (:lLO) SO 1000 M :lL2/:l.5 ,.000 C 10,000 H 
:lL) Beekma.nn 47 • 2:) Tab 1.. l!.296. 5) Tab l.. 1389; m 56l.( 607 ff. 
4.) m 607 r:r.·;. ww· :1L5s·. 5) m. 6:1l0; ww 202:. 6) DI 675:. 7 J m 699. 
8) IH 8:1!.0;. with s trerigths. of ind:i. vidual tribes.:;· 
9) ww 5"55 f. :11.0) ww :~i95; 408. 
Ajnada.yn ~) 
Source 
~al~Istf ab 
529 ff 
*Dhaha.bi, Paris 
I,. fol l:18, r 
Bal ll5· 
Fut Lees; I, 71.-129 
The YarmUk 5) 
~Asikir fol 57, v. 
*Asi.kir,. Cod. Damascus. 
I~aq in Ta.b 1.. 2347 
B'aJ. 155 f. 
*'Ibn al-Kalbi 
in Dha.ha.bi~, Paris,, I,:l!..26 •. 
("- ~ -r 
.::csa. idl. b·. al-AzJ.z 
as: above 
Sa.~· b.~ Um:ar 
in Tab 1.. 2089 
Losses·. 
Arabs 
56,000 
20,000 
47,500 (2) 
(4-75 dea.d) (4) 
24,000 
24,000 
24,000 
2.7,000 pilius 9000 
under Khalid 
5000 (6)_ 
129. 
Greeks 
70/5·20 ,ooo 
(5000 dead) 
1.00,000 
90,000 (3) 
(50,000 dead) 
80,,000 
200,000 
100,000 
(~2:,.000 Armenians.) 
200,.000\ 
500,000 
1.2.0 ,ooo 
240·,000 
70,000 (7) 
over 2000 ( 8) 
lL) Ca 13, 56-65. 2) Fut Lees I, 71.;: this number refers to the strength 
of the a.rmie·s• which left Arabia for Syria. S1) Fut Lees I,. 1.27. 
4) Fut Lee-s: I, 128. 5) Ca. :l5, 46-1:1!..6• *· 6) al;:.l)a.w:labi in Fura.t, 
fol 64, v. 7) Tab 1.. 2-349. 8) Sebeos: 98. 
*' Sources marked w.ith a.n asterisk are cited by Caetani but ha.ve not 
been verified. 
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Caetani (:ILB ,56ff see a.lso :1.3.,.28 and u:,52Z note 5) a.f'ter referring to 
the insoluble confus·ion of the sources·~ both f·or Ajnidayn and the 
Yarmiik, es·t~ates the Arab n1:llJlber·s: at Ajnidayn at: 9 ,000. He concedes 
that the: Greeks. ma.y have been more numerous, but insis,ts tha.t. the: 
nUm:bers on both s·.id!es must. have been quite small. For the. Yariiiik·, 
the agreement in the sources• for the figure· of 24,000 for the Arab 
s·trength is in·teres•ting, and it is; proba.bJle:,. since the Arabs ha.d been 
considerably, reinf'oreed s:ince· the: first invas:ions ~ tha. t. this. figur~ 
is. approximatea.y corre·ct. The number for the Greeks. ean be taken as 
meaning " a. vas•tly superior en~my'' ,. but the. ae:tua.l ratio was probably 
not more than two to one,. i.e:. 25,000 to 50,.000 but the Greek force 
may have been e:u:en smaller. B~1isarius. had an a.rmu of 15,.000 agains,t. 
the Vandals and 10,000 against: the Ostrogoths~ while: J"ors;tinia.n never 
·a.~ 
ha.~ more: than lBO,OOO men under arms on all fronts. 1) Yet. Justinian's 
military expenditure,. with other exba.v:aganee·s•,. strained the national.. 
exchequer to .the. limit. By the end of the s.th century the. whole tenor 
of Byzantine teaChing was·. towards·. the husbanding: of mea~ manpower 
res·ource:s. 2) As; the author of the Str.ategikon says;;." In particular 
one·· should avoid pi tchedi ba ttle:s ~ch dec:ide irrevocably the :fate 
of' armies· and peoples·. Ins·.tead one: should re:s:ort to clevernes.s, 
ingenuity and surpris·es•,. stratagems• and ruses .• " 5i) At: this time a 
large Byzantine: army exceeded 15,000 m~n w:ith a maximHm· s.ize of 2Cl,OOO 
infantry and 2i4,.000 cavalry. 4) 
:l!.) Brehier 54:l!.~ 2:) Strat. 98f':f. s·.) Strat. ::IL02:. 4) Str.at. 57. 
1.22. 
It seems unlikely,, therei'ore,_ that Heraclius-.,. in the aftermath o::r· the 
exhaus>ting_ w.a.r- w:i th Perscia. ,, coulciil. have assembJ:.e:dl an a.rriJ::J more than 
50,-000 strong. The proportion of trained veterans. was probably small, 
and the re:s:t of the a.rnzy,; wouldl be composed. oft raw.· levie:s and unreliable 
Arab auxilia.rie s· .• 
Source 
Ta.b :li.. 2556-
Ta.b 1.. 2~51L 
Bal 2-55:f 
Tab 1.. Z:35o:f'i' 
c 
*Mas udi IV,. 207, 24 
Tab :lL. (Sa.yf) 2250: 
Arabs 
6-7 ,.ooo: 
7-8,000 
ov.er :30 ,ooo; 
9-1.0:,000~-
7,_000 
:5:8,.000 
50,.000 
Persians · 
:1.20,000· 
60,000 plus 
slave:s 
120' ooo, a.nd ~0.' 
elephants-. 
50-,000 a.nd 
elephants 
6Q:,ooo 
120•,000 
Ca.e:tani ( :lL6,. 1.27 -:1L29) es.tima te:s the number~ at. 5-6 ,000 a.nd 15 , 000 
f.'er s.ians. 
In .general numbers. are always. exaggerated in the sources. to glori.:Ji'y.-
vietory a.nd excuse defeat. With little: more to exp~pt :from new material 
except perhaps research into population figures (see Cae.tani 13•·, 28 
a~d n~te 2'.). no exact reS:u]t can be ob.tainedl. The number of men with 
1.) Ca-16, 5-117. 
~ Source.sc marked with an as:terisk cited by Caetani but· not verified. 
:!..125.·· 
their familie:s able to move out of Arabia a.t a given time,. especially 
in summer·,. w.ould be limited by the amount of grazing a.nd well. .... water 
available.. At the outs:e.t. the: total .number of men in the field in each 
theatre probably dd.d no~_.e:x.ceedl :lLO,OOO,, ris:ing :in Syria. to a.b:out:. 20,.000 
at the Yarmuk,. w.ith less than half that. numbe~ at. Qidisiyah. By the 
end o:f." the first surge. f'owa.rd, about 640,. as reinforcements exceeded 
the losses;, the numbers in each region may l:J.ave risen ·to 5.0,000. Not 
until 650; were the numbers. sufficient. to form the equivalent of' a. 
modern .A:rriJy Corps:. :lL) 
:1) Be·ckmann 4.7-55; WeJ!l. VI,, 76f. 
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Troop' Formations 
No coherent picture: is· given by the sources o:r· the battle formations 
in early Islam. The sociological structure of tribal relationships, 
both hostile and friendlly, began to be apli t vertic-ally wd. th the: rise: 
of.· ~amma.d. Al-Waqidi gives lists; of participants at Badir, whence 
it is. apparent that almost all the families of Quraysh had members 
in both camps·. :l!.} There· are other cases- of friends and relatives; being: 
tivided! by Islam. 2:) Nevertheles-s the clans. remained largely undis;turbed 
t:or a time. At Badr the Emigrants and: HeJ..pers· fought side= by side for 
the first time 5} and, although in Me.dina. the division between the: 
Aws. ana the Rpazra:j continued, a:t ~ud they were regarded as distinct 
from the An~ar ~ who were Medine:se. who actively supported Mul}.a.mma.d. 4} 
Tw.o battle: :formations; were: employed in early Islam- tribal and 
numerieal. 'l'here: a:re: many allusions. to tribal units., w;i. th the leader 
named!. 5) Tribal affiliations; w.ere: not destroyed. or merged into a 
single loy~ty to Is·-lam,. as is. shown by the fact that; after the found-
-ing of Kiifah and! B'a.s:rah, a: man who ha:d become detached from his- tribe 
was; able to rejoin it in one of. those towns. 6) 
The numerical unit, of ten men,, w:as. known as thec-arata.h, or simply 
as the <"asha:rah;; 7) Sac d1 b. Abi Wa.qqas wrote: to the Caliph from Sha.r"i:fi'· 
c r in Iraq,. and was ord1ered by ~ar in an a.ns:w:ering letter to adop·t 
the 'ten' formation. 8) 
:1} Wa<q! :133. f.f;; 151. ff ;; :157. 2.) Waq 106;; 225. 3i) Waq 1.41.; 1.57 • 
4) Vlaq 276 f. 5) Tab :h.. 1.950;: 2167; 21.88;; 2224. 6) Tab 1. 2487. 
7) 'l?ab :li... 2225·;. 2225;: 222~; 2505;; 253:1:..;: 2490;; 2495. 8) Tab 1.. 22.23. 
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c: c -Sa.yf' b .. Uinar, quoted: b;w ~abari, asserts that the a.rafah Si}Tstem wa.s :in 
~xistence in the lifetime of Mul}amma.d and that it was used for the 
C I 
allocation of pensions. (a.ta), 1.) but it is: unlikely tha.t. it was in 
us·e. s:o early: and there: is; no mention of· it in al.-Waqid:ii. or Thn ~shim. 
.. -An .arafah wa;a; the equivalent of the Sec·.tion in a modern army a.nd it. is 
therefore perhaps: a little strange t.p.at indd.v.idual s:ec.tio:n· leaders 
(~if) should be: mentioned by nam:e:. 2) A '·'century" is: also mentioned 
in 'J;'"abari 5·) but it is u:nlikely that such a tight formation would 
- ( -have: been tolera.te.di at the time of the: early eonques·,ts:; eVieil the ara.f.ah, 
though nominally of ten men, could! va:r.y in strength and could i:nclude 
c -
wome:n and: children. 4) There: is. no evidence to show· that. the ara.fah 
sys•tem: deliberately ignored.. tribal a£f.iliations,. 
Conunandl 
( 
Ac:oording to Sayf b>. Uinar the: follow·ing chain of command was operative 
( 
in the: early conques.ts in Iraq:- 5) 
:JL •. Amlr 
--
2 U ,l _, t cb: -t . :.. mara ~:~U.- ·a. J.ya · 
-) c -5). Uinara al-a shar 
4. Ashib a.l-ra.yat 
5. A11uw:wadi 
6 ) - al ,_- l • ,, ·,. Ru us; -qa.ua. .l....!.. 
:!i.) Tab 1.. 2224 •. 
4.} Tab 1.. 2:496. 
2:) Tab 1.. 2:2:25 ;: 25'85. 
5.) Tab 1.~ 2225. 
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Caetani, howe:wer,. thinks that this is a mixture= of ancient org;mis-
-ations; with those in being. at the time of Sayf~ the second eentur,y 
of the· Hijrah. 1) 
The· ~~)a~ al=g:a.bilah was. by :li'aoll" the mos,t &1.nent of the·se ranks .. 
a.nd! was in existene·e lllong before IslB.III!. His·. tribe· wa.s. his. regiment 
and no Caliph w.ould: dare: to t:cy a.nd depose him and subs.ti tute another 
in his place:. Exami>Jle:s: of such leaders a.re: al..-Mu"l:;ha.nna, of' the Bakr 
_) -
b. Wa il,or rather the Shaybani clan of· that. tribe·; JTa.ri.r of the 
- ~ c . 
B'a.jila.h;; a.l-.A.sh ath o:£ the: Kindiah. 2) When Uma.r joiE.ed: a. band of' the 
,._ r 
B'aj i]ah to a. band of the B-anu Amir lie= put Ar.faj a.h b. Hartha.mah in 
ov;erall co:mmam.d" but Jari.r compa.ained that he had put. a. s:tra.nger over 
c - r 
them. Uma.r reins;tatedi Ja.rir and s:ent: Artaja.h back to Ba.~ra.h; he had 
r 
mis·.ta:kenly as.sumed! that .Ari'a.jah w:as. of the Baj'ila.h,. whereas he: was in 
fac:t: a elient. s,) Before. troops. set out on expedi tiona. such tribal 
lead:ers. were= oon:f'irmed in their commands by the Caliph when they 
marched pa.s;t him in review in Medina;: 4) there were t:wo l.ea.ders of' 
the· Banti Dubba:h because of its·. size. s,) Difficulties. arose: when two 
( 
tribal leaders were: ac·ting: toge:ther as, for exa.mp;Iie:,. in Iraq when 
Jarlr refused to take orders. from al~~tha.nDa because he w:a.s his equa~. 
( c - -Umar supported J:arir and e:ventual]y sent S.a di b:. Abi-Wa.qqa.s a.s supreme 
C'Omma.nder. 6) 
:1.) Ca. :1!..4,. 59 1 note s,. 2:) Well VI,. 78f. 5) Tab 1.. 2200; 2201.. 
4.) Tab 1.. 1950;; 2:ll88. 5) Tab 1~21'.S9 6) Tab 1..2202,. see also 
Bal 198f for a similar dis;pute between Habib b. Maslamah and 
Sal.In'an. b. Rabi. ( a.h in Armenia. · 
127. 
( 
This. tis;pute· and the action taken by Uma.r is: an exampJle of the gradual 
development of a High Command, al.though the Caliph and his: deputed 
general had no real basis of power over the tribes; and could only· 
exercise controJi.< by persuasion a.nd by strength of personality. They 
. r -
were some:times disobeyed:, as when parts of' Sa. d's army,' at Qidisiyah 
attacked before he: ga.v;e· the order. 1) No exact chain of command devel-
-opeai in the. early conques•ts. 
liJp, to Uinmayya.d time:s·. the term a.nlir hadi no meaning o:fi' nrankn in 
-' r -the modern s:ense·. Uinara al-ta biya.t: meant: leaders of tae·tica.l form.-
-a.tions and could coincide with tribal leaders. when, for example, 
sueh a leader led his men in vanguard, wings, rea.rguard,. etc. 2) The 
-\ (' -
meaning· or.· the term umara. al-a. shar· is, not clear from the sources -
) 
it is·. rareJ.y; us:ed in ~aba.ri.S:) The name qa id pJL. quwWa.d is: held by 
Wellhausen 4) to ha.v;e been the official name for the: Khura.sanian 
officers of the Abbasids. The: term sB.hib, a.l-rayat is·. found only in 
the· tra.di tions: o:f· Sa.yi',. ·quoted by ~aba.ri. The~ conferment. of· the 
stamdard meant. confirmation of· ooiD!Il8.nd and also appointment as governor 
of' a province. 5) At: the: Ba t:tle: of the Bridlge the· command-in~hief' 
and the bearing: of the flag were synonomous.J 6:) but .ai'terw.a.rds this 
prac·.tice was le:ss often mentioned; perhaps with increasing: respons-
-ibili ty the leadier· no longer a.ctual]y carried the: ·standard. 7) 
:l) Tab :l. 25501. 2:) Ba.l 2M; Tab 1.. 2o:l66·;: 222·5; 2:474. 5') Tab :l.. 22:25,~ 
s·ee Ca 14, 59. 4) Well. •. VI, 65i;. s.ee aJ.so Ca 15, 72:. 
5') Well. VI, :li.02:,. note: :l. 6) Ba.l 251f'. 7) Be.ckmann 60•. 
128. 
Tactics 
The ideal battle formation to the Arabs and their opponents was the· 
tarbiyah, ::lL) which was: adopted on the march as we:ll as; before battle. 2) 
In its·. complete form, which w:as not always. attained,. the· ta( biyah 
consisted of vanguard, muqaddima.h, 5) the w.ings, mujannabatin, 4) 
dlivided!. into right w.ing, ma;yma.nah, 5) and l'eft w·ing, maysarah, 6) 
the centre,. qalb,. 7) and the rearguard,. saqah. 8) 
'Phe various·. arms; of. the formation were: also sometimes mentioned 
by name,. especially cavalry, kha.yl, 9) mujarr.a~, 1.0) rikb'in, 1.1.) 
and. infantry,, rijl or rij&lah. :112) Archers.,. murimiyah,. ~··) and scouts, 
~ala'i~ were: also occasionally referred to, ::1L4) as was the: reserve, 
rid:", 15)· andl baggage., athqal. :16) 
'l?here was; nearly always. a vanguard. andl two w.d.ngs in the formation 
but less; often a rearguard and centre,, while: the: tali(' i, were. usually· 
separate: detachments .• :1.7) Baggage and reserve:· can also be cons·idered 
as; s·eparate de.tachments in the rear of the actual field! of' battle .• 
It: is: not clear in· .. -the s.ource:s, whether cavalry,. infantry and bowmen 
are ~dditions: to the ta'biyah formation er are to be identified Wlith 
one of its five: basic divisions· .• 
:lL) Tab 1 .. 2092: f~ 22:65 £;; 2505; 2225; 2474 ff';, 2398; 2505·;: Fut Lees 
II, lL68 r.·. 2:} Tab :tL. 255~,; 2,6:lLB. 5) Tab ~. 2224--; 22.65 f; 25.05; 
2598;: 2474;; 2618. 4) Tab :tL. 2224.; 2505; 2618. 5) Tab 1.. 2166J 
2558;. 2474;, 2505-. 6) 'fab :1. 2:1!..66; 2558,; 2474;; 2505·. 
7} Tab 1.. 25'·29; 2505.. 8) Tab :1. 2225~ 25'05. 9) Tab 1.. 2474; Yac- q II, 
1.59. 1.0:) Tab 1.. 2:1!.85;: 2224; 2:62i. 11.) 'li"ab 1.. 2224. 
l!.2~) Tab 1.. 2224;: 2550 ~ Bal 5:80 f ;; Fu t Lees II, 1.69 ;. 1.91;: Ya c q II, 159. 
13') T'ab 1.. 2266. :.1L4) Tab· 1.. 2:ll.85; 2:3!.9:1.;. 222,4;.: 2266. 15) 'fab 1.. 25'01. 
1.6} Tab 1.. 261.9; 2829. 1.7) See. Ch. VI. 
1.29. 
'fhes·e· dirisions; - vanguard,. two wings., centre and reargua.rd - are the 
ancient oriental battle order;; the. same Arabic: te·rms; are us:ed in the: 
tradd. tions; to describe Greek and Pers-ian battle groupings.. ~) For 
battle-readiine:ss the troops: were· d.raw.n up in ranks (saf:f'· pl. s:ufiif), 
. . 
a practice already established in- the lifetime of the Frophe:t• 2) At: 
Badr !Jfu.~ammad took grea'j:; pains: t~ make sure that: th~ ranks: were 
straight ag.d pre.sentedl a solid: front. to the enemy,, supervis·ing the 
assembly himself.· •. 5i) Aceording to s·a.yr, the ranks o;f the Muslims a.t. 
Qadlis!y~ were thirteen deep; a.nd included inf~:tr.Y' ,, archers·. anal. cavalry 4). 
but again it ,is; impossible t.o. .. determine from :the de.sc?ript:i.on the. 
posd. tion in the formation of the imlividua.~ arms;. Before the ba.tt:j.e: 
the ~roops were harangued. to incite. their valour, such apeeehes., full 
of pious: exhortations:, being fre•quently quoted. 5) Alt~tively the 
S\irah 1B'ooty 1 was read! to the soldier~ 6) anQ: the ra.nks prayed in 
turn. 7) Single combats w.ere very frequent,. ta~ng pilace e-ither before 
the battle or while it w.as: in progre·s:s:, and there: are many full 
descriptions of s.ueh encounters:. 8) At Khayba.r .duels: took place before 
the wa:lls of the forts: when the Jie:ws made s:orties· .• 9) The single 
combats. were not to be started bef'ore the third ba ttl~ccy ( takbir) • 1.0) 
:li..) 'l!ab ~. 2054;; 2088;; 2266. ~:) Waq .82:;; 87;; 21!.9;; 222:; 256; WW 1.76;. 2.92:. 
S·) Wa:q 52·. 4) 'l"ab 1.. 2-5;29 f;. s:ee ·al~·o Wa.q 52: r.·~ -_222:; m 444. 
5) Tab lL. 221L9 f'f;. 2289; 25.51.;; _.~97;; :Fut. Lees·. II, 1.91. ff. 
6}' Tab :JL. 22.94 f. 7): m 662.. 8) Tab ·:t. 2055'.;. 2101.; 2296;; 25'06; 
2422;; 26S8 r·;; 2687;; wa.q 65;: 87; 2~i;; 25o ;: ww: 5:55; m. 443;: 567 r. 
9) WW. 272:;. IH 761.. 1.0) Tab 1.. 2:294 f'. 
150. 
C"aetani thinks. that the conception of dense:, well-ordered ranks opposing 
each other is: erroneous and that a typical battle in early Islam would 
develop' into a. number o:r· loos:e melees and sd.ngle combats and that. the 
battle w.ould thus. be: fragmented over a wide: ~ea. i) This do~s-~ot. 
accord w;ith the s:ources,. all. o:f· whom: give s-imd.lar d:es:crip-tions of the 
drawing-up. of the: suf'Uf'. ( s.ee· above:) • If' the Muslims had broken their 
ranks in this- manner in the: early battles they could have been des:troyed 
pd.eeemeal by· the numerically superior cavalry forces of· their enemies.2:) 
In ancient and medie"'lla.l time:s. battles were invariably fought: in· tight. 
rank~. 5) 
The moment of s;tarting: ba.t:tle was sometimes chosen w.i th regard 
to religious considerations and weather conclitions-. 4) The signal to 
comme~ce: the battle. was given by the: battle-cry or· takbir; the firs.t. 
cry signified 'tighten sa.nda.l-strap:s and see to your personal needs', 
the s:econdi 'se·eu.re your clothing and make ready',_ the third 'attack' .5;) 
The:se s:ignal.s were. sometimes giv.en by shaking, the battle-standard. s.) 
Usually the two s.ides faced! each other. in· straight. pa.ralle:l lines 7) 
s.o that the right wing of one army was. oppo&ite the le:f.t wing· of the 
other. 8) In the· early days at least.,. the Muslim standard bearer stood 
in the: van. 9) 
:lL) Ca. Vo_l. II,. 285. 2:) IH 561.; Tab 1. 15·96;; Waq 250. 5i) Beckmann 71.. 
4:) B'a.l 50S~;; Tab :lL. 2622:. 5) Tab. 1.. 2598. 6) Tab l.. 2.605. 
7) Wa.q 2:19,;: 222~;. 256. 8) WW 50;; 1.08;: :1.76; 271.. 9) Wa.q 22.0;. WVl 274;5ll. 
1.51.. 
~attle:s usUally began in the: morning,. 1.) and! ac·eorting: to al-Waqidi 
the firs.t: phase eonsis.te'di of archery and stone-throwing:,. 2) although 
Sayf says that at·. Qadisiya.h. the e-a~valry started! the fighting. each 
~Y· 5). At. the: YaFmllk the cavalry appears to have acted as a harass-
-ment to the adi¥ancd.ng: Greeks. while. the :ranks of· the· Musliml infantry 
were: being aligned. 4) The ba. ttle was; thus Mvided into three parts: 
md.s;s=ile: tis:eharge:;; e-av.al.ry charges;; hand-to.,.,hand fighting. 5) 
B'attle.-erie:s, were used!. to stre·ngthen the courage of one 1 s own: 
side,. to strike fear into the enemy,, or as. an identification ill! the 
)leat .of combat; or in d!a.rkne:s:s. 6) .If the. issue: of the contest. was not. 
de·c1.ded by the· end of the dla.y the contestants usually retired to camp· 
f·or the night. 7) At·. Ba.U, however,. the Muslims remained in their ranks 
on the: night: before the: battle,. 8) and at. Qad!is:iyah they remained on 
the battle-fieJ.d all night. 9) The: battle w:as regarded as won when 
the: enemy wa.s defeated or dispersed, the. battle.-field in possession. 
of!' the: "ric·tor,. and the. enemy camp; open to. pillunder. 1.0) A reversaJL of 
fortune: such as that w,hich occurred at ~ud~ when the Meccan cavalry 
. . 
undler Knalid broke through and! routed the Muslims after they seemed 
already to have. won the day, '\Voul.d have been a. considerable blow to 
Se:veral. ane.c&otes reveal that medieval s;tanaa.rds of chivalry 
were in force, a.i though harsher conduct. might often be: used· in. the 
heat of the battle: or its immediate aftermath. 
:ll.) B'al 50S,;. m 757. 2;) WW 165;; 1.76; 199;; 200;, 2'12:. 5·) Tab 1.. 2.5.09. 
4) Fut Lees II,190:. 5) Tab 1.. 25;::1!.9;. Fut. Lees. II, 1.70f. 6) Bal 25,9f; 
Tab :lL. :ll.947;; 25;27;: 2552.~ 7) Fries. 76. 8) Waq 82:. 9) Tab lL. 2555£'. 
:lLO) Be·ckm.ann 74. :lL:l!..) Waq 2~f'·;: 229f. 
1.52:. 
Thus ~adJ, before the battle of Badr, offered to allow: the Me.ccans; 
to withdraw,, and permitted some Me:ccans to drink at the we::Ll occupiedi 
by the Mus·lims.. 1.) After ~ud r Umar and Abu Sufyi":n made a compact: to 
meet the followd.ng year at Badr; 2) commandlers· urged their troop·s. to 
refrain from treachery a.ndJ from killing women and children. :;·,) In ("Iraq,. 
when the river divided! the two side·s. the Muslims·, asked the Persians. 
~~"will you cross·, over to us: or s·hall we cross. over to you ?·It 4). 
'!'he influence of the leacier cannot be estimated in general terms. 
becaus·e: his: personal qt_lali tie:s, such as• courage·, sagacity and fore-.-
-sight were: all-important, and! his• men followed his·. example rather than 
his. commands·.. He· was the: s,tandardJ bearer and! the flag w.as: the holy 
symbol, not of his own rank, but of the tribe or cause: which it: rep-
-res:entedl. Thus: the ::loss· of the s:tandard was: e:quivalent to defeat 
and if the leader· was: killed it was. handed! on to another. 5) The flag 
was the rallying point for the troops·. a.ndJ had! to be de-fended at. al~ 
costs;;; great· bravery w.as shown by standard! bearers:· in fulfilling 
their duty.. 6): Ne:vertheles.s there: w.ere occasions. when a s:ta.nd:ard 
.. 
bearer deserte(n his pos·,t. 7) The place of the commander was: in the 
centre of the ta cbi.yah, as: w.as al.so the case in later years:.;; 8) at. 
Qid!isiyah Sac d used the high turret of the castle of~ Udayb as:. a 
command post and encouraged the tribe:s therefrom by nalil.e:; 9) in Syria 
r 
Abu Ubaydah 1 s; po 3d. tion was at the centre ( g:a:lb) of the army. :lO) 
:ll} Waq 56;; IH 440. 2:)' Di. 585·; 666. 5:) WW 25:6 f;. Fut Lees I,. 7 •. 
4) 'l!ab :ll.... 2185;; ·2587 f. 5) Tab 1.. 2625;. Waq 256 f. 
6) Waq 225;, 236. 7) WV'f 5·1.2:. 8) Fries: 76. 9) Tab 1.. 255'5i. 
:1!..0) Tab 1.. 2505:;: Flit Lees II, 19:1!. .• 
155. 
In ciraq the Arabs; had to deal Wii.th a new menace: - the elephants which 
w.ere: wi. th the Persians; at the battle of the Bridge. :l.) and at the battle 
of Qidisi.yah. 2:) 'llli.e elephants were provided w:d. th a ,·howdah' ( tabut 
pill. tawablt) which was securedl around their bodies• by a girth (waa.In 
. 
pl. wu~unh 5i). eaeh howdaoh w:a.s capable of carrying 20 men-and the. 
elephant was; gua;rcied. by a band. of riders a.ndl infantry,. the whole: array 
forming a kind of mixed battle-group:. 4). The vulnerable points: of the 
animal were, s·aid to be the eyes·. and the trunk 5) and they w.ere 
attackea by warriors; in pairs, one of whom attaekedl the eyes Writh· a 
s.pe·ar w.hi.le the other went for the trunk or the how.da.h girth. 6) 
4
ll.) Tab 1. 2.:JL74;: Bal 251l. f. 2) Tab 1.. 2266 fft; 2298 •. 5} Tab 1.. 25.0:1.. 
) Tab :1L. 2520;; _2524-;: 22.98;: Sebeos 22:. 5) Ta.b 1.. 2525. 
6) Tab 1.. 2.'301.;; 2525 ;. 25;25·~ 
Statie Warfare and Defence. 
From, the earlies't days of Islam the Mu.sJi.ims had to contend with fort-
-re:ss:es barred against them· byr the hostile inhabitants; thus in the 
) 
lifetime: of the Pl'ophet the: Jews in Khayba.r 1.) and the city of' Ta :if 2) 
• 
had be.en besieged but,. as, in later times, ii;he: s·ieges were: quite ineff-
-ective in carrying the:se pJiace·s by as.saul.t:.. Unless a ·sie-ge was given 
UP' as hopele:ss,. on]y treachery among the defenders g~ve vicii;ory to 
the: bes:iegers .. 5,) Towns were very rarely taken by assauJlt. 4) A siege 
was not c.onduc·.ted under modern c·ondi tions: since= the: besiegers fought 
by day ana retired! to the safety o:fi' their own· encampments: at night; 5) 
battles at night were an exception. 6) AJi.though the: bes.iegers attempted 
to eut off· supplies this was seld:om achie:ved, even b:w day,. and it is 
) 
doub-tfu]L if nWllibers were: sufficd.ent. t;o ae:eompil!ish this. 7) At; !'a if 
( -
sharpened s.ta.kes (hasak min id!an) were used in a.n attempt to cut off 
the tow.n but. this was unsuece:ssful. 8) (The Persians also used stakes 
of wood or iron :..- hasak: min al-kha.shab. or min al-ha.did - as a defence 
in open warfare). 9) This ineffe.Ctiveness w:as not confined t·o the 
Axabs, since· both the Greeks and the Persians were more succe·ss.fu]. in 
defending fortre:s.ses than in attacking· them. By: the: 7th century, in 
siege warfare, the defence: was stronger than· the= attack. ~0) How little 
the te·chnique of· s.iege· warfare was unders.tood! is shown by an incident 
at. Khaybar: a siege machine w.as captured through treachery ll) yet. it. 
was fourte.en days before it occurred to ~a.mma.d to use it. 12) 
:lL) B'al 25i,;. WW 265f. 2) IH 869ff. 5) B'al 199;; 5.1,5.,;; WW 2.67;; Fu:t. lfi;;r 80. 
4) Tab lL. 2151ff·; 2427f·; 2475ff. 5) BaJL 12'l'; WW. 271f; 5'69;: Seb 100:. 
6) Bal. lLO:lL;: :1.98;: 2!4'8;; Tab 1. 2156:f'f'. 7) Tab 1. 2:l.47f'f. 8) V'IW· 5>70·. 
9) Tab 1. 2458;; 2597;, 2605i;; 2604. 1.0) Bal. :127;; l"fw 267;: Seh 5>7; 65;. 
Fut Mi~r 79f;; Stra.t: :l06f. 1:1L) WW 269. :1i.2) vVW: 277. 
135. 
Even in the nineteenth century Dought,y wrote: 'In Tayma'mud walls 
were: sufficient protec·tion - no-one had the ingenuity to use powder·, 
or a: palm1 . trunk as. a ba ttering-ra.IIl!e 1 :1) 
During the seven year s·iege of Caes·area the city was .. assaulted 
f'or many months. w.i th a battery of 72 siege machines. 2) Ladders w:ere 
us:edl to sca:le· the walls of be·leaguered c:i. ties; and fortres;se:s. such a.s 
Babylon in Egypt;,. where: al-Zubayr reached the battlemen~s but w.as. 
unable to enter the fortres;s. because his; advance: was. cut off by cross-
-walls·. built a:cros·s: the ramparts. 5) More effective in gaining a.cces·.s 
to fortres.ses was entry by stealth, es·.pecially when s.ome unguarded. 
entry was; revealed to the bes·iegers; by a traitor·. 4) Ac·cess was gained 
through w.a.ter-cours:es. (sa.rab pJl. a.Sr&b), breaches. (na.gb pl .• a.nqab), 
and: thr.ougP. underground ga.llerie.s; ( dha.yl pl. dhuyUl) • 5") Sorties. 
were s.ometimes mad!e by the defendleTs. 6) 
That. the Arabs; themselve:s undiers.toodl. the advanta.g~: enjoye·d by 
the defenders• over the attackers in.: siege warfare is. indicated by the 
reluctance· of the Medlinese: to leave· the town to fight a pitched battle 
in the: open. (Ul}ud). 7) ~ad w.a.s; adlv.:is·ed to let. the Mecca.ns enter 
the town, where the superior loc::a.l lmowledge of the inhabitants would 
act to their advantage. 'l'.he plan of the town assis·ted defence:; th~· 
gap:s. between the house·s being walled!. up:,. the men eould defend them~ 
-selve·s. in the s;treets. whiJLe the w.omen a.ndi c.hilclren a.ssis:ted by 
throw.·ing stone:s; from the roofs· .• 8) 
1) Doughty I, 52:9. 2) Micll. Syr II, 450 f. 5) Bal 215; s.ee: Butler 
270 f. 4) B'al 580,; T"ab 1.. 2554. f. 5) B'a.l 1.41. f;. Tab 1.. 2554 f; 
WW ~6. 6} Bal 84,; Sebe.os: 65. 7) Waq 2.09 f;. IH. 558. 8) Wa.q 209 f. 
1.36. 
Mul}a.mma.dl inc·linedi to this. view but was prevailed upon to go out by 
the younger men whose reasons·, were·: remembrance of Badr;. fear of being. 
taunted with cow.a.rd:ioe;: d!e·s•ire ·for martyrdom and Paradise; the: damage 
being· intlicted on the crops: by the: Meccans and the fear that the 
Mecoans. would s.poil the wel]s. 1.) "Ylhen next. the Meccan~ at:taeked Medina 
in the battle of· the Ditch the Muslims remained on the. de:f.ens.ive with 
. the titoh guarding· their exposed flanks. 2) The ditch was more effect-
-iv;e for its novelty,. however, than becaus·e· of the: physical barrier-
the Meccans. eaJ.led it unworthy of Arab warriors: to employ such a 
device. 5) Later dli tche:s came to be us·ed as: a normal means. of defence:.4) 
Impediments like: the garden walls at. 'Aqra.ba (Yamimah) were: a.lso used 
for defence 5) a.nd natural features: such as mountain passes were used 
for refug~ 6) as wel.l.. as• for ambush. 7) The Mec:cans·. al:so dug: ditches 
as traps a.nd Mul].ammad himself fell into one: of the:se· a.t ~ud. 8) 
At: the approach of an enemy the women and children were broU:gh~. into 
the town 9) and. before Uhud! the. Me<lli.nese also took in the camels and 
farm tools.. :li..O) Many tow.ns·. ha.d places. of refuge near the town (u"?m 
pl..· a.tS:m) which were kept in repair and provis:ioned for up: to two years; 
w.omen,. children and the old oould take refuge: therein when an enemy 
was at hand. U) The· small number of references: to defence· points to 
an improv:is:ed,, primitive battleora.ft. in this; branch of mi.li ta.ry know-
. - _} ) -ledg~:;: only the: Thaqif' in Ta if' had an:y experience: or- skill in the a.rt:.1.2 
• 
li..) Waq 21l.Off·. -· 2:) WW 192:;; :1L99;; Ha.md.dulla.h -8-:l!..O. 5i) W.'l 201.-
_4} Tab :lr~ 24$T;· Fries 58£'. 5:) Tab, :t.. 1.940; :1L945i;: .. :1948 •. 6) ·Tab :li... 2464. 
:_·,·:_ m 57·€!.; 85.2:e-. 7) IH 844;_ WW 558;: Fut Lee·s I;J:,:152:. 8) Waq 241.; 
IH 57-2. 9.) WW 5"55. 1.0:) Waq Z07; 11.) Waq 2,81£; m 577'; 674; 6:78. 
12) B'eckmann 85;. - · . 
157. 
De-ception. 
The= Arabs w:e:re: masters of the art of· using_ deceit: in warfare. One of 
the ob·jecti-ve:s of. deception was to keep· the enemy in ignorance: of one 1 s 
tr.ue. s·,tr.ength, e:.g·. by interchanging troops of.· by keepd.ng. part. oif.' one 1 s 
r r 
r·orc·e concealedi in the rear. 1.) At. Ayn Shams Amr. placed one pari of 
his a:J?my fac·ing the: a.dlViancing enemy and two other groups concealed 
on the f'lanks·; thes.e attacke:d from ambush and the Greeks w:e:re trapped 
be:tween the three: forces.. 2:) When Klialid b-. al-Walid w:as in Ba~ra.h 
with Suw:ayd b. Qu~bah he was told by Suwayd that- the Persians were 
being deterred froiiD attacking: by the. pres.ence: of KhB.lid a.nd his men; 
Khilid theref·ore led his men out. of' the camp' during the: day and ret-
-urne.dl by night:. :5,) In the purs.ui t a.:rter lJl?.ud ~a.mma.d ordel!'ed many 
camp- fires to be lit. in order to deceive the Mec·cans- as to his true 
strength, and a friendly tribesman also helped by exaggerating. the 
Muslim numbers to Abu SufYan. 4) 
Women w:ere: us:ed in various. _ways to simulate fighting: men: the 
Hawazin put: women on. camels: in the third rank of their battle form-
-a:tion, 5) and at al-Yarnimah, after t:he battle,. women were stationed 
on _the: battlements of the forts to make Khalid believe that they were 
c -
w.e·ll garrisoned. §) In Iraq, when al-Mughira.h w:a.s fighting; the Persians 
across: the: Tigris., the women,. apparently on• the:ir own ini tia ti ve, tied 
their shawls; to pole:s to resemble banners. a.nd approached the bat:Ue-
-field;: the: enemy thought. that: they were: ·r.ei.nforc·ements and fled. 7) 
1) Ta.b 1.. 251.8;, WW 511.2:; 525. 2) Fut. Mi~ 5·,9;; Ji. Nik 557. 5) Ba.JL 24.1.. 
4.) Waq 5:29. 5) WW 558. 6) Tab :1. 1.951.;; Ya 'q II,. 1.46f. 
7) Tab- :t.. 25'86f. 
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r 
Rus.es were sometimes effective in siege warfare,. as when Abii Ubaydah 
at the s:ie~ of Latakia had ditches dug deep enough to conceal mounted 
men,. who emerged and fell upon the inhabitants when they dro:ve their 
beasts. out to pas;ture in the morning. 1) To· ~in admi t.tance to a. town 
a man put. on a blood-s:tained Persian garment and pos:ed as a fugitive; 
aft~F he: was admitted he opened the gates. to the Muslims .• 2') On the 
battlefield the·. aneient ruse of the: feigped :fnig;ht was used with 
success. 5) At. Nihawand the persians were provoked to leave their 
entrenched po:s·i tions by the: Muslillll cavalry,. who assailed them with 
arrows and then retreated in stag~s,. gradually drawing: the: Persians 
towards the. main body of· the Muslim army. 4) 
The: Arab ~oman in battle. 
In the Prophet 1 s. life.time· women, w.i th his permis:s·.ion, took part. in 
the: campaigns·., where they performed functions that in a modern aJMllY 
would be performed! by a number of separate,. spe.cialised unit·s. 5) 
They encouraged the. men with s:ongs and with beating· drums and tamb-
-ourine•s.; 6) they brought food and drink andl tended the: wounded; 7) f) -
they repaired the: water-bags.;; they were also used, as mentione.d above,. 
in rus·e:s to deceive. the enemy. At. Uhud the Me-c·can- women had with 
them kohl pots. (mukhulah pl. makahil) and pencils (mirwad pl.. ma.rawid) 
. . 
which they hanc'l:ed to a man if he showed cowardiice and told him he was 
a woman. 9) Wome-n also occasionally took pari. in the f'ig;hting. 10) 
:1L) B'al 13i2f'. 2:) Tah 1_. 2564. 5) Tab 1. 2084. 4) Tab. 1. 2597;2521.. 
5) Wa.q: 200; m. 562; 768;; 847. 6) Wa.q-3·2.;: 206;; 207; Fut Lees II, 1.97. 
7) Waq 258;, 246;, WW. 284; Fut Lee:s :q~~;li227 .8) WW. 2.83 note. 5. 
9) Waq 267 • :1LO) Wa.q 256;; Fut Lees. II, 22l.ff;; 227. 
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- ( Such a one: was Na.sibah bint Ka b who fought bravely at Uhud, was badly 
w.ounded,. and later went on to fight at the battle of Yami.ma.h. 1.) 
M~.d said he always saw her fighting:,. whether he looked to his 
right or to his• lef't.; no wonder that; she· spoke contemptuously of' the 
inactivity of.· the Mecc:an women. 2:) With the: beginning of· the foreign 
conque:s:ts Medina ceas.ed to be both base c·amp. and field eneampment. 
combined. On a journey of unknown duration in diis·.ta.nt lands the 
w.arriors;, e:spe:cially the South Arabian tribesmen, could not. leave 
families, herds and movable chattels; unprotee:ted in the homeland. 5) 
These: theref'·ore had of necessity to accompany the fighting men,. forming. 
a rudimentary kind of baggage: train. 4) For FOtection women a.nd 
children were left behind in camp w.hen the me·n WeEit out to battJ.e, 5) 
and they :followed on when the f.~ghting: was over. 6) If the: enemy 
entered the camp; the women defended themselves with spirit .• -'l) It 
was charac·.teristic of· the v.:irili ty of the. Arab warriors that they 
eontrae:ted marriages. both before. and after battle:s.. 8) 
1) Waq 265f'f. 2:) Waq 266f. 5) Tab 1.. 221.7f'f; FU.t Lees I, 3f'f. 
4) Tab 1.. 22:1!.8;. 2562f; Fut. Lees I, 71.; 89. 5) Tab 1.. '2586; 241.9. 
6) Tab :1. 245:1. 7) Tab 1.. 2347; Bal. 13:5£'. 8) Ta.b 1. •. 25'65:f; Bal US. 
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ProV:isioning. 
On expeditions in Arabia. the Muslims; usually took their own ra tio:ns 
with them' 1) but the diet could be. supplemented and varied by hunting 
such a.ni.maJ.s· a.s: the wild donkey, gaze·lle and ostrich. 2') The staple 
meat, however, was·. camel and a slaughtered camel was sufficient: for 
a da.y's·. ration f'or a hundiredi men. 3.) Camels; were taken with a force 
f'or the express purpose: of' slaughter -4:) a.nd were also killed to provide 
a. meal for g!.lests:. 5) Dried dates were, often mentioned as basic. rations 
since: they a.re: easily obtained! in Arabia, are non-perishable and 
occupy a. small volume in relation to their "Walue: as; food. Mixed with 
butter a.p.d curdis: and s.tored in skins: they w:ere known as ha.nd"t; 6) 
. they were also mixed wd.th milk, bread and f'a.t .• 7) When hunger. became: 
acute the diet of' dates w:a.s. supplemented w.ith horse.-fiesh. 8) On a.n 
r 
ex:ped!i tion to the: Red Sea. coa.s~t ,. led by Abii Ubayda.h, the date ration 
had! been provided by Mul;la.mma.di and, as conditions: became des,pera.te, 
r 
they were: d:oled out by Abu Ubayaa.h in small quantities;: the. situation 
was saved when they found the. bodzy" of a. whale, which was·, eaten. 9) 
On this; expedition as: on others. the men were red~ced to eating the 
fle:sh of' the:ir riding camels. :1!.0) Indeed shortage: of' f'ood w:a.s not 
infrequent ll..) and! sometimes dried dates. were the: only form: of· 
sustenance available .• :112:) 
1.) WW 266; ;392:. 2:) W'V'l 406. 5,) IH. 722:; Wa.q 48. 4) Waq 3·2·9. 
5) WW 80;, 3:1.7£'. 6) WW 401.. 7) IH 987. B) W'v'f 275£·;· 
9) Tab ::1!... 1.605f·; IH 992:. 10) Ta.b 1 .• 2206 .• U) WW 36~ 
12} IH 992;;, W'vV 407f. 
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E'a.sting in wartime wa.s an ancient custom· pre-dating Isla.IIl!. 1) 
' Ah-Mutha.nna., before the battle of' Buwayb, ordered that. the fast. be 
broken in order that: the tr.oo;p:s should not be: weakened by lack of 
food. 2) 
In the foreign conques:ts the troop:s usually lived off the land 5;) and 
commanders_ sent out f·oraging parties (~lii.f) of· cavalry f'or grain and 
cat:tle. 4) Provis:ions·. were also provided: by the towns·. on the· desert 
( 
borders. 5) Uma.r seems·, to have been paJrticularly prudent about prov-
-isioning 6} and it is·. possible: that. he sent cam~ls a.nd sheep for 
( - ) slaughter to the army in Iraq. 7 This was an exeeption, however, 
becaus,e. the countries were always more fertile than the .Arabian home-
-land. In 65·9 (A.H. 18),. a. ye'.a.r of drought and.fa.mine in Medina, 
( 
Abu Uba.yda.h sent: 4,000 camels to the city laden with provisions for 
the inhabitants. 8) In Medina two new· storehouses were built f'or storing 
the incoming booty and each townsman had voucher.s which entitled him 
) 
c_ 
to shares. 9 Up: to the: Caliphate of Mu awiyah the Prophet's busheJL 
was. usedl in the allocation of· s·hares but this was. later enlarged. 1.0) 
The more' luxurious fare · of the Persians was unf'amiliar to the 
Arabs and was found! worthy of comment:; ll) white: bread in particular 
seems to have been much apprecia. ted. 1.2.) The Greeks thought that the· 
Arabs·, would perish in the. coihd of Win·ter because of their d:j.et: of 
(" 
camel meat· and came·l milk. 13·.) In Iraq camphor was used in cooking 
in mistake for salt:. 1.4) 
::li)VIfv'l 402·, note. :1.. 2') Tab ::)L.. 21.85. 3) Tab 1 .• 2257; B'al 256;: Ji'. Nik 555. 
4) Tab :1.. 225lliff;; 2244;· B'a{ 173i; :·257;•<· ... 5) Tab 1.. 2205·. 6) Tab 1.. 2257. 
7) Bal 255f'. 8) Tab 1.. 2576f. 9) Ya.' q II, 176f. 1.0) W\V 288. 
1:1!.) Tab :li.. 21.71.;, 21..72; WW 402:. ::ll2') Tah l.. 2035; 23.87. 15•) Tab 1. 25.90f!. 
:li.4) Tab 1.. 225;7 ;; B"al 264. 
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Vinegar-,. oil and! honey we.re w.eJ.l likeclll. andl the: inha.bi ta.nts. of Egypt. 
w.ere· obliged! t:o supply them to the :Mus:lims in a.ddi t·ion to other 
taxation. 1.)(" U"ma.r himse;t.f restrictedi his c!Jd.et _to very s.imple: f'a.re·;. 
he is. mentioned as: eating bread!, oi] and. date·s. 2:) He seems to have 
been the. first to organise: a. eommis:saria.t, f'or while he: was at. 
Jibiya.h in Syria. in 658 (A.H. ::1L.7) he diViided! provis-ions (arzaq) into 
summer and w-inter rations. 5·;) 'i'his. wa.s: thus a: development from the: 
system: whereby· eaeh man provisioned himself' to a sys;tem of ra. tion. 
allowances;,. derived perhaps: from the Greeks. The basic ra.t:i.ons, a.s. 
s-tipula.teid by(Uinar, w.ere bread, oil and vinegar~ 4) The• :fae·.t that 1fu.e 
rations were is:sued! by the· bushe·l indicates. that the.y were given out 
in the· raw and that. their preparation w:a.s: to suit; in<lividua.l taste. 
The, pro'V'ision of water w.as; seldom mentioned,. presumably beeause 
wate.r w.as; more plentiful. in the new-ly-conq:ueredl regions·. 5) In desert. 
regions, of course:,. lack of· water caus:ed hardships·. 6)-
:l) · BaJ. 2:1L4 f.. 2) Fut. Milp' 81.. 5)- Tab :l. 2525·. 4) Yatq II,. 1.68. 
5) 'l?'ab :lL. 222:1.. 6) Tab :lL. 1.966;. 2:1!.12 f.·. 
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Care: of· the: Wounded. 
'Dhe type or· w.ound! inf'licted depended on the type of w.eapon us·ed and 
the manner in which it was wielded;. most wounds, were given by the 
sword, lance or arrow on vulnerable parts or· the bo~; occasionally 
through gaps: in armour. 1.) Bad wounds. to the leg and the foot. were 
common since here there was ·no prote·ction from the mail shirt , shield 
or he·lmet:. 2:) WoundJs, in the shoulder, hand and tors:o were: mentioned 
le:s;s often, perhaps because: these parts .were. mos·t easil..y pr.otected 
by the .shield. s~) On the other ha.nd the los:s; of· an eye by an arrow 
was. v;ery common. 4.). 
The· wounded of one.' s own sidle were taken to c·amp: and cared for 
by the women. 5) although this could only happen ·if the: issue of the 
battle were fav;ourabler the enemy doubtless: treated Arab wounded in 
the same: way as the Arabs. treated theirs - by killing them with clubs, 
a taSk perf'ormed by women and boys as well as; by the. warriors. 6) 
Wounds: were: treated! by. water, 7) by poul tice.s or f'omen ta tions., 8) 
and by cauterisation. 9). The:. flqw of blooi w.a.s sta.nclled by the a.pplic-
-anon of ashes· or crushed bone:s. 1.0) Household. remedies. were. also 
usedi,. tl.) and! e:v.:en .the spittle of the Prophet. :11.2.) That: care was 
neces.sary is. shown by w.ounds incurre;:d. on raids, when there. was no 
time: for dressing the injury,. turning· septic and ca.us'ing death. 13:) 
:ll.) Waq; 23.9;: Tab ::IL.· 2423·. 2) Waq 6S1;. 86; 1iVW 55:., note 5·. 5i) Waq 2:66; 
WW 120; IH 574 •. 4) Tab 1.. 2jLQ1.;; Bal :13'5f; 257;: Di 574. 
5) Tab :lL. 2504.;; 2517;; 2565·;:: Waq 24,6;. WW 268. 6) Tab 1.. 254~;; 2562£'. 
7) Waq 24:4;; 24,-6·;. ~ 504. 8) Waq 265.,- :·• .. •\, 9) Waq ·509;. VhV 22li.f. 
:ll.O) Waq 244;, 2.46. U.) WW 284. :11.2) m 552. ~i) Wa.q 534" 
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Treatment of· the slain. 
Enemy dead! were. plundered and l~ft on the· battlefie.ld, 1.) although at 
Badr the Meccan dead! were thro\i.n into 8J. w.elli. .• 2) Fallen Muslims were 
buriedi 5.) in single: or double. grave:s; 4) :prayers w.ere saidl. over them,. 
the bodies; w.ere _w.:rapped in c·loaks., arid the. fee:t. strewn w.i th leaves of 
the: harma'l,' ~.plant. 5) It. seems to have been usual to wash tb.e bodies., 
but the martyrs• of Ul}ud were left unwashed, on Ml1~ammad 1 s orders, so 
that they w.ouldl appear· before Godl with their bloody wounds. 6) At 
Qidis!yah also, bea-aus:e of. the: great. number of deadl,. sac d permitted 
them! to be· buried unwashed. 7} At ~udl ~ad stopped relatives from 
taking their dead back to Medina for burial and they w.ere buried where 
'they had: fallen .. 8) 'l'he:ir grav-es must have been poorly marked because: 
a few: years later they were indis·.tinguishable, w.i th certain exceptions;, 
from the graves: of B'adw:' w.ho: died in the Caliphate of Ulila.r-. 9) Women and 
children had to help·· with alJL the. w.ork of preparation and burial. 1.0) 
21:-eatment of pris.oners•. 
-
The treatment of prisoners was very va.riedi: in Arabia a prisoner could 
e:s;cape death by exchange. :11.) or by ransom'; 12) the· rans:om· price oould 
be a:s: high as 4000 dli.r~s. 1.3:.). In some ways Muhammad's views on the: 
' . 
. treatment of prisoners were not in accordance w.ith the S]llirit of 
his. time:S\;; it is. often reported. that he warned his follow.er·s. to treat 
1.) 'l"ab :li.. 23ll.9;; 2358:;; 2359; 2544. 2) Waq 1.06 ff. 3) Waq 1.43.'; 5:00; 
wW 5:8:1!..;· B'al 3'.90.;. 4) Waq 262:;: 2.94;: WW 400 i m 586. 
5) Waq 2:6:1!.. ff;: 50:1. f;. ww. 142. 6) WW 142:.. 7) Tab 1.. 25;1.6. 
8) Waq 502":;: m. 585 f. ~) Waq 505;;; WVY 143. 1.0) 'l'ab 1.. 23:17. 
11.) Vfaq 154. 1.2) Waq 1.0:1:.. f; 1.24;; WW 579;: IH. 426 ;: 729 ;; 985. 
15.) Waq 124; m. 462:. 
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prisoners. well and on oceasd.ons: he: forbade the killing of individual 
captives·., 1.) and if a. prisoner ae:cepted Islam he was freed. 2:) Although 
p~o·~~cribed: ea.ptiv.es were· s·ometimes pardoned,, dangerous enemies of' Islam 
were: a.lw.a.ys executed, 5•) the Prophet-. being particularly" obdurate 
a.ga.inst poets and singers: w:ho had mocked him or his religion. 4) In 
the foriegn etS~que:S'.ts: prisoners were either killed or sen-t to Medina 
as sla.v.e:s.;. 5) enemy leaders were some:time·s; e:r.ueif'ied. 6) Some prisoners: 
c 
who halii. been sent by Amr to Meclina were re:turned to their homes in 
( 
Egypt by Uma.r on the grounds that they w:ere dhimmis: a.nd hence c'Ould 
;-: .. ·:,not be taken into captivity. '7) Women a.nd ehildren were divided from 
the: men .ana pil.a.eedi under- guard!,, 8) being: cons:idered as part: of the 
booty; 9) they did not always.,, however, escape death. 1.0) In Medina 
c Umar· dli.s:tributed the prisoners among the orphans of the Ani?~ a.nd 
s;ome: w:ere used as s.cribe:s and others as: labourers. 11.) Owners of 
s·lave·s obtained in the early fighting:, a.nd who ha.d since died,had 
them repla.eed by other pris·oners. 12:) In Egypt a Greek commander. 
sue:eeeded. in getting; capti.v;es. ba.ck from• Arabia. by agreeing: vd th 'Amr 
c 
to pay the jizyah ~·.) and one of Uma.r' s. firs,t acts on be:coming Caliph 
wa.s to send all the pris:oners of the Ridda.h wars back to their families:.1.4) 
Death, therefore:, w.a.s by no means the. inevitable lot. of a. prisoner. 
1) Waq '75;; 100;; :llD:lL;; ll5;: IH 446; 459;; B'a.l 40. 2:) WW 5.90. 5·) Wa.q 1.06; 
:ll.08 ;; IH 458. 4) WV'l 5'54. 5) Ta.b :t. 2064 ;: 20'72:;; 20'7'7;; 2122; 21.82 ;. 
Bal 1.4~;: 2:1.6. 6) Ta.b 1 .• 2:122:;: B'al 5·28. '7) B'al 2:15ff;: Fut Mi~.r 83. 
8) m. 8'7'7;. ww 17'7; 55 2;; 589;; Seb 211.. 9) B'a.l 24 ;: 86;: :1.42:. 
:W) Tab 1.. 20'70;; 20'72:. 1:1.) Ba.l 1.42:. 1.2) B'a.l :1.42. 13) Tab 1. 2581.. 
1.4) Ya(q II, 158. 
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Booty. 
QurJ" an Siirah 8, 41.: 'Know that when you take spoils one fif'th belongs 
to Allah,. to his disciple,. to (his) near of· kin, to the orphans, to 
the wayfarer---· •' Perhaps no aspee~ of Arab militar,y affairs is 
giv;en as full a treatment in the sources as. the ques·.tion of boo.ty, 
which is hardly sucyrising if' one considers that the obtaining of 
plunder was. not only an Arab warrior's. sole: means of enriching him-. 
-s·elf· but,. in the early conquests, it was als:o his only hope of being 
paid for his serv.i.ces•. In ge:meral the FUl.es; as laid down by ~amma.d 
were these: one: fifth of the spoils (khums.) was reserved for the: common 
good of the Islamie community - this applied to booty taken in the 
enemy camp• or· W·i thou t fighting,. called al-anfal;: i:f, howe:v;er, a warrior 
killed an enemy in combat then the personal spoils (al-aslab - mount, 
weapons:, mov:a.bles.,. e:tc •• ) went. to the slayer;: if' a. man pe::rrsonally took 
an enemy captive then the prisoner (a.sir) belonged to his cap.turer.:l.) 
After the: fif'th had been deducted the remainder wa.~ . shared out. by 
lot, ea.ch man receiving; one s'ha.re, with a further tw:o shares if he 
wa.s a. horseman. 2:) This practice:,. originated by the Prophet., of all-
-otting shares to the: -~v:alry and infantry in the: ratio 5:~ was 
continued in the foreign conquests., 5) although at. Qad.is!yah the 
ratio is. said to haVie been 2::1... 4) There: is evidence to show· that. 
the rule:S: for dealing with booty w.ere s·.trictly regarded;: thus 1the 
Prophet: consigned the soul of his· dead slave to hell for having taken 
t' 
a. mantle. from the spoils of Kha.yba.r ;: 5) Uma.r refused to allow a 
:li) Wa~ 95 ;.: 95; Tab :lL. 2065; 2:425. 2:) 1/W ::IL78;: 226;: 577. 5:) Tab 1.. 2477; 
2:627. ;, Fut Lees. II, 24l.f'. 4) Ya. c q II, 1.65. 5) Ba.l 54. 
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courier money to reJ!>ay a loan which he had obtained in B'a:~ah on the 
se~curity of his. share in some _plunder which w.as: as yet undivided;; ~) 
nor could choice: article:s: in the spoils. be re:served by anyone before 
the booty had been dis.tributed. 2:) MW}a.mmad did!, however, confirm the: 
right of a warrior to personal spoils as·,, for instance, when he: all-
-ocated the belongings·, of Abu Jah] to his. slayer. 5,) The Prophet. 
insisted on receiving the fifth even if he had not .been present at. 
the battle, and if" plunder were gained by a direct. surrende;r to the· 
Prophet, without fighting, then that booty belonged entirely to 
~ad to dispose· of as he saw fit. 4) 
~ -Gold wa:s: e~spe:eially prized as: pers·ona:l booty and in Iraq the 
Muslims• wore Pe:Jrsian golden armlets, looted no doubt from enemy dead;5) 
al-Muthann~ instructed his. men to take: gold, silver and portable goods 
but not hea1fY chattels .• 6) Booty proper, i.e. that: which was. collected 
and distributed;, included pris.oners, women, children,. cattle: and 
mounts, arms and armour·, movables·. and, when the Jew·s were: evicted, 
land. 7) 
The terms used for booty are: qabad pl. agbad;· 8) ghanimah 
. . 
pl. ghana' im;. 9) · .f!t' ;. 10) na.fal pl. a.nf&l .. ll) In the foreign oo~ques;ts 
- . ) 
the· words: most commonly used! were ghanimah and fay. An official 
( s:&hib al.-agibad). was: madle responsible for the: gathering.,, ~arding 
. . 
and division of the: booty ·and he, was sometime:s; given assis:tants. :1:.2) 
:IL) Tab 1.. 2.702f. 2:) m 759. 5) Wa.q 82:. 4) B'al :liS; 29.;. IH. 764.;: · 
WW :1!.66;: 285. 5) Tab :lL. 2425,. 6) Tab :IL. 2205. 7) Tab 1.. 22~4; 
2257ff;, 2440·;. 2704;: Bal 25if'; 54f; :IL75:; Waq 96£'; :li.84f';; :196; ·574; 
556 ;; 420;: WW lL66;. lL78; 215. 8) Tab :l!.. 2095;: 2444. 9) Tab 1.. 2598; 
. Ba.l lL45;. 4:1!2. :1!.0) Ta.b :IL. 2444;; 2467;. 2598; Fu.t. Mi~r 85 .• 
:U.) Waq 95;: Slirah 8, :li.. U:). Tab :li.. 2567;: 2585 ;, 2444 ;, 245:11..;. 214-54;: 2.465; 
2'477;, B'al 585;; IH 766;: 857. 
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The right to receive a share in the spoils w.as• not always confined to 
those who had taken part in the fighting; thus. Mul}ammad decreed that. 
a share: in the spoils. of· B'adir be: g;iven t:o the. weak :l!.) and absent 
Muslims w.ere also sometimes; rewarded. 2;) After Nihaw.and shares. were 
allotted to the forces: who ha.d ~arded the distant approaches·. t:o the· 
battlefield'" 5) At ljunayn, for political reasons, Mul!a.mmad allotted 
much larger shares·. to s.ome: leading Mec·ca.ns than to the An~ir, causing 
diis:satisf'action among· the. latter. 4) In the: conquests, however, the 
basic sys·tem as: laid down by ~ad w.aa general?-Y followed, with 
. ( 
share:s giVien only to the: fighting men; Uma.r refused a portion of the 
booty to the: La.ldum and Ju~ be_c-ause they had deserted to the· enemy 
at the battle of the Ya.rmlik. 5) Sl.ave,s and w.omen Vlere not en~i tled 
to any sha.re:s but were: allowed to receive: only gifts·. 6) Although 
the: sou:ree:s·. give lis:ts of booty in dirhams 7) or in animals and corn 8) 
and report that the fifth was: sent to Meillina, giving the: name· of the 
leader of the e:seort, 9)_ it is doubtful whether the distribution of.· 
the spoi.Jls was a well-ordered affair, eape·cia.lly in the early days.:li..O) 
\. 
It is mos:t unlikely,, for insta.Il;ce·, that the spoils taken by a.l-Mutha.nna. 
in his. raids: along the: Eup~ate:s had the fifth reserved and s:ent to 
Medina.,_ :li.:l!..) and on the: early expeditions: into dd.s:tant regions the 
plunder· was probably divided on the: field of· battle. :1L2) At Qadisi.ya.h 
the: Persian camp seems to hav:e been plundlere.d on the, spot w.i th Sa. ( d' s 
permission. 13) 
lL) Waq 95i. 2:) Wac:t 96f;; v-rvv 577. 5,) Tab 1.. 2628. 4) Waq 420f. 
5) Ya'q II, :1!.68. 6) W\'f 68;; 285; IH 75~;. 767;. Yacq II, :t.65. 7) Tab 1.. 
205·7;: 2450f; 2464. 8) Tab 1.. 2197. 9) Tab 1.. 21.68;: 2lL70; 25:9a. 
:1!.0) Ca. 25 ,45·;;; 11.) Tab li.. 2202ff. 12:) Tab l!.. 2808f;. Ba.l 1.97f. 
13) Tab 1.. 2'356f. 
( 
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Disputes :1.) and irregularities 2;) in the. dd.s:tribution of booty eert--
-ainly occurred, and this·, s·ometime.s. led! to intervention from Medina. 
c -Thus when Uma.r sent. Qays b. Maksh~ as a reinf'oreement to Qaclisiyah, 
(" 
and he· arrived after the fighting w.as over, Umar· ruledl that he. and 
his men were: entitled to a share of the booty if they arrived be:f'ore 
) ( - ' the dead had been buried. ~:· U"thman had to a.rbi tra te in a similar 
- - c ·. 
way between ~bib b. Ma.sla.mah and Salman b. Rabi ali:i.Il!.~Ar.menia.t-~.) 
It is not: w:i thin the: scope of this work to di.s:cus·s. the complex 
question of· land tenure andl taxation in early Islam; the. sys·;tem. varied 
wid:el.y according to ci.reumsta.nces and differed from province to prov-
-ine.e:. The: problem has been thoroughly treated by Dennett:. In general 
la.nd available for settlement by the Arabs was of three kinds·.: land 
which had been the private property of' the royal pow.er,. either SasinidL 
or Byzantine:; land whose owner ha.d :f'ledl or ha.d been killed in ba. ttle; 5) 
land taken by force (kha.raj land) which could, w.i th the Ca.liph' s 
pernds:sion:,. be· e:onffisca.ted and given as fiefs to Muslims, or· i't was 
s:ome:time:s boug)lt. 6) This: was not the: :rule:,. howe:ver·,. since it was the 
policy of the Mus-lims to leav:e· the· native: cultivators with 'their 
animals in occupation of· the land! ana tax the produce therefrom. 7) 
Uma.r· said that land was• not to be divided but left to the peasants, 
whose taxes= could! be included in the pensions of the: Muslims; other-
wise there: would! be: nothing left for the Muslims: who came· after. 8) 
:1..) Tab 1.. 28:1.5,;; IH 456;; Bal 198; Fut Lees II, 2l4-:1.f. 2) Ta.b 1.. 24641'; 
2450;. ~) Ba.l 256. 4) BaJ. :1.98. 5) Dennett. 2.6;; 60. 
6) Dennett: ~5; 57;; 47. 7) Tab 1.. 2028;: 2427;: Bal 447ff;. Fut Misr 82f. 
8) B'al 266. 
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Arab garris:ons·. were joined a".f'ter the endi of hos,tili ties by their 
families: andl settled in the vicinity of their stations.. They acted as 
landllords: and collected taxes: froin' the: peasants who worked the land. ~) 
The development of a system of command. 
The Prophe,t and his. firs.t four· succes.sors were: both religiouSi and 
military commanders: andl they exercised the. hig)l command independentJiy 
excep-t: that. the: four Caliphs were: bound by their s.tric.t adherence: to 
the known wishes of MW}.ammad. Ad;vice was, however,. s·ought. in co~ciJi 
by M~amm.ad in military matters, though ne:ver at. other time:s .• 2) Abu 
B·ekr 5i) a.ndl.'Uinar 4) als,o sought a.dv:ice, especially before important: 
battles such as the YarmUk· 5) andl.Nihawand. 6) In Arabia al1 warriors 
eould take' part in councils: of war but in the c:onques.ts only the: 
leader,s took part. An exception to this: was'Uma.r-1 s: council a.t Jabiya.h 
in Syria:,. whe·n he consulted the Companions of the: Prophet. 7) 
There: are ma.ny. reference.s to the Caliph appointing; commanders 8) 
but it ;i.s: likely tha. t: some: of these: cases are untrue:; r Uma.r could not., 
for instance·,. hav:a given the leadership of the. Baji.lah to J'arir b:. 
<Abdallah without. the· consent of the tribe,_ and. probabJiy he. merely 
ratified! a.n arram.gement that he had no power to a.l ter. 9) Appointments 
of leaders from the Companions: a.nd the Qura.ysh,. however, were ma.de: 
by the: Caliph. 
1.) Bal 150;: :h64.;. :1!..85; 1.97 :f;; 5:29. 2.) Waq 209;, W'N 105; 1.92; 2:99; 
244. note: 5; m 74:JL. 3) Ya'q II, 1.4.9. 4) .:YS.C'q II, ~65·. 
5) Ca. :1!.5 ,. 64. 6) Tab. 1. 2.6~1. ff; see BaJL 52, for war council of 
Quraysh in Me:cea.. 7) Tab 1. 2511. ff. 8) Tab 1.. 2018; 2021.;. 
2162:;; 2455·;; Ya c q Ii:, ~45. 9) Tab 1. 2201.. 
The· Caliphs als:o moved commanders~ from one post to another 1.) a.n.d 
depos·ed them for irregula.ri ties:,. 2) because their troops. complained 
against them, &) or for pers·onal reasons. 4) There is: no mention in 
'the:· early yea.r·s. of· election of commanders by the troops: themselves 
as: in later time·s, 5) or of the: commander's baton which was his mark 
of office· under the Ummayyads. 6·) 
There was an almos·t complete lack of unity in the early; warfare 
in 'Iraq and! Syria;; in the abs·ence· of· a real high command disputes 
over· leadership were· common. 7) Nor were matters help~d by t~e qualit.y, 
of some of the generals selected by the Caliphs. Between the departure 
or· KhBJ.id from1 '"Iraq and the arrival of ·saC' dl,, the: eommandier s:en.t. from' 
Mecti.na was Abu rUbayd b. Mas·~ iid. 8) Des:pi te his. personal bravery he: 
seems to have had little. mi.li tary ability sinee· he· insis~ted, against 
the advice of other leaders., in cros.s.ing· the river where: he: was 
attacked! by the Persians andi his troop·s driven back, while he him·sel:f 
w:as killed ( B'attle: of the Bridge). Only the tac:tic-B;l skill and 
' . courage: of al-Muthanna andi other leaders allowed part of the force, 
) ( - - ... to cross back to safe.ty. 9 In Iraq before Qati:nyah the conduct: of 
the C'ampaigns: was. marked by these de:f'ec·ts: lack of a chain of command; 
a. bias towards·. leaders: from the 'believers:' - not always the best 
commanders:;; frequent changes: in command, so that a. oontinuous,.unif'ied · 
command was• not pos:sible. 1.0) 
:ll.) Tab L 2:U.Off;. 21.46;: 255:1!..;; 2678f. 2) Tab 1.. 2594;. Bal· 2'78f. 
5) Tab 1.. 2829.- 4) T~b :tL. 25.95';; Ya (q II, :ll9::llf'. 5) Fries. :liB. 
6;) Frie:s: :ll5;; 64. 7) 'Tab 1.. 20lL8;; 2::1i.l.5;. 2ll.6; 2·:1:.60;: 2161.;; 21.62; 
21.74ff';: 2202;; Bal 250; Ya/ q II, :li.65. 8) Tab :1!... 21.74f. 
9) Tab :1!.. 2:1L75ff. 10) :B·eckmann :11.05. 
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The traditions for the first ex:pedi tions. to Syria are s·omew.ha.t 
confus·ed: one states; tha.t there were. four leaders, :IL) the overall 
command being with the one in whose region the battle was. joined. 2:) 
According to Wiqidi,. however, the sole commander was. Abu "uoaydah,. 5) 
,.. . 
and another report name~s. four lead!ers, w.ith Abu Uba.yda.h as commandew.-
-in-chief. when all the groups w.ere united~ '!'here ma.y be an element 
of truth in all thes:e reports,. in that it is s:ens·.ible i'or an officer· 
to take command. in the region which he know,s;, whereas a commander-in-
-chief could have: been appointed for important battle·s:. Who actually 
commanded in such battles remains .. an open· ques·.tion. cAmr was mentioned 
as·, commander-in-chief before: the arrival of Klia.l.id, 5) and Khi.lid, 
at least up; to the arrival. of Abu ('Uibayda.h,. pl.ayed a leading role. 
Ire. is· named as commander-in-chief, 6) as. lead!er of the v~ard, 7) 
and a.s leading his. ow.n adherents:. 8) Ac:e.ording. to Balaahuri,. he was. 
always. chos.en as commander when the-Muslims; me:t for battle:,. 9) and it 
is probably true that: the. other leaders w.ere content to le=t him' 
command. them bec'aus:e of his' energy,, prudence and tactical skill. 
B'eckm.a.nn, comparing the early campaigns in Syria with those. in 
ciraq,. says that in Syria., despite the independence of the leaders, 
there w.as a noticeable unit.y of action shown, for example in the 
rapid but orderly retreat to the Yarmllk in 656 (A.H. 15) 
:lL}; Tab 1.. 2078 ;. 2084. 2): B'al. :1.08, 2.0 ff. 5:) Bal 1.08, 5 ff. 
4.) Yarq II, 150. 5) B'al ll6o. 6) Tab :t. 2lL09. 7) Tab 1.. 21.45; 2146. 
8) B'a.l :1L09. 9) As for 8'•' 
155 .• 
He: points~ out that in Syria dispute:s_ over leadership:· w:ere not: mentioned 
nor were cases: of exaggerated pride:, as when Sar d refused to risi t: 
al-Muthanna on his. death-bed. :h..) Nor were the leaders boastful. of. 
their prow:es.s as was: al-Mutha.nna at Buwayb · andl elsewhere:. 2:) He 
concludes· that in Syria the Muslims w.ere puritanical, with a dis:c:rl.pline 
inculcated by fear of God!. 3) The subjec.t is·. importan:ti;; because no 
army can be. vic:torious: w:i thout good leadership,. Yet it. is not possible 
to giv;e: a fully satiszfac.-tory answer to the que·s:tion: in the Arab 
conques:t"s. wha. t part was; played by religious: ardour, desire tor booty 
and good leaders·hip' and: how: much weight. ·should! be given to each factor ? 
The answer must depend! in part on personal opinion which can, however, 
be guided by the evidence available. 
. 1.. The reliability of Badw: troop·s was suspect:, espe.cially those 
who were still heathen o:r only superficially converted to Is·lam. They 
could! fight bravely, as d!idi al-Muthanna ~;ti;; the: Battle of the Bridge, 
but this: was to extricate: himself'· and his men from disaster. 4) At 
other time:s·. al-Mutha.nn.S. follow:ed followed the tra.di tional methods. of 
the ghazw.· - a sudden surprise raid, colle,ction of as much plunder as 
could be: conveniently carried,. and! a speedy retreat into the desert 
to elude the, pursuit. 5) He had no patience' with the Muslim desire 
:h..). Tab :li.. 222ll:f• 2.) Tab :l. 2l.94; 2-2.05.5)Beckma.nn 106f; see als;o 
Well IV, 79ff.. 4) Tab 1.. 2jL.78f·. 5) Ta.b :IL. 2.2.02£'. 6) Tab 1.. 21.79. 
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At al-Yamamah KhB.lid divided the, Emigrants and the: An~ar from the· 
tribes; under separate banners so that it could be: seen. which of the 
~cups: fought more: brav:ely, and in the outcome it was the: Cqmpanions 
C' 
who bore the brunt of the fighting. ~) At. the ba. ttle of Ay;n Sham·s 
(' 
Amr e.ompl~ined: that the men of Yaman were not pJ!.a.ying: their part and 
he had to rely on the Companions for victory. 2:) Doughty, commenting 
on the fighting quali tie:s of tribesmen in nineteenth century Arabia, 
s:ays:: "There is: so little concert among; Beduins tha.t. sometimes· a. 
multi tude may be: tiscomfi ted almos.t as. one: man!" 5~) 
2. There was: probably; a. higher proportion of:' townsmen in the armies 
( -in Syria than in the armies in Iraq, and many of these were believ,ing 
Muslims.. Hence there was a eore of men who were prepared to fight. 
stubbornly in a pitclled battle:; it is significant: that. the only record 
of indiscipline; at the YarmUk w.a.s the d!es.e:r.tion of the Muslim·s 1 allies 
from the Lakhm• and Judh&m, 4) whereas at Qadis'iya.h sacd eould not 
control the tribe:smen during the battle:. 5) 
5. Beckmann 1 s views on the unity prevailing in Syria are not valid 
for the period! before· the arrival of Khalid. The: leaders are de.sCTibed 
as· not co-operating with ea.ch other 6) and for~tting their promise.s 
to Abu Bekr. 7) 
1.) Tab; :1.. 1946f ;: s·e.e· also Fu t Lee:s; II,, 19:1... 2) Tab 1.. 2592;. 
5) Doughty II, 554;. se:e· a.lso Doughty II, S6; Glubb W.I.D. 287f. 
4) Tab 1. 2548.- 5) Tab :lL. 2550; 255·2. 6) Tab :lL. 2091.. 7) Tab. 1.. 2lll.. 
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4. It is: most unlikely that the manoe:vres in Syria. a.£·ter the arrival of 
KhaJ.id,. such as: the re-grouping· before Ajnadlayn and the strategic 
w;i thdra.wa.l to the Y:armiik, could hav:e been c·arried out without some 
form of unified! command. 
Without attempting to offer a. final solution to this question 
·the following sugge:stions: are tentatively put fow.a.rd: 
. A rigid dis.tinction between the behaviour of the: a.rmie.s, in Syria. and 
( -Iraq should not be drawn'; cases of ind.is:cd.pline and lack of unity 
oc·curred in both theatres· as did cases of bravery and eoneerted action. 
On balance:,. how.ev.:er,. the. army in Syria., which had the h~rder task, 1.) 
w.as probably better led, more. united and,. ha"ring. a consid~rab]e number 
of conv;inc:ed Muslims:, was. be:tter able: to face the enemy in pitched 
Khalid was not the nominated commander-in-chief· but his reputation 
and the· :force of his. pers:onali ty must have been so greau. as to compel 
the: others v;oluntarily to accept him as leader. He was thus commander-
in-chief in fact if· no.t in title. and this• enabled him to ca-ord.inate 
the: strategy of· the: Syrian armd.e·s:. 2:) 
~Umar mus.t hav:e: realised that: the conques:ts could not. be· continued 
and consolidated in the same manner as they had be:gun, w.i th a number 
of e~uaJ. leaders: acting independ:ently ,, and this: led! him·. to a.ppqint 
. . r 
a commander-in-chief· to each theatre:; Abu Ubayd.ah b. al-Jarr~ to 
) c C' - ) Syria 5· and! Sa d b. Abl Wa.qqas 1io Iraq. 4 
1.) Ca. :lJ.6, :ll27f. . 2:) Ca. 2:1L, 551.. 5i) Tab 1.. 21.48 ~ 4) Tab 1.. 22i6. 
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This. w:as in 65.6 (A.H. 1.5) ,. both appoinments being made at about the 
same time, an~ it marks a turning point in the: development of a high 
command, although the tw:o commanders. could not issue: orders. which 
w:ould be obeyed without_ ques·.tion but: w:ould hav:e· to obtain results 
t' 
by exa.mpJi.e and! persuas--ion. In this: respect: Abii Ubayd.ah,. in particular, 
was a happy choice; blameless in his• private life·, unselfish, and 
excellent in his· dealings with others, he was w.ell qualified to 
co-ordinate the efforts- of the a.utocratie. leaders. in Syria. 1.) Khalid 
c 
was thus; not deposed - Umar would not have had the power to depose 
a man of his reputation and standing - but be:e:ame, as he had always 
been de. jure, one of several leadter.s of equal rank. 2) Under Abu 
c Ubaydah they seem to have: w.orked together in a sensible and states-
-manlike manner to achieve the common goa~. It. is. only fair to add 
that Abu CUbaydah might have· had an eaSier task than Sacd who had to 
try and exercis.e control ov.er tribal chiefs to w:hom Islam was li ttle• 
. 
more than a. name. The leaders in Syria were from· Me:cca or Medina and 
most of. them' had fought under the Prophet; the idea tha.t. they -,vere 
ear:eying out his; wishe-s w.oul!ii be likely to make them· lis.ten w:i th 
( 
re,speet. to the chosen deputy of· Umar, the s.econd successor of Muryamrnad 
and one of. his• nearest and most trusted!. Companions·.. The trend towards. 
unification, however, was interruptedl by the epidemic· of 659 (.A;JI. 1.8) 
c - -iri. which Abii Ubaydah and Yazid b. Abi Sufyan died,. toge-ther with mailiY' 
other- devout Mus•lim•s. 5) 
1) Tab :lL. 2144f·; Well VI,. 59. 2:) Ca 15, 51ff. 5;) Tab 1.. 252:0:;. Bal. :159£. 
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For the remainder of the period under review. there. is no. information 
as· to the real ehain of command; perh~ps: all the commanders were 
independent of each other·, a view; supported by the reports that the 
Caliphs often nominated eommand~r·s·. themselves·, which they would 
hardly have: done: if there: had been a commander-in-ehief. ~) 
Mu~ad always·. appointed a deputy to command in his. absence: 2) 
c~ 
as;, for example, when he left Alii in charge: at Medina when he went: 
on the TabUk expe.di tion. 5) In the foreign conque:s:ts this practice· 
was also followed and commanders nominated deputie:s. 4) There was no 
rigid sys:tem for appointing suc·ce:s.sors to a. general should he fall in 
battle: but it was done on occasions. by Mul].a.mma.d,. 5) by the Caliph, 6) 
and by the gene;r-al him:s·elf. 7) Wills w:ere sometime·s. made before 
battle. 8) Apart froiiil 'uma.r' s discussions w:i th his. commanders in Jabiyah 9) 
Mu r iw.iyah was the first re~larly to review his troops. 1.0) 
1) Ba.l 197;, 51!.7; 525 ;; 5:86;; Tab 1.. 2695i. 2.) WW 99;; 16;3;;, :1L67;; 1.74;: 
21.0;; 242·. . 5') m 897. 4) Tab 1.. 2.1.0.9;. 2122:;; 2290; Ba.l 577;, 587. 
5) Waq 402:. 6) Bal 502:. 7) Tab :IL. 2600ff. ( but note: that: refs. 
6) ana 7) contradict each other:- at the battle. or· Nihiwand 
B'aladhuri says that.cUmar named the succes.=sors; to Nu <man,. while 
o:ra.bari s:ays; that they were named by Nu .. man himself). 
8) Tab 1.. 2:lL07 • 9) Bal :11.5-9; :li5::1L. 10) Ca. 25, 25·,. 
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The Origin, Planning and Direction of the Early Arab- Conquests. 
Vlhen considering the decisions taken by M~ammad one has to take into 
account the intui tiv:e nature of his thinking· and! the part p1ayed in his 
life· by(.:dxeams·. and manifestations. Thus. the battlefield of Badr was 
shown to him1 by Allah in a dream ~) and he had been promised either 
the capture of the caravan or vic·tory over the Mec:ca.ns·. 2:) • It is 
incor.i'e·ct. to argue that he used his. revelations: as a political instr-
-ument to attain his ends because this. would assume a. type, of mind 
that. w:as governe:d by calm logic. and calculated policy. This. was not 
t~e of Mul_lammad: he undertook th~ expedition to TabUk in a period 
of great heat wd.thout ade.quate·· forethought to· the supply of· water and 
proViisions;: 5;) at. ~a' if he pitched! camp: s:o neaF the walls that the 
c·amp was. within bow shot of the town andi had to be moved. 4.) He was 
a.ls·o supers~ti tious·. - on the way to Khayba.F he took one road in pref'er-
-enoe! to another beoaus·e :it was o·alled ma.Fkhab (wide,. easy) 5) and he 
belie:v.:ed in lucky and unlucky omens. 6) Nor could the transmission 
of M~ammad!' s ideas by the medium• of dreams: and ma.nifes·.ta.tions be an 
afterthought. of' the trad!i tionalists si!!l!ce jus:t such revelations: are 
an es;sential feature of the Qur" an itself,. and the belief in diJ?eams 
and. omens was in keeping with the spirit of the times and was much 
older than Islam. 7) 
:1!) Tab ·1. 1288;; Waq 45. ~) Surah 8, 7;. ni 435. 5.) Tab 1. 1.696; 
WVl 5.91ff;; m 894. 4) Tab 1.. 1.671.; m. 872. ,_5,) :ww 2:$6... 
6) IH 559. 7) We·ll Reste 200f;; 205. 
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In this prophetic or 17 reveale·d" vein a.r.e· two remarks~ of Mu.l}.ammad' s 
about the landis' beyond the borders of Arabia: when the Ditch was being 
dug he: drew.' sparks: three: time:s: from a s.tone: tha. t he: was trying to 
break with his~ pick and interpreted " the. firs:t means~ that God has 
opened! to me the Ya.man, the second Syria and! the wes:t:, the: third the 
eas:t. ::lL) On the: ride to TabUk he told Bila.J.. tha. t God had allotted to 
him the trea.s.ures: of' the Greeks: and the Persians• and strengthened him 
with the. warlike: support of the Kings: of Ifimyar. 2,) V'lhether these: 
reports are true: or not Mu~ad' s intere·s.t in the routes: to the 
north is; shown by the series of expeditions which he: either led or 
s:ent northw.ards;; three to DUma.t al-Jancial in A.H. 5.~ 6 and 9 respect-
-ively;: 5) two to MU 'tah~ the first in A.H. 8 under Zayd b. Harithah 4) 
- (" 
to av;enge: the murder of the: Prophet' s emissary by Shura.l).bil b. Am-
al-Ghas:s·ani, the s.ee.ond! in A.H. ll under Zayd' s: son ·usama.h, who was 
ins:tructed by Mul}a.mmad from! his·, death-bed. t'o go and aveng!a his father.5) 
(Although another s•ource s:ays: only that he w:as told to range: widely 
with cavalry in the lands of· the Quda (' ah). 6) Finally there: was the 
great expedition to TabUk in A.H. 9 1 led by Mu}?.ammad and organised on· 
the basis o:f' a false rumour put about by some Naba.te·an merchants in 
Me tina. to the ef'fe.ct that. Herae·lius. w:a.s in H:i.ms and had assembled a 
vas·.t army of his Arab allies whos:e v;angua.rdi was in the B'alqa: 7) 
While: Muhammad' s reasons for mounting the:se expeditions. cannot: be: 
fully as:eertained,, his intuitive reasoning must have been influenced 
1) IH 675:. 2) ¥VVV 598. 3) IH 668;. WW :li..74f'; (:1Lst) Wtl 256f;;(2nd) 
IH 905'·;: WW 405fi; (5.r-d). 4) IH 791f; WW 509f. 5) IH 970; ww: 455f. 
6) Tab :11.. :li.85:1L. 7) IH 895tf'f; YfW. 590f. 
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by hard facts. Thus the raid to TabUk was: made at the time~ when the 
Byzantine s:tar was in the ascendlant,. after total victory o:ver the: 
Per·s·ians·. had been won and the. Holy Rood returned in triumph to 
Jerusalem!. The: .Chris:tian Arab tribes to the north would: thus· have 
been inclined! to renew their wavering allegiance: to Byzantium a.nd 
MuJ;I.aJ!l!D.ad 1 s. raid may have been intended as a counter-stroke to demon-
-strate the: growing power of' Islam. Furthermore, MulJ.ammad mus.t have 
s:een that: his: p.oliey of· uniting· the· Arabs under Is:lam,, his edict. that 
" the Muslim is. brother· to the 1\lfus·lim•." i) andl. henc·e the prohibition 
of' raiding:, would! deny an outlet. to the warlike spirit of' the Arabs. 
It· would als.o remove: the means by which a tribe~, in time:s: of want, 
re~s:tored its·, f.ortune:s. at-. the expens·e of.' a richer neigpbour. 2:) There: 
is eViery reason to believe, there£ ore, that Mu~ammad had in mind s:ome 
form of hostile, a.e:tivi ty agains·t·. Syria., al thoug;h it cannot be: known 
whe.thu· he intended!. to attempt a real conquest or merelYi to mount. 
la.rge-s:cale raidls. In the case of ciraq there is: le.s·s evidence: 
Mu~a.mmad and the: peop]e oft Mecca B.ndl Medina were doubtless. much more 
( 
familiar with Syria through trade. than they were with Iraq, Busra in 
the ~wran, for example., being an important terminus for Arab'ian 
. caravans;. 3) It is: signi.:f'icant: that: the Mec~cans, when they wished 
to s:endl a caravan t-o Syria by a route· that would elude t-he Muslims, 
1.) Waq 454.;; s:ee Lam B·ere: 1.7:liff • 2:) Watt; Medina :ll05ff. 
3) WW 391.;. Fut Lees·. I, 45; Opp' I, 280; Dussaud 8. 
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(' 
and chose a. road that in the firs;t stages led towards. Iraq,, had to 
find a. guide: because the route was: unfamiliar. 1.) It. is. also signif;... 
-icant that the early campaigns in ciraq w:ere carried out by al-Mutha.nnA, 
who w:a.s probably s;till unconVierte~ to Islam, in conjune:tion with 
Knalid 'b. al-W"alld and a small force· of Muslims. It. is possible that: 
Khilid ha.d not obtained the, prior approval of Abu Bekr for this·. venture. 2) 
On the other. hand Abu Bekr had in mind the expedition to Syria as 
s:oon as he ha.d! finished w:i th the. wars. of the Ridtdah 5.) and he tied 
the banner·s of the leaders. (i.e. confirmed the:ir appointments) him-
-s·elf. 4) It seems· very unlikely that: sueh a pious MusJ.im· as Abu Bekr, 
one of the closes;t·. as:sociates of the Prophet., w:oulci have: sanc:tioned 
an enterprise if he had thought that it would be contrary to the 
wishe:s. of Mul}amma.d, and just as stra;nge ifcUma.r had given his approval. 
r 
It is· also worthy of note: that, after Khalid was. re.called from: Iriq, 
r r 
only the small force U?dler Abiii Ubayd w:a.s s.ent to Iraq before the· 
de:spa.tc:h of Sa,c dl,, 5) and that Sa (d.:' s a.r.m;y was: small and as:sembled 
with difficult,y. 6) 
In conclusion,. therefore, it can be stated that the Arab expans:ion 
originated from the need to :li.'indl a.n outlet for the warlike energies 
of the Arabs: which were given an added bi tterne:ss by the Ridda.h wars, 
ana to find a. means: of livelihood for the surplus population of Arabia.. 
Mul}amma.d! had perhaps. intuitiv:ely recognised the:s:e neces:sities·., and 
had given his: approVial to some: form of' military operations against. 
( 
Syria, though probably not agains:t ffiq. 
1.) Waq :1!.96 •. 
2) Tab :IL. 20:1l8f; s:ee Ca. :1!2, 155ff. 5) Ba.l 
5) Tab :ll.. 2159 ff. 6) Tab :lL. 2216 ff. 
107. 4) Ba.l 1.08. 
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Plann:l.ng. 
What evidence there. is points to an original intention t_o send only 
large-scale raidl:i.ng parties· into Syria., a.nd: hos;tili ties were begun 
in this: way by the Muslims: late: in the year 655 (Ra.jab onwa.rds. 
A.H. :l!.2l. :li.) Se:v.:eral indepena:en:t groups. moveliii from Medina to the 
borders· of Syria, J"orda.n a.nd ·Palestine.-, ea.eh group. having a line of' 
a.dva.nee· laidi dbwn by the= Caliph, who als:o assigned to each a.rJDYi a 
region for its• objeetive:,. 2:) an arrangement well suited to the aneient 
B'ad\w me·thodls of raiding. In the period that: followed! a. constant 
s;tream of new: recruits: began to come to Medii.na and. were sent to 
whichever commander they preferre.Oi. 5) 
In the· early years. of the c·onquest the course of events was de.ter-
-mined by cireums,tance;s; beyoud the oontrol of' Medina, since: the 
military operations: of the Muslims. in Syr~a, apa:rt from. raiding, were 
ma_inly reac:tion to Greek action. Thus. the recall of Khalid! w.a.s 
prompted by the mus:tering of' the: Greeks; a.t. Ajnadayn, and he ha.d to 
take s.peecly action to as=s.emble, from the s·cattered Arab forces, a.n 
a.r.my large enough to give: bat:t"le·• 4} The s;tr.a.tegie wi thdra.wal. to the 
Yra.rmiik: before the a.divanc·ing Greek army is another exa.mp:j.e= of the. 
movements of the Arabs being dictated by the movements; of their. 
enemies:. 5) Only after the battle of the Yarniiik had des;troyed the· 
effec·.tive: power of the Greeks were the. Arabs. able to operate with 
complete, freed:om ·of movement.· 
l!.) T"ab :1i.. 2079 ;; 2.090 ;· Bal. :108;. Ya. 'q II, 150. 2) Tab 1.. 2090 
3·) Tab. :1!.. 2082:;, 21L08 • 4) Tab :1.. 2:li.25;, Ba.l :ldl.5i :r·; Ya r q II,. 15~; 
Fu t, Lees. I, :101.;; Mich Syr II, 41.8'. 5) Tab 1. 2087;, . Ya c q II, 1.60·;. 
Fut Lee:s II, 129 ff; Mich. Syr II, 420 f;· see Ca. 15, :Ji1. ff. 
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Much the same sort of picture emerges• in(Iraq: the early raids under 
Khalid, al-Muthanna and Jarir achieved li t.tle: of permanent value but. 
]>rovoked the Persians into as:semibling a larg~ army to dli'iv:e the 
intruders away from. their borders~. ~) When this'. news was received in 
Medina, rUinar held a eouncd.l of war 2) andi it was eventually de.cided 
to s.end satd w.ith an army toe-Iraq. 5,) Meanwhile al-Muthanna retreated 
to the: desert border 4.) where he died short]y;· after. 5) After the: 
battle: of' Qadi;-iyah and the rapid oe:cupation of lower riraq in 65·7 
(A. H. ::IL6) there w:as a paus·e, of s:ome years: during which the on].y milii ta.ry 
ae·tivi ty was the· e:onquest. of Jazirah and Khuzistan, which completed 
the Arab conquests of all the terri tory north of Arabia. up. to the 
mountain ranges. of Iran and As·ia Minor. There seems·. to have been a 
marked: reluctanc-e on the part of·rumar to allow the conquests to go· any 
farther: he: forbade s:eaborne raids from Ba:Q.rayn to Fars.;, 6.) reproved 
a commander for· leading his. troops into mountainous country; 7) ordered 
t~at there shou~d be no water barriers between him and his armies, so 
that a camel could be ridden from Medina to any of' his forces; 8) 
wished there to be· a 'wall of' fire' at the mountain. barrier dividing 
the Arabs from• the Persians; 9) forbade C'Amr from enteri!lg Ifrlqiyah 
(Tunisia) after his·, raid on Tripoli. 1.0) Abil B'ekr had also been cautious 
but in a different manner. His. advice to the leaders of' the Syrian 
expedition not to penetrate deeply into eneiilYi· country until they had 
:1.) Tab .:11. 22lL4. 2~) Tab :1.. 2·2~3· f'. 3) Tab 1. 22·1.6. 4) Tab ~. 22i5. 
5) ·Tab ~~ · 2222;. 6) Tab 1. 2·546. 7) Tab 1. 2545. 8) Tab 1. 25:60;:· 
Ya ( q II, 179 ;: 180;; Fu t Mif?r 91. f'. 9) Tal;> 2545 f. :!.·~.'' '· 
~0) ya,cq II, 1.79;: Fut Mi~r 91£'. 
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cleared all hostile forces from their lines of communication was sound 
tactical common-sens:e. ~) Nor can cUmar' s attemp:t to recall c-Amr from 
his; march into Egypt,. 2:) if true, be construed as reluctance to invade 
. ' 
Egypt,. since he mus.t have realised that it would be dangerous. to leave 
such a powerful reserve of Byzantine sea and land power on the flanlcs 
of Syria and the J:Iejaz •. 3) His motive was probably to wait until the 
reinforcements· under al-Zubayr,. which later joined 'Amr· at. Heliopolis,4) 
arrived from Al"abia,, so that an army of adequa.te S'ize could be sent 
into Egyp:t. But his objec,tions to advancing into the Zagros and else-
-where s:eem· to have been of a different nature and his motives. are 
harcff to dd.scern. Perhaps he was influenced by fear· of the unfa.milia.r, 
or by remembrance of' some, injunction of the Prophet.. He. may also have 
.; 
Vliished to keep. the: Arabs as a pure-bloode.dl elite and every conquest. 
in wholly alien lands increased the: numerical disproportion between 
the subject race:s; and the Arabs. 5) In 642: (A.H. 21) his hand was 
forced by the. pressure of the large numbers of immigrants arriving. 
inciraq, 6) and he gave orders for the. advance to Nihawand. 7) .A£ter 
the battle w.as. won he gave permis;s:ion for the: J.l.rus1ims. to spread war 
(athkhana) into Persia and the s.low conquest of the: Iranian plateau 
began. a) 
1.) Tab lL. 211:1.. 2:) B'al 212:;; Ya c q II, 1.67 ff;: Fu t A'li~T 56 f. 
3) B'ecker 549. 4) Bal 215·;: J". Nik 557. 5) Ca. 2·5:., 845•. 
6) Ca. :liS, 81.; 20, 15. 7) Tab 1. 2596ff;: Ca.etani (2:1., 40 note 1..) 
holds; the· riew that the· expedition to Nihawand was undertak:e·n 
without the· knowledge or app:r-ov:al of Umar,·a theory whic-h is 
unsupported by evidence in any of the s.ource:s:. 
8) Tab 1.. 2654;, 2682. 
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The following points, therefore:, summarise: the planning and development. 
of the· .Arab conquests:: 
~. At the outset there was no plan for the systematie. conquest of 
Syria and r Iraq;: the Caliph sanc:tioned o!'I.Jly a number of large-scale 
raidls into Syria, Jord!an and Palestine •. 
2:. As. these: raid!s developed and! ric:tories were: w.on the raids. turned 
·into a war of conque:st and a more sys·tematic c-ampaign was. waged. :l) 
5·,. The major effort was put into the ope.ration~: in Syria, and r Iraq 
was largely neglected until the battle of the YarmUk had been won. 
4 .• In both theatFe·s the decisive battles: were forced upon the Arabs 
by the adv;ance: of large hos·.tile armies intent. upon expelling them from 
the: terri torie:s. they had occupied: the Arabs ac·cepte.d the challenge 
and des·,troyed the enemy power·, but they did not deliberately seek 
out the enemy force:s to offer battle:. 
5. Al'ter the battle-s. of the YB.rm.Uk and Qaclis'd:yah· the expansion cent-
-inued! into Jazirah and Khuzist&n, and the invasion of Egypt was 
ordered :to remove the Byzantine menace to the w.est .• 
6. During this: period!( Um.a.r _refusei to allow, the Arabs to penetrate 
the mountains of Persia.,, but was forced to do so in 642 (A.H. 2:l) 
due to the necessity for providing a livelihood for the immigrants 
• • • (T--arF~ v~g J.n ..u.·a.q. 
1) Becker 342:. 
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The Direction of the Conquests. 
It is: not easy to as.sess. the degree of control exercised by the Caliphs· 
ov-er their commanders: in the field,. particularly in view of th·e 
suspicion that· the chroniclers wished to show that: the conquests were 
pil.anned and d!irected wholly by the suc.cessors of the Prophet., a.p.d hence 
they exaggerated the role: played by Medina. The position of Abu Bekr 
I! 
was; very precarious and Umar, in his. first two years in office·, had 
to proceed w,ith gre.at tact and caution, because: his power was insecurely 
based and his; offic·e. was not univer·sa.lly recognised as that. of supreme 
commander. It was. on:ll.y after rev-erses such as the battle: of the ~ri~ 
and: the re.treat. to the YarmUk,. which made many Muslims realise that 
r 
unity of command was: essential,. that U:ina.r was able to take effe:ctive 
cont:rol.:1) 
Abu BekJr·, who died in 654 (A.H. Uii) at. about the time: of the battle 
;2) 
of AjnadiB.yn,. seems not to have had! much influence on the course of the. 
early· campaigns. Not only was his. po·si tion insecure,. but the speed of 
deployment of the armies and! their diispersion over wide tracts of 
country made: it aifficult for the Caliph to locate: his commanders or 
to obtain early and ac:cur.ate: information. Almos;t his. s.ole contribution · 
to the operations:, but a. very important. one:,, was his decision to order 
Kl:i"alid to Syria. f'romr Iraq, so that. there w.as. one. leader able to combine 
the Arabs into an efficient· fighting force .• 
( 
The case: oft Uinar,. once: his authority w.as e.stablished, is v:ery 
different,. both be;caus.e; of· his·, character and beca.us·e it·. '\Vas under his 
rule that the decisive. phase of the conque:s:ts. oc·eurred, and a beginning 
::1!..) Ca 25:, 824-829. 2:) Ba.l 11..4. 
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was·. m~_de. in organising the adminis:tration of the conquered l_a.nds .• 
Many of the traditions; about his direction of affairs. mus;t be: suspec.t·, 
a.nd!. acme are patently untrue. tU:inar could not have: known much about 
the geography of· the more. dtis,tant; theatres·, of war - on one occasion 
he asked a courier to de;s;cribe the reg7.on of Makrin to h.i.m:. 1.) Yet. 
one rep.ort s·ays, for ins:ta.nce, that. he: ordered! Suwayd b·. Muqarr.in to 
go from Ray to Qiimis; a.nd that he nominated the leader of· each division 
of the ta/biyah in Suwa.yd's force. 2) Sometimes it is revealing to 
compare traditions: which report similar events. On one: occasion the. 
eomma.nders in S;y.ria wrote:· to' Uinar giving: him details· of (}'reek. troop 
dispositions. in Pale;Stine. 'umar is then said. to have written to Yazi.d 
ordering: him: to send: Mt{ iw:iyah against Cae:sarea, to ~ telling; him 
to attack Ar~abiin, a.nd to 'Aqlamah ordering · him to attack Fiqir. 5,) 
~ . r 
Another tradition reports: that Uinar s·ent; instructions: to Abu Ubayd:&h 
which could be followed if things had not ehanged in the intervening: 
time, a.ndl outlined. the cours:e. of action that he thought the best. 4) 
• r The se.cond trad:i tion is: more credible sJ.nce Umar could not have. known 
the exact position in the operational zone, a.nd. rigid ins,truc·tions 
would!. have been out-of-date: by the time they arrived. 
There can be no doubt that rUmar appointed. the commanders-in-chief 
for important. operations· 5) a.ndl the governors (imil)o:fi'· provinces. 6) 
1.). Tab 1.. 2.707 f • 2) Tab :h.. 2656. S) Tab :L. 2597. 4) Tab l.. 2l.SO. 
5) Tab 1. 2:li.55; ~6;, 2596; Bal 250; 255;: 5'02:.· 6;) Tab :1.. 2.425~; 2S78;. 
2580; · 2646; B'al 1.72:;; 55~;; Ya' q II, 1.66. 
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It is: also recorded that he appointed the leaders of expeditions that. 
were merely large-s:cale raids:.. 1.) One' tradli tion says he _ ei thex ordered 
(Abdallah b. Bud:ayl to lead a.h expediti-on to Isfa.hin or that. he wrote 
to Abu Miis·a, his governor ov-er B·a:~rah, a.nd_ told him to s·end Abdallah.2) 
There were other occasions when'Uma.r s·ent his:c&mils. such instructions, 
. . . . 
telling them: w:hich men he wished to be put in command:,_ S) but there 
are also many mentions. of the 'imils: appointing the leaders themselvea,4) 
al.though'Umar may have been informed afte~ the e.vent. 5) When,. 
how:ever.·, al..!"Ala· b. al-Hac}rami invaded: Firs from Ba{lrayn agains.t rU:mar-' s 
orders he was tismis:sed from his; pos-.t. 6) 
Commanders a.sked(Uma.r for reini'orcements a.ndi he w:ould then order 
these, to be sent from other regions,. 7) although here. again it is 
like·ly that i:n many c·ase-s: more direct: ac.tion waa; taken. There are 
two versions :r·or the relief sent to ( Uthman b. Abl-l.!:Is in. F&rs: one 
says tha.t:rUma.r ortiered Abu Miisa to go to the aid. orrut:runa:n, 8) the 
other thatrUthmin asked for help fro~rumar and from the governor of 
Kili'ah, and that the: latter sent Abu Milsa to extricate him. 9) In fact, 
r -U"thman probably asked for· assistance from the neares·,t Musl.im 
garrison,_ B·a~rah. 
Other order a; of a military nature were is:sued by Me~ and! included 
the sending out of· independent battle-groups w:i th orders. for speci:f.io 
tasks·.,_ at first from: Medina,_ :LO) later from the s-,tanding camps.. U). 
1.) Tab :lL. 2655;: 2640 ;· 2'656. 2:). Bal 5:li.2:. 5.) Tab :L. 2457; Bal :L98; 
50:1i. f.;; 5"1.7;; 52:5. 4): 'Pab :1!... 25i95-,;: 2440;- 24651; Ya'q II~ 159;. 
Bal lS:IL;; 5.09;: 5;li8;; 594; 405,. 5) Bai 2,24. 6) Tab 1. 2546 f; 
B'al 586, f. 7) _ Ta:b 1.. 2505·;; 2549;: 2499; Bal 256;; 580; :J. Nik 557. 
8} Bal 387. 9) Tab 1. 2700. :lO) Tab 1. 2080 -ff. ll) Tab 1.. 2505; 
2604 ff. 
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Such were Abu B'ekr ' s ins~truc,tions' to Khalid b. Sac- id. to go . to Taymi ~ 
and to collect re·s~erv;e~ forces(ridil) 1.) by recruiting in the neighbour-. 
-hooa., exoeprt for the Ah1 al-Riddah,. but; not; to ge:t; involved in ba.t:tle 
unles·.s he were attacked!. 2) For the expedition to Nihiwa.nd c-Uma.r· ordered 
tw.o thirds of the forces from Kii:f'ah to march against the Persians and 
the· other third! to remain in Kiifa.h a.s: a. defence f"orce:. The: Kll:fi'an 
troop·s: we3!'e reinforced by a.n aux;i.lia.ry force from B·a.~ah, the whole: 
army being under the command of Nile-man b. Muqa.rrin. The: troops in_ 
Syria: and t..ile Yama.n were told to remain at their pos.ts a.g~ins:t; po·ssible· 
. . 
(" 
attacks from the~ Greeks or Abys:sinia.ns:, 5:) a.ndl Uma.r also sent detach-
-ments: to Fars, Isfahan a.nd Ahw.az to a.c·.t a.s; flank guards: f·or the main 
) ( -Muslim army. 4 In A.H. :lL4 or perhaps: later, Utba.h b:. Ghazwan was sent. 
.( 
by Umar with 800 men to the vicinity o:f Ba~ra.h w,i th orders to prevent· 
the people of· AhW:az,, Fars·. and Mays:an from a.s:sisting the Persians. 
against the W!Us:lim·s. in the north. 5) 
As; well as• appointing: commanders the Caliph eould also dismd.ss 
them, a.s: occurred s:everal times• wd. th both r Umar 6) andl'"Uthnia.n. 7) 
C' Although the sources mus;t be in error in saying tha. t Umar dlismisse·d 
Kha!id in A.H. 15 he was. in fact removed from his command. about. two 
years later when he was a.t. Qinna.srin. 8) '.l'w.o reasons. are given :for 
:1!..) Tab 1.. 2080; 208li.;; 2086;; 209:1L; - see 'l'ab lL. 2:1L91.;; Ca. 14, 54;, for· 
ide:ntifica.tion or· rid, with reserve. For rein:t'orcements from · 
Med!ina. the w.ordl maddah was always used:- Ta.b 1.. 2082:; 20M;· 
222:1!.;; 2550;; 2'567;, 2584. 
2): Tab 1.. 2081. 5) 'l'ab 1... 2598 ff;, Ba.l 502: ff.. 4) Tab 1.. 261.6 r. 
5} Tab :1!.. 25-78 f ;; B'al 54:1L f. 6;) Tab 1.. 2509 f;; 252:6 f; B·a.l 2.78 f; 
5·52:. 7) Tab 1.. 281:1L;;. 2813;; B'a.l ;1•2.7. 8) Ta.b 1.. 2526· :f. 
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his: dismissal: the first: bec-ause he had a.mass:edi ])lunder, 1) and the 
( -
s·e:cond because~ Uma.r. although not angry with Khalid, felt that the· 
people were: turning away from•. him,. and he w.ished to avoid strife .• · 2) 
Simd.larJ:.y ,. Shur~bi.JL was remov-ed from· eomma.nd in Jordan in favour:.:-of' 
(- (' ( 
Mu awiyah because~ Umar considered that. Mu awiyah was be:tter f'i tted 
for the po s;t. 5i) 
'um.a.r seems to have= been ])&rticula.rly severe with those who amassed 
wealth through pJ!.under a.nd went a.s far as to confiscate their possess-
-ions. 4) He also oh·jected to luxury and os:tentation in dres·.s. 5) 
c: -Uithm.an' s reasons= for depos=ing leader·s and a.ppoin~ing others· were les.s 
worthy, since his nomd.nees· w:ere: often members. of his own f'amiJ!y. 6) 
A hint of the confusion prevailing: towards the close: of his reign 
and after his death may be gathered from the s:ourees.: W:hen his a.ff'airs 
bec·a.me dis.turbed! his camils: in Sijistan and! Khurasan left their. po:st.s 
to go to cUthman in Medina.; 7) disturbed conditions in Egyp·t at this 
time, until the situation w.as stabilised by the triumph of' Muc awiya.h, 
are reflected in the number o:r· gov.:ernors liste·d by· a.l-Ba.l'adhuri. 8) 
One. of' the: functions· of the comma.nde:rr.·s in the field was the 
conclusion of' peace treaties with conquered towns· and territorie:s, 9) 
and! the Caliph doe=s not seem to have interfered in these matters. 
1.) Tab 1.. 2526 t·. 2:) Tab 1.. 2528. 5) Tab 1.. 2525. 4) Bal 21.9;. 584; 
Fut Mi~r 146. 5) Tab 1.. 2080; 2402;. 6) Tab :1.. 2828; Bal 222; 
Ya c q II,, :l9:1L f. 7) Bal 394 f'; 408. 8) Bal 2.27 f' • 
9) Bal li..47;. 1.50; 158 ;; Fu t Lees. II,. 151.. 
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The. role of the Caliphs in guiding and directing, the early c:onquests 
can be: summarised as follows: 
lL •. In the early stages,. before large-scale: raids had dev;eloped into 
war·s; of conques;t,. the insecure: po;&ition of the·. Caliphate, and the: 
depilioyment: of raiding parties over wide stretches of territory made 
it difficult for Medina to exercise: effec:tive control,. and the. 
commanders operated independently, co-operating w.ith each other on]y 
when threatened by large enemy forces. 
2:. Soon after the ac-cession ofcUmar, when it was realised that the 
raids; had been transf'orm.ed into wars of conques·.t,. the control of Medina 
over the theatres: of' operations tightened. Commanders-in-chief were 
appointed by'Umar and were dismissed if he thought that they were 
abusd.ng their power or ac·ting· corruptly .. 
5. Ne:wertheles:s, the commanders had almost complete freedom' of action 
in the· field.. Direct ins·tructions couldi not be sent- from Medina on 
tae:ticaJ. matters: becaus·er Umar was ignorant of eondi tions obtaining 
in the distant territories. andi beca.us.e his generals,. with their strong 
Arab s.ens:e of individuality, would res.ent any cheeks upon their free-
-dom of action. If orders did arrive from Medina they could safely 
be ignored and the excuse. could be made later that conditions: had 
c 
changed since Umar had been informed of the situation, or he could 
s>imply be told that he: had;. been mis-informed. It. probably took some 
r 
temerity to do this,, and Uinar 1 s strong personality doubtle.ss acted as 
a curb and preYented acts; of open defiance to his known wishes. ~) 
:1..) Ca. :1i9, lL ff. 
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4. Decisions of strategic importance were. taken by Medina,. e.g. the 
s:ending of the army under Sac d b. Ahi.-Waqqas to (Iraq and the de.cision 
t<;> allow. the Muslims to invade· the Persian:· highlands.. Such decisions. 
were· influenced by the arguments. put forward! by the· commanders.~ which 
w.ere in turn influenced by conditions prevailing in their own regions, 
anal were made after consultation W:ith leadling Muslims in Medina. 
5. The Caliphs. sent out battle groups charged W:i th specific: tasks 
and the.se group:s: were· independent of the command:er to whose, region 
they were assigned. 
6. The central control from Medina was at its s:t:ronge·st in the reign 
of cUmar. Vfuen rUthman became Caliph he: dismissed governors and inst-
-a.lled his own nominees, often for the wrong reas·ons: this mus.t have 
led to a lowering· of morale,. as. mus·t the frequent changes of governors. 
during· his re.ign. 
7. The civil s.trife which marred the period before and after the death 
of rUthnian caus·ed a breakd!own in the sys,tem of ad.minis:tration and 
ended the firs.t expansionary period of Islam. 1.) 
1) See. als.o Mich Syr II,. 449 f;: for the civil s.trife followd.ng the 
death of~Uthmin. 
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The military administration o~ the conquered territories. 
As: ever larger areas: were conquered by the Muslim· a.r.mie·s: it became 
ess'entiaJ. to divide the newly-w:on territories into regions. under 
governors·.. Thus Pale,stine· was dii videdl into tw.o regions,. each with 
a governor, 1.) and governors; ?lere: appointed over Jrordan, 2~) Ba.~r.a.h 
~ 
and! KUfah, 5i) and in Syria. 4) In Syria Abdallah b. Qa.y~ w.as res:pons-
-ible. ~or coastal defence and for all ~ortresse·s. along the shores of 
the Mediterranean, 5) and (Amr b. •Abasah was ir.~. charge: o~ the graria.ries.·6) 
This: was the beginnir.rg o~ an a.dministrative organisation and by 63'8 
(A.H. ~7) _all the regions were organised. under ramils. 7) This first. 
phase reaehed its culmination whenrUmar toured the conquered Syrian 
provinces:. andl held a conference for about t?zenty days wi·th a.ll the 
troops operating in the area. 8) Here,. at Jabiya.h,. the organisation_ 
o~ the SiYS:tem o~ border fortre.sse-s. ( farj pl. fur\ij) was decided upon~ 
garrisons: were: organis·ed and personal dispos·itions were: made. A sys·tem-
-atic oontrol of commis·sariat was begun and rations, were divided into 
. ' 
winter (al-shawati) andl summer (al-s.awa if) provis,ions. 9) 
'i'he ~allowing is a. sketch o~ the organisation of the theatres 
of operations. and the divis;ion of the. battle: :force:s;: 
Between the enemy territory (dar al-harb} and the conquered! areas 
. 
(dar al-islam) lay the border regions. ( tha.ghr pl. thugh'Ur) , de:populated 
and devastated by eons,tant passage of warring force:s. ~0) 
1.) Tab 1.. 240'7. 2:) Tab 1.. 2·:398. 3) Ta.b 1.. 2·5'78 ~. 4) Tab _i. 2.646. 
5) Tab :1L. 252·:3,8. 6) Tab 1.. 2525,.:1!5. 7) Tab 1.. 2526; Ya c-q II,. :181.; 
W5 f. 8) Tab :1. 2401. ff'. 9) Tab 1.. 2525 ff; see Ca. 1.7 ,-:1L62. 
1.0) Ba.l 16:3 f. 
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The thughur of Kiif'ah were. the dis,tricts of Ijulwan, Masabadan, Qarqisiyah 
and Maw.~il each W:i th i~s own commander. 1.) In the year 646/7 (A. H. 26) 
the frontier provinces of Adherba.yjan and Ray w.ere directly under 
Kiifah,. the first W:ith a garrison of 6,000, the: seeond with -4,000. The: 
troops; in Kllfah numbered 40,000 and since. the. garris:ons were relieved 
each year 11'ea.ch man got the chance for booty once every four years. n 2:) 
Later on veterans ( ahli a.l-~ ta' i wa al-diwan) were settled on the 
frontiers,. in Adherbayjan for example. 3-) The:s.e borcil!er F.aids thus 
replaced the rapid and extensive adiv;ances of' the: early conquests. 
The conquered! lands were also garrisoned, the words used being: 
maslah pJl.. ma.silih, 4) rabi tah pJL. ra.wabi t, 5) or Ill1.1I'8.bi tah. 6) 
-- . . . 
Such garrisons were usually small. 7) cUma.r ordered that Antioch be 
garrisoned by picked Muslims. and that. they should be generously paid,8) 
while in ~ulwan,. on the other hand, a.l-Qa.< qa c formed a garrison of 
non-Arabs. 9) Many polsts we-re: only garrisoned in the summer raiding 
season in order to secure the retreat. :lO) 
From; the great number of local garrison& a few fa.vourabJLy situated 
places- were selec:ted as headquarters. for w,ider operations - the: s.o-
-e:alledl. ajriid (s. jundi). U) Since Ba.ladhur.i complains. about the 
indiscriminate, us:e of this term it is. not to be expected that: its 
exac-t meaning; can now. be ascertained. 12;) On occas·ions. the word jund_ 
was us·ed a&. a synonym for maslah ~~) and this ind!ica.tes the dievelopment. 
1) Tab :li.. 2497. 2} Tab :t. 2805. ~) B'al ~28. 4.) Tab 1.. 2647. 
5) Bal 1.42:;, 1.85. 6) Ba.l 197:('-. 7) B'al 264 f';, 30:1L. 8) B'al 1.47 f. 
9) Tab :lL. 2473 f'; :1.0) Ba.l J-27; 150 ;; 1.85. ll) Tab :1.. 2.360. 
1.2;) Ba.l :ll3i:1L :ft. ::1!.3) Bal 127 ;: :1.85 • 
175. 
of· the jund, a standing camp· of the army in the rear areas, from the 
maslah, a rest camp: or ga.rrls:on in operational areas.. A typical dievel-
. 
-opment. of this: kind: was a.t B'a~ah,. which w:hen first oc-cupied was built: 
of reed huts which were dismantled and s;tored away when the inhabitants 
went on raids:, but later the settlement was Ci:Onstructed of sun-dried 
bricks. lL) 
The development of large se:ttlements occu]l:d.edl by Muslims. was either 
in as:sociation with existing towns; or their foundation was ordered by 
- Medina. 2:) 'IDle number of the:s:e amsir ( s .• mi~r) in 'umar·1 s; lifetime :ls 
not known; al-Ya r q'Ubi says that. there were s.even, but owing to a lacuna 
in' the text only five are nameci - Medina., Sham., J azi.rah ,. Kllfah and 
Ba~ra.h. 5} Probably the am·~ar dev.eloped from the ajn&d just as the 
ajnad had grown out of the mas&l~ but the precise nomenclature and 
the tis:tinction between the three ca.tegorie:s is not important: in a 
r 
mili ta.ry context:. What is relevant is the fact: that Umar felt. it to 
be necessary _to found such settlements so that the spirit of Islam: 
should! not be co~pted by the vices of cities; such as al-Ma.di. lin, 
·-
and so that the conquerers: should not mix with no:n-.Arabs.. 4) He ordeJ!'ed 
their fC>undation and gave. instructions; about the type of sites to be: 
S'elec:ted e.g. that they should! be near water and pas.ture. 5) 
In the early conques.ts: none of· the enc-ampments, in the we:st s.eem• to 
have: attained the s:ame importance: as. Kiifah and B·a~ra.h, although Khalid 
( - - ) and Iy~ a.re mentioned as· _us-ing Qinna.srin a.s a. raiding base. 6 
:1i.) BaJ. 546;; 542~. 2) Ya cq II, 1;76;: Fut Mi~r 91 ff;: 128 ff. 
5) Ya.< q II, :1L76;; see Well"'tq:, 86,note 2·. 4) Ga :1L6, :lL-12:. 
5) Tab :1i.. 2560; B'al 275; 54:1i. :f-;. Y:a. ~ q II,_ 1.71.. 6) Ta.b 1.. 2526. 
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Pensions 
Pens·ions were paid to Muslim veterans of the early conquests and to 
their families: up to the time of the institution of· the Diwin - the 
pension lists - the: warriors , with one: exception,. 1.) were not. paid 
in coin but re:ce:iv;ed their share of the· booty. ('Uiiia.r- is universalJL;w 
named in the: sources as the originator of the: Diwin, 2:) but the date 
given for its: e:sta.blishment varies. r -The trati tion of Sayf b:. Umar. 
(" 
puts the event; a.t; Uina.r' s; oounciJL a.t. Jibiya.h but his chronology mus.t. 
be. at; fault becaus:e he p;:La.ee.s this council in the yea.r: A.H. 15. ~) 
Anothe-r tradci.tion for the date: is. the: year 641. (A.H. 20). 4) The 
first tradition is suspec·t because: it includes. in the roll of the 
T.amim· non.-Muslims a.ndl Islamis·ed Pers.ians,. presumably to make. gpod 
later claims to pension rig;hts. It also pla.c:es the Prophe:~'s uncle, 
a.l.!Abbas,. high on the, lis.t~ a.l though as a. late conv-ert; to Islam he 
would not. have been highly: favoured. 5) The s:econd s:ource' s. reliability 
is; enhanced! by the· suppor-t of a.l-Ya. c qiibi,. who is. usua.l].y conscientious 
r 
about da.te:s.. The: year· 641. s·eems the most likely time for Umar t·o 
- ,J hav;e:. insti tu tedi pens·ions,. s;inoe _in this; period betw.een Jalula. and -
Nih'iwand there was a. pause in the: Muslim expansion. Boo:ty was. not 
therefore: available at that time,. whi]e recruits were pouring in from 
Arabia. The taxe:s of the oonquered lands.,, which the warriors were 
forbidden to farm·.,, 6) could: be, used for paying· out pensions. 7) 
1.) ww 406. 
Ya. 'q II,. 
Ya < q II,. 
"6) Fut Mi~r 
2) Tab 1.. 2411 f;; 2486;; 2496 ;. 2.750;. Ba.l 448 ff; 
175 f. 5·) Tab 1.. 2411. f~ :,_ _ - ·. ·-.. 4) Tab 1.. 2595; 
1.75; Ca. 20, 247 ff; 21.,. 25 note 1.. 5) Ca. 20., 5~; 20,5·28. 
1.62:. 7) Ca. 20,. 247 ff;; Beckmann 12.7 ff. 
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The: moraJ.e. of.· the: Muslim C"Onguerors 
The s:ource:S; s:tate that intense religious feeling·, in the early Muslim 
armies:, was: the cause of their. obedience and. readines.s ·for martyr.dom.1.) 
They also report that. before battle troops: were harangued and urged 
to fight. with the. knowledg~ that God was with them 2) ana that the 
hope: of boot,y was often added as a more tangible incentive. 3) The 
changed! conduc:t of the Muslims, seemed very s:trange to their non-Muslim, 
eontem!l!>oraries. Abu Sufyan c:omm.ented, on first s:eeing: them pray: 
"I have· never s·een. such obedience:, neither from: the proud Persians 
nor from the Greeks. with long forelocks." 4) Similar remarks were made 
by'.U'mayr bl• Wahb when reporting back to the: Me:ccans from' a reconna.is-
-s-ance: at. Badr. 5) At: Qad:is:Iyah. the. ~sia.E!s were· amazed at Muslim 
dis:eipline: and: thought t..'l-ta.t. they were about to attack when they 
as:sembled to pray. 6) The tl!'ustworthiness. of such reports is enhanced 
by the: report; o:f· a Chris:tia.n his;torian, Michael the: Syrian,. who quotes· 
a. Persian spy as: saying,. of the: Muslims.: "I s:aw: a peopJ.e: barefoot., 
in rags·.,. weak, yet very brave·." 7) Cases of cowardice 8) and disobed-
-.ience 9) are mentioned but they s:ometimes refer to non-Mus·lims in 
alliance with t:P,e Muslims. :10) The. reports. of c:oward:ice on the first 
raidl to MU, tah are= intended to vilify Khalid, ll} whose subs.equent: 
career should! afford E!Jllple: proof of his. courage. 
1.) Tab 1.. 2~5·;; 22.90;. B'al 'li·77;; Waq 52;; VfN 5'8;; m 445; 572." 
2:) 'l!ab 1.. 221.9; 2289;: 2·35~;: 2597;. 2.625·; Fut: Lees I, 5'-2. 
5.) Tab l!..~ 2051.;: 2095;. 2295:; Fut Lee:s I, 5;: II, 1.50 ;; 151. 4.) Ba]. 38. 
5) Waq 5".7;: IH. ~~:: 6) T~b 1.. 229:1.{ f~r S·imd.lar 'remarks see also 
Fut Lees. I, D2,. Fut Mi~T 65. 7) Mieh Syr· II, 421.. 8). Tab 1.. 2:1.76. 
9 )' Tab. 1.. 235'0; Waq 226 r·;. VI'IV 1:1:1!..;. Fut Mi~r 77. 1.0) Tab 1.. 2547 f';. 
ww 558 f;: m 844 f. :u) w« 5:09 ff·;. m 798. 
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Khalid' s; courage vr.as tempered, as in all good generals, by prudence: 
he reproved! Shurahbi.JL b. Has:anah at Yamamah for attacking: the Hani.:('ah 
. . •· 
w.ith a ~mall force of cavalry before the arrival of.· the main army, ~) 
and on his march to Syria he turne~ asiae to a~oid the Greek frontier 
fortre·ss.es. 2;) There: are: grounds, however·,. for believing: that Sac d. 
b. Abi.-Waqqas was; not over-endowed Wii th courage,. since: he avoided t?e 
fighting on the expedition to Nakhlah, offering a lame excuse for his 
cond~c-.t,. s.) and he dire:cte·d the. battle of Qadis:iyah frolll! the rear •. 
In Tabari the reason given for this is: that he was: suffering, from boi1s 4.) 
but Baladhuri is; non-committal. am1 says that it was for 'a certain 
. •· 5') reason ...... 
Muhammad 1 s attitude to ac:ts of' v-iolence: and destruction appe·ars 
at first sd.ght to be e:quiyocal. He permd. tted at times the felling of 
tree:s; 6) and! the burning of vines and house§;; 7) he ordere.d the hands 
andl feet; of pris,onelrS. to be cut off 8) and sent: men to as;sas:sinate: 
his; enemies. 9) At other time:s he f.prbade such ac·ts .• 10) His views,. 
howev-er, were not· really contradic,tory,. for his ac.tions were dictated 
by circuins:.tances·.. The: destruc-tion of crops and! property was the. 
method used to induce a besieged town to surrender- 11.) or to compel. 
its garrison to giv.e battle. outsicie. the walls. 12) 
:11.} Tab :1!.. 19~1i. 2:) Tab :JL. 2t.l.2:. 5) m 42.4.,;: 4\26;: see Wa t;t Medina 6 f. 
4) Tab lL. 2.288 f. 5) Bal 258. 6) Wa.q 56:1.. 7) WH 569 f'. 
8) IH 999 ;: WW "240· f.. 9) IH 548 f; WW :lL70 f';; 224 f •. 1.0!) WW. 309 f. 
1.1.) B'al 246. 12)~ Wa.q. 21.0 :f'';; J. Nik 562. 
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When a. neWi movement depend!s upon id:ea.s, the most ~rous enemd.es 
are: thos·e: who oppos·e the: id!ea.s on which it is. based, especialJ!.y thos·e· 
who can com.pos·e: telling satires, a.nd it was the:se foes that: Mul].a.mmad 
s:ought to elimnate. 1.) At other time~ he was opposed to senseless 
violence:, or us:ed clemency as an instrument. of policy to win over 
his enemies,, as when he chose ransom· rather than d:ea.th for the prisoners 
of B'adr.. 2:) . There is,. ne:vertheless ~ evidence• enough in the sources to 
show; that ha.tred ran high between the Mec·cans; and the Muslims 5) and 
its: resullts are: shown in sueh actions as the painfull. diea.ths inflicted 
on Mus·lim prisoners, 4) and the equa.ll!y unpleasant·. treatment given by. 
a. MusJlim! to a tribesman who mocked Islam. :.5} Mutilation of the: dead 
a.lso oeeurz;~,. 6i) but. the dis·gus:ting: behaviour· of' Hind, the wife of 
Abu SU:f'yin, at. the: battlefield of· ~ud,. 7) is obviously regarded with 
dlistaste, by the narrator and s.uch actions may therefore have been 
excep.tional. (This may, howe.v.er·,. be: a tendentious Abbasid :repa(t"t: as 
Ibn IsJ:?Aq hints when he quotes Abu Su.fyan a.s saying that. mutilation 
gave: him'. neither satisfaction nor anger) • 8) In the Riddah. wars and 
in the: f'ore.ign conques·ts acts. of cruelty such as wanton. k::i..lling:s, 9) 
killing: of women and! children,. ~0) and crucifixion of prisoners, 11) 
oo:eurredl. Violence: was in a.e·corda.nce with the spirit of the times 
and the Arabs e.ould no doubt: expect; similar· treatment from their enemie-s. 
~) ni 819;: see: VVa.tt. Medina 18. 2) Vlaq 1.02; f·. 3) IH 557; ·562 f; 
ww 25'8;. 56:1. r. 4) m 640 r:; ww :1!.56; r. 5) Ta.b 1.. 1458 f. 
6) Tab 1.. 14:1!.5;: 2340;: Waq 269. 7) m 5'8:1.;; Waq 279. 8) m ·s8s;. 
9) T'ab 1.. :li.925.;: 2:1L82:. 1.0:) Tab 1.. 2070;;: 2072:; Ji. Nik 555;; 559; 56? f. 
:li:lL) Tab 1.. 2122:;;. Bal 328 f. 
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Even a hostile witness·, such as. John of Nikiou, although he: complains 
of the heavy load imposed on the people of Alexandria by the payments 
of tribute·, 1.) admits: that'.A.mr observed the terms of the treaty, 
despoiled no churches:,. committed. no acts of pillage·,. and protected 
the p.eople. 2:) 
Sev,eri ty towards the·ir enemie:s; mus;t ha.ve· been tempered by a sense: 
of comra.dieship among themselves w:ithout which no arDzyJ can achieve 
success; even the severe:'Umar wep;t: to hear of the Muslims: killedl at. 
the battle of:" the Bridge, 5i) and at the new.s of the death of Nu' man 
at Nihaw.a.ndl. 4) 
The· Mus:lim'. ideal a.ls·o inc·luded simplicity and abs·tention from 
]uxury. Here: again r Umar is· the . exemplar, 5) and his; ascetic. character· 
is; contrasted w:i th luxury in dress 6) ana livj,.ng •. 7) His. example: was 
seld!om followed by his·, commanders:,- how.ev,er,. a.ndi they sought to enrich 
thems:elv;e·s·. by pilundler;; 8) on one oc·casion a wooden door built into 
Sa/ di 1 s hous•e w.as: said to have been burnt by cUmar' s order. 9) Such 
deviations: w.ere: common andi contradict the idea of an as:cetic: purl tan-
-ism. :1.0) Nevertheles.s, from' the reports o:f an opposing· tendency 
given in the· pz:oeceting· pages:, anal from the external ~vidence=, it: must 
be inferred that: some motive force in addition to the s:elfish greed 
:for pil.under anima. ted the: Muslim conquerors· .• 
1} JF. Nik 585., 2) Ji. Nik 584. 5) Tab ~. 21.80. 4) Tab ~. 2598 f. 
5) Bal 5'27;. s:ee: . Ca 20, 9. 6) Tab :t. 2080;; Mich Syr II, 425 f. 
7
9
) T'ab 1.. 2171. f; Bal 527,;. Yl'a r q II, 1.68. 8) B'al 21.9;. 584. 
) B'al 278. 1.0) Tab. 1..; 2:1.49;: B'al 1.08. 
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CHAPrER VI 
MOBILITY 
SECTION I: 'f'he Arab mounted! on c-amel-ba.ck:-andl. horseback. 
In the· s:ourees• the commonest name used :r·or the came:l is ba("ir 1) 
1 ,_C". _,;: b C"- ,_- r. p· • au J.rt~ou, ur an,, a.ua. J.r; the~ noun is: of feminine ~·nder, but. in 
the TV!entieth century the Badw use the term for c·amel,, regardless. of 
s.ex. 2:) o:ther words. which occur frequently are': nagah, 5.) a.n adUJLt 
fema:le:; ibl,. a pollective: noUn.; 4.) jamal pJi .• jimil, a ma.le:;; 5). 
r&hilah pl. ra~il, a female riding camel. :6i) 'The: term ri.ki.b pl. 
rukub,. riki,ib, usually means riting: camel; .7) in the Qur..Jan it is 
used of· camel-riders as dlis•tinct from hors.emen, in the. expres.sion: 
1ma. aw.ja.ftum~ ralayhi min. khayl 'w.a la ~be I ThiS means. I YOU urged 
not your horse:s: nor your camels against it' {stronghold of B. Na4ir). 8) 
Occasd.onally other·::terms are used,. including: ni~ pJL. :nawa~, 
for a ca.me1 used!. to draw water from a well, but; also some:time:s; 
ridden;: 9} naji.bah pl. na.ja ,ib, a throughbrecl riding camel; 1.0) this 
w.a.s the noblest of all camels a.nd a tribe' once: boas.ted that. its na;]a., ib 
w.ere: the e:qua.l of· its: kha.yl. :U.) A bakr· pl. abkir w.as a young: camel; 12) 
1.} Tab. :L 1274·;; :15545.. 160:1.; 2600;; waq 1.7; 96;; 97; m 4.2.4;: 455:; 45r? ;. 462:. 2) Mus·. Rwa.la. 550. 5: : Tab 1. 1.745; 2.002; Wa.I!J! 5.75;, WW :5:9 note· 3·; 
D! 4221; 665·;. 722:;: Ya~ q II,. 1.90;: Fut Lees II,. 1.42; see MUs Rwala 551.. 
4) Tab 1.. 1.4:1L9;; Waq :1!..5;; 96; :li.81.; Bal 276; ni 722:; Fut Lees I,. 2?. 
5) T'ab :t... ::1!.559;; 1.660;, Waq 1.7;; 80; Bal 99; Fut: Lees. I,. 89. 
6) Waq M.;, 1.08;, Ba.l 550; lli 807; Fut Mif}:r 185. 7) m 459; 440.;. 
Ya.cq II,. 162<. 8) Siirah LIX,. 6;; ni 655;. Ba.l :liB;; 2.9. 
9) Waq :liB; nr. 441. 1.0) Ta.b· 1.. 1.981.; a.l-Khansa/ 9:li.,. and note: 1.. 
n) Waq 555. :1!.2~)' Wa.q :ua. 
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both dhulUl pl .. d!hulull.,, 1.) and matiyy or matiyah pJL. matayah 2') vrere 
other· name:s. for riding: camels:. Sometimes the term aibah pJL. duwab 5) 
is: us·ed but this·. word can mean any ridling animal or pack animal. 
In general the BadW: treat their camels well..,. but in extremities., 
as during: KlialidL' s march, 4) they Wiill kill camels and water their 
hors·es w.ith the oontents of their s.tomachs. Caetani 5) thinks that. 
this is• an improbable s·.tory, being. oontr.ary to the nature of the Bacm, 
but. Thes'iger· s·ays. tha:t: an Arab who is· really suffering from thirst 
will drink the water from a camel's stomach or even. thrust a s.tick 
cillovm its throat and drink the vomit. 6) Musil rela.te.s how a. camel is 
incited to dirink by special songs and. byr s'lapping: the. surface of the 
w.a.ter in a rhythmic. manner;: ma.ny camels are: tra.ined to recognise by 
these sounds that they are to go on a long dry journey and to drink 
more greedd.ly. After drinking they are: a.llow:edi. to graze: for about 
an hour andl are then brought ba;ck and incited to drink: again;: a strong, 
fat camel ca.n be ma.de to drink from 60 to 70 li tres·. in this way. 
·when the Badw:· are returning from a raid and. lacking watex bags, fear 
that the wells; en route may be: blocked~ they first: force the camels 
to drink to exces;s as· described above. Then the muzzles are• tied, 
the lips may be. cut to prevent grazing, and e:u:en the rec:tum, sewn. up 
to prevent excretion. The ur;ethra may a.ls:o be fastened w:i th a stake 
to prevent s:ta.ling. The. water obtainable from the• beJ.lie.s of ten 
camels.,, when mixed W·i th milk, is sufficient. for from 80 to :li.O.O hors.es. 7) 
1.) Tab :lL. 1.707.. 2;) Tab :li.. :li888; Fu t Lees II" 1.47. 
Waq 5:·2.6;; B'a.l 406; Til 589. 4:) Tab 1.. 2:1l.2:; 2125. 
6)- Thes. :li.38. 7) Mus. AD 5'f'10 f. 
5·) · Tab 1.. 24i64; 
5) Ca :1L2., 41.9 f. 
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It should not be inferred! that. the attitude of the Badw to their camels 
is: nece·ssa.rily; cruel or indi:ifferent. 'Fhe. c~el is their main support 
in the harsh life of the desert~ pFoviding· transport, Ildlk,. meat and 
eovering,, a.nd this fae:t is not. una.ppre.cia.ted by the: Badw when they 
c ) 
refer· to the c·amel . as the Gift of- God - A ta Allah. 1.) Nor- is affection 
lacking: betwe:en·. man and beast.; 2) a camel will answer the ca.ll. of its 
master and may go over to its master in the night and p~ace its muzzle 
aga.ins:t h:illl'. as if to be assured of his sa:f'ety. 5i) ·ca.mels are sometimes 
called by name. 4) The practice:s described: above are a. last. res:ort in 
the struggle for survival~ not. a S,Ympto~ of the usual attitude of the 
Ba.dw toward!s their camels. 
'1'he B'ad'w a:r.e: expert at: identifying_ a·,:~ca.Iilel bY."· its traeks and can 
always identify their own eamels in this way,. while, some: can remember 
the tracks• of every c·amel they have ever s:een. They can dis·.tinguish 
the region· a camel come:S: from by its pads: an ani.ma.1 from the- grave·l 
plains: has polished pads, while one from the sandy desert has soft. 
pads·. 5) They can tell where a camel has grazed from its diroppings. 6) 
Thus Abu Sufy"in realisedi that two Muslim scouts had been at a well by 
examining the droppings.,. saying: "This is foddeT from Medi.na.~' 
( ") 
"i.iV' allahi ali if Yathrib. ha.dlhihi~" 7) 
Women w:ere: ea.rried on camels in litters., a kind of cage made of 
Cy- (" 
wooden poles;·. 8) this w.a.s called the za ~nah pl. zu un and the same 
term, was used~ by·extension~ for the· women carried therein. 9) 
1.) The:s: 69. 2) Thes 44.;; 56. ~) Th.e,s 69. 4) Tab 1.. :1..745. 
5) 'The·s 52:;, s·~e: WW 95; :1L72.. 6) The:s 52;; .Tab 1.. :lL45:4. 7) rn. 457; 
Wa.<g; 5:4;, see- a.lso Dt. 807. 8). Wa.q 1.81.;, Fut Le.e,s I,. 9:1.;: see Mus 
Rwala. 68 f. 9) Ta.b :lL. :lL590. 
• 
1.84 • 
In the early s.o'"urces camels: are: frequently mentioned in similies. a.ndi 
other allusio~s,, especially in poems; such references ·sugge:s.t tha. t. 
the originators· of.· the isnidl w.ere. familiar with the ·ha.bits and 
management of camels. l) 
'llli.e a.vailabili ty of ca.meis. 
'llli.e poverty of resources, in early Islam is indicated!. by the s:carcJ..ty 
of' camels on the march to Badr;; there were over 300 men but only 70 
camels;, which were ridden i~ turn. 2) On other expeditions. two men 
ha.a to s·hare one camel, 5) or the numbers of men exceeded the number 
of mounts. 4): Before the raid to 'li'abilk s.ome Muslims w.ep.t because they 
ha:i no camels· and tw.o of them w.ere given a camel between them·. 5) Even 
the Me:ccans at Ba.dr 6) and the Ditch 7) had fewer mounts than men. 
More: rarely,. in operations. outs.ide: Arabia,. there w:ere occasions. when 
the number of camels• w.as insufficient. 8) Nevertll.eles.s the situation 
mus;t have: s1owly improvedi.;; camels· were. often taken as booty 9) and 
this,. together W:i th the adherence· to Islam of camel-riding nomads,. 
wouldi tend to increase. the proportion of camels·. to warriors:. Long 
tis;tance travel in the de:sert could hardly be eon;templated without: 
the camel,. :lLO} and even the short purs.uit to ~~ a~-As:a.d after ill).ud 
was considered a hard journey on foot. 11) It ~ems likely that,. by 
the time the. f'ore·ign conques,ts·. ;vere under way, the great: majority 
of the Muslims had the·ir. OWrn ca.mel.s. 
1.) Tab 1.. 2560 ;: IH 564;. 57'5i;. 651.;; 655;: 667 •. 2:) Wa.q 15 
5) m 722:;: 795:. 4) WW' 2.2.9;; 587. 5) \WI 592;; Th 895 f'. 
7) WW 191. 8) Fut Mif}r 58;; Fut Lees: II, 1.47 f'ft. 
9) Tab :1!... :ll.B59;: :1.554;, :1L674;; Waq 96 f;, 1.84;. 5'551; WW 95;: 
297;; 5:75;; m 877. :li.O) Mus.·Rwala. 549. 11) Waq 526:. 
f. 
6) ww 44. 
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The: sources,,. however, hardly ever s:tate· s.pecifieal]!;w that a journey 
was undertaken on camel-back; they merely say "they went: to such a 
pJ!aee:," ev.en· for journeys of se'Vieral hundred miles. The. term's used 
are usual]y· sara :1.) for travel by day, sar'a. for·. trave]. by night,. 2) 
and f'aw:waza for traViel in the: arid desert. 5'>) Nevertheless, f'or the 
warfare in Arabia, there are so many references to camels that it 
is certain· that al]. the long journeys in Arabia were. made on camel-
-back. 4) The same is: true, although references are fewer·,. for the 
(" -· 
ea:t'ly campaign in Iraq; 5) for Qadisiyah; 6:) f'or Syria; 7) for 
(" 
Khi.lid:''s mareh; 8) for Jiazi.ra.h. 9) Amr' s army for the invasion of 
Egyp.t is: called: a cavalry force in one source,. :1.0) and .rohn of Nikiou 
always refers· to hors.e:s and horsemen,. ne:v:er to camels. U.) Camels .a:re 
mentioned. elsewhere:,. however·, both in Egyp.t. :1.2) and in· N. Africa 13) 
andi when they entered Egypt: the Musld,m!.s were expe.c:ting to take camels 
. as booty to replace their losses. 1.4) It. has been shown above (Ch. III 
p: •. 70) that: the: d.romed.a.FY had been domesticated. in Egypt: and N. M:rica 
before: the beginning· of the. Chris•tian era, so there is no reason to 
( 
doubt: that Amr.·' s men woW..d find camels to loot when they arrived in: 
( 
the Delta:. Amr·'·s force. may have includedL a higher· proportion of cavalry 
than armies. in other theatres,. but. it: is likely that the invasion force 
and the N. African expeditions relied mainly on the camel for transport. 
1.) Waq 525',;: B·al :1.42:;. Ya'q II, :1.47;; Fut Lee:s I, 40. 2) Ta.b 1.. 2204:; 
B"aJL 99. 5i) Tab i. 2122: f. 4) Tab· 1.. 1580 ;: :1.745;: 1.874-; li..888; 
1965 f; wa.q 97; :JL08;; 1.09;; m 7.67;, 7.95;; ~po. 5) Tab 1.. 2059; 2069; 
22:06. .6) Tab 1.. 23:09. 7) Tab 1.. 2.085;; 2:5;9@.\; 2576; Fut: Lees I, 27;. 
Fut Lee:s. II; lL47 ff. 8} Tab ·1.. 2ll2: f; 2:JL2l!.. :!'; Bal llO f·; 250. 
9) Tab 1.. 251:JL. 1.0) .Tab :t.- 2592:. 11.) J. Nik 559 f';. 561.;: 568. 
1.2) Fut: Ivi:i_~· 5'8,;; 81.~ ~~) Fut; Mi~ 1.84 f.. 1.4) Fut Mi~.r 58. · 
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In a:ll these: dles·ert a.ndl. s:teppe regions,. whieh have unbroken land comm-
-unications w;i th Arabia., w.i th no sea barriers or· la.r.g~ mountain range:s. 
interv-ening,. the dromed.ar.y ha.d been d!omes.ticated f·or centuries bef·ore 
the: Mus·lilll! inv;asions (see Ch. III). This. continuity of terrain and 
ca.mel-cul ture:,. together with the evidence of the: sources.,. make.s it. 
highly probable that the· methods of' warfare and transport, in these 
areas•, remained v:ery s.imilar to thos.e used in .Arabia., w.i.. th the drom.edary 
as; the indispensable: means· qf long-d!istance tr~sport. 
The accounts of the. w;a;rfa.re: in the highlands o'£ Persia. a.nd Asia. 
Minor, how.e~ ,. contain very few refer~niies 'to camels. Indeed in Ta.ba.ri 
only two such ref~renees have been found. One is in the: story o!f' the 
d!isa.s:trous. e.x:pedi tion ledL by M~jashi to K:irniin,. when the: troops perished 
in the snowi,· and!. a. girl was. sav;ed by spendi:ing the nigllt in the belly of 
a dead! ea.mel (ba< ir). 1.) The s:econd occasion was when camels were taken 
as booty in Kirman a.ndl. the troops were uncertain how' to divide them:,;: 
they asked.(Umar to give' his: jud!gement:,. and it is, cle·ar from his reply 
that the animals. in question were Bac·trla.n camels,. since: he referred, 
by wa.y of comJ?aris:on,. to the normal method of dividing Arabian eamels.2) 
In this. period ea.mels• were usedi. by couri.ers: to Metina.. 5) It is possible 
that these: animals• w.ere obtained in Ba~ah, 4} a.ndl. tha.t: the troops 
w.ere not on camel-back while on operations. in the higPJ,.a.ndl region:s. 
1} 'l!a.b 1.. aB63·. 2) Tab :IL.. a704. 3) Tab 1.. 2600;; 2707 f. 
4): 'Ya.b ::ti.. 2102. 
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It seems: likely that mules were used! extensively in the mountain a.rea.s, 
and they are mentioned sev;eral time·s. 1) There: is·, e.ven a tra.d!ition 
that Abu Mus·a wished! to lead an expedition froiD! :Ba.~ra..h. with his army 
aJ.l on foot;. the men not unnaturally objected when forty laden mu1es 
for Abu Mlis~'s personal use were led out from• his mansion. 2) In the 
mountains the us·e of· mules, paek-horses ( birdhawn. ]ll. baradhin), S) 
and perhaps. J3'a.e.tr.ian eamels,. must have altered the tradi tiona.l pa tter.n 
of J3'a.dw warfare: and movement.. Since the J3ac•t:rr.ian camel, like the 
mule,. is. a pack animal and not usually a. ric1ing animal, 4) most soldiers 
w.ouldi no longer,, as. in Arabia.,. ~ve mounts. undter them. There must 
have· been a. gradual tr.ansforma. tion into the Persian s.tyle: of warfare, 
with s:quadrons of ca:v;a.lry forming an elite,,. while as a general rule 
the mass of the fighting men were foot~s·olcliers .• 
There: is; no evidence to ind!ica te the method of trans:p01J!'t. in the 
arid! lands: of the Great Desert, Makiin, ana; Khurasan. We are: told that 
that the first: raid!s into Khurasin took the de·sert: route, 5) where 
water is; scarce: and. conditions are not suitable for horses. and mules. 
Since: the us·e: of:" the diromeda.r.y had been knovm in these regions for 
many centuries, before the Mus.lim; conquests,. (s:ee: Ch. III,. 72) it is. 
probable that- aromeda.ries: were available: to the Arabs for transport 
in the· dleserts: and steppe:s t·o the. north-east: and east of the Iranian 
p:lateau. 
:l!.) Tab :li.. 2504;; 2549;; 2552:;: 2829. 2:) Tab 1.. 2829. s) Tab lL. 2625i. 
4) J3a.dW: (Wis:sma.nn) 882:. 5) Tab 1.. 268~;: 2885. 
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'!'he: Arabs. as• mounted! infantry. 
The dromedary is used!. by the Arabs as a rlcling animal,. a beas-t of 
burden, or f·or agricul tura.l. W.Ork. It·. is not easy to fight from the 
baek of a came:l,. ana its. use B:$ a. cavalry mount in the conque:s:ts was 
very infrequent. The warriors. who had. camels. but not horses must. be 
considered as·. mounted infantry, not cavalry. Only two references to 
fighting from ca.me:l-ba.ck hav;e been found;; the stand:a.rd!.-bearer of· the: 
Haw'izin at E;unayn fought Wii.th the lance from the back of a red camel; 1) 
a.t. Qidisiya.h a. party of infantrymen were said to have been mounted on 
camels a.nd.usea. to frighten the enemy's horses. 2) 
On· the o-ther sid!e: the attestations. a.re much more: numerous and 
convincing. Sometimes it is stated spe.cif'iea.lly that the troop·s were 
on foot.,. 3)' anal. there: are many reference:& to infantry as distinct; 
.from: cavalry. 4) At; ~udl the Meccans' came~s: were left behind. in camp, 
andi. guaraed by slaves 5) a.nd at ~yn a w,oman held her husband' s camel 
Wlhile he fought. 6) At the YarmUk· the· Arabs' camels were hobbled and 
s.ta.tioned around their encampment - the· Greeks were also on foot:. 7) 
The. reinforcements from s. Arabia to the Yarm'Uk were infantry and! 
travelled! on camels. 8) Other references to fighting on. foot: oc·cur in 
poems·. 9) The fact that sa.nda.l-straps. w:ere tightened before, bat.tle: 
) _, imp]ies that a firiii! foothold was nec·essa.ry. 1.0 At Mu ta.h a. warrior 
e.ven dismounted from his hors~ when hemmed in on a.ll s·iclea. :1.1} 
1.) Tab :1L. :1660; WW 560. 2) 'ra.b i. 2509. 5.) Tab 1. 1.659;. 2530; 233.1.; 
Waq 6li.;; WW 559;; 3:6:1L;, m 846. 4) Tab. 1.. 2224;; 2530; 2477;: 2627; 
Bal 380; 390;; Ya' q II, 159;; 1.65;; Fut. Lees II, :1.69;: 1.9:1.; 241. f; 
Fut Miqr· 184.. 5) Waq 227;· W1'1 111.. 6) Tii 847. - 7) Sebeos 97 f. 
8) Fut Lee·s. II, 149. 9) ni 624;. 650. 1.0) 'rab 1.. 2598. U.) m 794. 
189.· 
Trav:e~ on Camel-back. 
There: are= des·criptions of marche:s in the sources but the· information 
given is usually very mea.gr.e. 1.) , Times of mareh are often omitted!, 
and! when they are: given it is frequently impossible to iaentify the 
destination. Where the total duration oi' ap. expeO!ition is~ known, 
events su~ as. raids,. battles anc1 trading; stop.s are included in the· 
total time:,. so that. the actual m.areh. time is unknown. 
In the time of Mul}a.mma.d the armies set out from an assem.b·Jly point., 
such a.s. a:l-JUrf·, near Medina; 2!} the armd.es de.stined for Syria. assembled 
at. Sirar,. als~o near· Med:ina.. 5:) In Arabia a.t least. there seems to have 
. 
b~en little discipline on the march and no-on~ objected, on the march 
to ijudaybiyah,. when a man left the ranks. to hunt and kill a wild do~ey, 
anal having: eooked it, rejoined the march. ·4-). In later tiines the marching 
order was·. the same: as the order. of· battle ( ta c biyah) with vanguard, 
rearguard,, e:tc:. 5) but. it is not known if the two wing_s acted as flank 
protec:tion or were in file:. Scouts~ we:re sent out when in enemy country 
a.nd these were either volunteers. or wer.e: guides hired from~ a. tribe. 6) 
Sometimes the troops: marched by d~ and. by night. 7)'Navigation was 
by guide·s; 8) or by the s.tars. 9) On the way to Syria a party of rein-
-forcements los·.t their way,. and! it was not until their leader. saw a 
certain: mountain whieh he knew1 to be near their destination that. they 
w~e: sure of their route. 1.0) En route· to ?iJ.daybiyah the guides lost 
their way on the secondary track which had been taken in order to try 
and achieve· secrecy. U.) 
:l!.} Waq .2:1!.4;; VNT 211.; 229; 242:;; '500f;. Tab 1.. :1;:29~ .. 
~) Wa.q :l!.S.;: :ll5;; ww· 226;; 509; 526;; 591;. 454. 5'·) Tab :l!.. 221.21 ff. · 
4) WW 243>;; see als·o WW 50:3!... 5) Tab i. 255.7; 2.6:l!.B. 6) Waq :l!.95;. 557;: 
WW 2'45. 7) Tab :IL. 26:l!.7;; ·ww 595;; m 72r7. 8) Tab 1.. 21.:1L2·. 
9) 'l'ab :l!... 2115·.. :ll.O) Fut Lees: II,, 1.48 ff. 1:lL) WW 245. 
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'rype:s~ of Ma.Jl'eh - March Speeds.. 
For the purpo:se of considering· march speedls it is·. necessary to divide 
travellers into three broad ca te~ories;. i'he.se a.rec: 
~. Camel-mounted couriers· .• 
2:~ Raiding partie:s;,. without w.omen,. children,, or heavy bagga~. 
5:. Tribal!. group.s, with families and household chattels. 
::lL.. Couriers•. 
Couriers~ certaintly rode hard: i.n: one: case a man returning to Kii:rah. 
fro~ Medi.na se:t out at night and the next morning another rider· was 
( 
sent out by Umar to bring hilll! back but could! not overtake him: before 
he arrived! at: :Kilf'ah. 1.) A courier from Ba!p:'ah to Medina had to have 
his mount replaced for the return journey because his first. camel was 
exhaus:ted. 2:) Even with exp.edi tionary force:s the camels became emacrl.a.ted 
and had to be: revived! by grazing on fresh green pastUre. 5) 
Various times. are given for the journeys of single: riders: the. 
time for the jo~ey fromt Mecca to Medina, ov:er 250· miles, was three 4) 
or four· 5) days. Al..oMu~ is said to have riai4en from Medlina to1 
. /6) 
!firah in ten days;, a dis:tance of. about 670 miles. Some: of the times 
giv;en are rid!i.culous: thus a coW!'ier is suppos:ed to have .travelled 
from Ifriq!iyah to 'Medina in tw.enty days, a. distance o~ at leas.t. 2,000 
miJles, 7) ana: another· from Medina to the Yarmuk,. over 700 miles,. in 
three ~s. 8) Additional information can be obtained! from reliable 
modern s;ources. The:sd.ger covered U.S :mi.les; in 2.5 hours. and 450 mdles 
:li.} 'l'ab :ll... 2599 f. 2:) Tab :1!... 2.705i. 5:) Fut Lees I~. 'Zl. 4) W1f :lL02:. 
5) Waq 525... 6) Tab 1.. 2:1L65. 7) Fut Mi~r :nB5. 8) Fut Lees II, l.42 ff·. 
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in nine days:. 1) Musil quotes a journey by two eouriers who rode 
94 miles. in 24 hours:; 2:) on a.n~ther occasion a ma.n rode :IL.60:- miles 
., 
fro~· sunrise to suns:et,. spent the night:,. a.ndl. did the retUrn trip the 
following day, also between sunrise a.ndL sunse,t;. 5i) Glubb says that. 
a, rider ea.n• cover ~0 miles: in a da.y, not b;Y trotti.ng: but: by travelling 
for 20 hours: a:t. 5 m.p.h., and &leeping for only 4 hour!i• On the 
second day he w.:i.ll do less, and! on a. trip of 5· or 6·. days he will. do 
50 to 60 miles a day. 4!) Simd.lar figures a.re given by Doug]lty who, 
after citing· various typical journeys by camel ridlera, ~s that a 
dhulUl in· good condition may do 70 mile:s a day for short journeys,. 
60 to 65 miles a day for a week, and 50 miles a day f'or a fortnight. 5) 
It can be as:sumed, therefore,, that the speed of couriers during the: 
conques:ts·. would be similar. to the·s:e: a ridler w.ouldl cover about 100• 
miles: in one day, 400l miles in a w.eek, a.ndi up; 'to 700 miles; in a f'ort-
-night. 
2:. Rad.cling Parties 
Three. expedi tions• w.ill be eon&i.dered: TabUk; the raid led by Us'imah 
' - - r -b. Zayd to the Balqa; the march of Khalid b. al-Walid from; Iraq "to 
Syria. 
The raid to TabUk. 6) 
No women were mentioned as accompanying, the expedition., and it: is. 
unlikely that. there were: any,. since women w.ere usually mentioned when 
pres.ent, e.g. the twenty women w.ho w.ent to the siege of' Kha.ybar. 7) 
:L): Thes 1.7. 2:) Mus AD 1201. 5) Mils. NN :1!.45. 4) By letter·. 
5) Doughty II., 555·. 6) WW 590i ff.; ni 895·, ff. 7) ww.· 285·. 
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It: is difficult to ascertain the time taken on the journey: the 
departure w.a.s ii.l Rajab, 1.) but the order w:as not given for preparations 
to start until Rajab had! begun, and these preparations mus:t: have taken 
time:. 2) It w:a.s still Ra.jab when ~d arrived at TabUk and sent. 
Kh~lid!. on to Diimah~ 5i) The mareh,. therefore,, crould! s:careely have taken 
more. than 20 dlays.,. perhaps less, for appro:x:ima.tely 580 miles. 
They s:tayedi in TabUk for 20 days 4) - Ibn Is.liiq says·. l!.O nigllts., 5) 
bu.t·--e:ViEm Kh.BJ.id couldl not h~ve done the round trip) to Dilmah ( 45:0. miles;) 
which included! fighting: a.ndl taking prisoners and! booty~ in such a. 
short time:. 'IDle- army returned! to Medina, arriving: in, Rama.qi"n ,. and 
since a deputation of_ Thaq'ti'' came: to see ~a.dl later in that month, 
his; return may have been· early in Ra.macJ.&n. 6) Waqidi refers specific~ 
-ally to the speediness of the return march,, 7) so the journey may 
have been compl.eted in les;s; than 20 days;. Numbers are: given as 
5:0,000 men, ::11.0,000 hors.e:s· and :tL2/15 ,.000 camels, 8) but are probably 
exaggerated,. especially for horses. Muhammad expressly ordered that 
/9) . 
. all the men should be well. mountedl, but: from the ratio of men to mounts 
_this does not appear to have: meant that: every man had a mount to 
himself·. Indeed!, the sources. s;ta.te that two men had t:o share one 
came1. :1lO )-
lL} m 895· f. 2;) ww· 59:1L;; m 895. 5) ww 40:5!. 4) ww. 40:1.. 
6) ww· 4:ll4;; IH 9:1!.4:.. 7) ww· 409. 8) ww 408. 9) ww 592. 
::11..0) ww 592:;; m 895 r·. 
5.) m 904. 
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Us&inah 1 s; rad.di. 1.) 
As:suming the des-tination to have been in the vicinity of Kerak• the: 
distance: for the s·.ingle journey is, about 600 miles: by 1ili.e coast; road,, 
and about 660 miles, via 'rabUk. The party was. absent from Medina for 
55 days, 2) a.nd since: they took s.ome: booty 5:.) they must have stayed 
for some days before the return march. The speed of ma.reh,. therefore, 
cannot have been les·s than 40 miles·. a day. 
Klialid! 1 s March• 4.) 
Certainly the most celebrated forced! march in desert conditions: 
(ma.fazah) 5) in the early eanquests was that of the force of about 
. ~ 
600 warriors; 6) led by Khil.id b. a.l-Wilid frolll! Iraq to Syria. The 
aources a.re more than usually confused about this episode, and Orient-
-aJ.is.ts have been unable to agree on his i tinera.ry. Many events which 
C' - .... 
took place when Kliau.id was raidling in Iraq, or whet;i a.l~Mutha.nna was 
operating along the EUphrates after· KliSJ.id! 1 s. departure: have been 
included in the accounts of the journey. There are certain events., 
howev:er, which are mentioned! by mos:t of the tratitions, without; 
contradicting each other, ~d! Wii thout introducing geographical absurd-
-itie:s;. 'Fhes.e form the basis: of the following narrative. 
While in ¥Ira.h, ::RliSJ..id receivecl instructions frollll Aou Bekr to 
go and! reinforce the armies in. Syria. 7) He W!a.s told to return the . 
women and!. children to Medina. w:ith a.n escort. 8) 
:lL} Tab :lL.. :IL848 ff. 2) Ca. Chron. :h1.., 1:l!.:li.. 5) Tab :li... :ll.851.. ) 
4)~ 'l'ab :lL. 21U ff (Sa.yf b. '"umar); 2:1L21 ff ( Ibn Ishaq); 2:1!.09 (Ma.ai. ini); 
B'al 1J!D f; 250;, Ya.c q II, :11.50: f;, Ca. :12, 592: f; MUs AD, App· VIII; 
de Goeje· 57 ff·. 5) Tab L 2;125~, 10. 6} B'a.l no. 7) Tab :lL. 21.2:1.. 
8) Tab :ll. 21L2:lL. 
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Kllalid then left from ?fra.h 1.) or from c: Ayn al-'l'a.mr 2:) the d.a te or· 
his: departure:, accorddne; to Balidhuri,. being Rabie II,. A.H. :!L5:. 5) 
At some s.ta.ge in his· journey occurred the famous forced. march through 
waterless desert from Quraqir to Siiw.a, 4) and the des:crip·tion or.· this 
is: very vivid!. In Quriqir a guide· was. round who wa.r.neal Kliilia that: 
the route: to Suwa wa;S" difficult even for a s.ingle rider. 5) Kliilidl, 
however, insistea on attempting the march, and preparations were 
begun,, the men being told to provide themselves with sufficient water 
for2:·the journey. 6) Presumably the water-bags w:ere only .. enough to 
., . . . . . 
carry water tor the men, beeause a1 me:iP.s had t9 be fojm4 to provide 
c . 
water for the horse:s. The. guid!e,. Rafi , s.ele.cted twenty old, f'.at 
~els: who were watered and then incited. to drink again (al_ra.la.l 
bac d a.l-na.hal) 7) until they were. s"&ted. ·~eir lips. were then eut 
to prevent theiii! from ruminating. 8) The journey was. five nights, 
i.e=. six days., duration. 9) At. each night ha.lt tour of' the camels 
were slaughtered and the. w:a.ter from. their bel.lie·s: was mixed with 
milk and. the: mixture fed to the horses· .• 1.0) 
- '" When they approached Suwa the guide• who was suf'f'ering from 
an eye: a.f'flic:tion.~: ll) was unsure of' the: loeation of the. well and 
ordered!. the. men to seek for a clis:tinctively shaped bush. 12) Ev:en-
-tuaJ.ly its stump, was. dd.s:cov.ered and digging at its foot reViealed 
the w.e~l. 15i) 
:li.) Tab :11.. 2112. 2) Bal 250. 5i) Bal 1:1LO;· 250. 4) Tab 1. 2tl:22: f; 
21.12' f;;. Bal :t:li.O f. 5) Tab :lL. 21i:Ji2;;, 21.2:2. 5) Tab :t.. 2:125'• 
7) Tab :lL. 2125'• 8) Tab :1. 2jiji2:; 2125·. 9) Tab 1.. 21.22:, 1.5. 
1.0) Tab :IL •. 2:Jil!.3.,. 1. f. U) Tab 1.. 2:lili.5i,. 1.0. 12) Tab 1. 2115•, 12:. 
:1!13) Tab 1.. 21M .• 
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Apart from the above na.rrativ.e there: is mueh con£uaion in the: sources: 
for the remainder of the itinerary. Some accounts mention piaees 
along· the Euphrates; and! als·o towns: along the road!. from Me:sopotamia. 
to Da.ma.scus.,. sueh as Arak, Tadmur (Palmyra), Qarya.tayn a.nd :EJuwwir.!n. 1..) 
. (" ) O:ther c;leta.ils are given only in the account of Sayt' b. U:ina.r·, 2 who 
- (" - -aays that. Kha.lid 1 s route from' Iraq w.as; via Dwnah and thence through 
the desert-to Qu.r'iqd.r. While: at. Qur'iqr.ir he asked which way to travel 
in ord:er to, avoid the Greeks, lest they impede him from bringing help: 
to the. Mu.s·lims·. He w:as· told! to make for .suw.~,. which lay at the second' 
ga.te into Syria,. a.ndl one of the local inhabi ta.nts. told. him that. he: 
must se;t out. with the morning s;tar on his right eyebrow.. 
There a.re three. main the.orie:s: for the route: taken by KhiJ.id: 
r 
that of de Goe.je places: Quraqir in the Iraqi d:es·ert north-we:s·t of 
Ayn al- 'l'a.mr.· and! Suw.a in the Pa.lmyrene, north of Arak on the: road to 
Damascus,. whence: he followed the road! towards the oasis of Da.mas:cus. 5i) 
The: DUmah mentioned by Sayf, which is specifically named in one. account: 
in Baladhuri as. Diima.t-a.l-Jandal, 4) is assumed, on the basis of· another.· 
rather tenuous· tradition in Balac11lhuri,. 5) to be Diimat-al-~rah, near 
Ayn al-Tamr. 6) This; is a possibility, but it offers c·ertain dif'fic-
-ul.ties,; why follow: a difficult route through the desert when he· e·oulliil 
have followed: the river to the high road:? The: names: Quraqir and!S.uwa 
cannot be found in this• area.. Water in the· vicinity of· Arak: is 
1.) Tab 1.. 2·1.09; Bal 110 f. 
4) Bal. 1:lLO f. 5) Bal _65·. 
2) Tab :t. 21:!!.2 - 2jJL5. 
6) De Goeje 10 ff. 
5·) De Goeje 57 ff. 
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plentiful; there would be no need. to seek for it in the way described.1~; 
This. objection aJ.so app_U..ies .. to. the s:econd hypothesis, that. of 
Ca:e:tani, followed! by Becker. 2;) Caetani maintains:. that, reading; Rabie II,. 
C' - . - -· A.H. 12; f'or Rabi II,. A.H. ::1!,5, in B"aJ.adhuri, Kh8.lid left ~rah in December 
655:, a.n<il pursued! a leisurely course up the Euphrates·., r&icling and 
plundering as: he w:ent. Having dealt Wi:i. th some. ~aghlib ca.mp•s. in the 
region of al-Bisbri, he turned south a.nd made f'or Sukhnah, which Caeta.ni 
' . identifies. w.ith Suwa;: Quraqir is: as.sumed to lie in the area of al-Bishri.. 
'fherea.:f'ter his; route was the s·ame as: that given by c!e· Goe:je:. The: mos.t 
s·erious: fault in this: ~eory is; in the· diatanc.e between al-Bishri 
and: Sukhnah, no more than 65· miles.. The route iSJ well-watered 5i) but 
e:v:en if it w:exe! quite arid! the d.iatance: is no more t_~ a. forced march 
.. 
of one: day for an Arab raiting party. It is: quite: impossible: that. 
this could have inspired the remembrance: of a. Giff.icult forced march 
of five: nights; duration. Furthermore, it is not in keeping with what 
w:e: knoWi of Khallid' s charac·ter tha. t:,. on receiving: an order from Abu 
Bekr, he should halve s.pent more tha.n three months on the journey. 
Neither of the tw.o theorie.s discussed! so far includes po·si tive: 
. - -'· identification of· the two mos.t important place-namea: Quraqir and Suw.a.. 
'Fhere is; a Quraqir,. hoWever, at the w:e·s:tern end! of· the WS.di Sirl_lan. 
It is. the Qulban Qur'iqir and. it is. s;till marked! on the map with a 
village: of the same. name clQs.e by. 4) 
1) Pers·onaJ. ex:perienc:e. 2) Ca :li.2!,. 41.6 ff'~ Be.eker 54:1i... 
5"} Personal experience. 4) War Office map,, series' :li.: 1.,000,000 
a.l-J"aw.f-;: Palestine Survey 1941., 1.: 500,000 ... Sha.rq al..Urd"un. 
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It is; here: tha:t Mus·il places the start of the waterless journey for 
reaaons which appear to best fit the available facts. 1) The course 
of ev.ents: as; pre:sentedl by Mus.il is> as: follow·s;: Khi:Lid se.t out from 
- c ~a:h in late March, 634, the date Rabi II being the midd!le of· the 
c 
s·eaaon which was known to the Badw.· as Rabi.. 'fhis was. early s·pring and 
was; divided! into sections, this us-age be·ing e:spe·cial]$' .prevalent. in 
c - ) Ira~.2 That 'the use. of the oldi s:easonal names persis:ted into modern 
times; is atte.s.teal by Doughty Who s:a.ys.: 'Rabi c a is spring, autumn sferry 
to the nomads,•. :;.) Ke: took the route through Diiinat-e.l-Jandal,. the: 
c 
normal trading route from Iraq to Syria. When in· the Wadi. Sir~an he 
re·aliaed that. the road. to the west,. regarded by the BadW as. one of 
the tw:o gates into Syria, was guard~d by Greek fortresses w~ch were 
still. mannedi and suff'i¢-ent to bar the path to his .. small fore~ 4) He 
therefore· turned north. and would certainly have ;had to start off in. a 
north-we:sterly dd.reo-tion• (morning star on his right; eyebrow) to avoid 
the w:ors·.t: of· the lava flow. Hd.s destination. was ·Sa.b-c Biyar in the. 
: ' desert eas.t of Damascus:,, which Musil. identifie.s with Sliwa; there is 
( (" ) - ... c -still a. small:. hill. and! a. small wadii shi b called Suwa a. t Sab Biya.r. 
Wh:i:J,.e: -in· that region he probably looted sheep from the· shepherds of 
- . c: . ' Qa.ryatayn,. :eynw.warin, Arak• 'I'adimor, '13& alabakk,. and -·Bu~ra. who drove 
their animals• to the. Jabal al-8harqd. for the spring _gra.z,ing:. They 
still did in 1954, at. least from the :firs.t four p~aces named. 5.) 
1.): Mus: AD,, App: VIII• P 555; ff. 2} Well Re:ste: 97. 5i) Doughty I, 2.61.; 
see aJ.s.o m 6::1i2:;: and m Guillaume 4@5,. note 2:. 
4) Dus:s:a.ud 29 ff';; 58 ff. 5). Pe:r?aorial experience:. 
This: may account for the tra.di tions: which mention these: p~a.e·es·,, having 
confus.ed such depredations W:i th assaults upon the towns. themselves. 
!he inclusion of· '.l?admor ,, Arak,. and Sukhnah in s:ome itineraries may 
have: occrurredi because of ~:Qients, at a later date, w.he·n Khalid' s descen-
-d.ants· living in ~II!- ha.d dealings: with towns in th~ Pa.lmyrene:. From 
_ ..... 
Suwa Khalidl moved on an&,. in a surprise: attack,. overwhelmed a. camp• 
of· the Ghassan,. on Eastel!"' Day, 2i4:th April,. 634·, at: Marj Rahi~, now 
Adhracoah, north-eas.t. of Damascus. :t) Thereafter his. doings become part 
of the conquest of Syria. 
From' Quraqir to Sabc Biya.r is slightly less than 200; miles; since 
the sun was. hot when they were: searching for w.ate;!'· 2:) it w:a.s·. probably 
late: morning or early a.:fi'ternoon,. so the march Jil.us,t have taken five 
a.nd! a half' days,. gi'Viing a. march s.peedi of about 5o miles; a dla.y. This 
.is~ not very high but· allowanee mus.t be made: for the fa.c:t that. they 
had baggage wri. th them,. 3) that a route through the lava had to be 
negotia:tedl, and that there: was: no water to be found... It: remains., 
theref'ore, a considerable: feat. 
From. the evidence of thes·e three: expedi ~ons it seems that the 
speed of march was. s-imilar to that of raiding parties in· the: 20th 
century, before ·motor transport wa:s widely us:ed. This varied between 
35 and! 50 miles a ~' while in the night march before a dawn attack 
they would: cover up~ to 60 mile&. to try anal. achieve. surprise:. 4) 
:lL) Tab :li... 2aL25; Ba.l ·112.. 2:} Tab . :li... 21.15. 5,) Tab 1.. 2tl25i. 
4} Glubb·, by letter. 
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5. Triba.l Groups .• 
The bes·,t example. of the type of' exp.ed:i tion in whieh the families of the 
. . 
tribesmen went on the ~ch is; the adv-ance: of' the army under Sa cd to 
Qadlis·iyah.. Preparations for the expedition began in: the autumn of 
656 (A. H. 1.5) at. ~irar near· Medina. 1.). Mos.t of' the rec:rui ts w.ere· from 
the Ya.man 2) and! came 'With their women, chilciliren,. andi. mo.r able pos:se:ss:-
-ions· .• ~i) After some time. Sacci ~oved his force to Zarudi in_ northern 
Arabia on what: ·1~ter· became the pilgrim. road to Mah. 4) Here he 
dis:tributed! the assembled tribeS; around the ne:ighbouring: wells, 5) 
and! reinforcements slowly joined him;. 6) He had! arrived at Zarud at. 
the be~nning of' winter 7) but he may hav-e mov~d northwards. in stages,. 
si.nce he· was at Thaclibiyyah 8) and! then at Shar"af·. 9) In the early 
spring; he atbanced &lowly f'owardl to the region of' Qadisi.yah. 10) There 
were 700 women Wii th the Nakh c and!. :JLOOO Wii th the Ba.j ilah at tlii s time 
and!. many marriages: were concluded both be:f'ore and after the fighting:. 11.) 
-> When the army moved on to attack aJ.-V.aaa in the families andl the sick 
were: left behind at Qad:irlyah wi t:h a guard, :ll2l} and whe:n the city fell 
they were se;nt for •. :lil5) 
For similar campaigns. e·lse:vdlere. we have. s ca.ntier information. 
We: know·, for example, that; women were present at 'the battles in Syria; .L1.4) 
and that they w:ere sent to the rear for safety dUring the fighting:.15.) 
:li} Tab :lL. 22.12! f'. 2) 'I'ab :lL. 22·lL7 f;. ~219. 5} Tab t. 221.8. 
4) 'l'ab :1!.. 2220. 5) Tab lL. 2221... 6) ~ab :1!... 2222:;; Ba.l 255·. 
7) Tab :1!... 2221. 8) B'al 255. 9) Tab 1.. 2222:;; 222:ii f. 1.01) Tab 1.. Z5:49; 
see Ca 16, 11.9 ff for the prelude to the. battle of Qadisiyah. 
11.). Tab :li.. 256S. 1.2:) Tab :li.. 24:1.9. 13) Tab :li.. 245;:1L. 1.4} Tab 1.. 2100;. 
Fut Lee·s: I, 5 ff; 89. :li5i) Fut Lees I, 89;; II, 190. 
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T.he reinforcements that went to Syria from the Yaman_took their families 
w.r.i. th them. 1} It is' unlike·ly, however, 'that. the early incursi.ona 
inc·luded family groups:;: they were probably compos·edl. of' warriors only, 
on the pattern of Us·imah 1 s raidl. 'Fhey would. ha.v.:e the greater mobility 
of this. type of force.· 
The march speed of tribal parties cannot have been higp., and again 
w.as probably s:imilar to the travel. s·peedls of such groups in the: early 
'l"w.entieth century. Mobilization w.as·. slow:·, las.ting sev;eral weeks,. and 
the march speed w.as: about 20 mile.s: a day, pe-rhap:s• rea.ehing; 50 miles 
a day over arid stretehe·s. 2:) 
A year·• s i tinera.ry. 
It w.ill be ins.tructiv.e: to examine the oper-ations of Kh8.lidl b. al-Walid 
from the time he set out for Buzikhah at the end!. of September 65·2 
(Ra.ja.b A.H. U} 5:) to his arrival at. J?drah les:s: than one- year· later, 4) 
to observe~ the tistance:s• that could! be tra.vel!l,edl. in that time in 
-,mrious. conditions. Since there is. some doubt whether he took part. 
in operations in B~ (a.l-~s~) 5) or that he returned to Medina. 
be-fore- s-e.tting, out for c Iraq, 6) the:se two journeys have been omi ttedl. 
It has been as•sumeCl that he went from Nib'ij to B'af!rah, and! not tirect; 
to ~rah. 7) Dis;tance:s: are approximate as in all the;se: calculations; 
we· do not know the exact rou te·s nor any deviations that; may have been 
made:. For s:ome of the:se journeys there w:ere women with the party, s:ince 
families: were s·ent back to Metina. before the· march to Syria; 8) on 
others·. he may have been alone or w:i th a. few; companions.. 9) 
:lL) Fut Lees I, 5· ffj; 7:11.. 2) Glubb by letter. 5.). ~ab 1.. l.886 f. 
4) Tab :1.. 2026;. s·ee Mus: ME App; VII. 5) Bal. 84.; 90; 6) Tab 1.. 201.6. 
7) Tab :lL •. 2.01.6;; see ·Mus ME 284 f. 8) Tab 1. 2:l!.21... 9)- Tab 1.. 1928. 
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1.. Sep:·. 652yRajab ll. Medina - Buiikhah,. 255 miles: negptiations with 
) 
B'. Tayy; battle. of BuzBkha.h;; acceptance of surrender from. the B. Asad 
co_ 
and! B,. Arrui.r. Tab 1.. :l887 ff. 
2:. J!an. 655/Dhu a;t-Qa~d.ah ll. BuzSkha.h - Bu~~. 500 miles;; dispersion 
.,.. of other rebel. tribes. in Centra.l Arabia; cap.ture and execution of 
B·. Tami.m; marriage of KliB.lid. Ta.b :lL. 1922 £'. 
3!. Marc-h 655/MuJ:a.rra.m :1!2:. Bu~~ - Medina, 575. md.le:s.: reprimand b;r 
ADti B'ekr; exoneration of' Khalid; collec:tion of new army. Tab 1.. 1924£'. 
c 
4. March 653·. Medina - Ya.m'ima.h,. 52.()} miles: battle. of· Aqrabah (J'une) 
and. reciUction of strongholds:; peace wd.th B··· ~ah on lenient 
terms:. Tab :l!.. :1.95:0' ff'; Bal 88 f. 
5. June: 653/.Rabl I - II, :h.2i. Yamama.h .... Nibaj, 2:80 miles: discuss-ions 
..... c-
with al-Mu.thanna and conelus;ion of' agreement to raid Iraq. 
T'a. b :li.. 20:18. 
6. June 633/.Rab{ II, :12. Nibaj - Basrah - Hirah, 690 miles:: raids on 
. . 
route northwards. f'roiili Ba~ah;; transport of baggage: by boat. for part 
of journey,; capd. tula.tion of ~rah in Sep •. 653/.Ra.ja.b 12:. 
Tab 1.. 20:11.8 ff;: Bal 2.41. f'f';: . see: Mus ME 2:85'; - 516. 
Total distance: 2620 miles.. 
Since distances w.ere measured in straight l:i.nes~, and no deviations of 
route. or unrecorded journeys. have been allow.ea for, it is likely ~t. 
the total distance oovered was: at least 5000 miles.. This series of 
journeys., it s·eems, was. in no w.ay extra.-ordlinar.y and gave rise. to no 
spe:cial comme,nt in the traditions.. In the course: of the year there 
·-
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~e raids:, battles, negotiations;, dis:tribut:t'on of· booty,. marriage -
all the normaJ.. a.f'f'a.irs in the life of an Arab warrior. 
This; is. extremely relevant to the central argument of this the·sis., 
more so tha.n a.ny individual feat of s;peed! and endurance. It reveals: 
a.n attitude of minai. in which. the undertaJd.ng of journeys. over immense: 
distances;,, full of ha.rdship1 and danger, was: almost a matter of routine. 
There is a story, mentioned previously, of a rider returning: to Kufah, 
after whom a s:econdL rider was. despatched with orders to bring him back 
to Medina. 'The second! rider c·ould not overtake the firs:t until he: 
got to Kiifah;: both then returnedi to Medina and the first. eventually 
rode back to Kiifah. In other w:ord:s. he rode as· a courier a distance. 
of about 2500 miles,. apparently without protest. 1..) This point. has 
been stres:sed because there: is perhaps a te~dency, inherent in European 
w.ri ters,.. to regard a long journey on ca.meJ.-back w:i th the dismay they 
w.ould feel if i'acedl with it themsel vesl. Becaus·'e of this. feeling:, a 
European may doubt that a certain journey took pil.ace, considering, that 
the reasons. for the journey were inadequate c·ompens.ation for its 
lenglth a.nd ha.rdlship. His logic. is• not the logi·c of. an .Arab raider. 
1) 'Tab 1. 2599 f. 
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The horae and hors:e riding_ 
'l'he attitude of the Arab towards the horse is, reflected in the chron-
-icle:s; a.nd in poetry. 'l'he hors·ema.n,. the cavalry leader, is above all 
else: the embodiment of the Arab idea of chivalry and manline:s·s. lie 
was the rider who was so :mif't that his horse: appeared to be: swimming.,. 
the bringer of gifts.,. the taker of booty, the leader that. guided his 
horsemen when the way was los.t, generous., the protector of those to 
whom ~s proteetion was extended, a wi.se counsellor in the assembly. 
He W!S.S straightforward a.nd hones·.t. in w.arl'are,, a seeker after vengeance 
and! poison to the enemy, the releaser of prisoners., the sta.ndarEl bearer, 
not afraid! of death when the battle was at its; height. The. foregping 
,"' 
is taken from a poem ·of a.l-Khansa lamenting her ·dead brother· Sa.khr,. 
. . . 
and while no doubt. it presents. an ideal that was seldom attained in 
prac:tice,. it is nevertheles:s valuable in listing the qualities. that 
were mos;t highly es:teemedi in an Arab warrior.~) 
References to horses and cavalry aboundi in the source:s:, and although 
the camels, particularly in the early days,. m:us.t have greatly ou11;-
-numbered the horses;,. the references. to horses are mll:Ch more numerous. 
The horse is• nearly always c·alledl fa.ras pl. afras: 2:) and the rider is 
called faris:_ pi. furs"in. :5i) Muha.mma.d called female horses faras, 4) 
and the w:ord is: of feminine gender, but in modern times: faras has come 
to mean any horse regarclles:s of sex among the B'adw·; because with few 
exceptions only mares; are bred. 5) 
... ' 1.) Al-Khansa 9 f. 2:) Tab 1.. 2:lL9:h.; 2521.; 2.425; m 794;; Ba.l 258; 
Waq 60; 74;; 2lL4; 252. 5.) Tab 1.. 2096; 22.97; Waq 206. 
4) Fut Mi~r 1.44. 5) Mus. Rwa.la. 5·72 .• 
204. 
Individual animals are. often described in great: detail.: by colour; l.) 
markings.;; Z.) temperament;; 3,) a.ccroutrements;: 4) and. by na.me:; 5) horses 
were: s·ometime s armoured. 6) 
The general name for c·a.v:alry is khayl p].. khayiil and is. W:idely 
us:ed! for des:oribing horse: formations• in various• circumstance:s. 7) ~e 
word! kuri,. is; us:ed as a collective. term meaning; mounts, never as the 
de:signa.tion of a battle formation. 8), Other names are used. for cavalry 
units, ac·cordling to the functions; they .perform::-
- ) ) :1L. The katibah pl. kati ib!" 9 
'mli.s. w.as. the eqUivalent- o:f· a cavalry s•qua.dlron;; sometimes the katibah 
w.as: gi'Vien impressive.-s:oundling e;pli the-ts. to enhance its. reputa.tiolil!, e.g;. 
kati.ba.t-al-kharsi! the silent s:quadiron, :l_lO) and kati.ba.'t.-al~a.hwil, the· 
fears:ome: s:quadron. 11) 
2!. The tali c ah p!li. tali.) i c 
. 
'rhis was usually a. small spy troop: or reeonna.issa.nce patrol sent. out to 
obtain information;: 12!) its size was between one and. ten men; 13): but 
the expres.s:ion is; als:o used for a raiding party, 1.4) a.nd _in later years 
came to be us:ed :r.·or a unit of the ta c biya.h formation. 15} 
1.) 'l'ab lL. :1L6l.4;. 2·li95•;; Waq 74;: 250;; Bal :172;. Fut Mi~?r 1.44. 2.) Wa.q 250;. 
T'ab :l!... 2:l1.95•. 3) Tab lL. 2lL9:1L; B'al 99. 4) Tab 1.. 2.639 •. 
5) Tab lL. :1509;; ll5:li0 ;. 2191; WW 251.;. IFl 575 ;- Fut Mi~ 144. 
6) Wa.q 25:ll.;. 252'. '1} Tab 1.. 20:119;: 2085;; 2297;: U52: f.;: Wa.q 53i;; 2.07;. 219;, 
B'a.l :£.49;: 200;; Fut Lees; I,, :1!.29;: Fut Mi~?I" 143. t •. 8) Tab 1.. 2420;; 
·wa.q 57. 9) Waq 21.5 ;. 365;. 412:; Ya' q; II,. 1.65;; Fu t Lees I,. 1.4-. 
1.0) Tab :1. 243:6;; 2440. :11.1.) Tab 1.. 2436; 2440. 12) 'fa:t> 1.. 2104; 2204;. 
2258;. Fut Lees: I, 1.0. :13i) Tab :1L. 22.61. :1L4) 'I'a.b 1.. 2.686. 15)' Ba.l 1.76. 
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5i. The sariyah pl. sa.r'i..y;a 
-r The term ca.n have: a similar connotation to the tali ah, a patrol s.ent 
out. f'or information or for forage,. 1.) In a.l-Waqidi, however,. s:ariyah 
is used to· distinguish an ex:pedi tion in which MulJamma.dl did not take 
part from an expedition (gha.zw;) led by MlJ4amma.c1. 2) The detachment of' 
-r 
cavalry which routed the Greeks: in the Wid!i a.l-Arabah in the: first. 
engagement in Syria. w.a.s:. a:lso called a sariyah. 3) 
Jl;_.. Th • T ~:~1... :'1 • - ~ • ~~ 
":t: e: JaTJ.uiGiU pa.. Jaz"flj J.~e 
Usually this: term. was used in the phrase jar1d!ah kha.yl,. and. described 
· a. horse troop which w:a.s acting indepenciently ,, e,.g. on long-dis~ta.nce 
raids into enemy country. 4) 
5:. The mujarra.dah. 5) 
'nli.s·. was. usedl of' the cavalry arm of an army in battle formation. 
6~. The ra.bi~ pJi .• ra.wabi~. 6): 
When a tow.n or a region had been subdued it w.as; often neces.s:acy to 
s·.tation a. mounted garris.on in the territory as. a mobile. guard force 
to put down revolts: and discourage insurrection: this w:a.s the rabi tah • 
.... - . 
The word muri.bi tah ha.s; the same: meaning. 7) 
7-. The kurdus pl. karaais. 8) 
The ac·count of' Sa.yf b. '"uma.r of'. the battle of' the YarmUk is• the only· 
place: where this. term hals been found. · lie d!ivides. the cav.alFy into 
many karidlis: and gives the name of the leader of each one. 
:l!.} Ba.l 1.75'• 2:). Waq lL f'; see: Tab 1.. 1.441.;; _1554; 1556. 5) Tab l.. 2l.08. 
4)' Tab lL. 2.64l!.; B'al 226; Fut Mi~ li..69;; 172:; 185·. 5) Tab 1.. 2618; 262j.. 
6) B~l 175;, 185; 22~;, Yarq II,. 150~ 7) Bal 198. 8) Tab 1.. 2095 f'. 
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The possession of a horse in Arabia wa:s.,. and is, a luxury;: the inner 
desert is not the natural. habitat of horse:s a:nd they w.ould perish did 
not the Badw; look after them better tha.n their own children. A runa.wa.y 
horse cannot live long in the desert, while a camel would survive. even 
without man.. Horses: ha:ve no economie: vaJ.ue, being used· as: weapons f'or 
obtaining booty and influence. :1) No mare: can be W·ithout water for more 
than 24 hours. 2); A foster camel is· n~oe:ssary to every mare to provide: 
milk for her. A camel may be reserved to ca:rry water for one mare and 
in summer the mare may drink two or even three times; a day; a camel-loaa 
of skins: will hardly water her over two days:'! 5) 
The numbers· of horses. available to the· Muslims in the early days; 
was very small 4} but mus:.t have been augmented by the aoces;s,ion of Mecca. 
since the richer Me·ocans: could: always: put a:n effective cavalry foro~: 
into the field. 5} At Ba.dr.· 6) and at the expulsion of the B. Quray~$ 7) 
there' were horses in the booty but the numbers: were sma.il;: no horse:s: 
were· mentioned in the booty taken at ~ although 6000 camels: were 
. . 
eapturei. 8) Horses, were bought from the spoils: of the B·. Quray~ah 9) ·· .. 
and the B'·· Na~r, :li..O) and in the peace treaty w:ith Najran it was. sti~ 
-ulated! that the Muslims be provided w.ith 50 horses in case of war. ll) 
The figure of' 1.0,000 horses: at TabUk 12) is, oertain:Ly a gross: exaggeration 
especially a.·s·.,the· .jo~~ was: undertaken at a time of' great heat, and 
many thousands: of camels would have been needed merely to keep the horses; 
alive. 
lL) Mus ~a. 57:lL. 2:) Mus·. Rw:ala ~2:. :i) Doughty. I,. 305;504. 
4) Wa:q. 57; 2"65;; 3$3i; WvV 168; 1.75 f'; 229. 5) Wa.q 32;;: 2.02.;: 385i. 6) W:aq 98 .• 
7)' Waq 574. 8) Tab 1 .• :1.67~.· 9) Wa.q 5.74. 1.0} B'a.l 1.8. tl) Bal 64f .-
12!} ww 408. . 
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It is certain that the numbers of horsemen with the .Arab forces remained 
small until the victories of the Ya.rmiik a.nd QS:disiyah opened up. greater 
opportunitie:s: for taking horses. as booty. We: are told,, for example, 
that there were: horses in the spoils of Qadii.siyah :1!..) and Jaliil~~ 2.) 
There seems also to have: been a more systematic attempt to provide 
hors·e:s; for the Muslim armies. 'umar had horses: collectedl from all areas 
for use on miliitary operations. and there were 4000 of these available 
in Kiif'ah. 3) 'fhere was. a horse pas·.ture for Muslim: mounts iri· north 
) 
-< Syria.. 4 ! A eertain Naf'i b. al-~i th was. the firs;t to wean a colt. in 
Bal!!'f'ah and he was. grantedl. a fief in Ba~rah by cUmar for the purpose of 
rearing hors-e:s. 5) 
Although w.e. are told that all the Muslims. w.ere mounted after 
Qidislyah 9) this is·. extremely unlikely and is: not borne out by the 
-' s,tatement that. the cavalry that fordied the river at al-MadBI in numb-
-eredl 600;, 7) this was probably the total number of horsemen with the 
Arabs; at the time:. B'oth in N. Syria 8) and in Persia 9) the cavalry 
is; mentioned! as distinct from the main body of the army under the 
commander-in-chief. 'fhus. the cavalry of· I;Iabib b. Masia.ma.h in Armenia 
roamedi about (jalat kha.yluhu) subduing villages:. 1.0) c·avalry was· sent. 
agains•t a town and the main body of the army W:i th the commander-in-
-chief marehed until they caught. up wd. th them . before the town. :U) 
In mountain regions, when the army was united, mulea; w.ere ridden and 
the· horse:s; w:ere: led: at their s·ides (verb: ijta.naba) .. 12} 
::t.
5
:) 'lab :lL. 2420. 2) Tab :lL. 2464. ~) Tab 1.. 2499. 4) Bal :li91 •. 
) Bal 550f·. 6) Tab 1.. 24ZO. 7)- Tab :lL. 2.435. 8) Bal M1.. 9) Tab :tL. 
2905-. :1.0) B~l ·200. -11.) Bal 290;. 5:12: •. 12:) 'l'ab :lL. 2504;: 2552. 
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This: is:, of cours·e·, an extension of the a.neient B'adw. technique: when on 
a raid of leating the horses by the side of the camels•,. changing to 
hors:eba.ck immediately before: launching: the attack. 1.) This is. a. verzy 
. . 
old practice and! was. empil:.oy:ed-by the Na.ba. ta.ean a.llie:s of the Romans 
in their attaek on Jere:sa.lem1 in A .. D. 67. 2:) 
On hors:e: management in general. there is little. information in the· 
sources. The des:cr.ip:tion of al-Muth~ 's; horse give:s a.t). ind!ication 
of the Sl:f'fection of' the Arab rider for his. mount: the horse: wa.a calleal. 
Sha.miis; for his gentle alisposition and purity and was used only in ba.ttl.e, 
a.f'ter which al-Mutha;nn,S; a.lw:a.ys: ba.de· it farewell. 5:) ( Al-Mutha.nn8. 
mus.t ha.ve: had! a. s·ens:e: of humour - Shamus means•. hea.ds:trong, res.tive:). 
· A rider is; mentionea that. always rode a. female horse,. never.· a 
) 
-l 
male. 4 At· the crossing of the Tigris. at. al-Mada. in the sta.l1ions 
were separate~. from: the mares. to ensure· tna:t both groups remained 
docile:. 5) Solicitude for the horse did not ·apparently extenal to the. 
mounts of' the ene;my' which were s:ometimes: d!isa.ble:d by cutting·, the: 
leg tendons. 
l!..) Ta.b lL• 2069;; Waq 290;: WW :1!..58;. m. 719;. 797. 2:) B'a.dw(Wissmann) 885. 
S;) . Tab lL. 2l!..9:1.. 4) Tab 1.. 2S·2:lL.. 5) Tab :1.. 2455·.. 6) Waq 6:1.;: 251.. 
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T.he influence.of terrain on mobili~. 
It must be empha&"ised that: the mobility of the Arabs was. mos;t effective: 
when they were in their natural environment - the open desert. Eien in 
Arabia: there were natural obstacles that riders found difficul t.y in 
negotiating. One. of these was lava (harrah) which was a barrier to 
riders; ~) Medina~ at the battle of the Diteh~ needed no additional 
protection on the sides guarded by lava as· this· was regarded as·, impas.s.-
-able. 2:) The ditch itself was a simple enougP, device:, yet· it com.ple:teJiy 
nonplussed the Meccan cavalry,. us:ed as. they wer~ to the open desert.:ii) 
En route to Efudaybiyah the Muslim army had cliff.icul ty on the march 
because of the broken nature of the eountr,y, intersected by ma~ 
ravines: (shicb pJ!.. shi~ib). 4) Wadis: couldl be obstacles; to movement., 
wihen the be dis had become soft after rain; 5) a wadi became impass·able . 
when it was: converted to a torrent after a downpour. 6.) The desert; 
itself was fe·ared!. when it was unknown and!. waterless;; 7) a 'poet: des·cribes. 
· the difficulties of travel in the northern de:s:erts, where s·.trong camels. 
become feeble and where lie the skeletons. of exhausted animals:; 8) 
a f'orce mounted! on camels suffered! greatly from: thirst in crossing the 
> 
narrow Dabn.& desert;. 9) 
But these were diff.icul ties that the Arabs: were accustomed: to 
encounter and surmount. Once out of the familiar surroundings. of 
Arabia, however, each new obstacle presented itself as a formidable 
:lL) Waq 21.6; WW 298;: Duss·aud 2rl. a). Ham 8 f. 5i) Wa.q 562: f. 
4) Tab 1. •. 155·.z.;; ww 2.45. 5) m 459. 6) \VW 508. 7) ww 298 •. 
8)' IH 6:15. 9) 'l'ab 1.... :ll965 r.·. 
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barrier the overcoming of which demanded a mental effort at.least: as 
great as. the phys.ical one:. This; apprehensi.on is: reflected in the 
attention which is paid. to such episodes. in the s:ources. Several pages 
are devoted by ~aba.ri to the crossing or· the Ti~is· at: al~Ma.daJin and 
the whole enterprise is; des:cribe·d: as: fraught w·i th diff.icul ty and 
danger. ~) On another occasion the Arabs: were unable. to follow the 
Persians.,. who were: in boats., becaus·e: of 'the intervening water. 2) The: 
early Muslim: inva.tiers had. no s:kill in bridge building and had to enlist 
the services of local inhabitants· to do this work for them. 3.) 
InN. Africa a.nd in the Syrian andririqi de~erts,. the mobility 
of camel...;znounted troops: could be used to the full. Condlitions. in the 
B'a€1iiet-al-Sham, in particular, where. there are: few.er na.tural barriers 
than in many· parts: of Arabia., a.re es·pecia.lly favourable for the move-
-ment of· large forces on camel-back. In Egyp.t and (Iraq,, in Pers.ia and. 
Asia Minor movement is; hampered. by swampy condd. tions. and. river·s :i!n• the 
riparian regions, and by mountains: and rivers. in the, highlands -'umar 
once reproved a commander for leading his·. men into impassable, mountains:.4) 
In the:se: areas the .Arabs: had! to adapt thems:elves to a new :r·orm• of.· 
warfare,. without t:.,_e eas:e. of movement. they ha.d enj'oyed: in the desert. 
Their mobility in such condii tions·. cannot ha-we: been greater than tha. t. 
of their enemies:. 5) 
:lL) Tab lL. 2432t ff; Mich Syr· II;. ~25·, f •. -~} T~b 1; 202.7 f;. see J. Nik 
56:1L. 5:) Bal 251. f.; Fut Mi~r 75!;. J. N-ik 559 f; Sebeos. 100. 
4:) Tab 1. 2545. 5) See: ·a.bove :1!..85-:lL87. 
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SECTION II - Mobility as an ins.trument of war in the early conques,ts. 
In warfare ~e purposes of mobility·a~e these: 
1.. Concentration: the ability to assemble scattered forces and to 
receive: reinforcements. swiftly in order to have a.n army large enough 
to ·offer battle with some hop:e of success. 
2:. Disruption: to penetrate: into enemy-held country,.. interfere nth 
'j__' ··line:a. of sup:p!l.y and communications, and throw the. country. into 
administrative chaos>. 
5 •. T.o achieve surprise. 
4. To evade pursuit. 
5. For pursuit and e~ioitation •. 
6. For intelligence. 
"t •. For communieations. 
a. For tactical use on the battlefield. 
The use made· by the Arabs of their mobility will now. be examined under 
these headings·;; in many cases . this will require a.n analysis· of. events. 
which have already been des·cribed in earlier parts of this work. 
~. Concentration. 
All. the evidence indicates. that at the decisive battles of the Yarmiik 
and Qadisiyah the Arabs were inferior in numbers. Their victories 
must be attributed! to tactical skill a.nd! high morale. 
' ( ' 
In· the conquest of Egypit the ability of Uma:r quickly to despatch 
al-Zubayr to reinforce'Amr certainly hastened the reductio~ of the 
Delta. Mobility therefore played! a. part in producing a. force of 
adequate size: in time for effective operations·. (Ba.l 2:1.5) 
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It c·annot be said that the ability of the Arabs to concentrate. swiftly 
w.a.s an important factor in their success; at Qidi.siyah. We, have already 
seen how· slow: were the preparations and! how leisure.ly the advance of 
Sa <a;, s army to ciriq. It is true, however,. that. sac di reques.ted rein-
-forcements. in the spring of 63.7 (A.H. 1.6) after he arrived incitaq 
and discovered the size of the Persian army. Some veterans·. of the 
Syrian c~paign came speedily to join him, :IL} and although they were 
few in number, only a few hundreds;, 2) they were doubtless w~lc·ome. 
It is.in Syria. that w.e. must look for advantages gained by the 
ability to concentrate forces which, although inferior in numbers. to 
the enemy,. were: still sufficient for victory. An event which was to 
have· far-reaching consequences. was the sudden arrival of Knalid, 
admi tted!J..y w.i th only 600 men,. but a force of proven fighting a.bili ty. 
More important was the presence of Kliilid himse:lf', the outs.tanding 
Arab leader, with the energy and the will to unify the scattered Arab 
raiding parties. He succeeded in assembling a force.which was large 
enough to defeat. the Greek arrey at Ajnadayn. 3) This w.as: dlone between 
his arrival from the desert on 24th April 634 (:IL9th ~afar A.H. 15) 
ana the battle on· 30th J'uly 654 (28th J'um.aa.B: I· A. H. 15,). This, is not 
a very long period when it is·. remembered that the a.rmi.ea w:ere operating 
over large areas of J'orcmn, Pale·stine and Syria; a great deal of· time 
must have been spent in interchange: of messages·,, persua.sd.on, councils 
of war etc. That this: could be done over w-ide s.tre·tehes of country 
1) Tab :h. 2549 f. 2;) Tab 1.. 2550. 5i) Tab :lL. 2:1.25 ;: Bal 115 f; 
Fut Lees I,. :tL01.; Mich. Syr II, 41.8. 
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shows·, tha.t in these regions the Arabs must have been able to move 
about with speea and confidence. 
The decisive stroke in the campaign w.as the battle of the YaruLUk. 
When the Greek army began its·. marc-h south Kh&lid! was. in lp.mf?·, and 
other leaders were operating: in widely sep.arated theatres. ll) The· 
concentration: of theae forces and their strategic retreat. to the 
YarmUk:, w,ith Khalid as·, the guiding hand:, again shows the value of 
ea~ communications and mobility. The position taken up. before: the· 
battle was as:tride the only feasible route to southern Jordan and 
hence to Medina. It was an excellent position from which to give. 
battle, with the broad plain of the Jaw.lan to the north, and the· 
barrier of the gorge carrying the. Yarmiik and its·. tributarie:s·. dividing 
the plain from the broken, mountainous, terrain to the south. The 
plain narrows to a corridor between-:· thes.e mountains. and the lava flOW1 
to the east; it w.as across this corridor that the Muslim' army s.tationed 
itself in the w.a.i ting period before. the battle. During this: time they 
were: receiving. rein:forcement.s from Medina, and S·ince their position 
w.as. ao s.trong defensively they couldi chose the right moment for battle, 
i.e:. when they considered themselves sufficiently stz:ong. 2) 
In general, however, on the issue of concentration of forces· 
it can be s·aid that only in is·olated cases did it play a. part, not-. 
a decisive one, in deciding the outeome: of battles. Disputes. over 
leadership:, and the tendene:y of individual lea.aers· to p~rsue. their 
own selfish ends. probably more than outweighed, in this: respect, any 
advantage: gained by superior mobility. 
1.) Tab :lL. 2087; Y a q II, 160 ;; Ca. :15, :h~ ff ;. Mieh Syr II,. 420 f. 
2) Tab 1.. 2088;: Fut Lees. II, 147 ff; Ca. 1.5, 118 f. 
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2:. Disruption. 
The· effeet of cons·.tant w.a.rfare and raiding: by· mobile enemy forces. in 
a e·ivilised country, is. to weaken material strength and to und:ermd.ne 
morale, so that the population is prepared :tor e:ventual submd.s.sion. 
This kind of operation is to be dis:tinguished from the rapidl. exp].oit--
-ation -Of suc·ce.ss after a decisive battle;: it is the •'·softening-up·' 
-of an enemy before the mortal bilow. is struck.. The bes.t examples of 
this' are the eampaigns in <Iraq from• autumn 65S· (Rajab A.H. :1.2:) until 
the battle of Qidisiyah~ and the Syrian campaign from the first inroads 
until the battle of the Ya.rm'Uk., The raids. by rAmr and his c-ommanders. 
in Egypt before the fall of Alexandria mus.t also have: c-aused disrliption 
but information is: rather s:canty. :!!.) Other raids into e-nemy country 
C" ,\ - j'21) CT.r- .:l • • ) 
such as• that s:e-nt by al-Ala to Fa.rs or by ....,.a~ 1nto Armen1a 5 were 
buccaneering expeditions s:eeking for l;looty, and can have had little 
effect upon the later conquests. 
This is not to pretend, of course, that the operations in the 
c ~ly days in IraC!JJ and Syria w.ere inspired by reasons: of long-termt 
strategy. The primaey objectiv;e w.as booty, 4) but the ultimate effect 
w.a.s wholly in the Arabs' favour. The raids by Khilid andl a.l-Muthanria. 
in the w.inter of 655/654 (end of A.H. :12) were di:irected! against the 
·· towns of the Euphrates. and against hostile Arab tribes f?UCh as ~he 
B·. 'l'aghlib. 5) Some of the operations·. were to exac.t. tribute from 
:li) B'al 2:1i.6 f. 2!) Bal 586; Tab :lL. 2545. 5} Bal .176. 
4) Ba.l 249;: Fut Lees I, 5. 5) Bal 248;. Ya.('q II, 150. 
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such towns: as: Anbai- 1) and: Hd:rah. 2;) The townsfolk seem to have been 
very ready to pay the small tribute which was demanded 5) and to 
provision the raiders 4) and to provide guides: 5) in return for peace 
~ the s:af'e:ty of th,eir crops a.nd orchards .• 6) Other raids were against 
tribes s.uch as; the Taghlib and followed the classical Badw pattern,. 
including: the night march and the dawn attack. 7) The single ins•tance: 
. . r 
of a deliberate. attack on a strongpoint was the capture: of Ayn al-Tamr 
where the Persd.an garrison was. put to the sword. 8) .A:f'ter :Khil.id' s. 
departure al-Mutha.nn8. continued to raid on the same pattern .. 9) The 
disas,ter at the battle of the Bridge: was a: set-back but the Persians. 
did not follow up their success·.. :10) 
Before the final advance of Rustam 1 s army to Qidisiyah no Pers:ian 
troops; remained on the w.es.t side of the Euphrate:s; the northern Arab 
tribes; had. been given a sharp lesson w.hich may have. dissuaded them from 
wholeheartedly espous'ing the Persian cause; the riparian townsfolk had 
shown thems·eJ..ves unw,illing to offer resistance and reaey to give. assist-
-ance. to the Arabs.. Furthermore, the Arabs· had g_ained knowledge of the 
'Iraqi. terrain w.hich was to prove: valuab].e to them later. · The effects. 
of mobility were als·o felt in the lull before the battle since the 
Araba were able to r&idi the s.urrounding countryside Wiith impunity, 
supplying themselves with food and fodder and interfering with the 
Persians' lines: of communications. :lUL) 
:li.) Tab :lL. 2056. 2) Ta;b l. •. 2058 f·;, Bal 243-i ~. 5:,) Bal 245.· 
4) Tab :1L. 22.0.5·. 5) Tab li. .• 2202:. · 6) Bal 244;: s·ee ~s. ME: 287 f. 
7). Tab :1i... 2202: ff. 8) Bal 2i4:6 f; 'I'ab :t. 2.062: :f. 9) ·Tab :li.. 22.02! ff. 
10) ~al 25:1i. f; Tab :lL. 2l59 f. U). Tab 1.. 225"4; 223'5; 2257 •. . 
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The operations. in Syria were more extens:ive and more damaging. We 
hear from a Syrian source of the devastation and. loss of life suffered 
by the settlements of Jordan and Pales·tine. :l) Large parts of the 
country were separated from any contact with the Empire, and cities 
were at times cut off from the regions that. w.ere still unoccupied. 
In the yea:r· 654/15• the Patriarch Sophronius· of J'erusalem' spoke in his 
Christmas s·ermon on the s.ta:te: of anarchy prevailing in the- country. 2) 
A country torn by war,. its communications disrupted, its organis:ed 
communal life at an end,. cannot have been a s:ecure base for the 
mounting of the las-.t effort of the Greek forces .• 
The effect of such disrup,tion, however, must not be exaggerated;; 
both the Greeks a.t the Ya.rmiik and the Persians-- at the Qidi.siyah c-ould 
s·.till put forces into the field that were superior in numbers to the 
" Arab al!'IIli.es:. What is significant is. the very fact ~hat. the Arabs were 
victorious-. in those: two decisd.ve battles despite: inferiority in both 
numbers and weapons. The effects of morale: upon the- outcome of a 
battle are real,. but they cannot- be measured; it cannot be doubted 
that the fighting s-pirit of the Greeks• and Pers·-ians had been weakened 
by the effects of the mobility of the Arabs. Shortage of supplies,. the 
sight of. a ravag~d countryside,, the a.bili ty of the Arabs to revictua.l 
with impunity (and at the enemy 1 s. expense) , must all have depressed. 
the spirits- of their adversaries. The lowering of morale was probably 
most marked among the Arab allie-s. of the Greeks. and Pers-ians. 
1.) Quoted in Ca. :12:, 547. 2:) See Becker 541. f. 
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5. Surprise 
Intelld.gence ( 13ee below:·, sub-section 6.) and security are the two 
factors which decide whether surprise can be successfully achieved. 
Sentry duty,. espe·cia.lly a:t night, was very important and was·. often 
undertaken by volunteers. ~) On one raid two men shared the night 
watch 2;) but the first mention in the sources of regular watches was 
at the battle of the Ditch, where ~ad set up obs·erv;ation: .. posts;; 
reliefs; were· organised and the posts. were s.upervisecli by a cavalry 
troop. ~ad! himself m~de the round of the posts and when a night 
.attack was impending he sent two units as reinforcement to t~e threat-
-ened sector. 5i) At ~da.ybiyah three night watches. took turns at se.ntry 
duty. 4) By night sentrie:s recognised each other by watchword:s (am;t:, 
amit); 5)- the w~tch ended at the morning prayer. 6) By day ~atching 
posts were placed on·raised ground which commanded a view over a wide 
stretch of country. 7) Strangers w.ere challenged. by the sentries·.,, 8) 
but cases of s:entrie·s neglecting their duty were. not unknown. 9) 
Probably the loos.er discipline of the non-:Muslim' tribes made them 
neglect sueh pre:cautions., since surprise was. sometime:s achieved! by 
1.0) 
Muslim forc£s:. A tribe might feel itself secure. if it--ha.d no inform-
-a:tion of the pre~·ence of hos.tile forces: in the vicinity. It is 
certainly very difficult, in Arabia, to keepi secret the movement of 
a sizeable body of men over a long: distance and there: may be a bas:is; 
1) ·Tab 1.. 1585; Waq 47;; 107;: 2.08; 2tll.6. 2) WW :l!..72:. 5) WW :IL97;. 1.98; 199·. 
4) WW: 255i. 5) Waq 258 ;. WW 2.02::. 6) VIW. 5·57. 7) WW 200 and note 5.; 55'k·. 
8) WW 552:;; m 687 ;. 815. 9) Tab :li.. :1!.585;; Waq 580;; Vfv'lf 232:. 
lLO) Tab 1.. 2J!.2!4 f ;; 2207 ;, Bal 248. 
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of truth in the story of· the 'ba.ri.d al-jinn 1 by which Medina. heard of 
the victory of· Nihiwana before the arrival of the courier. ~) One of 
the chief occupations of the Badw is the exchange of new~ and when 
information is; passed by word of mouth from one nomad to another it 
can be transmitted over great distances. in a rema.rka.bly short time:. 2) 
The MusJ..ims·. were several times; given valuable information by friendJJ.y 
tribesmen. 5) 
Superior Muslim! discipline may also have enabled them to keep. a 
degree of secrecy and hence achieve surprise, .as in the march to Mecca.4) 
A common method of keeping the enemy in ignorance of one's intentions 
was to halt a considerable distance from the. enemy camp' and to s.et out· 
on the final. mareh at nightfall, arrivirlg in time to attack at the 
first light of dawn; 5) ~adl is said! always• ·to have attacked in 
the morning. 6) Other devices were to travel by night and hide by 
day, 7) following an unfamiliar route, 8) or setting off in one direction 
and then changing course later :towards one• s true objective .• 9) 
Sometimes the attack was. actuaJ.ly mounted! during the hours of dark-
-ness>. :liD) Despite all such precautions· the enemy "Was·. o:f.ten alerted. 11) 
On the strategic use made of surprise attacks in the foreign 
conquests there is little evidence to show that these: played an imp-
-ortant role in deciding the final outcome. As. we: have seen, the camps 
1} Tab :ll. 2.629;: see Well Reste :l!.55. 2) The~ :lL09,;; 154. 5) Tab 1. 1874; 
2205;: Waq 196;: 555. 4) Bal 57;: m: 808 ff;; ww 5:26 ff. 
5)" Tab 1.. :lL608;. :ll874;. 2204;; ww 152 f;; 255; 255; m 974; 990. 
6} m 757 •. 7) Tab :lL. :1!.266;: :1!.592. 8) Ta.b 1... :lL372 f; 1552:; Waq 555; 
VTW" 245; 2.98. 9} IH 71.8;: 'vVW 151.. :lLO) Tab 1. 205":8;: 2070; Bal 2'48; 
mr 518. :li.:IL) Tab :lL. ::IL50l.;; IH 718;. \Wl 15:1L; 25:2!;; 2:11. 
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of hostile Arabs and the settlements. on the borders of the desert 
were often taken unaware,s;;; doubtless~ also, ma.ny villages in s;outhern 
Jordan and ·paies,tine awoke to· fin~ Arab raiders·~ at their gates. But 
in no encounter· of anY importance was. the e+ement.of· surprise of any 
sigriifical?-ce. :. 
4. Evasion of purs1_1i t: - the desert ~s a re~ge:. 
There are many example:s: of .the Arabs' use of the des:ert a.s a. retreat 
a.nd of.the inabili~ of any of their opponents to operate in the 
desert. 
_, 
'i'he first notable ins·tance was; the raid to Mli ta.h under 
Zayd! b. Ifiri tha:h when, although Za.ydi. himself was killed toge:ither- with 
other ·leaders·, the main bodiy of the force was extricated a.ndl. led back 
to ~edina· by Kh~id! b·. a.l-Wa.lld.: 1.) There is n9 doubt that, ha:d the 
Greek forces; been able to mount an effective pursuit, hea"'Y los·ses. 
could ha.ve been inflicted on the Muslims. The Greeks: had Arab 
auxiliaries with them (mus·.ta ~ ribah) 2.) but the tribe of Gha.ssi.n:, the 
most powerful of the Greek allies:, was no longer nomadic:, 5) and was. 
perhaps as fearful of venturing into the desert as the regular Byzan-
-tine: forces. ... ' The raid! of Za.yd 1 s s:on Usimah to the Balqa.,. where he 
was ins tructe·d to 1 ra.nge: widely with cavalry against the tribe o:f· 
Quaicah', 4)' is v:ery scantily report~d in the s:ources but again there: 
was no attempt at pursUit by the enemy. 5) A man of 'fa.yy, boas·ted tha. t. 
he was. the best guide in the sandly d:esert;; he used to bury wa.ter in 
the ground in ostrich shells a.ndi when he raided ca.Die1s: none dare· follow 
him into the sands:. 6) 
1.) IH 791 f;, W\Vi 509 f. 2) Tab :lL. :t6:li.Oi'. 5) Opp I,. 280. 4) m 970; 
WW. 455 f; Tab lL. 1851.. 5) Til 970; WW 455f;, Tab 1.. 1.870. 6) IH. 985. 
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One of the best descriptions of the teclmique of using the desert as a 
. ' safe refuge between raids concerns the operatJ.ons• of al-Mutha.nna along 
the Euphrates: in the period between the battle of the Bridge and the 
battle of Qidisi.yah. ll..) The services of· tw.o guides, one from ~rah, 
the other from Anbar, were· nece.ssary to enable him to carry out these 
raids,. 2) They guided him through the desert s.o that he ~voided det-
-ection before a raid, 5) and s:o that he eluded the pursuit after he 
had taken his spoils." 4) When .preparing for a. da.wn attack he sent 
s·couts aheadl and when they returned wd.th their info:r;omation he set out 
by night for his• objective. He instructed his: men that they w.ere: to 
take only gold, silver, and portable goods, so that their mobility 
should not be impaired. He attacked at dawn ana, after plundering the 
village, rode swiftly into the desert. On the march he overheara. one 
of his men whisper fearfully about pursuit and reproved him, s-aying 
that the news would not yet have reached the town,· but that in a~ 
cas·e fear would I?I'event pursuit.. Ev:en if the enemy caught up with 
them it w:ould only mean another victory andi more booty for them. He 
w.ent on to boast. about his; own speediiness. and to s·ay that Abu Bekr 
had. told him to keep; halts to a minimum and to make a series: of rapid 
raids in quick succession.· 5) 
' That the desert, even for such an experienced leaaer as al-Mlltha.nna, 
could be a menace as: well as. a refuge is shown by an incident at 
~iffin (on the right bank of the Euphrates near Ra.sif'ah). 
:1.) Tab :ll.. 22.02; ff •. 2;) Tab :1.. 2202. 3) Tab :1.. 2204.. 4) 'fa.b 1.. 2,206. 
5) Tab 1L.. 2204 f;; for a similar surprise raid see WW: 226. 
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'IDle people of!' Siffin crossed over to the left, bank of' the river· a.nd 
there• fortifiedl thems·elves.;; al-Mutha.nria. was: obviously unable to launch 
an a:s:s-aul t anal his; force w.a:s. reduced to &ueh s:trai ts tha.t; they w:ere 
obliged to eat their Ficling camels;. :lL) 
Thes:e raids; are! intere,s;ting in that. -they throw light on the out-
-look of an Arab warFior a.ntlll on the age-oldl rile:thotils employed for 
carrying out plundering raids: with a minimum_ of risk. However, the 
application a.ndl de-,relopment of thos:e method!s: in the conduc·t. of the: 
- r . 
decisive battles: in Syria a.nd Iraq is of greater importance. 
·In the early incursions• into Syria the Arabs·. may have us:ed raiding 
tactics;, r_etreati~; t.o the desert after de:s.poiling towns• on the: desert: 
fri~s;. A tribesman a.dtis·ed ('Amr to use the 9:esert as• a. refuge since 
the Greeks w.ould: not cla.re· to leave the:ir forts; a.nd Viillages; and he 
could! therefore fall upon them by s.urprlse .• 2:) One reason for the• 
choice of the Yarmiik battlefield!. was: pro~abJiy its; posi tio_n astride 
the road! leading s·outh to the desert. 51) In the event of defeat. the 
Al!."abs; could! have ~:xtricatec111 thems:elve·s a.n(ili retreated! to Arabia, where 
the· enemy would not have: dared to pursue them. 
At- the Yarmiik ther· reasons: for the selection of the· battlefield! by 
the· Arabs;,. or rather by Khi:lidl b. a.l-Wa.lid!,_ are fairly elea.r· but they 
have= to be arri vedl. a. t by- deduction. 4) For the batt-le of Qitisi.yah t..1'1e 
.... 
s:ource:s: are more: explicit. 'Fhus: a.l-Mutha.nna is-. said! to have WJri tten 
to Sac d from his: death-bed: "Fight them on the: borc:lers; of their land 
:1L} 'Tab 'lL. 2206. 2} Fut Lees. I, 2.8. S·) On a. modern Iilap: the line: 
Dera ca.h - cAmm&n - Mac an - Ta.ouk. 4) s·ee Beeker 543i f. 
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near the stones of the land of the Arabs and near the clay of' the land 
of the Persians; then if Go~. gives victor,y to the Muslims they ( the 
Muslims•) will take posses:S'ion of what is: behind them (the Persians); 
an~ if the other thing (defeat} then take refuge: - you can be informed 
about thei~ a.c,tions. until God! send!s you in again." 1.) c UmarJ;s orders to 
s·ac d had a. S·imilu· tenor: he was to s.tay ·on the margin of. the desert: 
andl let the enemy come to him. If defeated he was to retreat to the 
desert, for the· Persians' wexe: n frightenedl of. the des·ert and ignorant 
of it." 2) When Sa.(~ rep,orted to,..Umu· that both sic:les: were: waiting: for 
the opportuni t,y to attack(Uina.r re~iedl n s.tay where you are: until God! 
moves: them against you." 5) The Persian general, Rustam, is, reported 
as having opposed his: king' s· de:sire: to advance: and give: battle; he 
wishedl to remain inactive until the Ara.bs :r.e:turnedi home in despair. 4) 
In earlier days: his arguments might have been jus:tified and opportunities 
for taking· booty 5) md.ght. not: have been sufficient incentive to keep 
am Arab army inta.c·t. Re·ligion may have been the s:econd fa.ctor which 
prevented! Sa. ( d 1 s. force from· dis,integrating. 
At no time, in fact,. is, there mention of either· Greeks. or Pers:ians 
attemp:ting to pursue a.n Arab r·orce into the desert; even after the 
total defeat of theeMuslillis at the battle of the Bridge the Persian 
riposte~ w:as merely to pursue the Mus:li~s to the.ir ca.mp· a.nd assail them 
. ineffectively with arrows. 6) 
The effect. of such conditions. upon the outc:ome of the early Arab 
campaigns: can ~ardly be exa.ggera. ted. Their rea.r w::i th its line.s of 
1.).. 'fa.b :l. 2226 f. ·2) Tab 1. 2228. :3) Ta.b :l. 2250. 4) 'fab 1.. 2248; 
22!49;; 225:1. 5) Ta.b :l. 2232;;, 2234; 2247. 6) Tab 1.. 2179. 
e'Ommunications: wa,s; completely safe from enemy interference; the 
de.s:patcll of reinforcements· 1..) and! provis·ions: 2) was without hazard; 
booty could be se·nt back to Medina w.i tholit::Jf~~Zr Q:ft~ i~t.~eeption• s) 
When the men went out to give. battle the women and children were left 
in saf.e,ty at a desert well, 4)· a.nd the men would fight with greater 
heart in the lmowledge that. the·ir families. were' safe. In the event. 
of' a reverse' th~y could 'cut their losses' and retreat to the des:ert 
to await a. more fa~ourable opportunit,y for attack. 
The effect: of such elusiveness upon the enemy's' morale can be 
conjectured. The Greeks at the YarmUk and the Pers~a.ns: at QadisfYah 
must have lmown that any victory short of total annihilation woul~ 
bring only a temporary respite, since they mus:t ha~e. been aw.are by 
~his. time that they were facing armies bent on c·on~est and! not mere 
prea!atory raiders:. It: must ha.ve been dishea:rtening, to say the least:,. 
to face an enemy knowing that the results of victory might be short-
-lived, while: the result of defeat would almost certainly me~ the: 
los·.s of vas•t tracts: of terri tory. The psychological effect. of figllting 
on the bordiers·. of the desert, however,. must a.ls•o have worked! upon the 
~nda of the Muslims:. During the long delays. before the battles of 
the. YarmUk and Qad!:isiyah many of the Arabs must have be~~ tempted to 
turn their backs: on the prospect. of de.sperate encounters• and retire· 
to the· relative: s·afety of the familiar desert. There is. no record 
in the s·ources• of such desertions and! it is highly probable,. had they 
1} Tab 1.. 2088 f ;: 2:l82 f;. 2221.;; 2549. 2) Tab 1.. 2257. 
5·,) Tab lL. 2·:1L68; 2170; 2592:;: Fut Lee.s II,. 240. 4) Tab 1.. 21.97;; 2419. 
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occurred , that their effe.ct w:ouldl have· been cumulative and that the 
- ~ c 
armies of Abu Ubaydah an~ Sa dl w.ould have. mel ted aw.ay whence they came. 
It is true that water w.a.s: a.vailable at both sites and the ~rovisioning 
of the armies was: probablycat least adequate, conditions not always 
readily obtainable farther s:outh. But both battles: were fought in 
aummer, the Yarm.Uk in August, Qjdiisiya.h in June,· and the waiting periods 
would be uncomfortable even for desert-bred Ara~s.. (Even more uncom~ 
-f'ortable, of course., for their opponents, who cannot have found it 
easy to sus·tain their morale during the long months of wai. ting) • It 
seems most unlikely, therefore, that desire for booty alone would have 
ke:J?it the Arab armies intact during those long pauses. There is. an 
argument here, a negative one admittedl.y, for the view that the cohesive 
. force of Islam was alrea~ effective as a curb on the traditional 
indlis:cipline, of the Ar.abs., and that a eore of' .genuine believers:, in 
.both ~es., provided the necess·a.ry s·tiffening for the w:ayw:ardness 
of' the tribes;. 
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5. Pursuit. ana Exploitation. 
In Arabia it was a point of honour to pur!Sue raiders after one had been 
attacked: the pursuers. might be on horseback,. 1) camel-back,. 2.) or even· 
on foot. 5) Apart from the ques.tion of honour, the main object: of such 
pursuits. was to recover boo~, and there were occasions when. the raiders 
.were: overtaken and the s-poils retrieved, -4) while at other times the 
raiaers made good their escape. 5) A ~ical example of a pursuit. 
mounted S'Ole·ly for reasons of prestige wa:s when the Muslims: followed 
the M:eccans for a. few.' miles. out of Medina on the day after the battle 
of lJl:lud. 6) There appears to have been no intention of engaging the 
enemy in battle, and the pursuit was intended to aemonstrate that. the 
spirit of the Muslims: w:as: not. broken and that they could s:till put, 
battle-ready force.s into the field. 
With the extension of the Mus·lim· conquests into the lands. of the 
P~rsian and Byzantine Empri.res the pursuit is; nearly always· mentioned 
as: the aftermath of battles. 7) The· word for pursuit is ta.lab·and, 
once past the borders of Arabia,. it was always undertaken by cavalry.8) 
The cavalry would follow; the fleeing enemy and cut down any fugitives 
they encounterea 9) but the pursuit was often-broken off at nightfall 
.. 
s·o the remnants of the enemy forces mus.t have frequently been able to 
es·cape. under cover of darkne:ss:. :1.0) At other times, however, the pursuit. 
1.) Waq 195. 2:) Waq 526:f. Tab 1.. 1270. 5,)- Tab :1!.. 1508;, W'lt 2:29. 
4) Tab 1.. :1.504 't. 5) Tab :1.. :1!.555; l.601.; Waq 55:4.. 6 )' Tab 1.. 1.427 f. 
Waq 3·25 f;: Til 588 f. 7) Tab :1!. .• 2054;: 21.94;: 2549 ;; B'al :li.S'5f. 
8) Tab :lL. 2018',;: 21.98;: 2559; Bal 51.5. 9). Tab :1.. 2422;: 2465;. Ba.l 2'64. 
:li.O) Tab :t. 2559;, Bal 2:~. 
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seems to have been more effectiv-e'; for ins;tance' after the battle o:r.· 
Qadd.siyah, when the Muslim cavalry advanced rapid!ly througP, lower 
riraq, elearing ·the. countrys-ide: of· hos.tile forces as they went and!,. on 
arriving at a:l-Mada' in,. containing the enemy within the walls of the 
city until the arrivaJ. of· the main Mus·li!m a~. 1.) A:f'ter the battle 
of Nihiwandl the pursuing cavalry overtook the fleeing Persians when 
they w.ere attempting to cros,s a ra.v.ine and inflicted further s.e:vere 
los:s.es·. on them. 2) 
Expilioitation is. pursuit. on a s;trate:gie: s:ca:le: - the rapid subj"ug:-
-a.tion of large tracts of country after the des;truc:tion of the enemy's 
regular· army in pitched battle,. Exa.mpilie.s of· sueh operations; are: 
the c·oncq;uests: in Nf. Syria after- the Ya.rmiik;. 5·) the oonque.st of the 
Pentap.olis; 4)- the subjugation of Jiazirah. 5) The most remarkable of.' 
- - r -these. campaigns: was: the: eonques;t. of .Ta.zirah, undertaken by Iya£1. h. Gha.nm 
in the two years· 659-641. (A.H. 1.8-2.0) ~ Although the region contained 
many large:, s:trongly~fortified tovm.s: such as. Raqqah a.nd N!asibin its 
c~onq;ue.s.t w.as said to have: been the easies.t of all the lands. conquered 
by the. Mus;lims. 6) Some: isolated strongholds held. out agains;tr Iyad 
. . 
and had. to be reduced by h.is; successor,. 7) but mos:t. of the. towns. made 
term.s without offering much r.es.is:tance. Jiazirah is a large: region 
. ( -
a.nd! the lis;t of pl.aces visi te·d and !SUbdued by I;y'a~. in the year 1.9 A.H. , 
for example,, shoWis that: he mus,t have: commanded mobile forces.. 8) 
:l!.) ~ab :1!.. .. 2420 f·;: 245:8. 2:) Tab 1.. 2625 f. 5) Tab 1.. 2'549;: 25>95: f;. 
B'al 150. 4) B'a.l. 22.4. f; J". Nik 578:; Fut Mi~r 1.70 f·. 
5) Tab :E.. 2505 f;. :B'al :l!.72: f;: Mich Syr II,. 42.6;: 445 r·. 6) Tab 1.. 2507·. 
7) Bal 1.75 f. 8) B·a.l 1.75 f;; Ya' q II, 1.72:. 
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It is most probable that the main body ofriya~'s force. were mounted 
on camel-back, although the s:ourc·es~ do not say so explicitly. We are 
told,, howe:ver, that. when al-Waii.d! left JTazirah after being: dismissed 
from his post as. governor of KUfah he left 100 camels in the charge of 
~ura.yth b. al-Nue man, ~) an incident which con:('irms. that camels were 
use~. in Jazirah at this period!. The expeditions in J~zirah were probabiy. 
s·imilar in many ways to the traditional B'adw; me:'thods- of raiding: for 
ins:tance: Raqqah was·, invested!_ at harv:est time and c-avalry troops 
(rawibit) we;r-e stationed at the gates: to p:F.event. sortie:s-;; horse 
scruuadrons- were then sent into the surrounding c·ountrys.ide· andi_ br.o1.,1ght 
back food and prisoners. After: five or six days the 'patrician' capit-
-ulat~,. presumably to avoid further depredations~ andi. to enable the 
harvrest to be gathe:re:d. 2) 
Whe.ther the main body of Muslim• troops w.ere equipped w:i th camels-, 
mules;,, or other pack animals· the patt~rn of moveme-nt and warfare seems 
to have been basically the same: in all the non-desert regions. The 
cavalry,, usually und!er a renow.ned leader such as ~bib b. Maslamah 5) 
- c ) or Jarir b. Abd!allah,. 4 were- often detached from the main army and 
roamed about the c·ount:r.yside· plundering- and! devastating. 5) Doubtle:ss 
in Iila:ny cases the actions of these head!.strong- commanders were not 
easily controllable by the com.mander-in-c-hief and their operations: 
were probably often carried! out w.i thout reference: to the . nominal Jlea.d!er·. 
This is not to imply, of courae,_ that the cavalry always lacked! dir-
-e·ction; in this: kind of mobile- operation over wide stretches of country 
1) Tab :li.. 251.1.. 2} B'al li.75·. 5:) Bal 1.47;; 1.49; 174;; :ll.85; Mich Syr II,441. 
4) Bal 254;; 264;; 501.. 5) B·al 200;, 226. 
228. 
able generaJ.s: s:eem to have, used their mobile. forces effectively. 
In the operations. in Jiazi.ra.h there w.ere no regular enemy troops 
in the field. to oppos·e: the Muslim forces: and! the object of the opera.tions 
was: to conquer the region by reducing:,. one by one~ the: villages~ towns 
andl fortified. places·.. The cavalry usually went ahead oft the main force 
to the next obje.ctive: :lL) and,. by making a show of r·orce,. contained the: 
inhabitants· vrithin the 'V'r.alls until the arrival of the res~t. of the. army.2) 
There is• just a Sl:lgge:s:tion of the use: of camels·. conferring adldiitional 
mobility onriyi~'s' army: in the acc·ounts of his ac·.tions the. cavalry 
is· seldom· mentioned as· acting as a detached unit,. 5;) while in the: 
ac:counts: of the operations• in Persia a.nd As·ia Minor,. 4.) for exampilie, 
sueh ind:e:pendent ae:tions are: fre:quently described. Once a town had. 
capitulated a guard!. of horsemen (r'ibi~) was often left behind to a.ct. 
as. ·g~son. 5): Cavalry were a.ls:o sent: out to guard the: flanks of· an 
a.d;vancing army. 6) There was an occasion in Syria.,. at Bayt Lihy?i., when 
the Muslim cav;aJ.ry s.creen me,t. Greek reinforceme-nts: advancing towards 
Damascus:; the Greeks: w.ere defeated and! pursued tow.a.:rds lp.m~-· 
In g~neral the Arabs s:eem~ to hav;e; quickly appre~ia.ted the value 
of .their augmented. cavalry forces: and to have used the~m effective:1y in. 
reducing. large: areas or· enei;DY terri tory. The: consolidation of' the·ir 
position w.ould be made: when the main force caught up: wd.th the cavalry, 
and the follow.-up w.ould be quieker w.hen the army was camel~ounted 
than when they were equipped w.i th mule:s·. or other pack animals. 
:1:.) Tab :1.. 24.20; Bal 176. 2} B·al 1.75',;: 51.2:. 5) 'Fab :IL. 2'505; Bal 1.72 f'. 
4) Tab :li.. 2682: f' ;. B'a.l 200;; 507. 5) Ba.l :l85 ;; ::!L98 ;: 221.;. 264·. 
6) Tab :1L. 2.61.6 f'; 2628. 7) Tab :IL. 2152; Bal :IL50;, Fut Lees I, 75 r·. 
229. 
6. Intelligence. 
The word for spy .is('~ pJ!. .• cuyUn 1.) and they were sent out before 
ev:er:y enterpris:e., 2:) sometimes ·singly,. 3) s:ometimes in pairs. 4) 
Captured! s,pie.s were usually killri, 5) so in order to save his life 
or to deceive the enemy a spy might assume another name. 6) In 
MuJ:amm.ad!' s· time spie,s were usually mounted!. on camels,. 7) but also 
on horseback;. 8) the terms·. ~aii. .. ah and! sariyah are: usedl in this. con-
-text to mean a small reconnaissance patrol on horseback. 9) The. 
members of such patrols; often showed considerable daring: a tali .. ah 
... ~ 
of· three men was. sent to reconnoitre the GhUte.h of Dama.s:cus and one: 
of· the riders waited by the gate of the c:i.ty and killed the gatekeeper 
when he emerged .at dawn; 1.0) before Qidisiyah a single spy entered the: 
Persian camp by night, s.tole a horse and was pursued! by three men, 
tw.o of whom he killed with his lance~ while he took the third back to 
Sac dl for ques:tioning·. ll) 
It was usual to maintain spies in enemy territory ':12) and perm!"" 
-anent· spy troops w.ere often used to keep a commander informed; ::1!.5:.) 
for instance Khalitt kept permanent spy troops in Damascus. 14) It was 
frequently s.tipulated in the terms of peace treatie.s that the inhab-
-itants·. w:ere to proV!ide, spies and guides for the Muslims .• 15) 
1) Tab JL.. 2:1!.52:;: 2184;; 2208; 2252:;: 2235;; 2597. 2:) Waq 1l. f. 
5'.) Waq 57; 207;: 290;; WW 208;: 307; 5127;; 589; 4) 'Waq ll;: 1.4;; 35; IH 434. 
5) WW :1!.76;; 299. 6) WW l.75;: 225. 7) Waq ll;. 33·;: 202. 8) Waq 208. 
9) T'ab 1.. 2:185;: 21.9l!..;; 2224;. 2225 ;: 2266;: (tali c ah 'l'ab 1.. ~724·; 21.45; 
B'al 1.73;; (sari ah see Tab :1.. 2261.. 10 Tab 1. 2104f'. 
U): Tab :li.. 2260. :lL2: WW 505·;; 327;, 356 f. ::li.5) .. Tab 1. .. 2126;: 2232:. 
14) Tab 1.. 21.52;: Fut Lees II, ll6. 15) Bal 150;; 158;; 159,;;· 242... 
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As·. in modern warfare, reconnaissance patrols were sometimes. ins.tructed 
C' 
to bring baek prisoners for questioning. ~.) Uma.r is:· even said to have 
had: ·his: own spies in every Muslim• army. 2) 
The term. 'spy' in connection w.i th the Arab armies· is perhaps a 
little misleading: in modern usage a spy is a. civilian operating in 
enemy country, but in the 7th centur,y there was no un~orm and hence 
the functions of' spies:, scouts., a.nd reconnaissance patrols were not 
, -· c 
always; s·eparate: and: distinct. Thus. the term tala i was used for 
scouts: who w:ent ahead!· of' the army as well as for independent spy 
patrols.;: 5.) a prude,nt cpmmamder. would cam~) at a considerable diis;tance 
from the enemy and send out a patrol to reconnoitre the intervening 
tract of' country and ensure that there were no advanced eneiDY,i forces 
b~rring: his. path. 4) 
Whatever method was us.ed to obtain information,. the Muslims seem 
to have been largely successful in obtaining advance knowledge of 
their enemies' movements and intentions. Thus the Meccans were seldom 
able to carry out operations without the Muslims being apprised ot· 
the·ir plans·.,. and the sending out of' caravans was: often known to the 
Mus:lims in time for an intercep.tion to be organised;: 5·) they were 
usually informed of the approach of hostile forces ana.w.ere able to· 
organise effective counter-measures. 6) The Khuzacah were said to 
have kept Muhammad informed of' everything that happened at Mecca. 7) 
1.) Tab 1... 2255;: B'al 1.75. 2.) Tab 1... 2208. 5) Bal ~76. 4) Tab 1. 2S17f'. 
5) W94 1.96; IH 547;; ww· 58. 6) Waq; 52 f; 209 f;; 562 f; WW 1.02:,; 
m 557f-;670. 7) m. 743. 
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Nor, apparently, were the Mus·lims a.ny less well informed during: the 
periott of foreign conques.t. The information of the Greek advance to 
Ajnad!a.yn was' known to the Arabs: in time for them to re-group into an 
adequate, fighting force·; 1.) when Heraclius made, his· great: effort to 
regain Syria the Arabs; lmeW: of the southward a.dV:a.nce .of the: Greek army 
and! were: able to collect. their scattered force's. and: make a. st-rategic-
w.ithdraw:al beyond the Yarmuk. 2) Similarly, the. fa~t: 'that the Persians 
w.ere amas:sing a large axmy·w:ith the object; of expelling the Arabs from 
the borders of riraq v~;a.s-. known in MeGina. 5) Later,. the mobilization of 
. the Pers:ian army a. t: Nihawa.nd, deep: insidie eneilJU' terri tory behindl the, 
mountain barrier, eaus:ed warlike; preparations; to be put· in hand in 
Kiifah and! B:a;;:r.a.h. 4i) (This is, accepting; the traditions as, substantially 
true·;; but see Ca.etani' s; the·ory t-hat: the Arab incursion was. a sudden 
. raid. led by Nu.'man acting without -orders from Medina -an agre:ssion 
and! not a. rep]iy 1!;o a Persian threat). 5) It: is: probable thalt: inf.·orma.tion. 
of this kind!, of great s;tra.tegic; v:alue to the Arabs, must: have been 
transmitted! by Semi tic. subjects. of the Greek andi Pers:ian Einpire;s to -
the;ir kinsmen in the border tribe·s~ and thence· to the Muslim·s.· In 
· s.ome c·~ses; such information might also have: been. obtained! from 
prisoners. 6) It. s:eems very unlikely that: intelligence such a.s; the· new:·s·. 
of the Persian preparations at Nihawand could have been obtained by 
mounted spy patrols: de:ta.chee! from the main MusJ.im'. forc-es. 
1.) 'Pab :1L. 21i25 f.. 2:) Tab 1L. 2086 .. f,; Ya '"q II,. :l!..60 ~ 5) 'Fab i. 2214. 
4) 'l'ab ~ 2:600 f;: Y.acq-TI, :ll.79. 5) Ca. 21., 52: ff. "6) Ta.b :1.. 2:6oo·. 
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As; local inhabitants·. were a.lso used for assisting· the Mus·lims as spies 
and guides in small-s:ca.le operations: such as: raidls upon settlements. 
a.ndi ca.mps.,, 1) there: is no reason why they should not have: passed o:n 
information of strategic value. 
The Arabs.,. of oourse, used mounted patrols for tactical rec·onnai-
-ss:ance with the usual objectives of determining the enemy streng~h,. 
dispos'i tions: and intentions. 2:) 
In conclusion, it appears that the Arabs: us:ed the same methods• 
for the collection of information that. a.re used by modern armie:s: 
interrogation of prisoners;; maintenance of permanent s.pies. in enemy 
territory;: employment of renegade's' from. the enemy as; spies. and guides; 
the use of mounted patrols for espionage and s·ecurity. Initially 
inf·ormation of' s,trategic v.alue probably came from traitors. and symp-
-a.thisers. in the enemy terri tory and such men were als.o of use during 
ae:ti-re- operations; in the field. Although mounted reconnais~sance patrols 
were used effeetively by the Arabs there· is nothing to indicate that 
they enjoyed a significant advantage.. over their opponents in this 
respect. 'I'he only part :g,f a.ny importance played by superior mobility 
' 
in the field of intelligence was in the transmission of information 
to Medina;;. thus once news ha.di reached:. the advanced Muslim forces. it 
could be speedily pas·sed on by ca.mel courier to Medina and the Caliph 
eould! begin arrangements for mobilisation andl. appointment of a leader. 5r 
:I.L) 'l!ab :I.L. 2205; r·.' 2') Tab :lL. 2:1!..04;: 2.61.7; 2.686;: W.V 5.:JLO. 
5!) T'ab 1. •. 211ll.;: 2:1159 f;: 221.4; 2349; 2807. 
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7. Communications. 
The word 'communications' in this context is. used in a limited sense: 
it is the means of transmitting; orders. or factual information from one 
person or group. to another person or group. The vd.der sens:e of the: 
word,. e.g. as used!. in modern ind'us.trial life, concerns. human relation-
--ships. It implies. that: the rea.s:oning a.nd motive.s. of management (say) 
shall be made fully· comprenS'ible and acceptabl.e to the employees.; the· 
phra.s·e 1 a. failure in communications' reaJ.ly means '!:a failure in human 
r~lationships.' An exami~tion of this problem, the interaction of 
personalities,;: was attempted in Chapter V.~, pp. :1L50-:li..72: and i77-1.80. 
The question of the spread of literacy in Mecca and Med!ina at. th~ 
time of Mul!a.mmadl is complicated by theological arguments; about the· 
literacy of Mul}ammad. It. is not poss-ible here to dis:cus:s the meaning 
of Qur' inic: expressions; such as al-nabi. a.l-umm.i,. 1.): or U!!l!!liyiin. 2) 
The meaning of ummi in Is·lamic theology is 1 illiterate 1 , hence Mul].ammad 
is; the 'illiterate: Prophet',. but some European se~:holars; eonsider that. 
the w:ord may mean ''heathen' in a non-derogatory sense. 3)· 'mlere are 
reports. in the source:s, probably tendentious:, that support "!the view 
that the a.r..~. of w:ri ting was·. not widespread in the early days o:f. Islam, 
thus implying that MuQamma.d could easily have been illiterate. Ba.ladhuri 
asserts that there were~ only seventeen of Qur~~ who coula write: at 
the begi~g of Islam, and ·quote:s WS:qiti to the effect tha.t writing: 
in Arabic w:as; rare among the Aws ani Kh.a.zraj in Medina. 4) 
l.) Slirah VII, 1:.57, 158. 2:) Sura.h II, 78;, LXII,. 2 .• 
5) Shorter Encyclopaedia of Is:lam, London :l1.96:1L., P'• 604. 4) Bal 471. f. 
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~ Uina.r was, said! to have been the first leader in Is·la.IIl! to organise an 
administration a.ndl to order documents·. to be signed! and! sealed. 1) 
Statements; with a similar tendency occur in the accounts of the foreign 
e:onques·ts: one tracli tion says· that al-Sa > ib b. al-Aqfa. C' w~s sent to 
the tr.oop-s·. in Persia to a.c·t as a. s;eribe and as; an accountant, for the 
dd.Vision of booty; 2:) another s:tates: that Ziyad b. Abihi was given a 
s·imilar appointment although "he w.as but a. lad! with curls on his hea.di" 
because: he was, the only one who e:Ouldi read! andi wr.i te.. 5•) When c-Amr s:ent. 
a eourier to Medina he was· said to have refused to give him a. letter, 
saying "are you not an Arab, able to rep.ort a message (verbally)." 4) 
There are many reports which show the opposite tendency. Wiqidi. 
says. that on the departure for TabUk the w.a.rriors w.ere so numerous. 
that a. record (listing those entitled to booty) could not be ]:cep>t, so 
this practice lllaiY alread&' have. been us.ual. 5) It is·. hardly credible 
that a commercial centre like Mecca. could have tra.nsae:te.Ol business 
w.i thou t considerable use of w.ri tten ma teria.l; that MW}.ammad had ab-
-s:orbed this; commercial atmosphere: is: atte.s.ted by his: use of metaphors 
. \ 
in the Qu ran. He: uses. words. like ~isab (reckoning)., .6') hasib. 
(reekoner), 7} wazana (to w.eigh), 8) and mizi.n. (a ba:lance}; 9) his 
ins,truetions: about loans· inc·lude regulations. for the ree·orting of .debts, 
in writing and! before witnes·.se.s•,. by a notary (kitib). 1.0) Mul}ammad's. 
treaties. were in writing, for exa.mpil..e: at. l!ud:aybiyah,. 11.) and at. DUma.t-
-a.l-Janda.l, where he is·. saidl t:o have signed!. W:i th his. finger-nail. 12) 
1.) Tab :t. 2749. 2): Ta.b 1.. 2598. 5) B'al 545i. 4). Fut Mili!r 81. 
5) WW 59:1L f. 6) Siirahs·. III,. :li.99 ;, XIII, 2l.. 7) Sura.h VI, 62:. 
8) S'iirahs: XVII, 55; XVIII, :l05. 9) Slirah VII, 8, 85. 
10) Siirah II, 282 f. 1l.) WW 257. 12) WW 404; m 905. 
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There seems·, no reas·on, ·therefore, to doubt the many repor-ts which 
state: that w.ri tten correspondence was• sent f'·r9.m' commande~s: to Medina 
and from the Ca:liph to his generals. lL} News was, of cours·e ,. carried 
by couriers,, 2) who reported to the CaJ.iph in pe:rs:c;m when they arrived 
at Metina. 5) Mu c awiyah s:ent tw.o .couriers to Medina with the news of 
the fall of Ca.esarea, a.nd then sent a: third after them in ca.s:e they 
delayed on the journey. 4) The newa of Abu Bekr·' s. death· must have 
reache.d the troops in Syria by courier. 5) There was. no question at 
this. time of the use of relays;: the first relay station may have been 
set up by Na£{ b. al-~&rith who had! a: horae stud:. in Ba~ah,. 6) and 
this. development wa:s continued! by Mu' aw.iyah who mus.t have realised 
its necessity after his~ experience at Ca.esarea. 7) 
The question of the degree of control exercised. by l~dina has been 
dis.cussed in another section (Chap.ter v::··, pp~ .. ~6-:172); a. camel courier 
averaging 50 miles. a: day eould cover great dd.stances in a relatively . 
h t t . . s . ( -s· or J.ID.e=, and news; from . yrJ.a or Iraq, :for example,. eouldl reach 
Medina in less than two weeks .• · 'fhe Caliph, therefore, could be fairly 
well-informed! about recent events and. this would facilitate his control 
ov.er his generals and over the broad!. strategy, but not over the tactical 
conduct of the battles. 
1.) Tab :IL.. :li929; 208:1L; 2.0~ ;; 2084; 2:li.07;. 21..11.;: 2225 ;; 2566 ;. 2397 ;: 2598;; 
2611.;·. Ba.l 252:;; Ya'q II, :IL58; :ll.S6. 2:) Tab 1.. 2599;: 2703;: WW 102:;: 
Waq 20.2:;; 5_?3";;; Fut Mi¥- :l!.85;. Fut Lees II, ::IL42: ff'. 
5) Tab :1L. 2629;: 2"702 f ;; Ba.l 303. 4) Ba.l :lL42;. Ya c q II, 1.72: f. 
5) Tab :lL. 2:1!.55. 6) Bal 550. 7} See Fries 87. 
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a. The ta.c·.tical us·.e of cavalry on the battlefield. 
· In the early days. the battles. were fought on the Muslim side almost 
entirely by infantry, but the Mecc·a.na poss:es·sed sufficient hors·es for 
a. cavalry force·. At B"adr there is: little mention of' cavalry, although 
the Me:cca.ns• had 1.00 horses· with them, 1.) a.nd it is significant; that .. 
no attempt was made to a.ssau].t the Mus:lim ranks. w.i th a cavalry charge. 
Neither was; the cayalry efi'ec·.tive· at the battle of th~ Ditch, being: 
unable to gain a footing on the Muslim' side of' _the trench. 2;) At ~ud,. 
however, the hor~~men.~under. Kha.lid_ b. al-Walidl probably played a 
decisive. role in .the Mus:J.im defeat., bUtt again it is interesting to 
note that no frontal ~.ttack was, made by the cavalry on the Muslim 
d~fensive positions on the slope·s of. Mt. tn:ud. Instead~ :Kliilid adopted 
the S.'Ound ta.ctic·s.. of' at.tempting: to turn the Muslim. flank by g,eing roundl 
Mt. Ul}ud a:nd advancing wes;twards along: the Wadi Qa.nat until he was 
halted by a compa.ny of' archers: stationed to the. s,outh of' the wadi on 
Mt .. Rwnat. He: w.a.s unable to make any headway against them as long as 
they maintained their position;. hm-e, a.s in later mediieval battles;,. 
archers were a serious; threat to mounted troops;. It w.as only when 
most of the bowmen left their pos:ts that the cavalry broke throu-g;b. 
and fell upon the Mus·lims,. whose ranks: were disorganised in the. ques:t 
for plund!er. 3) The horsemen were. then operating in conditions: favourable 
to cavalry, wi.th room to manoeuvre andl. to W·ield the lance. 4) There 
is confirmation at a later date that it w:a:s: considerea risky for cavalry 
:1.) Wa:q 32:. 2:) Waq :?65 f. 3) Waq 21.7 ff;; see Ham 5-8. 4) Wa.q 250. 
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to attae:k ranks• of dis:ciplined infantry when unsupported by their own 
foot-soldiers: at QadiSiyah the cavalry were: warned not to attack alone 
because the enemy could then restrain the horses and prevent them from 
re:turning to the main body of their army.. Presumably they could then 
be unhorsed and killed. i) 
By the beginning of the 7th century the Greek armies had already· 
been re•orga.nised for d,ealing w,i th mobile enemies such as the Berbers. 
and the:ir cavalry had become ilhe bes:t-armec11l and! most numerous of their· 
. troop: formations. 2:). 'fhe f,er&ians also,. with their horse-mounted knight-
-hood, the As:S.w:irah, 5) could presumably put much larger cavalry forces 
into the field t~an the Arabs. The t,ype of country best suited. to 
cav:alry is well described by the: author of the Strategik.on: 
'tin order to charge, lancers: need a level terrain,. vast in extent, 
vd.thout. sw:am.ps, di tehes• or trees to break the line. Scarped terrain,. 
on the other hand!, is. most unsuitable for them." 4) One of the Hawazin 
at l!unayn commented! on a piece of land t;hat' " it was·. a fine place for 
cavalry,. not a hill with jagged rocks or a plain full oft dust." 5) 
The mobilit;y of the Arabs, so superior to that of their ~nemies 
for movement over long distances: in de:sert. or steppe,. became inferior· 
when they faced their opponents in pitched battle. 'fhere' is; consid-
-arable ev;idence to show that t;he Arabs,. before pitched! battles, 
ehose their pos:itions with great care andl tac.tical insight, but they 
chose them to give the greates.t po~sible advantage to thiiir mos,t: 
numerous .. and reliable arms - infantry and archers. It is quite 
:lL) Tab :1.. 2550:f. 2:) Strat 9;; see Brehier M4. 5:) Bai 2:80 f':;. see 
Nol Ges 44lL. 4) Strat 5:JL. 5) m: 840 f. 
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erroneous; to visualis.e these encounters as taking place in the open 
plain,. with squadrons. on camel-back and horsebac-k charging in attack 
and pursuit; the Arabs. had no wish to fight battles in terrain suited 
to cavalry. The defensive· pattern of ~ud was: often repeated, with 
the Muslims· drawn up behind a ditch or watercours.e,. wherever pos:sible 
on the forward slopes of a hill• Such was the position at the. YarmUk, 
w-ith the deep: trough of the river in front of. the Muslims,, broken 
country behina them, and an easy line of retreat to the desert in case 
of defeat. :1) In the Strategikon generals are advised to choos:e: the 
battlefiel~ carefully~ with regard to the. race of the enemy and the: 
relative strengths; of the: armies~ and of the various sections of the: 
armies. "For ins·.tance:, if the Byzantines are superior in cavalry then 
' 
a lev~l plain. is chosen~ if the enemy has: many arc?-ers one should avoid 
the feet of mountains.". 2) This is: preci.sely what the Greeks were unable 
to' do at the Yarm.Uk:, where they were forced! to fight at a tisadvantage 
on ground chosen by the Arabs:,. a fact which unaoubtedly played a 
large part. in deciding the outcome. 
Although the battle of Qidisiyah was: fought: in the p\lain the 
Muslim position was behind the channel of the cA tiq,. which the Pers:ians 
had to fill with s:oil,. reeds:, and pack-saddles (baradhi) in order 
to make the crossing. 5;)i It was the intention of the Muslims to re·tr.eat 
to the desert if they were defeated but if they were: victorious. the 
pursuit and the occupation of r:rr&q w.ouldi be easy. 4) 
:1). Tab 1.. 2088;. see Ca 15, l:li. ff. 2:} Strat :1.00 f. 5;) Tab 1.. 2286. 
4) Tab :1. 2226 f; 2228. 
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Thus in the·early battles, before the organised militar,y power of the 
Greeks and Pers.ians· had! been decisively broken, the Arabs chose posit-
-ions. where~ the prowess of their inf'antry could be used to the be.s;t 
advanta~e,, from which the retreat was secure an~ from whieh the line 
of advance lay through country sui table f'or the dep!l.oyment of pursuing 
cavalry in the event of victory. It was· only when the s·econdi phase 
began, with the invasion of the Persian highlands and the battle of 
Nd.haw:an~, that the Arabs: passed over to the offens:ive:: at Nihawand 
the Persians: were: enticed. from their fortifications by a feigned 
retreat and destroyed in the open. 1) Even ao, the Muslims. chose 
(" 
defensd..ve positions; on occasions.. There is: a story that Um.a.r dreamt 
one night of his army in F~s and 'saw' the~ in the open desert; this 
made him uneas.y and he wished them to give battle on the side of. a 
mountain s.o that the,y·could only be attaCked from one direction. The 
r 
Muslims heard Umar's; 'voice' urging them to do this,, took up their 
position on the sJ..ope a.nci were victorious:. 2:) When al.;..Al.ma.f was. hard-
-pressed in Khurisan he took his; stand in a narrow pass with the river 
Murghab on his: right and a mountain on his: left. ~} 
The conduct of the Arabs in pitched battle;& must not be conf'used 
w;i th the tactics used on raiding expedli tions., which were frequently 
mounted both before and after Nihawandl. Examples·. are:: Jaz.irah;: 4) 
Armenia; 5) the: expeditions-;·: f'ollowifl~:.'tl'i.e·'.:'v:i~tory··of Nihiwand, to 
:11.) Tab :1... 2620 f. 2:) Tab 1.. 270:lL;: Ya 'q II, :1L79. 5·) 'I'ab :1. 2901..; 
B'al 407. 4} Tab :1 .• 2474 f;, Bal :li..72: f. 5) Bal :ll97 f;. Ya 'q II, lLBO. 
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Jibal,. 1.) Q~s,, 2:) Jurjan, ~) Adherbayjan, 4) .and Khurasan. 5) There· 
a.re. several indications. that thes:e expeditions were of a gha.zw nature 
and, with the exception of Jiazirah, no permanent conli£uests were made: 
at this· time. Forts. were left alone. if they resisted;; 6) towns were 
said to. have rebelled after having been conQuered in this perioa and 
· ·hadl to be subdued! again later,· but it is probable that these early 
raiders: had .merely exacted a s·ingle payment of tribute: bef'ore contin-
('" -
-uing their march. 7) Even later, in the time of Uthman, troops from 
Kiifah were: stationed in the: frontier regions:, the thughur, and there 
were: :lLO,OOO men in thes:e· garrisons·.. ~e number of fighting men in 
KUrah w:a.s 40,000, s:o that "eaeh man got a ~ce: for booty once every 
four years." 8) When in the s:B.me period a.l..Wal:i.di raided Adherba.yjan, 
.Tilan and Muqi.ri: he· returned to Kiif'a.h after his. expedition. 9) There is·. 
·a marked· .. :.contrast, therefbre, between such expeditions where. a ma.x:i.muml 
us·e was made· .of mobility for long-range. transport and. the pitched 
battles: of B·aa:r, Ul}.ud,. the YarniU.k and Qadisiyah where the Muslims 
chose positions which restricted movement and. ensured that the issue 
would be decided by hand-to-hand fighting: on foot. 
When. cavalry· was u~ed in combat its position in the order of battle· 
varied; sometimes ·it was on the w:·ings,. 10) sometimes in front of the 
ma:in body of troops. lli.)· There were: three phases to an engagement: 
stone-throwing and missile: discharge, the cavalry charge., and the: 
11 Tab :ll.. 2655 ;; 2650;: 2655 ;· Ba.l 509 f; 5:Ji2: f. 2:) Tab :t. 2656 f. 
5) Tab 1. 2657f. 4) ~ab ~. 2660 f; Ya'q II, 180. 5) ~ab':lL• 2682 f. 
6) 'fab :1!.. 2479;; 2660. 7) Bal 509;. 519. 8) Tab 1... 2805 f .. 
9) Bal 522:. :li.O) Waq Z.19. ll) ~ab ~. 2550. 
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hand-to-hand struggle betw:een the ranks. of infantry,. whieh was always 
the last phase. Dis:eharge· of missiles usually preceded the cavalry 
a.tta.ek, l..) but at Qi.disiyah the cavalry eharge (mu~arada.h)w.a.s: said to 
have' been firs:t 2:} and. to have been repeated thirty time:s:. 5i) It is 
-ha;r.al to believe that: the cavalry at Qi.d.is:iyah was; very eff'eetive: on 
the- battlefield,. particularly as. their numbers were limited. There 
were: 111robably a number of charges~, a.1 though these, may not ha.v:e been 
coneerted attacks but s.epa.ra.t:e eha.rge.s by the horsemen of· different 
tribes:. 4) 
Some ~:tails are· given of fighting from horseback;: there is-
frequent mention of foot-soldiers being attacked by cavalry.5)At Uhud 
. . 
Kliilid b. a.l-Wali.d! was mounted on a. jet-black horse with a. white blaze. 
on ita: forehead! and white markings. on i t·s legs.,. andl he rode among the 
Muslims, when their ranks: w.ere disorganised, killing thelll! with his 
lance •. 6) 'nle Mu!!!J.im woman, Umm: Umara.h,. who fought as a warrior at 
ligud, was attaCked by a rider and her son went to her aid ana incap~ 
-a.ci ta.ted the rider by laming his horse:;. 7) disabling the hors·e by 
cutting the leg. tendons:. was a. me:thod sometimes: used by the infantry 
as a. defence against their mounted opponents. 8) 
Duels were also fought between tw.o horsemen in a st,yle reminiscent 
of the familiar tourney of later mediaeval times. 9) A Muslim rider 
and:. a Persian rider fought. each -other in this' manner,. first with the· 
:1} WW :1L63··; 176;: 1.99;. 2.00;: 212:. 2) Tab 1.. 23:1.9. 5) Tab 1.. 25·a. 
4} Tab :ll.. 2'35:0. 5) Tab :1:. 2099;; 21.04 f·;. Waq 276; IH. 570; 677. 
6): Wa.q 250. 7) Waq 265. 8) Waq 6lL; 251.. 9) Tab lL. 2262:;: Fut Lees 
II, 175i ff. 
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lance and then with s.words,. until both were unhorsed,. the Muslim finally 
killing his: enemy with his: dagger. (kbanjarahh 1.) At Isfahan,. when 
a Mus.l.im a.nd a Persd.a.n were duelling on horseback,. the saddle-bow of 
of.· the Mus=lim 1 s; horse was broken and the girth and breas.t-ha.r.ne:ss were 
eut, so that the saddle and s:a.ddle-blanke:t fell to the ground; the 
rider landedl on his: feet a.ncl remounted bareback. 2:) 
:1} T'ab :1!... 2425;. 2:); Tab i.· ·2.65'9; B'al 5'jj,3;. Vqe·a.bula.cy:- saddle - saJ!"j 
pil.. s.uruj; saddle-b~w -· 9!J!:S:bus: pl. g,a.rib:fs;: breast-harness - labab 
pl •. albab; girth - hizam pl. -&t.,. ahzimah" huzum;; 
. . 
saddle-blanket - .!!.E! pl. lubud, albad. 
•., 
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CONCLUSION 
The role of mobility in the: early Muslim conque.s:ts: may be cons·idered 
in tw.o ways;, as: in the foregoing pages. in relation to its. effect. upon 
the ta:e·tical and strate·gical conduct of the warfare,. or as: part of 
a w.ay of life:. In the latter context there. can be no doubt that. it 
w.as. a decisive factor. Because the w.ay of life, i·n Arabia was nomadie 
and based on camel trans:port the Arabs. were able to mobilise sufficient. 
forces. to invade= :the lantts·. of the Byzantine and Persian ~pires with 
some hope of succe:ss;. _Ha.cl the camel not been domesticated. and had 
the prevailing culture, therefore,. been primarily confined to oas.is 
agriculture in widely s:cattered, mutually isolated areas,,. no combin-
-ation .of f_orces and: no mass movement w.ould have been pos,sible. 
Looked at from the other viewpoint the picture· is: not so clear, 
i.e, •. how; important was the superior mobility of the .Arabs. W:hem they 
w:ere in the actual theatre of operations ? Other factors intrude. 
Acting in f"av.our of the Arabs were the:ir own religious fervour coup;ted 
with their rapaci. ty,. the pa.ssi vene·s:s or ae:ti ve co-operation of the 
indigenous populations;,. and the exhaus:tion and low: morale of the 
Byzantine: and Pers;ian powers. Ac·:ting agains:t them were their poor 
orga.nis·ation,. laek of a unified! command! or proper ehain of· eommandi, 
intra.cta.bili ty of individual AFab leaders, inade.quate weapons, and 
shortage of cavalry, lack of expeEience in military engineering and!. 
siege wa.rf'are:. Certainly mobility can be added to the favourable 
.f'actors:, but not from a.; ta.c.tical point of view,• The pi tchedl. battles. 
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were :fought defens:i.ve1y by the Mu&lims, and the issues were clec,ided 
by infantry. 
StrategicaJ.ly, however, mobility played a weighty part.. The Arabs.' 
mos;t important as:set w;as; their familiarity Wii.th the dies:ert,. conferred 
upon them by the· integration of camel-culture into a. fully nomadic 
w.a.y of life.. 'Pheir enemie:s; were unable 'to pene:tra.te. the desert,. and 
the Arabs; were theref.ore in posse:ss:ion of secure line:s; of communications;: 
more: important:,. they eould! use the desert as. a safe refuge and as a. 
base from w.hieh attaCks. could be launChea, a.t: points of their own 
ehoosing. 
When aJ.l the other ~ue:stions. dlis:euased in Chapter VI, Se.ction II 
are. taken into account - clisruption·, surprise,, intelligence, concentration 
of: f·orce:s;,. e:tc:. - all of which conferred advantages on the mobile Arab 
forces;• it mus,t be cconeluded that. their use of the camel was. an impor-
-tant contribution to their vic·tories .• ,, 

